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ABSTRACT 
 
Apartheid local government failed to deliver services to the people of South Africa. Instead, it 
created huge spatial/settlement distortions, economic disparities, skewed urban economic logic, 
and massive service and infrastructure backlog. This was not the case in apartheid white local 
government owing to the fact that it was built, partially, on the Weberian model of bureaucracy. 
With the end of apartheid and the re-incorporation of previously excluded communities into the 
mainstream of the civil service, there was an urgent need for rapid delivery of services in order 
to rectify the ravages of apartheid. However, the usefulness of the Weberian model in efficiently 
delivering services was open to question. Its continued insistence on qualifications and practical 
experience would have perpetuated the exclusion of the African majority who had been denied 
participation in the political and economic life. The Weberian bureaucracy, therefore, stood in 
the way of the new democratic government’s intention to transform and deracialise the public 
service. As a result, the New Public Management (the NPM) was introduced as a policy in both 
the upper spheres and local government with the aim of ensuring rapid service delivery and 
deracialising public administration.  
However, despite the introduction of the NPM at local government, poor service delivery is still 
endemic in many municipalities, partly due to corruption, patronage and skills deficits. These 
problems manifested themselves in the ever-increasing, and often violent, service delivery 
protests; the withholding of rates in some affluent municipalities; the rising number of provincial 
interventions in terms of section 139 of the Constitution; the issuing of disclaimers, adverse and 
qualified audit opinions by the Auditor-General because of poor financial management; and a 
flurry of court cases and reports on maladministration, corruption and fraud in the procurement 
of goods and services.  
In an attempt to turn the tide at local-government level, there is now a resurgence of the Weberian 
model of service delivery. Since 2006, there has been a shift in thinking from a wholehearted 
commitment to the NPM paradigm, which promised to bring efficiency and effectiveness and rid 
the public service of tardiness, incompetence and time-servers. The persistent dysfunctionality of 
many municipalities and municipal entities has forced the government to rethink its theoretical 
position. The return of the Weberian model of service delivery in 2006 was occasioned by the 
disenchantment with the NPM paradigm which had then been in operation for five years. 
This study traces and analyses the competing visions of how local governments should be 
organised to provide basic services effectively and efficiently – how the traditional Weberian 
approach brought to fruition only in the dying days of apartheid has been partially replaced by 
the New Public Management (NPM) approach in an attempt to ensure more effective service 
delivery and the transformation of the administrations. The study shows that after an initial 
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embrace of NPM, which produced mainly perverse results (and not effective service delivery), 
the pendulum has recently swung back to a Weberian approach. This thesis is advanced through 
a careful analysis of the relevant policies, legal frameworks, and practices. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
 
1 Background and problem statement 
Apartheid local government failed to deliver services to the people of South Africa. This is due 
to the fact that there was no single, uniform system of local government at the time.1 ‘Each 
province had its own configuration of local government institutions’2, modelled on the 
framework of the British system of local government.3 The situation was compounded by the 
development, in accordance with the dominant notion of ‘own management for own areas’,4 of 
separate local authorities for separated racial groups, which was meant to limit the extent to 
which affluent white local authorities would bear the financial burden of servicing 
disadvantaged African areas.5 The result was ‘a clever scheme of naked exploitation on the 
basis of race’,6 one in which ‘well-resourced and viable commercial centres, with their strong 
revenue bases, were reserved as white areas’.7 These areas were protected from the influx of 
Africans by a number of statutes8 that formalised geographical and racial segregation, thus 
securing viable rates bases for white people. 
On the other hand, the outlying and poor peri-urban areas (townships) without any meaningful 
formal economies were reserved for African people.9 These townships did not have an 
economic tax base as apartheid regulations barred retail and industrial developments in African 
areas, forcing African communities and retailers to spend most of their money in white areas.10 
Designed to reinforce the policies of segregation and economic exclusion, local   government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 De Visser J ‘Developmental local government in South Africa: Institutional fault lines’ (2009) 2 Commonwealth 
Journal of Local Governance 8 (hereafter De Visser 2009). 
2  De Visser 2009: 8. 
3 They were established within the framework of the English Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. 
4  De Visser 2009: 8. 
5  White Paper on Local Government (9 March 1998) (hereafter White Paper 1998). 
6  De Visser 2009: 8. 
7  De Visser 2009: 8. 
8 The Native Land Act 27 of 1913, the Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923 and the subsequent amendments to it, and the 
Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, are some of the primary laws directed against the African population. The 
Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 came as a first attack on the land rights of coloureds and Indians. 
9  De Visser 2009: 8. 
10  White Paper 1998: 23 para. A.1. 
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institutions in townships were stillborn.11 None of them had the resources to make any real 
difference to the quality of life of their constituencies.12 
Furthermore, the majority of South Africa’s African population was relegated to the 
homelands, where democratic local authorities similar to those in so-called ‘white South 
Africa’ did not exist. Instead, there was a patchwork of different non-democratic institutions – 
different systems of traditional leadership – which varied from one area to the next as 
determined by the apartheid geography.13 These institutions, seen as the extension of the 
apartheid state – given that they were used by the apartheid regime and were not accountable 
to their communities but to the political hegemony of apartheid – provided the public services 
normally associated with local government.14 
The creation of different local government institutions for different racial groups resulted not 
only in ‘a plethora of parallel bureaucracies responsible to multiple political authorities’,15 but 
also in an unequal, skewed and racial distribution of wealth, resources and services to the 
people of South Africa.16 According to the White Paper on Local Government, this ‘has 
fundamentally damaged the spatial, social and economic environments in which people live, 
work, raise families, and seek to fulfil their aspirations’.17 It left the townships and homelands 
in appalling social and economic conditions,18 as expenditure in these areas was a fraction of 
what it was in white areas.19 The legacy of an ‘urban economic logic that systematically 
favoured white urban areas at the cost of black urban and peri-urban areas’ has led to the ‘tragic 
and absurd’ results of deep, glaring structural disparities, extreme poverty and distorted 
settlement patterns.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11  Picard LA & Mogale T The Limits of Democratic Governance in South Africa (2015) 129. 
12  White Paper 1998: 23 para. A.1. 
13    Pycroft  C  ‘Addressing  rural  poverty:  Restructuring  rural  local  government'  in  Pernnell  S  et  al.   (eds) 
Democratising Local Government: The South African Experiment (2002) 10. 
14 Khunou SF ‘Traditional leadership and independent Bantustans of South Africa: Some milestones of 
transformative constitutionalism beyond Apartheid’ (2009) 12(4) PER 84. 
15 Chipkin I ‘Transcending bureaucracy: State transformation in the age of the manager’ (2011) 77 Tranformation 
41 (hereafter Chipkin 2011). 
16  Chipkin 2011: 41. 
17  White Paper 1998: 13 “Introduction/executive summary”. 
18  White Paper 1998: 24 para. A.1. 
19  Chipkin 2011: 41. 
20 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (14 October 1998) para 122. 
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Apartheid white local government was built, partially, on the Weberian model of bureaucracy. 
The key components of the Weberian bureaucracy are: hierarchy of authority; qualifications- 
linked meritocracy; application of impersonal rules; security of tenure; and division of labour. 
However, not all apartheid local institutions exhibited these components. It was only the local 
government institutions in areas reserved for white people, the so-called white local authorities, 
which to a degree incorporated the elements of the Weberian bureaucracy. Towards the end of 
the apartheid era, they fully embraced the Weberian bureaucracy and became ‘premised on the 
idea of a machine-like Weberian bureaucracy’.21 As a result, they became ‘bureaucratic, law- 
driven, hierarchical, multi-layered, departmentally fragmented, inward-oriented, racial 
oligarchies’22 that ‘operated a brutal system of racial segregation and domination’.23 Gumede 
and Sipholo describe this bureaucracy as ‘very rigid, hugely-bloated, and acutely geared 
towards material exploitation and extraction of resources and creations of colonial markets, 
with very little interest on improving the quality of life for the colonized’.24 
With the end of apartheid and the re-incorporation of previously excluded communities into 
the mainstream of the civil service, there was an urgent need for rapid delivery of services in 
order to rectify the ravages of apartheid. However, the usefulness of the Weberian model in 
efficiently delivering services was open to question. Its continued insistence on qualifications 
and practical experience would have perpetuated the exclusion of the African majority who 
had been denied participation in the political and economic life. The Weberian bureaucracy, 
therefore, stood in the way of the new democratic government’s intention to transform and 
deracialise the public service. 
As a result, this government brought in the New Public Management (the NPM) as a policy in 
both the upper spheres and local government25 with the aim of ensuring rapid service delivery 
and deracialising public administration. It put in place an elaborate legal framework to give 
effect to the NPM at local level, which sought to restructure local government internally and 
externally with the aim of ensuring effective service delivery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Chipkin I ‘Set-up for failure: Racial redress in the Department of Public Service and Administration’ in Bentley 
K et al. (eds) Racial Redress and Citizenship in South Africa (2008) 136. 
22  Chipkin 2011: 45. 
23  Chipkin 2011: 45. 
24 Gumede N & Sipholo KB ‘Governance, restructuring and the New Public Management reform: South African 
perspectives’ (2014) 4(6) Journal of Educational and Social Research 50 (hereafter Gumede & Sipholo 2014). 
25  At local level, NPM policy was introduced in 2000. 
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However, despite the introduction of the NPM at local government, poor service delivery is 
still endemic in many municipalities, partly due to corruption, patronage and skills deficits. In 
2009, nine years after the ushering in of the NPM, the majority of municipalities were already 
showing signs of distress, and in some cases, of outright dysfunctionality. In this regard, a 2009 
assessment conducted by the Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs 
(CoGTA) in the 283 municipalities that then existed in the country identified a ‘number of 
stubborn service delivery and governance problems … in municipalities over the years’.26 They 
included: 
 huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and sanitation; 
 
 poor communication and accountability relationships with communities; 
 
 problems with the political administrative interface; 
 
 corruption and fraud; 
 
 poor financial management; 
 
 weak civil society formations; 
 
 intra- and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and delivery; 
and 
 insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills.27 
 
These problems manifested themselves in the ever-increasing, and often violent, service 
delivery protests;28 the withholding of rates in some affluent municipalities;29 the rising number 
of provincial interventions in terms of section 139 of the Constitution;30 the issuing of 
disclaimers, adverse and qualified audit opinions by the Auditor-General because of poor 
 
 
 
26 Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South Africa: 
Overview Report - National State of Local Government (2009) available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/state-local-gov-rpt1.pdf., 2009 (accessed 15 October 2016) 4 (hereafter 
State of Local Government Report’). 
27  State of Local Government Report 2009: 4. 
28 Powell D, O’Donovan M & De Visser J Civic Protest Barometer available at 
http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/our-focus/mlgi/civic-protests-barometer-2007-2014/at_download/file (accessed 
18 October 2016). 
29  Powell D, De Visser J & May A et al. ‘The withholding of rates and taxes in five municipalities’ (2010) 12(4) 
Local Government Bulletin 9. 
30 Powell D, O’Donovan M & Ayele Z et al. Municipal Audit Consistency Barometer available at 
http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/our-focus/mlgi/municipal-audit-consistency- barometer/at_ download/file 
(accessed 15 October 2016). 
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financial management;31 and a flurry of court cases and reports on maladministration, 
corruption and fraud in the procurement of goods and services.32 The State of Local 
Government Report also identified three major reasons for provincial interventions in 
municipalities, namely, governance failures, financial failures and service delivery failures.33 
A subsequent country-wide programme, the Local Government Turnaround Strategy, which 
emerged from COGTA’s earlier assessment of the state of local government in 2009, was 
created to address the factors undermining local government and to restore satisfactory 
performance in the country’s municipalities. It also highlighted the following as core areas of 
concern: 
 there are serious leadership and governance challenges in municipalities, including 
weak responsiveness and accountability to communities; 
 the financial management of many municipalities is very poor; 
 
 many municipalities are unable to deliver basic services or grow their economies; 
 
 the legacy of apartheid spatial development patterns and inequity continues; and 
 
 there is inadequate human resource capital to ensure professional administration and 
positive relations between labour, management and councils.34 
Five years later, the assessment of the state of local government was no better. A 2014 
assessment of local government, which culminated in the policy document entitled Back to 
Basics: Serving our Communities Better,35  placed then 278 municipalities in three categories. 
The first category is the top-third municipalities which have got the basics right and are 
carrying out their tasks adequately.36 These are mainly the metros and secondary cities. The 
second  category  concerns  the  middle  third,  i.e.  those  that  are  just  managing  or    fairly 
 
 
 
 
31 Powell D, O’Donovan M & Ayele Z et al. ‘Operation Clean Audit 2014 – What went wrong and why?’ available 
at http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/our-focus/mlgi/operation-. clean-audit-2014 (accessed 17 November 2016).  
32 De Visser J & Steytler N ‘Confronting the state of local government: The 2013 Constitutional Court decisions’ 
(2016) VI Constitutional Court Review 1. 
33  State of Local Government Report 2009: 10. 
34 Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Local Government Turnaround Strategy: Working 
Together, Turning the Tide in Local Government (2009) 18 (hereafter Local Government Turnaround Strategy). 
35 Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Back to Basics: Serving our Communities Better! 
available at http://www.cogta.gov.za/summit2014/wp-. content/uploads/2014/10/LG-Back-to-Basics-Approach- 
Document.pdf (accessed 15 November 2016) (hereafter Back to Basics). 
36  Back to Basics (2014) 4. 
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functional.37 These are the rural towns that mostly have the basics in place and can deliver on 
the main functions of local government, but have some areas of deficient performance.38 In the 
last category are the bottom-third of the country’s municipalities, namely those that are ‘frankly 
dysfunctional’ due to poor governance, inadequate financial management, and poor 
accountability mechanisms. These are mostly rural municipalities with concentrated poverty 
and institutional weaknesses. They are marred by endemic corruption, dysfunctional councils, 
the absence of structured community engagement, poor financial management, and general 
decay.39 
The Twenty Year Review40 came to similar conclusions about the state of local government. 
The Review notes that there are serious service delivery weaknesses in the majority of South 
African municipalities, which are ‘compounded by a range of governance, institutional and 
financial weaknesses and the weak service-revenue link’.41 The 2015/2016 Annual Report of 
the national department responsible for local government (CoGTA) laments the fact that 
community protests have become a feature of local politics in recent times.42 It states that a 
variety of issues are at play, including instability of municipal administration; declining 
experience in key management positions; poor relations between elected and appointed 
officials; high vacancy rates after local elections; and the length of time it takes to conclude 
performance contracts.43 The first service delivery protest in the new dispensation was recorded 
in 2004.44  Currently, South Africa is seen as the protest capital of the world.45 
In an attempt to turn the tide at local-government level, there is now a resurgence in the 
Weberian model of service delivery. Since 2006, there has been a shift in thinking from a 
wholehearted commitment to the NPM paradigm, which promised to bring efficiency and 
effectiveness and rid the public service of tardiness, incompetence and time-servers. The 
 
 
 
 
37  Back to Basics (2014) 4. 
38  Back to Basics (2014) 4. 
39  Back to Basics (2014) 4. 
40 Ministry for Performance Monitoring and Evaluations Twenty Year Review South Africa 1994 – 2014 available 
http://www.dpme.gov.za/publications/20%20Years%20Review/20%20Year%20Review%20Documents/20 
YR%20Local%20Government.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017) (hereafter Twenty Year Review). 
41  Twenty Year Review (2014) 11. 
42  Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2015/2016 Annual Report (2016) (hereafter 
2015/2016 Annual Report). 
43  2015/2016 Annual Report 36. 
44 Alexander P ‘Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis’ (2010) 
37(123) Review of African Political Economy 25. 
45 Rodrigues C ‘Black boers and other revolutionary songs’ Mail and Guardian 5 April 2010 available at 
http://thoughtleader.co.za/chrisrodrigues/2010/04/05/on-revolutionary-songs/ (accessed 15 March 2016). 
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persistent dysfunctionality of many municipalities and municipal entities has forced the 
government to rethink its theoretical position. The return of the Weberian model of service 
delivery in 2006 was occasioned by the disenchantment with the NPM paradigm which had 
then been in operation for five years. 
While not abandoning the NPM paradigm, the government has been swiftly moving towards 
the Weberian model of service delivery by reintroducing qualifications-linked meritocracy, 
alongside the NPM’s performance-linked meritocracy, in local public administration. 
 
2 Research question 
This study seeks to establish why the New Public Management, touted worldwide as the best 
model for effective delivery of service, has failed to live up to its promise of transforming 
service delivery for the better and why we see a resurgence of the Weberian model. The further 
question is whether any aspects of the NPM have survived, or should survive. These questions 
are answered through the following set of subsidiary questions: 
1. Why did national government adopt the NPM policy at national and local level? 
 
2. How were NPM principles expressed in the local government policy and legal 
framework? 
3. Did the manner in which NPM principles were expressed in the legal framework 
facilitate or impede the implementation thereof? 
4. Where the legal framework facilitated the implementation of NPM principles, did it 
have the desired results of improving service delivery? 
5. Given the resurgence of Weberian model of service delivery, is there any role left for 
the NPM in the legal framework? 
 
3 Argument 
This study argues that the NPM was viewed as a break with the apartheid’s racist, inefficient 
and partisan Weberian model of service delivery. The NPM was seen as a dynamic new system 
to rectify the damage caused by apartheid and deal with service and infrastructure backlogs. 
Moreover, the NPM also fitted in with the broader transformation imperatives of the new 
democratic  government  and  the  economic  framework  which  was  the  dominant narrative 
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globally at the time. The NPM then became national policy and practice, and was also cascaded 
down to the local sphere of government. 
It is further argued, firstly, that, at local-government level, NPM principles were expressed in 
an extensive legal framework which imposed managerialism in all municipalities. In this 
regard, municipalities were required by law to confer wider discretion and autonomy to 
managers, allow lateral or sideway entry into managerial positions and refrain from interfering 
in municipal administration, thereby effectively letting managers manage. The only tools 
municipal councils had at their disposal to counterbalance the autonomy of managers were 
short-term contracts and performance agreements. Secondly, the legal framework provided 
options for externalising service delivery. These options were public-private partnerships and 
corporatisation. Given the proximity of local government to the populace and its role in 
rectifying the ravages of apartheid, privatisation was not made an option at local level. This is 
so because privatisation entails a total transfer of ownership in municipal functions or assets to 
the private sector. 
It is argued, moreover, that the manner in which NPM principles were expressed in law did not 
facilitate their implementation. To begin with, the methods or procedures for externalising 
services are so costly and toilsome that few municipalities use the option of externalising 
service delivery. First, the section 78 procedure of externalising services through a public- 
private partnership is unbearably difficult to implement. Secondly, a corporatised entity is still 
subject to the same laws and procedures as an ordinary service department. As such, 
corporatisation is no different to ordinary municipal administration and hence there is no 
incentive to corporatise services: it is simply an additional expense to the local fiscus. 
In the second place, managerialism has not been fully implemented. First, it is the council that 
appoints a second-level manager (i.e. one below the municipal manager), even though the 
municipal manager, as a head of the administration and the accounting officer, is charged with 
the formation and development of an administration which is economical, effective, efficient 
and accountable.46 This means, in essence, that while municipal managers are empowered with 
full discretion in supply chain management, specifically procurement decisions, by excluding 
political involvement, that same discretion is curtailed in human resource management, 
especially when it comes to the appointment of senior managers. Secondly, there is a panoply 
 
 
 
 
46  Section 55(1)(a) Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (hereafter Systems Act). 
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of laws and regulations emanating from national government and prescribing various actions 
and outcomes. This leaves scant scope of discretion for managers and, in effect, curtails their 
powers and stifles their innovativeness. Thirdly, conflicting regulations from CoGTA and the 
National Treasury confuse managers and thus undermine their ability to exercise discretion. 
The rivalry between these departments for control of local government leading to conflicting 
regulations is confounding managers in relation to which regulations to apply to which factual 
situation. 
This study argues further that in instances where NPM principles were expressed in law in a 
manner that facilitated their implementation, the desired results were not achieved. In some 
instances, the implementation of the NPM has had adverse effects on service delivery. First, 
the open skills recruitment system led to patronage appointments or the appointment of 
unsuitable persons. Secondly, fixed-term contracts led to political manipulation, or what is 
called the revolving-door phenomenon. Given that the employment contracts coincide more or 
less with the term of a council, this NPM principles enables the incoming government to clean 
out the existing administration, in a manner that resembles a revolving door. Thirdly, the NPM 
allowed neo-patrimonialism to flourish. Lastly, corporatisation, where it was applied, did not 
lead to efficiency in the delivery of services to local residents. In the case of the City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, where corporatisation had been fully embraced, lack 
of efficiency in service delivery has led to the mooted reversal of the policy of using 
corporatisation as an external service delivery mechanism. 
Furthermore, the study argues that the NPM’s implementation led to a number of unintended 
consequences, such as patronage, corruption and maladministration, and that these 
consequences revived interest in the Weberian model of governance. Three national 
departments led the way in this regard: then Department of Provincial and Local Government 
(DPLG), now Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), the National 
Treasury, and Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), that seem to be vying 
for regulatory control over local government. The DPLG initiated matters in 2006 by 
introducing qualifications and experience requirements for the appointment of local 
government  managers,  doing  so  via  Performance  Regulations.47   The  National   Treasury 
 
 
 
47 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly 
Accountable to Municipal Managers (GN R805 GG 29089 of 1 August 2006) (hereafter Performance 
Regulations). 
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followed hot on its heels in 2007 with its Competency Regulations.48 These set out a 
comprehensive competency framework consisting of minimum qualifications, work-related 
experience, core managerial competencies and core occupational competencies for managers. 
Not to be outdone, in 2011 CoGTA convinced parliament to amend certain provisions of the 
Systems Act dealing with the recruitment of managers, the intention of the amendment49 being 
to provide new procedures and competency criteria for appointment, and consequences for 
appointments made otherwise than in terms of that competency criteria. CoGTA also issued 
Appointment Regulations50 which contained detailed and prescriptive requirements for the 
appointment of managers. While these seemingly warring departments were competing in 
introducing the Weberian model at local government, the DPSA was waiting in the wings and 
eventually enacted the Public Administration Management Act,51 which also regulates 
employment in the public administration, including local government. However, the multiple 
regulations are causing confusion, since their sheer number and complexity make it difficult 
for municipalities to decide which regulations to apply, let alone decipher their meaning. 
Secondly, the Systems Amendment Act refined and reinforced the Weberian principle of work- 
related experience by requiring an additional element of ‘suitability’.52 In this regard, your 
previous experience must be experience that stands one in good stead. This is meant to weed 
out incompetent people who came in on an open-skills basis. The Merafong53 judgment is 
instructive in this regard: here, the Labour Court found a municipal manager unsuitable because 
of the strong opinions expressed by the Auditor-General against him in relation to his previous 
position.54 Thirdly, section 54A of the Systems Amendment Act provides for the separation of 
politics from the administration, another principle that reinforces the revival of Weberian 
model. Lastly, the resurrection of the Weberian bureaucracy was expressed through a renewed 
emphasis on professional institutes as a means by which to train and discipline their members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act: Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency 
Levels (GN R493 GG 29967 of 2007) (hereafter Competency Regulations). 
49 Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011 (hereafter Systems Amendment Act). 
50  Local Government: Regulations on Appointment and Condition of Employment of Senior Managers (GN   21 
GG 37245 of 17 January 2014) (hereafter Appointment Regulations). 
51  Act 11 of 2014. 
52  Section 54A(2) Systems Act. 
53  Merafong City Local Municipality v South African Municipality Workers Union (‘SAMWU’) and Another 
(2016) 37 (ILJ) 1857 (LAC) (Merafong vs SAMWU). 
54  SAMWU v Merafong paras. 19 and 22. 
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It is argued as well that there is still a role left for the NPM to play in the legal framework, 
albeit a limited one. That role is to soften the harsh elements of the Weberian model. Not all of 
NPM principles that were incorporated into the legal framework are useful: they produced 
mainly negative outcomes, thus supporting claims that the NPM is not suitable for developing 
countries. Short-term contracts, for example, are not beneficial in the current juncture. 
Managers must be employed on a permanent basis and removed only after disciplinary 
proceedings. This can be reinforced through professional institutes, which would enforce ethics 
and discipline on their members. The only NPM principles that are relevant in this strongly 
Weberian milieu are 
 limited sideway entries into local government; 
 
 performance agreements to hold managers personally responsible for their own 
actions; and 
 public-private partnerships (PPPs) for the purposes of mobilising resources and 
scarce skills from the private sector and transferring financial risks to the private 
sector. The infrastructure and service backlogs are still too large to be left to the 
public sector alone. However, the regulatory framework for PPP would have to be 
relaxed so that it is not as stringent and costly. 
 
4 Literature review and significance of the study 
A small body of literature is available on South Africa’s application of the NPM. I begin this 
section on the literature that relates to the application of the NPM at the national level. In this 
regard, Cameron states that the introduction of the NPM gave line departments greater 
autonomy to promote improved service delivery by transferring human resource functions to 
the line departments.55 Muthien in turn states that this manifested, inter alia, in the 
establishment of the senior management corps (SMS), which consists of employees in the top 
four levels in the public service, namely the Director-General, Deputy Director-General, Chief 
Director and Director; and their equivalents in the provinces.56 
 
 
 
 
 
55 Cameron R ‘New Public Management reforms in the South African public service: 1999–2009’ (2009) 44(4.1) 
Journal of Public Administration 910 920 (hereafter Cameron 2009). 
56 Muthien Y ‘Public service reform: Key challenges of execution’ (2014) 36(2) Strategic Review for Southern 
Africa 126 129 (hereafter Muthien 2014). 
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This came as a result of the unbundling of the highly centralised hierarchical policy and 
administration functions and the introduction of greater managerial autonomy by devolving 
executive decision-making to line-function heads of departments.57 According to Kaul the 
authority that is devolved or decentralised to managers is in exchange for accountability for 
performance.58 Cameron states that this is a trade-off between giving managers greater 
autonomy and monitoring their performance through performance agreements.59 Kaul states, 
with regard to short-term appointments, that this NPM tenet undermined the career system 
which relied on time served for promotion.60 The obsession with performance, according to 
Hughes, turned this tradition of long service on its head as it led to short-term appointments 
based on contracts.61 
Cameron,62 in his seminal analysis of the NPM reforms in South African public service between 
1999 and 2009, states that while there are elements of the NPM in the reform programme, 
the NPM has not taken off in South Africa in the way that has commonly been supposed. In 
his subsequent work, Cameron similarly looks at the impact of some of NPM principles 
relating to managerialism, namely letting managers manage, contract appointments and 
performance management, and concludes that, although these reforms were not implemented 
systematically, they influenced the political–administrative relationship.63 
Chipkin and Lipietz64 look at the late 1990s’ restructuring of the public sector and the initiatives 
to undo or ‘transform’ its bureaucratic form. They note that the growth of the NPM came about 
as a strategy to undo the bureaucracy in the public service. The literature by Swartz,65 Bardill,66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57  Muthien 2014: 126-128. 
58 Kaul M ‘Civil service reforms: Lessons from commonwealth experience’ (1996) 16(2) Public Administration 
and Development 131 139 (hereafter Kaul 1996). 
59  Cameron 2009: 920. 
60  Kaul 1996: 131. 
61  Hughes OE Public Management and Administration (1994) 44. 
62  Cameron 2009: 915. 
63 Cameron R ‘Redefining political-administrative relationships in South Africa’ (2010) 76 International Review 
of Administrative Sciences 676. 
64 Chipkin I & Lipietz B ‘Transforming South Africa's racial bureaucracy: New Public Management and public 
sector reform in contemporary South Africa’ (2012) Public Affairs Research Institute (hereafter Chipkin & Lipietz 
2012). 
65 Swartz D ‘South Africa in Southern Africa: Governance and developmental challenges’ (1999) 29(2) Africanus 
41. 
66 Bardill J ‘Towards a culture of good governance: the Presidential Review Commission and public sector reform 
in South Africa’ (2000) 20(2) Public Administration and Development 103. 
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and Pieterse67 on the reform of the public service and local government also echoes NPM 
principles. These authors discuss NPM principles as a feature of the overall governmental 
reform agenda. Tshandu and Kariuki68 examine the restructuring of the South African 
administrative system in order to meet the developmental challenges of service delivery needs. 
They argue that commendable legislative reforms based on the NPM have been put in place in 
South Africa's public administration system in the post-1994 period. However, they state that 
the success of these reforms is encumbered by ‘the fragility of the state bureaucracy as 
manifested in the silo approach characterising the South African government’s operations, as 
well as capacity limitations’.69 They use a case study of the Community Development Worker 
(CDW) programme, operating in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces, to illustrate their 
argument. 
Gumede and Dipholo70 look at the restructuring initiatives and the NPM in the context of good 
governance. They conclude that the ‘South African government has failed to take full 
advantage of the new wind of change thrust upon it by the NPM’ ethos, which is why South 
Africa is still mired in ‘bureaucratic red tape, systemic corruption, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, 
poor service delivery, poor accountability and nepotism, particularly in the award of 
government tenders to political dynasties of former liberation movements who claim their 
legitimacy from the liberation struggle.’71 They further state that owing to the incompetence of 
the human capital in South Africa, NPM principles are not implemented objectively. A work 
edited by Van Donk, et al.,72  especially the chapters by Schmidt,73  Smith and Morris74  and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Pieterse E ‘Participatory local governance in the making: Opportunities, constraints and prospects’ in Parnell 
S, Pieterse E & Swilling M et al. (eds) Democratising Local Government: The South African Experiment (2002). 
68 Tshandu Z & Kariuki S ‘Public administration and service delivery reforms: a post-1994 South African case’ 
(2010) 17(2) Public Administration 189 (hereafter Tshandu and Kariuki 2010). 
69  Tshandu and Kariuki 2010: 189. 
70  Gumede & Sipholo 2014: 46. 
71  Gumede & Sipholo 2014: 46. 
72 Van Donk M, Swilling M & Pieterse, E et al. (eds) Consolidating Developmental Local Government: The South 
African Experience (2007). 
73 Schmidt D ‘From spheres to tiers: Conceptions of local government in South Africa in the period 1994-2006’ 
in Van Donk M, Swilling M & Pieterse E et al. (eds) Consolidating Developmental Local Government: The South 
African experience (2007). 
74 Smith L & Morris N ‘Municipal entities: A panacea for service delivery constraints?’ in Van Donk M, Swilling 
M & Pieterse E et al. (eds) Consolidating Developmental Local Government: The South African experience 
(2007). 
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Pickering,75 reviews NPM principles as part of the overall governmental reform agenda and 
discusses how complex and contested some of these principles are. 
There is some literature on the NPM model of service delivery as it relates to local government. 
In his article, ‘Democracy and delivery: The rationalization of local government in South 
Africa’, Pycroft76 considers whether the legislative regime for local government can provide 
the necessary framework for overcoming the structural and systems weakness of the current 
form of local government. Thornhill77 traces the stages in the development of the new system 
of local government and administration, focusing on the political structures, office-bearers and 
the administrative structures. His work examines the principles of the NPM and their 
implications for service delivery. 
Pretorius and Schurink78 focus on the role of leadership in assisting local government to achieve 
optimal service delivery. Koma’s work79 makes an assessment of, inter alia, the state of service 
delivery in local government, and proposes salient strategies for undertaking the ‘mammoth 
task’ of shifting from mediocrity to excellence in the delivery of services. 
In an article entitled ‘Performance management in the Systems Act: Implementing 
accountability’, De Visser80 explores the legal framework for a specific NPM principle, namely 
performance management. Similarly, Pickering’s work on section 78 of the Systems Act 
focuses only on NPM principles relating to externalising municipal services.81 It makes an 
assessment of the difficulties municipalities encounter in implementing this provision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Pickering M ‘The distribution of power: Local government and the electricity industry reforms’ in Van Donk 
M, Swilling M & Pieterse E et al. (eds) Consolidating Developmental Local Government: The South African 
Experience (2007). 
76  Pycroft C ‘Democracy and delivery: The rationalization of local government in South Africa’ (2002) 66(1) 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 143. 
77 Thornhill C ‘The transformed local government system: Some lessons’ (2008) 43(2) Journal of Public 
Administration 492. 
78 Pretorius D & Schurink W ‘Enhancing service delivery in local government: The case of a district municipality’ 
(2007) 5(3) SA Journal of Human Resource Management 19. 
79 Koma SB ‘The state of local government in South Africa: Issues, trends and options’ (2010) 45(1) Journal of 
Public Administration 111. 
80 De Visser J ‘Performance management in the Systems Act: Implementing accountability’ (2001) 3(2) Local 
Government Law Bulletin 7. 
81 Pickering M ‘Choosing a service provider: Section 78 of the Systems Act’ (2001) 3(4) Local Government Law 
Bulletin 3. 
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Similarly, Geraldine Mettler82 considers whether Chapter 8 of the Systems Act is a help or 
hindrance in extending and improving the delivery of municipal services. The articles by 
Mare83 on the provision of municipal services through public-private partnerships, Reynolds84 
on the public-private partnership regulations, Mawoneke85 on public-private partnership 
procurement process, and Fessha86 on tying municipal manager’s pay to performance, also 
discuss the tenets of the NPM in a piecemeal fashion. 
The LL.M thesis by Johnson does more or less what this present study seeks to do, but on a 
small scale.87 It examines the policy and legislative framework governing municipal 
outsourcing, a specific aspect of the NPM also referred to as public-private partnerships, and 
describes the general features of a range of current South African outsourcing contracts. It also 
asks more or less the same questions this study seeks to address, namely whether the policy 
and legislation regulating outsourcing accurately reflect the policy objectives, and whether the 
service delivery contracts adequately translate these objectives into effective and binding 
contractual terms. 
In his book Principles of South African Local Government Law, Bekink discusses the legal 
framework for local government and ‘evaluates the extent to which the new system complies 
with the general constitutional obligations’.88 He discusses the various options a municipality 
could use in externalising its services. A chapter by Van de Waldt in a book on environmental 
law and local government in South Africa89 also discusses the subject of external service 
delivery mechanisms. De Visser’s book Developmental Local Government: A case study of 
South Africa discusses the transformation of local government service delivery. Steytler and 
De Visser,90  in their seminal work, discuss many of these NPM principles in detail. 
There is very limited legal analysis on the NPM as it relates to local government. The literature 
surveyed above, for example, discusses a legal aspect of a specific NPM principle and  assess 
 
 
 
82 Mettler G ‘Municipal service: Is Chapter 8 of the Systems Act a help or a hindrance?’ (2003) 5(2) Local 
Government Bulletin 10. 
83 Mare C ‘Municipal services: Public-private partnerships’ (2003) 5(4) Local Government Bulletin 5. 
84  Reynolds K ‘The new municipal PPP regulations’ (2005) 7(2) Local Government Bulletin 7. 
85  Mawoneke G ‘The PPP procurement process’ (2005) 7(3) Local Government Bulletin 12. 
86  Fessha Y ‘Tying municipal manager’s pay to performance’ (2006) 8(3) Local Government Bulletin 9. 
87 Johnson CV Outsourcing Basic Municipal Services: Policy, Legislation and Contracts (LL.M thesis, University 
of the Western Cape, 2004). 
88  Bekink B Principles of South African Local Government Law (2006). 
89 Van der Waldt G ‘Municipal service delivery and the environment’ in Du Plessis AA (ed) Local Government 
and Environmental Law in South Africa (2015). 
90 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) (hereafter Steytler & De Visser 2007). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
29 
Chapter One 
 
 
 
 
whether it thwarts or facilitates implementation of the NPM ethos for effective delivery of 
services. This does not give a global picture of the legal analysis on the NPM as a whole. For 
example, De Visser examines the legal framework for a specific the NPM principle, namely 
performance management. Similarly, Pickering focuses only on NPM principles relating to 
externalising municipal services. Likewise, Mettler only discusses Chapter 8 of the Systems 
Act. The same consideration applies to the articles by Mare, Reynolds, Mawoneke and Fessha 
Johnson’s study is narrow in its focus, only analysing the legislative framework as it relates, 
narrowly, to public-private partnerships rather than the entire NPM package. 
Even though Bekink does discuss the various options a municipality could use in externalising 
its services, he does not use the NPM as the philosophical or theoretical underpinning of such 
options. Neither does he set out to analyse the legislative framework underpinning the NPM 
and assess whether it frustrates or enables the proper implementation of the NPM in South 
Africa. The same can be said about the chapter by Van de Waldt, which treats the subject of 
external service delivery modes in general terms. De Visser’s book does not discuss the 
transformation of local government service delivery in the light of the NPM paradigm, let alone 
assess the legislation underlying it. Similarly, Steytler and De Visser discuss many of these 
NPM principles broadly and not under the theme of the NPM. 
From the above, it is clear that scholars have not addressed the questions which this thesis 
raises, namely why the NPM model of service delivery failed in South Africa and why we see 
a resurgence of the Weberian model. The leading scholars in this area come mostly from a 
social sciences background and do not offer the legal perspective this study brings to the issue, 
namely, whether the legislative framework underpinning the NPM facilitated or thwarted the 
implementation of the NPM for effective delivery of services at local government level. The 
legal literature surveyed above only discusses specific aspects of the legislative framework 
underpinning the NPM and not the legal regime for the NPM as a whole. 
In some cases, while NPM principles are discussed, they are not discussed under the lenses of 
the NPM. The NPM is not presented as the philosophical underpinning for the principles of 
deconcentration of powers to managers, contract appointments, performance management, 
corporatisation and public-private partnerships. As a result, these principles are not analysed 
in the light of what the NPM model of service delivery sought to achieve, why it has failed to 
achieve the results and why we see the resurgence of the Weberian model of service delivery. 
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There is, therefore, a gap in the literature regarding the legislative framework that gives effect 
to the NPM ethos and whether it provides an enabling environment for NPM principles to be 
fully implemented in South Africa or not. This study seeks to plug that gap in the literature. It 
will thus contribute to an understanding of local government reforms in light of the NPM ethos 
and the way in which it sought to enhance the delivery of essential services. 
 
5 Methodology 
This study is based on a critical analysis and review of both primary and secondary literature 
relevant to the subject area. As this suggests, desk-oriented research is the methodology that is 
employed herein. The most important of the primary sources are the Constitution of South 
Africa, legislation and government policies. Reference is also made to the relevant case law 
that interprets the primary sources, and to regulations and government publications on the 
NPM. 
In addition to using the primary sources above, this study also places considerable reliance on 
secondary sources such as scholarly works in the form of books and academic articles on New 
Public Management and the Weberian model of service delivery. Analysing these scholarly 
works about the approaches and experiences of other countries has provided useful lessons in 
understanding theoretical and conceptual foundations of the relevant models, especially the 
NPM. Given that the NPM reform movement began in the Anglo-Saxon world, this study has 
used the experiences of these countries to draw lessons on the implementation of the NPM 
reform wave herein. Furthermore, various internet sites were consulted for relevant data and 
updated information. 
 
6 Overview of chapters 
This study is presented in nine chapters. Chapter Two deals with theories of effective service 
delivery and looks in particular at the tension between the two of them, namely the Weberian 
model of bureaucracy and the NPM. 
Chapter Three in turn is the first of five chapters which trace the history of this tension. It 
examines the manifestations of the Weberian model in apartheid local government and its 
peaking when the writing was on the wall for the demise of apartheid. The chapter shows that 
apartheid local government was steeped, to an extent, in Weberian dogma. However, the high 
point of Weberian model was during the dying days of apartheid. 
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Chapter Four examines the policy debates around the introduction of the New Public 
Management. It shows that these policy reforms heralded the incorporation of the NPM model 
of service delivery and shaped a national and local framework of the New Public Management. 
Chapter Five discusses the practical implementation of the NPM model at national level. It 
looks at both the internal restructuring of the personnel management system as well as the 
service delivery apparatus through the lenses of the NPM. 
Chapter Six looks at the internal restructuring of local public administration through the NPM 
prism. The focus is on NPM principles of managerial autonomy, performance management, 
and fixed-term contracts, collectively known as managerialism. 
Chapter Seven explores the options available to municipalities for externalising the delivery of 
municipal services. These options are public-private partnerships and corporatisation. 
Privatisation is not an option at local government as it entails a total transfer of ownership of a 
municipal service or asset to a private company or provider – this is not permissible in terms 
of the White Paper on Local Government,91 given the important role the local sphere of 
government plays in the delivery of services. 
Chapter Eight looks at the resurgence of the Weberian model of service delivery, what it seeks 
to achieve and how it is being implemented. It discusses the uncoordinated introduction of the 
legislative framework for a Weberian model by three government departments, namely 
CoGTA, the National Treasury, and DPSA. 
Chapter Nine is the conclusion and contains recommendations. Although each chapter, where 
necessary, includes its own conclusions and recommendations, Chapter Nine draws the general 
conclusion and brings together all the major recommendations made in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 White Paper 1998: 168-9 para 2.2.7. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
Models for effective service delivery in South African local 
government 
1 Introduction 
Effective public administration is crucial for the functioning of modern states, whether they are 
developmental or not. In fact, for developmental states, such as South Africa, to live up to their 
developmental objectives, there must be an efficient and effective public administration, one 
which is committed to clearly outlined and systematically implemented development plans and 
programmes that consciously seek to address poverty and underdevelopment. 
This chapter discusses the two theories of effective public administration that have dominated 
the discourse on the reform of the public service since the early twentieth century. As such, 
these theories will be used as an analytical framework for investigating the transformation of 
local government service delivery in South Africa. The two models in question are the classic 
theory of bureaucracy advanced by Max Weber and the modern New Public Management (the 
NPM) theory. 
The first section of this chapter provides a conceptual exposition of Weberian bureaucracy. 
Thereafter it considers its key features, starting with the hierarchy of authority, division of 
labour, impersonal rules, meritocracy and security of tenure, and ending with an account of 
Weber’s fears about the dangers of bureaucracy, especially in relation to democracy. The 
section concludes by looking at the weaknesses of this model. This discussion will shed light 
on some of the reasons for the introduction of the NPM. 
The next section, then, turns to this second theory, the NPM, which Christopher Hoods 
describes dismissively as a ‘public management for all seasons’.1 Its underpinnings are 
examined with the view to extrapolating certain lessons which are key to the aims of this thesis, 
namely understanding the transformation of local government service delivery in South Africa. 
After having identified the main characteristics of the NPM, the section considers several of 
the NPM’s weaknesses, before comparing and contrasting the two models. This will   provide 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Hood C ‘A public management for all seasons?’ (1991) 69 Public Administration 8 (hereafter Hood 1991). 
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an analytical prism through which to view South Africa’s experience of administrative reform 
in subsequent chapters. 
 
2 The Weberian administrative model 
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type 
administrative organisation ... is ... from a purely technical point of view, 
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense 
formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control 
over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, 
in stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a 
particular high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the 
organisation and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in 
intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable 
of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.2 
Max Weber, the German scholar who became one of the most celebrated and influential social 
scientists of the twentieth century, as well as an essentially contested author,3 proposed that a 
purely bureaucratic state is by far the most effective and efficient form of an administrative 
state. 4 He proposed that a modern bureaucratic state or organisation is the most efficient means 
of controlling the work of large numbers of people, ensuring that decisions are taken according 
to common criteria. It is technically superior to any other type of organisation in accomplishing 
complex goals. Furthermore, it brings about equality because civil service rules and codes of 
conduct reduce discrimination.5 
Weber maintained that a bureaucratic organisation is rational, efficient and based on expertise 
because it masters a problem through the application of specialised knowledge. In his words, 
‘typically speaking, the modern bureaucracy is the most rational and thus inevitable technical 
instrument for the organisation of government’.6 According to Weber, bureaucracy optimises 
‘precision, speed, unambiguity ... continuity, unity, strict subordination, reduction of   friction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Weber M The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (1964) (edited with a foreword by Talcott Parsons) 24. 
3 Raadschelders JCN ‘Did Max Webers agony and ecstasy influence his profession’ (2010) 70(2) Public 
Administration Review 304. 
4 Weber M The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (1947) (translated by Henderson AM & Parsons T) 
XII, 337 (hereafter Weber M 1947). 
5  Weber M 1947: 122. 
6 Weber M Wirtschaft und Gesellscbaft (Economy and Society) (1980) 124-130 (hereafter Weber M 1980). 
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and of material and personal costs’7 in the performance of tasks. He contrasts the modern 
rational form of bureaucracy, the ideal type bureaucracy, with earlier forms of organisation that 
relied, more or less, on customary practices and entitlement to office. Thus, he advocates for 
the distinction between, or separation of, person from office8, as will be seen later. 
In his encyclopaedic masterpiece Economy and Society, published posthumously in 1922, 
Weber maintained that in order to achieve this level of performance, administrations or 
organisations must follow a certain structure, in no particular order of significance.9 First, 
positions must be fixed and legally prescribed. Secondly, organisational procedures must be 
codified in written rules. Thirdly, there must be clear lines of authority connecting superior and 
subordinate positions. Fourthly, employment in a bureaucratic post must requires proven skills 
in the tasks involved. Lastly, in return for compensation, the individual functionary must devote 
full working time to the organisation and not permit outside considerations to influence the 
performance of tasks.10 
From this structure, one can readily identify some of the key characteristics that Weber’s ideal 
type bureaucracy should possess. An administration or organisation must have hierarchy of 
authority; division of labour; impersonal rules, be meritocratic, and provide security of tenure. 
Put differently, a ‘Weberian bureaucracy consists of a hierarchically structured, professional, 
rule-bound, impersonal, meritocratic, appointed, and disciplined body of public servants with 
a specific set of competencies’.11 These characteristics are considered in depth in what follows. 
 
2.1 Hierarchy of authority 
Weber maintained that the authority to give commands required for the execution of official 
duties should be distributed in a stable way and strictly circumscribed by rules that are placed 
at the disposal of officials.12  In this regard, positions are arranged in a pyramidal fashion, with 
 
 
 
 
 
7  Weber M ‘Bureaucracy’ in Kramer FA (ed) Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy: A Reader on Organisations. 
(1973) 6-9 (hereafter Weber 1973). 
8 Höpfl HM ‘Post-bureaucracy and Weber's “modern” bureaucrat’ (2006) 19(1) Journal of Organization Change 
Management 17 (Höpfl 2006). 
9  Weber M Economy and Society (1968) (edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) 967. 
10  Weber 1973: 13. 
11 Sager F & Rosser C ‘Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of modern bureaucracy; reflecting on seminal 
administrative theorists’ (2009) Public Administration Review 1137 (hereafter Sager & Rosser 2009). 
12 Weber M From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) (edited and translated by Gerth H and Mills CW) 196 
(hereafter Weber 1946). 
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each position responsible to the one above.13 This hierarchy is monocratic in the sense that ‘its 
apex is one person, not a college’.14 The creation of posts must start from the top and move 
down to the lowest level of public officials. Thus, once a post of head of department or director- 
general has been created, the next logical step is the creation of the post of the deputy-director 
general and then the lower echelons.15 Similarly, resources are assigned from the top to officials 
and offices.16  This is done in order to facilitate the cascading command system.17 
The creation of a cascading system of command makes coordinated decision-making 
possible.18 It creates a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is 
supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.19 Such a system not only creates clear lines 
of accountability between superior and subordinate positions,20 but offers citizens the 
possibility of appealing the decisions of a lower office to its higher authority.21 It also imposes 
‘strict and uniform discipline and control over the personnel’.22 
As Weber put it in his famous essay Politics as a Vocation: 
 
The honour of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute 
conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order 
agreed with his own convictions. This holds even if the order appears wrong 
to him and if, despite the civil servant’s remonstrances, the authority insists 
on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest 
sense, the whole apparatus falls apart.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Klingner DE Public Administration: A Management Approach (1983) 45 (hereafter Klingner 1983). 
14 Weber M Wirtschaft und Gesellscbaft (Economy and Society) (1922) 128, 650 (hereafter Weber 1922). 
15  Weber 1922: 125, 650, 655-6. 
16  Weber 1922: 125. 
17 Nengwekhulu RH ‘Public service delivery challenges facing the South African public service’ (2009) 44(2) 
Journal of Public Administration 346. 
18 Giddens A Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (1989) 
278. 
19  Weber 1946: 197. 
20 Bernstein SJ & O’Hara P Public Administration: Organisations, People, and Public Policy (1979) 41 (hereafter 
Bernstein & O’Hara 1979). 
21 Shafritz JM & Hyde AC Classics of Public Administration (1992) 51. 
22  Hopfl 2006: 10. 
23 Weber M ‘Politik als Beruf’ (1918) (a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & 
Humblodt, Munich. Later Published as “Politik als Beruf,” Gesammelte Politische Schriften, Muenchen, 1921) 
11. 
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2.2 Division of labour 
With regard to the division of labour, Weber asserted that the modern bureaucracy involves a 
neatly articulated division of labour, with personnel subject to strict and uniform discipline.24,25 
He wrote that ‘the regular activities required for the purpose of the bureaucratically governed 
structure are assigned or distributed in a fixed way as official duties’.26 Each office has a well- 
defined sphere of competencies, with duties or jobs clearly defined and marked off from those 
of other offices. 27 
By their nature these functions are assigned to each position, as opposed to being assigned to 
a person.28 They are also objective and, in their substance, they have been explicitly fixed by 
previous decisions.29 This characteristic, in essence, creates a principle of fixed and official 
jurisdictional areas, each area being assigned regular activities as official duties.30 Officials in 
the ideal Weberian bureaucracy ‘are grouped into Behorden, that is, bureaux, departments, 
agencies, sections or ministries’.31 In this regard, the emphasis should be on the positions rather 
than on persons. 
Weber considered office-holding as a Beruf (a vocation or profession).32 This finds expression 
in two ways. First, there is a requirement for a prescribed course of training and special 
examinations. Secondly, the position of an official has the nature of a duty (Pflichtcharakter).33 
Weber maintained that holding office is not considered a source of income to be exploited for 
rents or emoluments in exchange for the rendering of certain services.34 Nor is holding office 
to be considered the usual exchange of services for equivalents, as is the case with free labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Weber 1922: 665. The tasks involved in public service were indeed administrative in the dictionary sense that 
is, following the instructions provided by others without personal responsibility for results. 
25  Weber 1922: 125. 
26  Weber 1946: 197. See also Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 51. 
27 Marcellus IE ‘African cultural value system and the dilemma of bureaucratic malfunctioning: Implications for 
development in Africa’ (2009) 1(7) Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business 152. 
28  Klingner 1983: 46. 
29 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1142. 
30 Weber M From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1958) (edited and translated by Gerth H and Mills CW) 650 
(hereafter Weber 1958). 
31  Weber 1922: 125, 650. 
32  Weber 1922: 652. 
33  Weber 1922: 652. 
34  Weber 1922: 127. See also Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 53. 
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contracts.35 Entrance into an office, rather, is considered an acceptance of a specific obligation 
of faithful management in return for a secure existence.36 
As such, Weber advocated for the separation of public and private life in terms of interests and 
finances.37 Official activity should be kept segregated from the private life of officials or 
bureaucrats. In this regard, officials or bureaucrats have no independent status or income, and 
office does not become their property: ‘public monies and equipment are divorced from the 
private property of the official’.38 Inspired by Karl Marx’s assertions about workers being 
separated from the means of production, Weber envisaged officials being progressively 
separated from ownership of the means of administration (Verwaltungsmittel).39 This means, 
among other things, that officials cannot appropriate their positions or use their office and its 
endowments as private property from which to derive additional income.40 
 
2.3 Impersonal rules 
Weber held that in his ideal type of bureaucracy, the ‘management of the office follows general 
rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned’.41 In 
Economy and Society, Weber observed that bureaucracy means subjection to impersonal rules 
which require officials to deal with their subjects impersonally and without respect to person 
or his or her status.42 In his words, ‘all rule (Herrschaft) over a multiplicity of people normally 
requires a staff of administrators reliably executing the general ordinances and specific 
commands of the Herrschaft or a leader’.43 Decision-making in this ideal bureaucracy must be 
based on the application of standardised rules to similar situations.44 
These rules should not be formulated on a case-by-case basis, but be abstract and general, 
applying equally to every bureaucrat or official.45 The generality of these rules requires the 
categorisation of individual cases on the basis of objective criteria. This stands in sharp contrast 
 
 
 
35 Roth G & Wittich C Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978) 959 (hereafter Roth & 
Wittich 1978). 
36  Weber 1946: 199. See also Roth & Wittich 1978a: 959. 
37  Weber 1922: 127, 665. 
38  Weber 1946: 197. 
39  Weber 1922: 127, 665. 
40  Etzioni-Halevy E Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma (1985) 28. 
41  Weber 1946: 198. 
42  Weber 1922: 123. 
43  Weber 1922: 123. 
44 Klingner 1983: 46. 
45 Bernstein & O’Hara 1979: 41. 
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to the dominant practice in patrimonial societies, where relationships are regulated according 
to individual privileges and bestowals of favour.46 
Impersonality refers to equality of treatment of all the officials and clients of an organisation. 
Officials should make decisions not on the basis of their personal views, but according to the 
responsibilities of their position and to applicable rules. By simply examining written records, 
authorities should easily determine if individuals dealing with the organisation or 
administration have been treated in accordance with these uniform and impersonal rules.47 
 
2.4 Meritocratic or professional appointments 
Office-holding as a vocation (Beruf) also finds expression in the requirement of a prescribed 
course of training and a prescribed special examination as prerequisites of employment.48 To 
this end, professional qualifications and knowledge (Fachwissen) are essential for employment 
into office and for the proper functioning of bureaucracy. Officials are selected on the basis of 
objective qualifications, acquired by training and established by examinations. As such, 
officials owe their positions to examinations and diplomas certifying their professional 
qualifications.49 The selection and promotion should be based on objective, formal measures 
of expertise (Fachwissen und Tatsachenkenntnis, meaning ‘academic qualification and 
practical experience’).50 This selection (Ernennung), not election, is done by superior authority 
on the basis of a contractual relationship between the officials and the organisation.51 This 
buttresses the idea of hierarchical subordination. According to Weber, should officials be 
elected, they would not derive their positions from above, from the superior authority in official 
hierarchy, but from below (from voters and political parties who give weight not to 
qualification but to the service such person renders to the political party bosses, in the case of 
political parties).52 
Bureaucrats should be ‘appointed to administrative offices because of their skills (meritocracy) 
and not because of their ancestry’.53 All employees hired by the administration or organisation 
 
 
 
46  Weber 1946: 198. 
47 Bernstein. & O’Hara 1979: 41. 
48  Weber 1946: 198. See also Roth G & Wittich C 1978: 958. 
49  Weber 1922: 126-7. 
50 Klingner 1983: 46. 
51  Weber 1922: 127, 653. 
52  Weber 1946: 201. 
53 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
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must demonstrate their qualifications for the job through education, training, or experience. 
Sager and Rosser reinforce the idea of meritocratic appointment by saying that public servants’ 
education is important, as they are supposed to be highly specialised professionals. According 
to Ringer, ‘public servants are individual officials (not collegial bodies), recruited into a fixed 
hierarchy of offices on the basis of qualifications that may be ascertained by examinations and 
certified by diplomas’.54 
Appointment to office should be open to everyone. Individuals should not be appointed to 
office on account of their birth or native personal gifts.55 The objective factor in their 
appointment should be knowledge and proof of ability.56 Such proof guarantees that the state 
will get what it requires; and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it also guarantees to 
every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants.57 
The other element of professionalised bureaucracy is that it is subject to a code of professional 
ethics according to which officials will faithfully execute the duties attending their offices 
regardless of personal sentiment and disagreement with the policies involved.58 As a result, 
modern bureaucracy is ready to serve whatever party is in power. Reinhard puts it thus: ‘[T]he 
security (calculability) of commercial transactions in a competitive economy depends upon this 
professional neutrality of the civil service.’59 Thus, the indispensability of skilled 
administrators and predictable career ladders make modern bureaucracy autonomous, but 
professionalism makes it a subservient and neutral tool.60 
 
2.5 Security of tenure 
Notwithstanding the concentration of expertise in the bureaucracy through meritocratic 
recruitment, the provision of opportunities for long-term career rewards is also central to the 
effectiveness of the bureaucracy.61 In this regard, bureaucratic jobs are for life, and carry a right 
to a pension and some security against arbitrary dismissal.62  This serves to guarantee that 
 
 
 
 
54 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
55 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1142. 
56 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1142. 
57 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1142. 
58 Reinhard B ‘Bureaucracy and the problem of power’ (1945) 5(3) Public Administration Review 205. 
59  Reinhard 1945: 205. 
60  Reinhard 1945: 205. 
61 Evans P Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (1995) 30 (hereafter Evans 1995). 
62  Weber 1922: 127, 654, 676. 
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specific office duties are discharged free from personal considerations.63 As such, they should 
regard their work as a full-time career or tenure for life.64 Making employees full-time career 
workers fosters an increased organisational control over them. Promotion is by ‘next in line’ 
(aufrücken) or seniority, not merit.65 This means that there is no way of jumping the queue, in 
the sense that junior staff cannot overtake senior staff for promotion simply on the basis of 
performance. Performance or merit is not a requirement for promotion. It is a requirement only 
for appointment. 
Similarly, salaries relate to status, not performance.66 They are measured not in terms of work 
done, as in the case of a wage, but according to rank and possibly, according to the length of 
service, thus making the office a sought-after position.67 The only danger with this, however, 
is the development of the ‘right to office’, with the concomitant guild-like ‘status group 
closures of officialdom and economic security’.68 Status group closures of officialdom and 
economic security mean that when there are too few controls, there is a danger that bureaucrats 
will use the authority conferred by their elite status or membership of control groups or guilds 
to dominate others, a practice which can be difficult to dislodge. 
Instead, the professional public servant should ‘find in his office his livelihood and the assured 
satisfaction of his particular interests’.69 This insulates him or her from society, and is a 
precondition for a functioning bureaucracy.70 Without this kind of insulation, the bureaucracy 
would be exposed to the push and pull of different interest groups. Thus, it is necessary to 
ensure the bureaucrats enough autonomy to resist corruption and capture by actors whose ‘rent- 
seeking’71 behaviour would otherwise derail the state's efforts to promote development and 
formulate policy in the national interest. The ties between the local implementers within the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63  Weber 1946: 202. 
64 Ringer F Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography (2004) 183 (hereafter Ringer 2004). 
65 This means that meritocracy only applies to appointment, not to promotion. 
66  Weber 1922: 127, 654, 676. 
67  Roth & Wittich 1978: 963. 
68 Roth & Wittich 1978: 963. Status group closures of officialdom and economic security mean that when there 
are too few controls, there is a danger of elite status or control groups, which become difficult to dislodge. 
Bureaucrats sometimes dominate people by using their authority. 
69 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
70  Evans 1995: 41. 
71  Evans 1995: 41. 
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state apparatus and the rent-seekers outside it would undermine the state’s functionality.72 It 
would result in the capture of state apparatus by rent-seekers. 
In Economy and Society, Weber wrote: 
 
According to experience, the relative optimum for the success and 
maintenance of a rigorous mechanization of the bureaucratic apparatus is 
offered by an assured salary connected with the opportunity of a career that is 
not dependent upon mere accident and arbitrariness. Taut discipline and 
control which at the same time have consideration for the official's sense of 
honour, and the development of prestige sentiments of the status group as well 
as the possibility of public criticism also work in the same direction. With all 
this, the bureaucratic apparatus functions more assuredly than does legal 
enslavement of functionaries.73 
It is important to create a strong corporate cohesion by conferring a distinctive and rewarding 
status on bureaucrats, by concentrating expertise in the bureaucracy through a highly selective 
process, and by providing opportunities for long-term career rewards.74 Entrance into office is 
considered an acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure 
existence. Without these benefits, which seek to insulate bureaucrats from social pressures, the 
alternative would be a rentier administration which is captured by privateers as their personal 
booty. 
Accordingly, bureaucracy is capable of attaining the highest degree of rationality and 
effectiveness. From this perspective, the fully developed bureaucratic mechanism is to other 
organisations as the machine is to non-mechanical means of production.75 This is the case 
because the division of labour minimises duplication of tasks as well as friction. Hierarchy 
facilitates central planning and coordination as well as control and discipline. Employment on 
the basis of qualifications makes for a higher level of knowledge and more competent work. 
Rules save effort by standardisation; they obviate the need to find a new solution for each 
individual problem; therefore, they also enable calculability of results. Impersonal detachment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72  Evans 1995: 41. 
73 Weber M Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978) 197-8. 
74  Evans 1995: 41. 
75  Weber 1947: 214. 
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promotes objectivity and prevents irrational actions as well as such inequitable actions as 
favouritism on the one hand and discrimination on the other.76 
Weber also insisted that the bureaucracy should be led by a non-bureaucratic head to ensure an 
unquestioning commitment to the organisation’s rationality.77 In this regard, personal 
identification with that individual provides the psychological leverage that reinforces 
commitment to impersonal rules. This makes it necessary to consider the relationship between 
the non-bureaucratic head and his or her bureaucracy, a matter discussed below. 
 
3 Political–administrative dichotomy 
In his later works, Weber was ambivalent about the political implications of bureaucracy, 
especially those for democracy. He recognised that the power of the modern bureaucracy was 
in danger of becoming overwhelming, and this presented a possibility that bureaucracy would 
overpower democracy.78 He was deeply concerned that those who staffed the bureaucracy 
would themselves become the masters of the state. He saw a potential situation in which the 
everyday rule of the bureaucracy over parliament and parliamentary government might develop 
into an uncontrollable bureaucratisation.79 
Although Weber regarded modern bureaucracy as the only rational form of organisation, one 
which was ‘not only inevitable, but ultimately desirable as well’,80 he expressed his doubts 
about its influence. Jackson puts it thus: ‘Weber feared that bureaucracy would enslave us 
all’.81 He feared that ‘[b]ureaucracy … is a precision instrument which can put itself at the 
disposal of quite varied interests, purely political as well as purely economic ones, or any other 
sort’.82 Expert officials might acquire a great deal of concrete information, which is not always 
at the disposal of their political superiors, and use it as a source of bureaucratic power and 
dominate others through knowledge.83 They might even resist policy changes proposed by their 
political masters, who find themselves in the position of ‘dilettantes’ or amateurs.84 
 
 
 
 
 
76  Etzioni-Halevy 1985: 29. 
77  Weber 1947: 216. 
78  Weber 1980: 572, as discussed in Sager & Rosser 2009: 1138. 
79  Weber 1980: 570. 
80 Ringer 2004: 221. 
81  Jackson MW ‘Bureaucracy in Hegel’s political theory’ (1986) 18(2) Administration & Society 139-57. 
82  Weber 1968: 990. 
83  Etzioni-Halevy 1985: 33. 
84  Etzioni-Halevy 1985: 33. 
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Linked to that is the code of bureaucratic secrecy, in terms of which the most important spheres 
of bureaucratic actions are withdrawn from public scrutiny. Citizens may complain to 
politicians about bureaucratic action, but that action’s secrecy makes redress difficult. This is 
compounded by the fact that the code of secrecy extends to parliament as well. Bureaucracy 
fights every attempt by parliament to gain knowledge. In the final analysis, the extent to which 
bureaucracy exerts power over its political master, and thus endangers democracy, depends 
largely on the interests of that bureaucracy itself. If it chooses to overrule its master, there is 
nothing to prevent it from doing so, signalling the dictatorship of the officials. The ruler 
remains powerless against the bureaucracy.85 
In an effort to make the state work efficiently and rationally while at the same time keeping the 
public servant’s influence in check, Weber advocated for a strict separation of the political and 
the administrative spheres.86 He stressed the subordination of bureaucracy to its political 
master, the elected politician. He held that the bureaucrat should be bound by obedience to the 
political power holder: ‘The honour of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute 
conscientiously the order of the superior … even if the order appears wrong.’87 
In his masterpieces, Politics as a Vocation, written in 1919, and Economy and Society, Weber 
distinguished between the political leaders and the public servants.88 He asserted that whereas 
politicians had to ‘prove themselves in the legislative and the electoral process and fulfil their 
duties with an ethic of responsibility, the administrators had to perform their administrative 
tasks neutrally and follow their political masters to the point of self-denial.’89 Weber believed 
that ‘the passionate struggle for power – “ira et studium” – is the politician’s element, whereas 
the bureaucrat should strive to execute legal orders dutifully, without anger and passion – “sine 
ira et studio”’.90 Overeem concludes that the German scholar ‘argued that it was essential that 
administration stay out of politics’.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85  Weber 1958: 232-5. 
86 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
87  Weber 1946: 95. 
88 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
89 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
90 Weber M ‘Politics as a profession’ in Winckelmann J (ed) Collected Political Writings: Max Weber (1988) 434. 
91 Overeem P ‘The value of the dichotomy, politics, administration, and the political neutrality of administrators’ 
(2005) 27(2) Administrative Theory and Praxis 315. 
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4 Summarising the Weberian administrative model 
In sum, Weber pictures an effective public administration as a formalised, professionalised, 
hierarchically organised and meritocratic public administration. He insists on a bureaucracy 
that displays a clear pattern of authority, the efficient specialisation of tasks, the impersonal 
and professional ethics of the bureaucrat, and comprehensive record-keeping for ensuring 
reliability and accountability. 
His ideal type of bureaucracy is structured in a manageable and predictable way: manageable, 
in the sense that jobs are clearly defined, work is performed by experts, and lines of 
accountability are clearly drawn; and predictable, in the sense that rules are not formulated on 
the case-by-case basis but are rather abstract and general, applying equally to everyone. 
However, Weber was not completely at ease with what he saw as the inevitable ascendancy of 
bureaucracy, fearing that it could become a tool too big for society to handle. Thus, he proposed 
a strict separation between administration and politics in order to keep the highly efficient and 
effective but potentially overwhelming bureaucratic apparatus out of politics.92 
The officials should not second-guess the orders of their political superior. If the official does 
not agree with them, he should resign. Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the 
highest sense, the whole apparatus falls apart. 
 
5 Problems with the Weberian administrative model 
Criticism of the Weberian administrative model emerged from a number of disparate sources, 
some as early as the 1940s.93 It gained momentum in the late 1960s, peaking in the 1980s 
through to the 1990s.94  What follows is the summary of these different critiques. 
Most critics tended to begin by acknowledging that the Weberian model is a great improvement 
on previous administrative thoughts and practices, such as the patronage and spoils systems.95 
 
 
 
92 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1140. 
93 Merton RK ‘Bureaucratic structure and personality’ (1940) 18(4) Social Forces 560 - 568; Selznick P ‘An 
approach to a theory of bureaucracy’ (1943) 8(1) American Sociological Review 47 - 54; Gouldner AW Patterns 
of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954); Gouldner AW ‘Metaphysical pathos and the theory of bureaucracy’ (1955) 
49(2) American Political Science Review 496 – 507; Blau PM The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (1955). 
94 Crozier M The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1964) (hereafter Crozier 1964); Bittner E ‘The concept of 
organization’ (1965) 32(1) Social Research 239 - 55; and many others. 
95 Chipkin & Lipietz 2012: 2, quoting Fukuyama 2010, who states in this regard that ‘it is precisely the emergence 
of a professional cadre of state administrators (a mandarin class), whose ties to kin and tribe had been severed or 
severely weakened, that marks the emergence of the properly modern state form’. 
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They recognised that it has some strengths, and said it has proved its worth by ushering in the 
industrial economies of the twentieth century.96 They said that its bureaucratic practices 
underscored industrialisation in the UK, the US and later Prussia, and it was also credited with 
the success of the most successful of modern states, the developmental states of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan97– as well as, in a less dramatic fashion, the positive developmental 
experiences of Costa Rica, Mauritius and the Indian state of Kerala.98 
However, they then quickly retorted that it was developed at a particular stage of 
industrialisation. It suited a relatively small and stable public sector, but has reached a point of 
diminishing returns in the new era of information technology. They then launched their salvo 
against the Weberian bureaucratic model, by making six main criticisms: the size of the 
government, fixed and rigid procedures, the centralized bureaucracies, employment for life, 
inadequate mechanisms of accountability, and input domination. 
 
5.1 The size of government 
The critique relating to the size of the bureaucracy in a Weberian model was on two fronts, 
namely waste and poor performance. It was charged that the bloated99 size of the administration 
means excessive expenditure is being devoted to funding administrative positions that are now 
thought unnecessary. The critics say that if it were just a matter of the money being wasted, 
that would be bad enough, but the inadequacies of a bloated administration have now become 
apparent, in particular, in terms of efficiency concerns. Hughes charges that because of its size, 
the tools of the Weberian bureaucracy are very slow and bureaucratic to achieve efficiency in 
government. This makes administrative performance worse rather than better.100 In the same 
vein, Bergmann notes that it bogs one down in time-consuming and despair-creating red tape 
and paperwork.101 
Because of its large size, the critique goes, this model is too cumbersome and dilatory for rapid 
decision-making and instant communication. It is not only large but lax. This makes it unsuited 
 
 
 
96 Vecchio RP Organizational Behaviour (1991). 
97 Chipkin & Lipietz 2012: 2, quoting Evans 1995. 
98 Chipkin & Lipietz 2012: 2, quoting Sandbrook et al. 2007. 
99 It should be noted that Weber did not envisage a large organisation. It only became large as a result of the 
specialisation of tasks where everyone performed tasks solely related to his or her office. This created a need to 
create other offices dealing with matters not dealt with elsewhere. 
100 Hughes OE Public Management and Administration: An Introduction (1994) 56. 
101 Bergmann BR ‘Bloated administration, blighted campuses’ (1991) 77(6) Academe 16. 
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for an ‘economy in which economic value is based on information and its manipulation, rather 
than industrial production’.102 Although production is still important, it is increasingly based 
on information systems.103 As such, the Weberian bureaucracy has become increasingly 
anachronistic and irrelevant to the needs of a society changing at breath-taking speed.104 
 
5.2 Fixed and rigid procedures 
The first critique under this rubric is that in the Weberian bureaucratic model, the achievement 
of results is less important than maintaining processes and rules. Rules themselves become 
what the organisational effort is directed at achieving, instead of being means of fulfilling the 
organisation’s purpose. The discipline required of bureaucrats by rules may lead to ‘trained 
incapacity’, a rigidity of approach which makes it difficult to adapt to altered circumstances.105 
This leads to the undermining of organisational goals, the so-called ‘displacement of goals’ in 
favour of detailed enforcement of rules and procedures.106 This also results in inefficiency and 
the deterioration of the administration’s supposed technical superiority.107 
Furthermore, individual bureaucrats might internalise the rules of the organisation and thereby 
making them ends in themselves, rather than the means they were meant to be.108 This is done 
to protect the legitimacy of one’s actions. Bureaucrats might not be punished for following the 
rules, even if the consequences of such actions are catastrophic for the general public or the 
employer.109 Hummel suggests that bureaucrats become mechanistic technicians who are 
detached from their humanity, emotions, society, and even their conscience.110 Al-Habil adds 
that bureaucracy forces humans to substitute their sense of right and wrong while performing 
their  daily tasks  in  conformity with  decisions,  rules,  and  instructions  imposed  by higher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 Pfiffner JP ‘Traditional public administration versus the New Public Management: Accountability versus 
efficiency’ in Benz A. et al. (eds) Institutionenbildung in Regierung und Verwaltung: Festschrift fur Klaus Konig 
(2004) 4 (hereafter Pfiffner 2004). 
103 Pfiffner 2004: 3. 
104 Hughes OE Public Management and Administration (2003) 17 (hereafter Hughes 2003). 
105 Merton RK ‘Bureaucratic structure and personality’ in Merton et al. (eds) Reader in Bureaucracy (1952) 371. 
106  Wallis M Bureaucracy (1989) 10. 
107  Hughes 2003: 35. 
108 Dessler G Organisational Theory: Integrating Structure and Behavior (1980) 29. 
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supervisors, who might be distant from the real social context and its necessities.111 Hummel 
describes this as ‘the bomb that threatens humanity’.112 
This results in the perception that bureaucrats are uncaring and interested only in following 
rules and regulations. When an individual case does not fit into the rules and seems to require 
that an exception be made or a rule be stretched, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for 
bureaucrats to meet it with alacrity and compassion. This then leaves the individual who is 
seeking the service with the impression that the bureaucrats are insensitive, unmotivated, overly 
rigid, unresponsiveness and interested only in serving their own interests and controlling the 
public.113 Hummel states that bureaucracy deals with human beings as cases rather than 
human beings who are in need for social and economic services.114 Thus Hummel concludes 
that bureaucracy is blind, deaf, and dumb. 
Despite some of the advantages of the Weberian bureaucratic model (e.g. precision, continuity, 
stability, discipline, and reliability), the critics also argue that fixed and rigid procedures and 
orderly working patterns are not suitable for a constantly changing environment.115 Osborne 
and Gaebler argue that a Weberian bureaucracy does not function well in a rapidly changing, 
information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy such as that of the 1990s.116 The 
rigid structures of this model, it is argued, are ‘too cumbersome and inflexible to address the 
increasingly diverse and fast-changing needs of modern economic and social systems’.117 As 
such, the argument goes, these structures are prone to stagnation, inefficiency or, even worse, 
corruption.118 The excessive reliance on rules and regulations inhibit initiative and growth of 
the employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 Al-Habil W Criticism for Max Weber’s Bureaucracy (2007) 10. 
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113 Cayer NJ Public Personnel Administration (2004) 67 (hereafter Cayer 2004). 
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Crozier also argued that because of this fixation on rules and procedures, a bureaucratic 
organisation would not be able to self-correct its behaviour by reflecting on and learning from 
its past mistakes,119  as it puts emphasis on repetition. 
 
5.3 Hierarchy 
On the issue of hierarchy, it is argued that once an organisation is set up, the assumption is that 
establishing the hierarchy, the personnel system, and the like, would lead to satisfactory results 
by themselves. The efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation in performing its tasks 
become the concern of someone else. The critics argue that the traditional model has ‘dozens 
of levels, each with several sub-levels and with barriers established to restrict progress beyond 
certain point’.120 This means the behaviour of workers is controlled from the top, and as such 
those closest to service delivery points are not able react quickly enough. Their reaction time 
is slow because they become so concerned with superior orders and complying with rules that 
they lose sight of the overall goal or mission.121 
In these dozens of levels, workers must wait to be told what to do by their immediate superiors, 
who in turn must wait for instructions from their superiors, and so on, because, as Thompson 
notes, authority is centralised but ability is decentralised.122 This bureaucratic culture produces 
inertia, a lack of enterprise, red tape, mediocrity and inefficiency.123 Sapru states that ‘it 
encourages administrators to be risk-averse rather than risk-taking and to waste scarce 
resources instead of using them efficiently’.124 It suppresses creativity and extinguishes 
imagination. It is argued that while there may be a need for order and precision in management, 
there is now a greater need for speed, flexibility and results, and hence for allowing the 
organisation to move faster in response to change and challenges. 
 
5.4 Employment for life 
In the Weberian bureaucracy, personnel rules are protective of individual employees. It is 
difficult   to   discipline   employees   and   impossible   to   dismiss   them   despite   manifest 
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incompetence. The critique is that this breeds ‘time-servers’125 not innovators126 in that one 
cannot make the employees responsive if the employees do not feel like it.127 Because of their 
assured existence, there is no incentive to respond to changes and this results in inertia. They 
can only be dismissed or disciplined for a wilful violation of the rules or for insubordination to 
authority or for theft, but even that happens only in circumscribed circumstances.128 As such, 
this model encourages laxity and no longer provides maximum technical efficiency. 
 
5.5 Input domination 
Weberian bureaucracy is criticised for putting too much emphasis on inputs as opposed to 
outputs. It is obsessed with regulating processes and controlling inputs129 that are used rather 
than concerning itself with results.130 This is manifest in two ways. First, it encourages ill- 
discipline in resource use and allows inefficient use and wastage of scarce resources. The critics 
hold that public budgeting rewards those departments and programmes that spend their monies 
regardless of what they accomplished through the use of their resources. Saving money while 
performing the expected job is often rewarded by budget cuts, while those who spend all that 
they are allocated and ask for more often have a justification for greater resources.131 This leads 
to inefficiency, which is a failure to maximize output for a given expenditure or to minimize 
expenditures for a given output.132 
Secondly, it puts emphasis on regulating recruitment processes, focusing on qualifications of 
people coming into the organisation, not what they can deliver. Its insistence on qualifications 
excludes people who, while not certificated, might have a proven track record in terms of their 
outputs. In the Weberian model, these people do not qualify as they are not the best and the 
brightest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 Hughes 2012: 44 defines time-servers as bureaucrats who do not work efficiently, who are impossible to 
dismiss and who merely wait for their retirement day. 
126 Blau PM On the Nature of Organizations (1974). 
127  Cayer 2004: 68. 
128  Cayer 2004: 68. 
129 Such as the number of personnel, the amount of money, the number of vehicles, number of computers, energy 
consumed, etc. 
130  Osbome & Gaebler 1992: 14. 
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6 The New Public Management 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of a theory of effective public administration 
called the New Public Management (the NPM) or the ‘new managerialism’, as it is referred to 
in numerous studies.133 ‘New Public Management’134 is the term used to ‘chronicle, interpret, 
and assess the wave of efforts to reform executive government across the world’.135 It is an 
alternative theory that represents a response or a reaction to the bureaucratic pathologies 
outlined in the preceding discussion. This new model is not a coherent theory per se; it actually 
has several incarnations, all representing the rejection of some elements of the Weberian 
bureaucratic state and coalescing under the broad appellation of New Public Management.136 
In essence, this model seeks to reorganise government in a way that palliates the latter’s 
‘accountability deficits through the introduction of market-based mechanisms’.137 
Minogue contends that the NPM seeks to replace the highly centralised hierarchical 
organisation structures with decentralised management and further restructure and reduce the 
size of the public sector, including the central civil services, to make it slimmer.138 The NPM’s 
emphasis is on transferring business and market principles and management techniques from 
the private into the public sector, which is in line with the neoliberal understanding of state and 
economy.139 The different scholars that feature in this theme state that bureaucratic 
arrangements once successfully provided security, jobs and economic stability, ensured 
fairness and equity, and delivered the ‘one size fits all’ services that were needed for most  of 
 
 
 
 
 
133 According to Drechsler W ‘The rise and demise of the New Public Management’ (2005) 33(1) Post-Autistic 
Economics Review 23 (hereafter Drechsler 2005), the NPM is part of neo-classical economic imperialism within 
the social sciences, which was strongly advocated strongly for by most of the international finance institutions, 
such as the World Bank and IMF. 
134 The concept is styled as such by such authors as Pollitt C Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo- 
American Experience (1990); Hood 1991; and Aucoin P ‘Administrative reform in public management: 
paradigms, principles, paradoxes and pendulums’ (1990) 3(2) Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 115 – 137. 
135 Hood C & Peters G ‘The middle aging of the New Public Management: Into the age of paradox?’ (2004) 14(3) 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 267 (hereafter Hood & Peters 2004). 
136 It is not a coherent theory but rather a discrete set of ideas. Hood refers to it as ‘a loose term whose usefulness 
lies in its convenience as a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated 
the bureaucratic reform agenda during the late twentieth century’. Pollitt and his colleagues call it ‘a label which 
many academics have given to a series of reforms from the 1980s onwards to improve the efficiency and 
performance of Western governments and/or public sector organizations’. It is also-called a movement which 
lacked a single definitive 'manifesto'. 
137 Chipkin & Lipietz 2012: 3. 
138 Minogue M & McCourt W Internationalization of Public Management (2001). 
139 Drechsler 2005: 17. 
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the twentieth century. Since the mid-1960s, however, organisational arrangements invented at 
the dawn of the industrial era have become anachronistic. 
 
6.1 The spread of the NPM 
The NPM first gained popularity in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries140 primarily as a reform 
movement informed by conservative and neoliberal economic policies directed at two things: 
restructuring the modes of providing services to the populace and transforming personnel 
management systems. In regard to the former, the welfare form of government was made leaner 
by, first, reducing its functions and privatising as much as could be taken over by the market.141 
The goal was a slim, reduced, minimal state in which public activity is decreased and, if at all, 
exercised according to business principles of efficiency.142 Secondly, the remaining functions 
not affected by privatisation were outsourced143 to external (mainly commercial) providers 
through competitive tendering.144 Thirdly, the hierarchical Weberian public administration was 
transformed to become more efficient and effective145 by creating entities, at arms-length but 
still under the control of the state, to perform governmental functions.146 In all these goals, the 
NPM advocated for the primacy of markets in the production and distribution of goods and 
services.147 
In regard to the transformation of the personnel management system, the focus was on letting 
managers manage, performance management systems and short-term contracts. Letting 
managers manage was in response to Weberian hierarchical and cascading system of command 
in terms of which a manager must wait for an instruction before doing anything. Performance 
 
 
 
140 The term is not used in its original sense; it is used loosely to refer to UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada. 
141 Woolmann H & Thurmaier K ‘Reforming local government institutions and the New Public Management in 
Europe and the US’ in Clark S et al. (eds) Handbook on Local Politics (2010) 2 (hereafter Woolmann & Thurmaier 
2010). 
142 Drechsler 2005: 17. 
143 According to Keraudren P & van Mierlo H ‘Theories of public management reform and their practical 
implications’ in Verheijen T & Coombes D (eds) Innovation in Public Management (1998) (hereafter Keraudren 
& van Mierlo 1998), the criteria is whether the function’s commercial viability may be maintained at less cost in 
the private sector or not. 
144 Woolmann & Thurmaier 2010: 2. Hood 1991 refers to the latter phenomenon as quasi-privatisation. 
145 Rosta M ‘What makes a New Public Management reform successful? An institutional analysis’ available at 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/Rosta_What%20makes%20a%20New%20P 
ublic%20Management%20reform%20successful_An%20institutional%20analysis.pdfRosta  2011  (accessed 12 
May 2016). 
146 Woolmann & Thurmaier 2010: 2. 
147 Ferlie W, Ashburner L & Fitzgerald L et al. The New Public Management in Action (1996) 17 (hereafter Ferlie 
et al. 1996). 
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management systems were meant to reverse the phenomenon of rigid compliance with rules 
which meant that officials were not accountable for own action, as long as they complied with 
rules and correct procedures.148 Bureaucrats would thenceforth no longer be mechanistic 
technicians who are detached from their conscience. The fixed-term contract was a reaction to 
the phenomenon of time-servers created by an assured existence and lack of discipline 
characteristic of Weberian bureaucracy. Renewal or not of an employment contract now 
depends on whether a bureaucrat is delivering according to predetermined criteria. The ease of 
dismissing bureaucrats was meant as an incentive for them to be innovative and personally 
responsible for their actions. 
In the United Kingdom, the NPM was introduced at the commencement of the prime ministerial 
term of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, while in the United States it commenced with the start of 
the presidential term of Ronald Reagan in 1980.149 It is, however, argued that the pressure for 
public sector reform in the latter case predated the election of Reagan, with the 1978 Civil 
Service Reform Act150 being passed during the Carter administration.151 The governments of 
New Zealand and Australia and later Canada joined the NPM reform wave between 1984 and 
1990. Woolmann and Thurmaier argue that the receptiveness of Anglo-Saxon countries to the 
NPM reform was due to their common-law tradition, which neither distinguishes between 
public and private law, nor between public and private sector. 152 It was thus easy to transfer 
managerialist principles from the business sector to public administration without having to 
struggle with legal and cultural barriers. 
The successes of the NPM in the Anglo-Saxon countries led to the NPM administrative reforms 
being on the agendas of most of the other OECD countries153 and other nations.154 Green- 
Pedersen suggests that this was owing to the macroeconomic troubles that the OECD countries 
 
 
 
148  Clegg 1990: 44. 
149  Rosta 2011: 3. 
150 The Act reformed the civil service of the United States federal government, partly in response to the Watergate 
scandal (a major political scandal which led to the resignation of the Republican president, Richard Nixon, on 
August 9, 1974). The Act abolished the U.S. Civil Service Commission and distributed its functions primarily 
among three new agencies: the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB), and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). 
151  Ferlie et al. 1996: 17. 
152 Woolmann & Thurmaier 2010: 14. 
153 Note that the OECD countries also include Anglo-Saxon countries. The spread was therefore from the Anglo- 
Saxon OECD countries to non-Anglo-Saxon OECD countries, for example, the Scandinavian OECD countries 
and the Continental European OECD countries. 
154 Gruening G ‘Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management’ (2001) 4(1) International Public 
Management Journal 2 (hereafter Gruening 2001). 
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faced in the 1970s and as such they were looking for solutions elsewhere.155 In continental 
Europe, many governments were not easily moved by the NPM reform wave of wholesale 
restructuring. Instead, they modified many of the Anglo-Saxon ideas underpinning the NPM 
and re-interpreted them in line with their own national politico-administrative contexts. 
According to Woolmann and Thurmaier, their ‘Roman law-rooted rule of law tradition … made 
them legally and culturally much less accessible and receptive to the NPM message’.156 The 
Netherlands was the first civil law country to apply NPM principles in a more penetrating 
way.157 
The Scandinavian countries were also not averse to the idea of joining the NPM movement and 
applying its instruments. However, they were similarly cautious of simply copying such 
instruments without regard to their national politico-administrative contexts. They only 
employed those management techniques tailored to their own institutional environments, and 
as such ‘significantly altered the … toolkit of the NPM’, as developed in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries.158 The classic case of a Scandinavian country that displayed unwillingness to adopt 
NPM principles with enthusiastic gullibility was Sweden. While adopting some NPM 
principles, Sweden retained a social responsibility model which does not comport with the 
market-led theory, with its stress on efficiency in service delivery.159 Reforms were mitigated 
by existing structures and traditions, and Sweden was more concerned with democratisation 
and modernisation than with ‘entrepreneurial government’ or imitating private sector 
practices.160 The traditional democratic values, therefore, have continued to inform the Swedish 
public sector reorganisation.161 This has served to mitigate some of the ‘hard-edged 
marketization’ that Anglo-Saxon countries have applied, particularly New Zealand.162 The 
other Western European countries were also more selective and adaptive in incorporating  the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 Green-Pedersen C ‘Market-type reforms of the Danish and Swedish service welfare states: different party 
strategies and different outcomes’. Paper presented at the 2001 Meeting of the IPSA Section of the Structure of 
Governance, University of Oklahoma, March 30–31. 
156 Woolmann & Thurmaier 2010: 14. 
157 Hemerijck A & Huiskamp R Public Sector Reform under EMU: A Literature Review (2002) (quoted in Rosta 
2011: 6). 
158  Rosta 2011: 6. 
159  Ferlie et al. 1996: 19-21. 
160 Pollitt C, van Thiel S & Homburg V New Public Management in Europe (2007) 3 (hereafter Pollitt et al. 2007). 
161  Ferlie et al. 1996: 19. 
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http://etd.uwc.ac.za
54 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
NPM ‘toolkit’. They incorporated NPM principles with material variations to tailor-make them 
for their formal and informal institutional environment.163 
It is evident that many governments throughout the Western world had to pick and choose 
reforms from the NPM toolbox, modify them to suit their own politico-administrative context 
and systems, or implement them in a different order or time-frame. According to Pollitt, this 
resulted in ‘reforms [in] the public sector hav[ing] the same labels in different countries but … 
not necessarily … the same in practice or in meaning’.164 A cursory look at different 
governments applying the NPM paradigm shows both convergence and divergence.165 Thus, 
Hood asserts that the NPM is emphatically not a parochial Anglo-Saxon development but a 
striking international trend166 in public administration discernible from the mid-1970s onwards, 
which has had variable international impact.167 Furthermore, variants of the NPM have 
emerged in different countries, depending on local history, culture, and political and managerial 
leadership.168 
In the developing world, the NPM toolkit was superimposed on the framework of the 
IMF/World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes, which emphasised cost-cutting, 
commercialisation and privatisation to maximise the efficiency of service delivery. This meant 
that in many developing countries, the NPM ideas were not home-grown; they were externally 
generated and imposed. Unlike most Western countries, many developing countries did not 
have an opportunity to adapt the NPM toolkit in order to tailor-make it for their own national 
politico-administrative contexts.169 This imposition did not take account of the NPM’s Anglo- 
Saxon origins and the extent to which it was created in the context of that culture and its 
history.170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163  Rosta 2011: 6. 
164  Pollitt et al. 2007: 1. 
165  Pollitt et al. 2007: 1. 
166 Other States, however, especially in the developing world and to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe, did not have 
much of a choice in adapting the NPM ideas into their domestic contexts, given that these were imposed or 
strongly urged on them by Western-dominated international government organisations such as the EU, the World 
Bank and the IMF. In developing countries in particular, incorporating the NPM toolkit was part of the conditions 
for financial aid. 
167 Hood 1991: 8. As such, the use of the word ‘toolkit’ is misplaced, given the divergence of views in what 
constitutes the NPM. 
168  Ferlie et al. 1996: 16. 
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The above reflection reveals that the NPM reform theory is an empty canvas on which to paint 
whatever one wants. It means different things to different people. According to Pollitt et al., 
the NPM is nothing more than a ‘shopping centre’ where the governments and experts from 
different countries shop for management instruments closest to their tastes.171 Furthermore, the 
focus, timing, and rate of its adoption has varied depending on country-specific conditions and 
legal and cultural barriers.172 Cross-country commonalities as well as divergences 
characterised the adoption and application of NPM principles. As a result, there are disparate 
and sometimes contradictory views about the meaning and implications of this theory. Same 
as there are varied and often contradictory set of traits being proffered by its 
proponents/exponents. Pollitt et al. state that ‘there are simply too many different types of 
reforms, too many contextual variables and too many strands of theory’.173 
 
6.2 Definitions 
The perennial problem with definitions is that they are always shrouded with the cloak of 
subjectivity, all the more so in a broad and divergent area like the NPM.174 In the light of the 
NPM being an ‘empty canvas’, it is variously defined and dissensus abounds on what it actually 
entails. What is common to these definitions, however, is ‘the attempt to implement 
management ideas from business and private sector into the public services’175 and the rejection 
of the Weberian bureaucratic model in an attempt to cut through the red tape and rigidity 
associated with old-style public administration and as a way of improving efficiency and 
service delivery.176 
The NPM represents a major shift from traditional public administration, with far greater 
attention now being paid to the achievement of results and the personal responsibility of 
managers. There is an express intention to move away from the classical bureaucracy to make 
organisations, personnel, and employment terms and conditions more flexible. Furthermore, 
organisational goals and personal objectives are to be set clearly to enable measurement of their 
 
 
 
171 Pollitt et al. 2007: 7 (quoted in Rosta 2011: 6.) call the NPM a chameleon: it constantly changes its appearance 
to blend in with the local context. 
172 Woolmann & Thurmaier 2010: 14. 
173  Pollitt et al. 2007: 6. 
174 Raghavan GN ‘New Public Management: Chennai’ (2004) Centre for Civil Society Research (hereafter 
Raghavan 2004). 
175 Haynes P Managing Complexity in the Public Services (2003) 192. 
176 Massey A & Johnston K (eds) The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance (2015) 
136. 
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achievement through performance indicators. Moreover, under this model, government 
functions are more likely to face market tests as a way of separating the purchasers of 
government services from providers – what Savas calls separation of ‘steering from rowing’.177 
The other feature of this model common to most theorists is the reduction of government 
functions through privatisation and other forms of market testing and contracting.178 The NPM 
is thus a body of management thought or an ideological system based on notions generated in 
the private sector and imported into the public sector. 179 
Hood asserts that ‘like most divinities, the NPM turned out to be somewhat mystical in essence, 
as no two authors … listed exactly the same features in enumerating its traits’.180 Manning 
explains the NPM as follows: 
Generally it is used to describe a management culture that emphasises the 
centrality of the citizen or customer, as well as accountability for results. It 
also suggests structural or organisational choices that promote decentralised 
control through a variety of alternative service delivery mechanisms, including 
quasi-markets with public and private service providers competing for 
resources from policy makers and donors. 
Hood in turn defines the NPM as ‘a pattern of policy and practice described as a style of 
organising public services’.181  He then identifies the doctrinal components thereof: 
 hands-on professional management in the public sector; 
 
 explicit standards and measures of performance, which were later termed as 
performance indicators; 
 greater emphasis on output control; 
 
 a shift to the disaggregation of units; 
 
 a shift to greater competition; 
 
 a stress on private-sector styles of management practice; and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 Savas ES Privatization: The Key to Better Government (1987) 288, 290. 
178  Hughes 2003: 44. 
179 Hood 1991, Hood C ‘The "New Public Management" in the eighties’ (1995) 20(2/3) Accounting, Organization 
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 a stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.182 
Borins defines the NPM as 
a normative conceptualization of public administration consisting of several 
inter-related components; providing high quality services that citizens value; 
increasing the autonomy of public managers; rewarding organization and 
individuals on the basis of whether they meet demanding performance targets; 
… and appreciative of the virtues of competition, and maintaining an open 
minded attitude about which public purposes should be performed by the 
private sector, rather than a public sector.183 
Despite this divergence about the meaning and implications of the NPM paradigm, a survey of 
the literature on the NPM reveals the following characteristics which appear to be ‘undisputed’ 
as they frequently recur in the writings of many theorists.184  These include: 
 privatisation, 
 
 corporatisation, 
 
 public-private partnerships or contracting out, 
 
 transfer of managerial responsibilities, 
 
 performance management, 
 
 flexibility in hiring, 
 
 competition, and 
 
 improved financial management. 
 
As such, the NPM is popularly denoted by concepts such as letting managers manage, 
performance auditing and reporting, outsourcing, marketization and total quality 
management.185 
There are, however, other characteristics proffered by some theorists but strongly rejected by 
others; it is a matter of dispute whether or not they form part of the NPM toolkit. This study 
will steer clear of the debatable traits and focus on those that find common acceptance. 
 
 
 
 
 
182  Hood 1991: 4. 
183 Borins S ‘The New Public Management is here to stay’ (1995) 81(1) Canadian Public Administration 12. 
184  Gruening 2001: 2. 
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In response to the problems associated with the size of government, the NPM proposes to 
down-size the bloated forms of organisations by privatising as much functions as is possible, 
outsourcing some of those not taken over by the private sector and ‘splitting’ government up 
internally into more autonomous business units, with policy formulation and execution being 
split. With regard to problems associated with the hierarchy of authority or centralisation, the 
NPM puts forward a hypothesis that the best way to counter those inefficacies is to decentralise 
or delayer or flatten the pyramid and ‘letting managers manage’. 
As to the problems relating to fixed and rigid procedures, the NPM insists on performance 
management and customer orientation. The NPM model counters the problem of time-servers 
by introducing fixed-term contract management system. It then introduces business principles 
relating to value for money and parsimony to address the problem of wastage in resources use. 
These NPM principles are looked at in some detail in what follows. 
 
6.3 Privatisation 
As noted earlier, privatisation is one of the strategies to reduce the size of government by 
decreasing the number of personnel in the public sector as well as reducing public-sector 
functions in an attempt to make the public sector lean and mean.186 The ultimate aim is to create 
‘a more efficient and effective public service’.187 In this regard, it is argued that in order for the 
public service to be efficient it must be a slim, reduced, and a minimal public service in which 
public activity is decreased.188 Other mechanisms such as corporatisation and public-private 
partnerships, discussed below, come in to play to make the decreased activity exercised 
according to business principles of efficiency.189 
In the same way as other NPM principles, privatisation in developing countries was generally 
carried out at the insistence of the World Bank and has been part of structural adjustment 
programmes.190 Governments were required to split their functions between small, strategic 
core functions, mostly relating to policy formulation, and a large operational periphery relating 
 
 
 
 
186  Ferlie et al. 1996: 13. 
187 Larbi GA ‘Overview of public sector management reform’ (1999) Discussion paper (112) 19 (hereafter Larbi 
1999). 
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to policy implementation. The public sector then keeps only the core functions and privatises 
as much of the remaining non-strategic functions as could be taken over by the market.191 
Furthermore, privatisation entails the outright sale of state assets to a private company. The 
phenomenon of privatisation is sometimes referred to as trimming the fat off government. 
 
6.4 Corporatisation 
Polidano states that corporatisation entails converting line departments of government into 
free-standing agencies or establishing semi-autonomous agencies or public entities, run by their 
own boards of directors, which render public functions on behalf of departments.192 These 
entities are variously labelled as executive agencies, special operating agencies, government 
corporations, contract agencies, public entities, state-owned enterprises and non-departmental 
public bodies, among other titles.193 This phenomenon, sometimes called agencification, allows 
for the separation of policy-making and implementation functions or responsibilities in terms 
of which governments focus on policy formulation, while the agencies expend time and energy 
on implementation. The provision of public services is transferred from the realm of 
government into a corporation or agency, which has a contract-like, arm’s-length relationship 
with the parent ministry and department.194 In terms of this relationship, the parent ministry 
appoints the management of these entities, which then report to it at specified times. In this 
instance, the parent ministry retains one hundred per cent ownership of the entity. 
The motives behind corporatisation are to ensure an arm’s-length relationship between the 
entity or agency and government. The aim is to discourage political interference and to ensure 
that the entity is less constrained by regulations and red tape. This would ultimately ensure 
greater managerial flexibility which would lead to greater efficiency, effectiveness and 
responsiveness.195 It is hoped that the distance between the department and the entity which 
frees the entity from departmental bureaucracy, encumbered by regulations and red-tape, with 
 
 
 
 
191 Woolmann & Thurmaier 2010: 2 
192  Polidano 1999: 6. 
193 Bilodeau N, Laurin C & Vining A ‘“Choice of organizational form makes a real difference”: The impact of 
corporatization on government agencies in Canada’ (2006) 17(1) Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 120 (hereafter Bilodeau et al. 2006). 
194  Bilodeau et al. 2006: 119. 
195 Wettenhall R ‘Public or private? Public corporations, companies and the decline of the middle ground’ (2001) 
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its associated inefficiencies such as slowness and unresponsiveness, will yield greater 
efficiency, cost savings and service quality. Secondly, it seeks to introduce business practices 
or private sector management techniques into the public service in order to achieve greater 
efficiency, cost savings or service quality improvements. The semi-autonomous entities would 
be run like a business. This leg of corporatisation is usually accompanied by the setting of 
performance targets along the lines of executive agencies in the UK or state-owned enterprises 
in New Zealand.196 
 
6.5 Outsourcing / private-public partnerships 
As seen under the discussion on privatisation, in all these strategies the ultimate aim of the 
NPM is to break down the monolithic structure of the bureaucracy into small service delivery 
agencies that operate on business principles.197 This was in reaction to large bureaucracies that 
were consuming significant amounts of the state funding. As a result of fiscal challenges this 
monolithic structure posed, the NPM proposed that states should mobilise alternative funding 
for service delivery from the private sector.198 
The terms ‘outsourcing’, ‘contracting out’ and ‘public-private partnerships’ (PPP) are used 
interchangeably. They all relate to a contract between a public institution and an individual or 
privately owned or controlled partnership, company, trust or other for-profit legal entity.199 
They are defined as long-term contractual arrangements between the government and a private 
partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the 
associated risks.200  In Korea, PPP projects are defined as projects 
to build and operate infrastructure such as road, port, railway, school and 
environmental facilities – which have traditionally been constructed and run 
by government funding – with private capital, thus tapping the creativity and 
efficiency of private sector.201 
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In the United Kingdom, PPP are defined as 
 
arrangements typified by joint working between the public and private sectors. 
In their broadest sense, they can cover all types of collaboration across the 
private-public sector interface involving collaborative working together and 
risk sharing to deliver policies, services and infrastructure.202 
In Australia, a PPP is defined 
 
as relating to the provision of infrastructure and any related ancillary service 
which involve private investment or financing, with a present value of 
payments for a service to be made by the government (and/or by consumers) 
of more than AUD 10 million during the period of a partnership that do not 
relate to the general procurement of services.203 
Public-private partnerships, therefore, serve two main purposes, namely to mobilise resources 
and skills from the private sector and to infuse business principles in the delivery of public 
services. However, the functions are still controlled by the state, which then enters into 
partnership with external or private providers. This relationship is controlled through contracts 
in terms of which the targets and outputs are specified.204 The idea here is that rivalry, at the 
procurement stage, is essential for lowering costs and improving the standard of services 
rendered.205 
Essentially, corporatisation and public-private partnerships are what is referred to as quasi- 
markets. These are not markets in the business sense, because services are not sold to 
consumers as is the case with privatised services – ‘they are free at the point of use’.206 
Furthermore, they are still regulated centrally. However, there is an attempt to simulate market- 
like mechanisms to make public service business-like, but not truly a business.207 One of the 
key features of quasi-markets is that public funding is allocated through competitive bidding. 
This has the effect of making organisations competitive, even at the level of delivery or 
provision.208 Similarly, the planning function (as a mechanism for the allocation of resources 
within the public sector) has now shifted from the public sector to quasi-markets.209 
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6.6 Managerialism 
The NPM not only proposes to reduce the number of personnel and decrease government 
activities, but also proposes that such activities must be performed by units closest to the site 
of service delivery and by letting managers at those units manage. This idea is referred to as 
managerialism and relates to the conferring of wide discretion and autonomy to managers with 
regard to organisational and staff issues. Managerialism encompasses the principles of 
decentralising decision-making power to managers (letting managers manage) and the 
attendant principles that are meant to circumscribe the managerial power and freedom enjoyed 
by managers, namely performance management and contract-based appointment. This is a 
paradoxical ‘autonomy for accountability’ trade-off that grants greater managerial power to 
managers to make decisions, while demanding that those managers adhere to more elaborated 
auditing mechanisms.210 In what follows, each of the elements of managerialism is considered 
more closely. 
 
6.6.1 Managerial autonomy 
Managerial autonomy is concerned with flattening the pyramid. It seeks to debureaucratise the 
public service as well as delayer the hierarchies within it.211 It pushes for a move from 
management by hierarchy to the transfer of administrative functions from the centre to 
administrative units. In this case, the management control is transferred to line departments or 
administrative units with the aim of improving efficiency in service delivery.212 As a result, 
those people responsible for the delivery of services are required to be proactive managers as 
opposed to being reactive administrators.213 They must be visible and hands-on managers that 
are free to manage by the use of discretionary power.214 These managers must take personal 
responsibility for their actions and decisions and must not hide behind procedural correctness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 Clarke J & Newman J The Managerial State: Power, Politics and Ideology in the Remaking of Social Welfare 
(1997) quoted in Ward SC ‘The machinations of managerialism: New public management and the diminishing 
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In essence, the transfer of powers to managers entails elevating the role of the manager in the 
bureaucracy and enabling him or her to make professional decisions. 
Polidano asserts that this feature is concerned with ‘the abolition or downgrading of many 
central personnel and financial control mechanisms’,215 which in the NPM jargon means giving 
line managers greater managerial authority and responsibility.216 Hood,217 in turn, describes this 
phenomenon as hands-on professional management, which essentially is concerned with 
letting the managers manage. The key concern here is whether public managers are free to 
manage their units in order to achieve the most efficient output. Cameron states that ‘devolving 
human resource and management functions to managers is an important component of the 
NPM’.218 Such human resource functions include the organisation and staff issues, the 
appointment, promotion and transfer of members of staff, performance management, and the 
obligations, rights and privileges of officers and employees.219 
Managerial autonomy has three main facets, namely an open skills set; wide discretion 
conferred on managers; and minimal political interference. The principle of an open skills set 
entails a movement away from the closed Weberian career system of reserving positions only 
for those with skills, qualifications and experience, towards opening up appointments to 
everyone. In this regard, a proven track record plays a critical role. The focus shifts from the 
inputs, what qualifications managers have, to outputs, what managers can do. There is greater 
emphasis on outputs as opposed to rules/procedures relating to minimum qualifications, skills, 
competencies and experience. There is flexibility or openness in hiring, all linked to the 
achievement or not of performance targets. This therefore allows for sideways or lateral entries 
into municipal administration, as opposed to the bottom-up employment practices of the 
Weberian bureaucracy. 
Wide discretion in turn relates to the strengthening of the discretionary power of managers, and 
giving subordinate levels and agencies more autonomy.220 The idea is to give line departments 
greater autonomy to promote improved service delivery by transferring such functions as 
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human resource functions to the line departments.221 It seeks to keep direct management control 
by shifting power from elected representatives to appointed managers, characterised by such 
concepts as ‘letting managers manage’ and ’strong managerial spine’.222 Letting the managers 
manage means that managers are given more resources, tasks and responsibility and greater 
discretion in how to use, perform or exercise them.223 It is envisaged that senior managers are 
given more autonomy to execute their work individually or in self-organised teams.224 
Minimal political interference, in its turn, is premised on the principle that managers must be 
free to take professional decisions and be held personally accountable for the decisions they 
take. This principle requires managers to personally account for the increased resources, tasks 
and responsibilities, which makes it less legitimate for politicians to interfere in the 
administration.225 
 
6.6.2 Performance management 
There are two central values to performance management. These relate to it being both a 
mechanism to tie managerial independence to the actual delivery of services as well as an 
accountability system for senior managers. First, according to Larbi, performance management 
relates to the entering of agreement, written and negotiated, between government and managers 
in which quantifiable targets are neatly set out for a given period of time and performance is 
measured against those targets at the end of the set period.226 This is a way of ensuring that 
they account for their exercise of the wide discretion they enjoy and are held personally 
responsible for their actions. According to Kaul, the authority devolved or decentralised to 
managers is in exchange for accountability for performance. Cameron states that this is a trade- 
off between giving managers greater autonomy and performance management. In return for 
being allowed greater autonomy, managers must be accountable for their performance through 
performance  targets.227   Senior  managers  are  expected  to  translate  policy  priorities    and 
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225 Christensen & Lægreid 2001: 10. 
226  Larbi 1999: 23. 
227 Minogue M, Polidano C & Hulme D (eds.) Beyond the New Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices 
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organisational mandates into effective departmental strategies, plans and programmes that 
ultimately deliver a better life for the people of a country.228 Furthermore, performance 
management provides ‘a link between each individual and the overall strategy of the 
organisation’.229 
Secondly, the NPM encourages extension of performance audits, both financial and 
professional, into the public sector. This comes in the place of monitoring compliance with 
rules and procedures, and insists on more transparent methods for the review of performance.230 
The core theme of this element ‘embodies the belief that public sector organisations should 
increasingly be subjected to rigorous measures of performance’, as opposed to control only for 
rule compliance.231 It signals a shift from ‘a process-oriented administration … to an output- 
oriented administration’,232 which emphasises ex post audit evaluation in checking for 
corruption and inefficiency, than ex ante controls.233 
This is what Pollitt et al. call ‘judgment by results’.234 It encourages the setting of standards 
and bench-marking and a greater use of protocols as a means of assessing professional 
performance and compliance with standards. Here the emphasis is on performance indicators, 
evaluations and performance-related pay, and quality improvement.235 Hood asserts that this 
form of accountability requires clear statement of goals, in the form of performance indicators 
and targets against which performance is measured.236 
Miller asserts that the performance management was introduced for the following reasons. 
First, it was aimed at providing an objective measure to assess managers’ performance. 
Secondly, it was aimed at determining whether the new corps of senior managers was 
performing its functions effectively. The third objective was to improve the political- 
administrative interface.237 
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Another element is customer orientation. In the Weberian bureaucracy, rules take priority over 
citizens. The NPM insists that the members of the public are transformed into consumers with 
rights in the new ‘public sector marketplace’.238 Consumers, in this regard, are no longer 
grateful, passive citizens but are actively shaping supply through their demands. Citizens are 
now put in a position of power, and the ‘public sector marketplace’ or the enterprise culture 
hinges on the notion of the ‘sovereignty’ of the customer.239 The primary consideration is the 
satisfaction of consumers, rather than the adherence to or respect for rules or procedures. 
This element is ostensibly in response to the obsessiveness with rules and procedures of the old 
bureaucracy which resulted in lack of accountability to the customers. This obsessiveness had 
the effect of ‘a lackadaisical attitude among the government personnel, who do not value the 
loss or gain of a customer, because of the monopoly they have over certain aspects of 
community activity’.240 This element, therefore, endeavours to bring in the core idea of being 
answerable to the consumer/customers, by incorporating greater service and client orientation 
among the public service providers.241 
 
6.6.3 Contract appointment 
In Weberian bureaucracy, the apathetic attitude displayed by government personnel towards 
citizens is fuelled by their secure existence or employment for life. They feel they did not owe 
citizens anything. As a result, the NPM moves to weaken job security and pension entitlements. 
The NPM pushes for a move away from a military-style public service ethic to contingent 
forms of employment such as greater flexibility in hiring and rewards and the concomitant 
weakening of job security or pension entitlements. In this regard, managers are hired on a short- 
term contract, rewarded according to their performance, and can theoretically be sacked if their 
work does not measure up.242 The civil service, based on rules and processes, is replaced by an 
individualised work system and performance contracts. Seniority has no place in the NPM 
paradigm; only merit, based on outputs, is taken into account. This has resulted in the political- 
administrative relationships being based more on individual accountability. Political    leaders 
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are supposed, through contracts, to specify targets and objectives more clearly, and 
performance should be controlled by use of quantitative indicators for monitoring results and 
for measuring efficiency.243 This removes the assured existence enjoyed by bureaucrats in the 
Weberian bureaucracy and creates incentives for time-servers to be innovative and work 
efficiently. The replacement of time-servers with innovators also means that much greater 
attention should be paid to the value-for-money principle in the use of resources. This 
introduces the element of parsimony in resource use, as will be discussed below. 
 
6.7 Discipline in resource use 
The NPM insists on an increased attention on financial controls, led by strong concerns for 
getting value-for-money, getting more from less and strengthening the finance function. Under 
this theme, public service agencies are urged to focus more on the way in which they use the 
financial and human resources at their disposal.244 Emphasis is shifted from spending to cost- 
cutting (i.e. cutting the costs of public service provisions while at the same time increasing the 
quality of such services).245 The value-for-money mentality, which is also explicable, in terms 
of getting cheaper and better public services for all, became dominant.246 In this regard, a flurry 
of elaborate cost and information systems were developed to anchor these goals. 
 
6.8 Summarising the NPM 
It has been established in the foregoing discussion that the NPM came to represent an 
alternative model of administration in the place of what it calls an anachronistic model. 
However, as mentioned previously, the NPM is not a coherent theory but rather a discrete set 
of ideas. It is an ‘empty canvas’ in which one could write whatever one wants or a shopping 
centre of management ideas closest to one’s taste. Different countries shop for contrasting ideas 
leading to variations in the form and substance of the NPM found in different countries.247 
However, the underlying theme of these variants is their reaction to the pathologies of the 
Weberian bureaucracy to which they seek to present a modern alternative. The NPM proposes 
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alternatives to each of the impugned Weberian elements, which alternatives are heavily laden 
with market considerations. 
What is clear, however, is that even NPM principles that are ostensibly a replacement of the 
Weberian principles did not produce the anticipated beneficial results. They, too, have some 
weaknesses of their own. This will be examined in the next sections. 
 
7 Criticism of the NPM 
There has been a significant shift in thinking about the effectiveness of the NPM. The 
enthusiasm for neoliberal policies brought about by the NPM between the 1980s and early 
1990s is now tempered with caution.248 It has been recognised that reforming the public sector 
through the NPM way of imposing one template of reform on all irrespective of context, does 
not lend itself to clear and unambiguous solutions. It is unwise and unimplementable and in 
some cases has bred conflict and undermined stability. The NPM has proven not to be a panacea 
in the public sector.249 
A number of criticisms have been levelled against the NPM. These range from the paradox of 
centralisation through decentralisation;250 the suitability of private sector management 
techniques in the public sector; controversy surrounding the benefits it brings; and its 
applicability in developing countries. What follows next is a detailed exposition of what each 
of these critiques entail. 
 
7.1 The paradox of centralisation through “decentralisation” 
This criticism stems from the oft-cited NPM phrases of ‘letting managers manage’, ‘strong 
managerial spine’ and ‘giving line managers greater managerial authority and responsibility’. 
The criticism in regard to these phrases relates to the phenomenon known as recentralisation, 
which is triggered by managerial autonomy. The critics of the NPM movement charge that 
empowering managers to manage programmes and budgets detracts from the accountability of 
elected politicians and distorts the lines of accountability. In this regard, it is argued that 
political executives have lost their control over the implementation of their policies following 
 
 
 
248  Larbi 1999: 35. 
249  Larbi 1999: 35. 
250 The critics treat the transfer of powers and functions to managers, thus giving managers greater managerial 
responsibility the same as decentralisation, which is not necessarily the same thing. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
69 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 
managerial reforms put in place under the banner of managerial autonomy.251 It is argued that 
this has resulted in the hunger of these political executives for more control over the public 
managers, leading to frequent interferences and meddling in managerial decision-making. 
Consequently, the public service has become more politicised following the managerial 
reforms, and the senior servants find their positions becoming more insecure due to the political 
executives' desire for more control.252 In essence, the NPM has complicated the relationship 
between executives and managers, because the politicians cannot rely on the top of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy to give instructions, as the latter is no longer in hierarchical control over 
lower-down managers who are now allowed to manage. The result is that politicians seek to 
intervene at all levels of the state bureaucracy. 
 
7.2 Applicability of private sector principles in the public sector 
The second criticism of the NPM concerns the applicability of private-sector management 
techniques in the public sector. It is argued that the principles of the private sector 
(managerialism and business models) may not be equally applicable to the public sector to 
serve as a benchmark for those in the public sector.253 Argyriades254 lends his weight to the 
critique of the introduction of market mechanisms in public administration. Kickert,255 in turn, 
points out that the NPM erroneously assumes that the public sector is not distinct from the 
private sector. Pollitt256 and Armstrong257 add that most areas of the public service and 
administration have distinct political, ethical, constitutional and social dimensions which make 
it different from the private sector. As such, it is argued that the NPM is flawed in that the 
principles it seeks to impose in the public sector are inappropriate because of contextual 
difference between the two sectors.258  The critics assert that the public sector ‘has more 
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complex objectives, more intricate accountabilities and a more turbulent political environment 
than the private sector’.259 
Moreover, the relationship between the public sector managers and their political principals is 
of a different order to any relationship in the private sector. On this score, Goodsell states the 
major criticism of the application of the business model to governance to be the fact that ‘it 
introduces privatised individual values in place of common community ideals’.260 The degree 
of freedom enjoyed in the private sector is not the same as that in the public sector. Private 
sector companies are free to lay off staff in times of recession and restructuring, while careful 
consideration must be given, in the public sector, to staff morale issues. Furthermore, the 
‘private sector is profit-oriented whereas the public sector has to be service-oriented to ensure 
societal equity’.261 Minogue262 argues that the NPM emphasis on efficiency does not comport 
with public sector values such as equity, community, democracy, citizenship and constitutional 
protection. Haque263 goes further to suggest that the NPM seeks to replace such public values 
as impartiality, equality, representation, integrity, fairness, welfare, citizenship and justice with 
business values such as efficiency, competition, profit and value for money. 
 
7.3 Failure to fulfil its promise 
The critique of the NPM in this regard is two-pronged, with both prongs relating to the 
professed NPM promise of infusing efficiency and effectiveness and lowering costs. First, the 
critics argue that instead of delivering on its central promise of lowering costs, the NPM has 
actually caused damage to the public service.264 It is argued that although the NPM claims to 
promote 'public goods' (i.e. cheaper and better public services for all), it has instead increased 
opportunities for corruption.265 The NPM is seen as promoting ‘self-interest, individualisation, 
and aggressive behaviour that tends to undermine the public ethos, the public good, and 
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integrative behaviour in public bureaucracies’.266 Minogue notes that increased managerial 
autonomy has brought with it blurred accountability and a higher predilection to corruption. 
Ha-Joon Chang267 adds that the NPM-inspired reforms have often increased corruption. This 
is due to the increased contracts between state-sector functionaries and the private sector, 
creating new opportunities for bribes and future, direct or indirect, employment in the private 
sector. Chang claims that corruption often exists because there are too many market forces.268 
Secondly, it is argued that the NPM cannot be said to be successful in infusing efficiency in 
the public service. In this regard, Drechsler states that ‘[w]e have no empirical evidence that 
the NPM reforms have led to any productivity increase or welfare maximization’.269 Van 
Mierlo in turn states that instead of efficiency gains, there is evidence in Western Europe and 
OECD countries of relative failure of the NPM paradigm.270 
Furthermore, numerous studies refute the claim that private sector organisations are always 
more efficient than public sector organisations.271 On this score, Murray states that ‘[t]he 
legend of private efficiency lives in company brochures but is seldom realised in the lives of 
the millions of [people] who fight the daily battle with insurance agencies or auto mechanics 
or TV repairments’.272 Murray concludes that there are more similarities than differences 
between the public and private sector; there is a blending and mix, with neither sector having 
‘a corner on the morals market’.273 Furthermore, a survey conducted to evaluate the public’s 
perceptions about quality of public sector services compare to private sector services found no 
significant differences in attitudes toward public and private services among respondents.274 
This led Poister and Henry to conclude that ‘the conventional wisdom that public services are 
inherently inferior to those offered by the private sector does not necessarily pervade attitudes 
toward government’.275  Goodsell, similarly, found favourable responses in numerous surveys 
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designed to solicit citizens’ ratings of governmental agencies, thus debunking the grand myth 
deeply ingrained in popular culture, that citizens are not satisfied with their governmental 
agencies.276 There are many other studies refuting the claim of private sector superiority over 
the public sector.277 
Downs and Larkey in turn found that governments are more efficient and businesses less 
efficient than popularly believed.278 Letza et al., in their turn, found that ‘the argument of 
privatisation as a vehicle for efficiency gains is a myth’.279 There are numerous other authorities 
who are highly sceptical about the success of privatisation.280 
 
7.4 Suitability for the developing countries 
The critics of the NPM’s applicability in developing countries begin by outlining some 
preconditions that are crucial for the successful application of the NPM model in transitional 
economies and developing countries. It is argued that the sophisticated, wide-ranging, 
comprehensive nature of the NPM reforms requires these preconditions for their successful 
implementation.281 These preconditions include: having an acceptable level of economic 
growth; having experience in how to manage and operate in a market environment; the 
existence of a strong judicial system to control the market and to uphold the rule of law; the 
state capacity to ensure smooth transformation from the old public administration to the NPM; 
as well as the cultural context of each country.282 
Based on those preconditions, they then postulate four criticisms in regard to the suitability of 
the NPM toolkit in developing countries. First, it is charged that the developing countries lack 
the   necessary   expertise,   managerial   capacity   and   resources   to   implement   the rather 
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sophisticated NPM reforms.283 The imposition of the NPM reforms by the IMF/World bank 
and international donor agencies (as aid conditionality) in developing countries did not take 
account of the state’s capacity in those countries, which is a ‘precondition for the successful 
implementation of the NPM reforms’.284 It is argued that developing countries may experience 
a culture shock and encountered additional layers of complexity as a result.285 
Second, there is a paradox created by the application of managerial autonomy in developing 
countries. The World Bank argues that while this NPM principle is properly applied in 
developed countries, governments in developing countries rightfully retain centralised 
decision-making.286 This is important in order to supervise developmental programmes and to 
ensure that governments are in a position to lead their weak and impoverished economies out 
of the woods. While the NPM emphasises free markets and a weak state, most developing 
countries have adopted the notion of a developmental state which is premised on a strong 
interventionist activist state, and the two cannot stand side by side.287 
Pushing for the NPM under these circumstances would mean that the leading public managers 
still retain control to make all decisions within their organisations and this can generate 
corruption and thus undermine a developmental agenda. Managerial autonomy itself provides 
greater freedom to public managers in the decentralised units than they are used to. Coupled 
with lower levels of supervision, this can create a fertile climate for corruption.288 Hughes also 
believes that the dramatic change from bureaucracy to market approach that the NPM 
advocates would contribute to a greater prevalence of corruption.289 
Third, given the reliance of the NPM on market principles, its application in public policy and 
management in developing countries might present a problem as these countries often lack the 
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necessary experience in the operation of markets.290 Sarker adds that the basic management 
infrastructure in developing countries is not developed enough to support the market-oriented 
reforms.291 Hughes points out that the rule of law is a precondition for the market to be 
effective, as it ensures compliance with contracts. Mongkol corroborates that by stating ‘[u]ntil 
capital markets develop and domestic entrepreneurs arise, a market economy may not work in 
developing countries’.292 Hughes charges that governments in developing countries usually 
find difficulty in adopting the contractual arrangements for the delivery of services owing to 
the absence of the necessary laws to enforce such contracts.293 Thus, McCurdy294 argues that 
the NPM’s attacks on the rules and regulations are misplaced, given that rules play an important 
stabilising role of structuring conduct in organisations, especially in developing countries. 
In addition to the absence of the necessary laws to enforce contracts, some authors are of the 
view that contract appointments cannot work in developing countries. They say that given the 
general skills shortage in developing countries, it is burdensome having a contract system as it 
usually leads to the haemorrhaging of scarce skills.295 The short-term nature of these contracts 
translates to a rapid turnover of managers and concomitant failures of accountability. Managers 
often move on at the end of the contract and fail to account for problems they might have 
created.296 Furthermore, the short-term contracts lead to greater political control over senior 
officials.297 The same ‘capacity’ argument applies to privatisation in developing countries. 
Moreover, privatisation might inevitably lead to foreign ownership or ownership by one 
particular ethnic group, and this might derail the developmental project of developing countries 
or even worst, pose a risk to social cohesion.298 
The fourth critique relates to the cultural ecology of each country and the NPM’s Anglo Saxon 
origins and the extent to which it was created in the context of that culture and its history.299 In 
this regard, the critique goes, an aspect of the NPM that might be useful in one developing 
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country might not necessarily be useful for another developing country.300 The one-size-fits- 
all approach of the NPM to public sector reform is problematic. Hughes contends that it should 
be considered that despite the success and improvement that the NPM can bring to the public 
sector, it could also result in reducing the performance of the public sector and even political 
instability.301 Thus Bowornwathana claims that when the NPM techniques are imposed on 
developing countries or when developing countries borrow them from developed countries, a 
detailed look at politico-social environment must be had.302 
 
4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the two theories of effective public administration that dominated the 
discourse on the reform of the public service from the early twentieth century to date, namely 
the Weberian model and the NPM. Key themes that emerged in this discussion are as follows. 
First, Weberian bureaucracy calls for the specialisation of tasks in that it creates a clear division 
of work with clear job descriptions. It creates a set of jurisdictional areas to which the needed 
activities are assigned as duties. These duties cannot be performed just by anyone; they require 
thorough training in a specialised area. Secondly, it calls for meritocratic recruitment. Entry 
into the organisation is based on a set of courses of training and usually on performance on 
prescribed examinations. Recruitment is based on merit, not on election or patronage. The main 
aim of this merit system is to prevent such things as partisan political interference in decision- 
making and their implementation. The hallmark of this system is neutral competence, with 
competence achieved through a system of hiring the best and the brightest for the positions. As 
a result, officials are not beholden to anyone for their jobs, they themselves worked hard for 
them. This improves their professional independence. 
Thirdly, the professional independence of officials is insulated from the tug and pull of societal 
interests. They have the security of tenure that goes with a handsome salary and a pension. 
Working for the organisation is a full-time occupation, not a secondary activity to be exploited 
for rents or emoluments in exchange for the rendering of certain services. This is meant to 
insulate the officials from personal consideration and rent-seeking tendencies. Fourthly, 
Weberian bureaucracy advocates for a strict separation between politics and    administration. 
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Accordingly, politicians should be confined to legislative and electoral processes (era et 
studium). Officials, on the other hand, should stay out of politics. They should perform their 
administrative tasks neutrally. They should follow the instructions of their political masters to 
point of self-denial. As such, the Weberian bureaucracy reinforces specialisation, meritocracy, 
professional independence and adherence to ethical standards, which are some of the elements 
of professionalisation. 
The NPM, first, pushes for flexible human resource practices. This leads to a recruitment 
criterion that is rather ambiguous, the focus being on track record as opposed to qualifications. 
The NPM puts emphasis on business techniques. Furthermore, it pushes for short-term contract 
appointment as opposed to career appointments. Here, appointment is linked to performance 
or outputs, and failure to meet the agreed upon outputs results in failure to renew the contract 
at the end of its term. It is argued that this form of insecurity of tenure is meant to weed the 
system of time-servers and introduce innovators 
Secondly, it pushes for deregulation and taking over of government services by the market. 
The argument in this score goes thus: ‘private businesses can manage efficiently because they 
are not encumbered with the rules and regulations of merit systems and they can hire the 
workers they need in an efficient labour market’.303 Thirdly, the NPM decentralises a number 
functions and then give more power to the managers. A lot of implementing discretion is 
delegated to lower levels in the production of goods and services, particularly to those closest 
to service delivery. Managers are, as a result, given greater control over hiring and firing 
personnel as well as the discretion on how money must be spent in order to accomplish policy 
objectives. The short-term contracts are then used for greater political control over senior 
officials. 
The following table compares and contrasts the key elements of both these models. What is 
clear, however, is that these models cannot operate side by side in their original form; they 
contradict each other. In order for them to stand together some elements of both will have to 
be discarded. 
The manifestations of the Weberian model and its toolkit in South Africa is the subject of the 
next chapter, chapter three. It will be shown in chapter three that the traditional Weberian 
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approach was in operation in South African local government since the colonial era, but was 
brought to fruition only in the dying days of apartheid. 
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Comparing and contrasting Weberian bureaucracy and the NPM 
 
 
 
 Weberian bureaucracy the NPM 
1. Hierarchy of authority 
 Positions are arranged in a pyramidal fashion, with each 
position responsible to the one above 
 Monocratic – its apex is one person, not a college 
 Creation of posts must start from the top and move down 
 Resources are also assigned from the top to officials and 
offices, in order to facilitate the cascading command system 
 A firmly ordered system of super- and subordination – 
supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones 
Managerial autonomy 
 Flattening of the pyramid 
 Transfer of administrative functions 
 Giving line managers greater managerial authority 
(letting managers manage) 
 Hands-on professional management 
 Personal responsibility for actions 
2. Application of impersonal rules 
 Office governed by general rules which are more or less 
stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned 
 Officials to treat their subjects impersonally without respect 
to person or status 
 Decision-making based on application of standardised rules 
to similar situations 
Achieving desired outcomes 
 Rules are flexible to allow the achievement of outcomes 
 Provision of services governed by market principles 
 Use market mechanisms to improve performance in the 
public sector, through competition and a tender system 
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  Abstract and general, applying equally to every bureaucrat 
or person, not according to individual privileges and 
bestowals of favour 
 
3. Employment for life 
 Bureaucratic jobs are for life and carry a right to a pension 
and some security against arbitrary dismissal 
 Guarantee discharge of duties free from all personal 
considerations 
 Promotion by next in line or seniority, not merit 
 Salaries relate to status not performance 
 Salary measured, not like a wage in terms of work done, but 
according to the rank and length of service, thus making the 
office a sought-after position 
Short-term contracts 
• Short-term appointments (flexible rules on tenure) 
 Appointment is linked to performance or outputs – failure 
to meet the agreed-upon outputs results in failure to 
renew the contract at the end of its term 
 Greater emphasis on outputs than rules or procedures and 
compliance 
 Performance-related pay schemes – bonus and incentives 
4. Qualifications-linked meritocratic 
 Office holding is a vocation 
 Merit determined through training and a prescribed 
special examination – prerequisites of employment 
 Officials owe their positions to examinations and 
diplomas certifying their professional qualifications 
 Bottom-up career system 
Performance based meritocracy 
 Office-holding is not a final career 
 Hiring is not based on certification but looks at track 
record 
 No bottom-up career advancement – introduce personnel 
from the top or sideways 
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  Appointed because of their qualifications (meritocracy), 
not because of their ancestry, race or native personal 
gifts 
 
5. Specialisation or division of labour 
 Each office has a well-defined sphere of competence or 
duties which are assigned to each position, as opposed to 
being assigned to a person 
 Officials are grouped in bureaux, departments and ministries 
 Emphasis is on the positions rather than on persons 
 Office-holding is a duty of faithful management – it is not 
considered a source of income nor a usual exchange of 
services for equivalents 
 Separation of public and private life in terms of interests and 
finances – an office does not become one’s own property 
Marketisation 
 Privatisation 
 Creating corporatised units or service delivery agencies 
based on business principles 
 Public-private partnerships 
 Controlled through contracts 
 Shift of functions to external bodies 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
The Rise and Peaking of the Weberian Model of Service Delivery 
in South African Local Government 
1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the manifestations of the Weberian model of service delivery in South 
Africa. It takes this discussion from the period of the unification of the four South African 
colonies – which saw the creation of a three-tier unitary system of government, with central 
state, four provinces and single-tier local government – to the end of formal apartheid in South 
Africa. However, as noted in Chapter Two, the existence of this model of delivery predates 
Max Weber. He did not formulate a new theory or come up with new concepts; he simply 
described what already existed in his immediate environment and elsewhere. This chapter, 
therefore, goes back to the pre-union period, i.e. the colonial period, to trace the roots of what 
existed in South Africa during the period under discussion. It, therefore, lays a foundation by 
a discussion of the colonial manifestations of the ideal type bureaucracy which was later 
theorised by Weber in the twentieth century. 
The discussion will show that some traces of the early manifestations of the model as later 
theorised by Weber could be seen in South Africa, emanating from Britain and the Netherlands, 
as far back as the colonial era. It complied with what later became the Weberian toolkit. The 
concept of outsourcing and corporatisation never featured in discussions before 1988. Local 
government alone was responsible for service delivery through its personnel, thus 
implementing the full Weberian model of service delivery. However, the Weberian model had 
a slow acceptance in the Union and the Apartheid parliaments, only peaking in the dying days 
of the apartheid era. In what follows, some early traces of the Weberian toolkit will be 
highlighted, to give context to the discussion that will follow on the manifestation of Weberian 
bureaucracy in South Africa from 1910 to 1994. 
 
2 Pre-Union manifestations of the Weberian model 
From the 1800s to 1910 the colonial administration displayed the basic elements of the 
Weberian bureaucracy. There was strict hierarchy, compliance with rules and regulations was 
strictly enforced, there was specialisation of tasks, and only qualified officials were appointed 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
80 
Chapter Three 
 
 
 
 
as governors or their aides.1 The security of tenure element was similarly manifest. Cloete notes 
that this is probably why the British empire was considered ‘one of the most wonderful pieces 
of human administration the world has ever seen’.2 However, the focus of this study is on local 
administration, to which I now turn. 
Local government in South Africa largely owes its origins to the colonial history of the country, 
mainly the British influences. Initially, villages in the Cape colony, where local government 
originated, were so small that there was no need for the creation of separate government 
institutions for them. The central government of the Cape Colony took care of the needs of the 
residents in villages and small towns falling within its jurisdiction.3 However, as the population 
grew, a need arose for an authority to exercise control, resolve conflicts and render some 
essential services of a local nature which affected the daily lives of local citizens.4 The 
rendering of these essential services by colonial officials was becoming unsatisfactory as those 
officials used central/national standards, not the peculiar needs and circumstances of a 
particular locality. This necessitated a need for separate government institutions to ensure that 
each local community was governed and administered with proper recognition of its unique 
characteristics and true needs.5 This separate structure would mean that local citizens were 
involved in the determination of policies, as well as their implementation, for the provision of 
local public goods and services.6 
Few elementary structures emerged in the Cape colony as early as 1685. However, the first real 
structure with an elected council, which marked the distinct form of local government as we 
know it today, was introduced in 1836 with the passing of Municipal Ordinance 9 of 1836 for 
the Cape Colony.7 It was modelled on the form of local government developed in England.8 
This Ordinance laid a foundation for a system of local government with an elected council, 
comparable  to  present-day  councils,  when  it  took  effect  on  15  August  1836.9   The first 
 
 
 
 
1 Binza SM ‘The evolution of South African local governments: The politics of memory’ (2005) 30(2) Journal 
for Contemporary History 72 (hereafter Binza 2005). 
2  Cloete 1986: 22. 
3  Binza 2005: 72. 
4 Cloete JJN Central, Provincial, and Municipal Institutions of South Africa (1982) 241 (hereafter Cloete 1982). 
5  Cloete 1986: 10. See also Cloete 1982: 241. 
6  Cloete 1982: 241. 
7  Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 1-3. 
8 English Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. 
9 Tsatsire I, Raga K & Taylor JD et al. ‘Historical overview of specific local government transformatory 
developments in South Africa’ (2009) 57(1) New Contree 130 (hereafter Tsatsire et al. 2009). 
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Municipal Council ever to be elected in South Africa was that of Beaufort-West in 1837 
followed by that of Cape Town in 1840.10 
This model was replicated, with some modifications, first in the annexed Natal in 184711 and 
later in the two Boer Republics, in 1856 (Orange Free State), and 1883 (in Transvaal).12 These 
laws provided for the election of councillors (known then as commissioners) who had to serve 
as members of the municipal council. Only the property owners were eligible to participate in 
such election. Furthermore, only persons who paid property taxes could be elected as 
councillors.13 However, among these minor modifications to the Cape Municipal Ordinance, 
the Natal Municipal Ordinance marked a significant improvement from the earlier Ordinance 
that was passed in the Cape. According to Craythorne,14 this newer legislation brought into 
being, for the first time in South Africa, the following concepts: 
 towns were constituted as corporate bodies; 
 
 representatives were elected by voters registered on a voters' roll; 
 
 the councils decided on a local tax levied on property, which had been valued (rates); 
 
 auditors had to be appointed; 
 
 the Town Clerk and senior officials were appointed and not elected at a public meeting; 
and 
 the committee system was introduced.15 
 
Craythorne further notes that these developments in Natal were so advanced that it can be safely 
said that what happened in Natal influenced the development of local government in the whole 
of South Africa.16 
Ordinance 9 of 1836 introduced structures and systems of governance which included the 
council, a weak mayoral system, various committee systems, the career system, town   clerks, 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Marais D South Africa Constitutional Development: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach (1989) 89 (hereafter Marais 
1989). 
11  Natal Municipal Ordinance 5 of 1847. 
12 Green LP History of Local Government in South Africa (1957) 21 (hereafter Green 1957). 
13  Green 1957: 19. 
14 Craythorne DL Municipal Administration: The Handbook (2003) 10 (hereafter Craythorne 2003). 
15 Craythorne 2003: 10. 
16 Craythorne DL Municipal Administration: The Handbook (1997) 2 (hereafter Craythorne 1997). 
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and the Westminster system in the local authorities.17 These structures entailed the following 
principles. First, it established a hierarchy of authority. In the administration, the Ordinance 
provided for the appointment, by the council, of a secretary (town clerk), treasurer and other 
officers provided for in the regulations to constitute the municipal administration.18 From these 
structures emerged a hierarchy of authority, with the Town Clerks at the apex, followed by the 
treasurers and other officers provided for in the regulations. 
Secondly, local governance was to be conducted in terms of rules and regulations. The Cape 
Ordinance, which was replicated in other regions, provided a framework within which 
municipal regulations and by-laws were drawn up, catering for the diverse needs of 
municipalities. It provided scope for the local inhabitants to use their initiative in terms of 
public participation. 
Thirdly, a system of specialised tasks was introduced. Binza contends that the transformation 
process undertaken by the Cape Ordinance was that the performance of functions of public 
servants were stipulated in the acts, ordinances and by-laws.19 Contrary to their English 
counterparts, the municipal councillors at the Cape were allocated a wide range of 
responsibilities. In terms of the Cape Ordinance, the councillors were empowered to appoint 
street watchmen, to provide fire engines, to erect lamp posts, to lay water pipes, to erect bridges, 
reservoirs and fountains, to keep streets in good repair, to establish markets, to enforce 
regulations on weights and measures, to enter into contracts for work and materials, to dispose 
of municipal property and to abate public nuisances.20 Out of these powers and functions 
developed offices such as electrical engineering divisions (responsible for street lighting and 
the like), civil engineering divisions (responsible for laying water pipes, erecting bridges, 
reservoirs and fountains), and fire brigade division (for the provision of fire engines). 
Fourthly, the administrators were salaried and given security of tenure. Municipal officials 
were entitled to some form of remuneration. For example, the municipality of Cape Town, 
established in terms of Ordinance 1 of 1840, paid its town clerks (then referred to as secretary), 
their treasurer and their bookkeeper a salary of 200 British pounds a year each.21 Their term 
 
 
 
17  Binza 2005: 72. 
18  Green 1957: 24. 
19  Binza 2005: 73. 
20   Warren  D  Merchants,  Commissioners  and  Wardmasters:  Municipal  Politics  in  Cape  Town, 1840-1854 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Cape Town, 1986) 14. 
21  Green 1957: 22. 
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did not coincide with the term of the councillors, which was for a maximum of two years (one 
year in some cases). They stayed in office for consecutive terms and therefore enjoyed some 
fixity of tenure.22 
Fifthly, the principle of skills and meritocracy was slowly established. This resulted in the 
appointment of well-qualified, trained, and experienced English males occupying senior 
positions in the higher echelons of all South African municipalities.23 For appointment 
purposes, qualifications and previous experience played a significant role.24 Most of the 
officials had qualifications and already had work experience from the United Kingdom and 
other parts of the world. Only a few of these officials were university trained engineers; almost 
all of them had been trained through apprenticeship.25 Essentially, the element of the Weberian 
bureaucracy relating to merit was met. 
 
3 Weberian principles in local government 
3.1 Local government in white areas 
As could be seen from the background above, the systems of local government and 
administration which developed in Natal and the two Boer Republics were based on the Cape 
model. However, each of the systems in these territories gradually developed its own flavour 
and characteristics as influenced by local social, political and physical realities.26 The 
developments in Natal, for example, markedly improved on the Cape model and introduced 
new notions in the system of local government and administration. However, even though the 
differences were evident for all to see, the basic principles and structures formulated in the 
Cape were not tempered with in any fundamental way. 
 
3.1.1 Rules and regulations 
When the Union of South Africa was established, the provisions of the constitutive Act, the 
South Africa Act, 1909, sought to maintain the status quo ante in terms of which all institutions 
 
 
 
 
22  Green 1957: 24. 
23 Binza MS An Evaluation of Policies for Attaining Excellence in Service Delivery in the Port Elizabeth 
Municipality (unpublished Master’s thesis, Port Elizabeth Technikon, 2000) 73. 
24 Mäki H & Haarhoff J ‘Municipal engineers in Johannesburg and Pretoria before 1910’ (2009) 5(2) The Journal 
for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 126 (hereafter Mäki & Haarhoff 2009). 
25 Mäki and Haarhiff 2009: 123. 
26  Cloete 1982: 242. 
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that existed before the Union were retained, ensuring that each of the four colonies (which 
became provinces) continued to develop their own distinctive system of local government. The 
power to legislate on municipal matters was conferred on the provincial councils in terms of 
the South African Act of 1909.27 
The provincial councils in all the four provinces passed a series of ordinances in their respective 
provinces to regulate the system of municipal government and administration.28 In most cases 
the provincial councils passed legislation on general aspects of municipal governance and 
administration and, where necessary, on specific aspects. Examples of ordinances dealing with 
general aspects included the Natal Municipal Ordinance 11 of 1918; the Transvaal Local 
Government Ordinance 9 of 1912; the Cape Municipal Ordinance 10 of 1912; and the Orange 
Free State Local Government Ordinance 4 of 1913. The Transvaal Local Authorities Rating 
Ordinance 6 of 1912, Transvaal Municipal Elections Ordinance 8 of 1912, Cape Divisional 
Councils and Roads Ordinance 13 of 1917, City of Cape Town Unification Ordinance 19 of 
1913 and the Natal Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949 are examples of ordinances dealing 
with specific aspects of local government. 
The crux of the matter is that local authorities were created by laws passed by provincial 
authorities, which defined the scope of their local jurisdiction. In all provinces, detailed 
procedures and conditions were prescribed for 
 the creation of municipalities or other local authorities, 
 
 election of municipal councils, 
 
 structures of local authorities, 
 
 their powers and functions, 
 
 their administration and staff establishment; and 
 
 their finances. 
 
There was little, if at all, that was left unregulated by provincial councils. 
 
Moreover, municipal councils were also empowered to pass by-laws which were subject to 
assent by the provincial Administrators.29  The provincial ordinances also prescribed   specific 
 
 
 
27 Section 85 South African Act, 1909. 
28  Cloete 1982: 243. 
29  Cloete 1982: 244. 
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functions which were entrusted to local authorities. Section 72 of the Transvaal Ordinance 9 of 
1912 and Chapter X of the Natal Local Authorities Ordinance 25 of 1970 provided that the 
municipal council may make, alter and revoke by-laws on a large number of specified subjects. 
These were the matters on which the council could make by-laws to supplement provisions of 
the relevant provincial ordinances and to provide for the manner in which local authorities 
could deal with these functions. The by-laws passed by municipal councils on those matters 
entrusted to local authorities were still subject to the approval of the provincial Administrator.30 
The procedure for making/passing these by-laws was also prescribed. In essence, municipal 
government and administration took place within the limits laid down by the provisions of 
either the act of Parliament or ordinances passed by provincial councils and its own by-laws 
and rules of orders.31 
In sum, there were numerous rules and regulation with which to comply and the provincial 
Administrators, or municipal councils and their committees ensured rigid compliance with 
those regulations. Municipal councils were required to give directions to their officials about 
the manner in which the provisions of the relevant legislation, ordinances and by-laws were to 
be carried out. They also had a duty to supervise the activities of municipal officials in order 
to ensure strict adherence to rules and regulations.32 Similarly, provincial councils had a 
responsibility to oversee the performance by municipalities of their function. Nothing could be 
done without their approval or instigation. Moreover, failure to comply with statutory 
provisions was met with sanction. Given that local authorities were creatures of statutes, it was 
easy for provincial councils to disestablish them at will on account of failure to toe the line. 
This fact made it possible for provincial councils to hold local authorities on a tight leash. 
 
3.1.2 Hierarchy of authority 
Before discussing the internal hierarchy within the municipal administration, it is worth noting 
that the councillors served on a part-time basis and the mayor of a local government institution 
was merely primus inter pares with no executive or administrative functions. He or she was 
merely a ceremonial head of the council.33 This allowed much more discretion to 
administration,  especially  the  town  clerks  who  were  the  head  of  the  administration and 
 
 
 
 
30  Cloete 1982: 256. 
31  Cloete 1982: 255. 
32  Cloete 1982: 257. 
33  Cloete 1982: 254. 
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sometimes designated the chief administrative and/or executive officer of the council. A typical 
structure of a white local authority is shown in the figure below. 
Figure 1: Hierarchy within white local authorities 
 
 
 
3.1.2.1 Town Clerks 
The provincial councils in all four provinces provided for the administration of the 
municipalities. In Transvaal, for example, section 58 of Local Government Ordinance 9 of 
1912 provides that 
[t]he council shall from time to time appoint a town clerk and a medical officer 
of health … and may also appoint such other officers as it may consider 
necessary and may pay such salaries and allowances to any such officers as it 
may determine. 
Section 62 of the Local Government (Administration and Elections) Ordinance 50 of 1990 
contains similar provisions. In Natal, section 199(1) of the Local Authorities Ordinance 25 of 
1974 provided that a 
council shall appoint a town clerk and another person as a treasurer … The 
council shall also appoint a medical officer of health and a sanitary inspector 
… and may appoint such other officers and servants as it may consider 
necessary. 
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In the Orange Free State and the Cape Province, it is section 67(1) of the Local Government 
Ordinance 8 of 1962 and section 60 of the Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974, respectively, that 
provided for the appointment of these officials by the council. 
The town clerk was the head of the administration and sometimes designated the chief 
administrative and/or executive officer of the council. However, no details were given of the 
functions which the town clerk had to perform in his capacity as chief administrative and 
executive officer. It was only in 1961, with the coming into operation of the Transvaal Local 
Government (Administration and Elections) Ordinance 40 of 1960, that a first real attempt at 
an exposition in law of the functions of the town clerk as chief administrative officer was 
made.34  Section 65(1) of the Transvaal Ordinance provided that the town clerk 
(i.) shall be charged with and responsible to the management 
committee for the proper carrying out of all the directions of 
the council and the management committee, the co- 
ordination of the activities of the council, and the general 
supervision, control and the efficiency of the administration, 
organisation and management of the council’s departments, 
sections or branches; and 
(ii.) shall be responsible for all communication between the 
management committee and the council’s departments, 
section or branches. 
This clearly indicated that the town clerk, who was also head of the administration or the chief 
administrative and executive officer, was at the apex of the hierarchy at local administration 
level. This role was also affirmed in the Cape Province in the case of Uitenhage Municipality 
v Uys.35 In this case the town clerk, acting without the prior authorisation of the council, had 
given a lessee notice to vacate by 1 June 1972. The action was subsequently authorised by a 
council resolution on 15 November 1971. The court held that ex post ratification of the notice 
could be effected at any time before the stipulated period of notice began to run. Cloete J said: 
[I]n a multitude of ways the town clerk acts and is required to act as the chief 
administrative officer of the town council. It is in my view an untenable 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Cloete JJN Provincial and Municipal Government and Administration: Selected Readings (1978): 226 
(hereafter Cloete 1978). 
35  1974 (3) SA 800 (E). 
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argument that his unauthorised acts on behalf of the council could not be 
subsequently ratified by his principal.36 
The foregoing discussion, therefore, places the town clerk functionally at the top of the 
hierarchy and only responsible to management committee and/or council as his or her political 
principals. 
 
3.1.2.2 Head of departments 
The multiple committee system that was in operation in some municipalities made it difficult 
for town clerks to function as chief administrative officers. The office of the town clerk was 
relegated to the position of primus inter pares as these multiple committees of the council 
developed a practice of linking up directly with the heads of departments of the municipal 
administration instead of working through the town clerk.37 To ensure that the town clerk was 
a principal officer of his council and that he was the only communication channel between the 
council and other officials, section 65(2) of the Transvaal Ordinance provided that 
every head of a department [should], except in respect of such functions, duties 
or powers as [were] conferred or imposed on him by virtue of any other law, 
be subordinate and responsible to the town clerk for the proper management 
of the department entrusted to such head. 
This, therefore, placed the heads of departments functionally below the town clerk. 
Furthermore, section 60(3) of the Cape Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974 states that the town 
clerk or a departmental head may, in the exercise of his powers and the performance of his 
duties and functions, act through any employee under his control. This creates a hierarchy with 
the town clerk on top, heads of departments below him and any other employees under the head 
of department’s control at the bottom. 
 
3.1.3 Meritocracy 
For the better part of the period under review (1910-1994) and until the late 1980s, the personal 
qualities and qualifications for the positions of the town clerks and treasurers38 were nowhere 
in South Africa prescribed in law. Whereas local and provincial authorities could not  appoint 
 
 
 
36  At para. 45. 
37  Cloete 1978: 224. 
38 The positions of the town clerk and town treasurer were sometimes held by one person. The Cape Municipal 
Ordinance 19 of 1951 and Ordinance 20 of 1974 provide that every council shall appoint a town clerk, a treasurer 
and such other employees as may be necessary, and allow that the office of town clerk and treasurer may be held 
by one person. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
89 
Chapter Three 
 
 
 
 
candidates without appropriate qualifications as carpenters, electricians, plumbers, health 
inspectors, engineers, etc., they did so for the position of town clerk. In fact, almost all the 
heads of departments, excepting the city/town treasurer, had to have appropriate qualifications 
before being appointed to such departments as the city/town civil engineer, city/town electrical 
engineer, city/town planner, and the medical officer. They made sure that they got the right 
people who were qualified for these positions. 
However, from 1910 to 1988 the authorities were prepared to appoint individuals, without 
adequate qualifications, as chief officers39 for all the above-mentioned departments as well as 
the treasurers. These were not even conditional appointments that subjected the employment 
of such individuals to on-the-job prescribed training. They were just appointed from clerical 
grades and were left to fend for themselves.40 Essentially, there were no specific educational 
qualifications attached to the position of town clerks by provincial authorities. Each municipal 
council was free to determine its own requirements. 
This situation was somewhat salvaged, informally, by the Institute of Town Clerks of Southern 
Africa and the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, which operated on a 
voluntary basis but required their members to be in possession of a university degree or 
diploma, as seen hereunder. 
 
3.1.3.1 The Institute of Town Clerks of Southern Africa 
The Institute of Town Clerks of Southern Africa (the Institute), formed in November 1946, was 
a voluntary association aimed at promoting and improving the technical and professional 
knowledge of town clerks. Their knowledge and competence was then tested by examinations 
prescribed by the Institute.41 To this end, the Institute approved a syllabus in 1948 which 
consisted of courses offered by the Institute and others taken at any university for degree or 
non-degree purposes. To be a member of the Institute, a candidate had to be: 
1) an Associate, 
2) a Fellow, 
3) a white person, and 
 
 
 
 
39 That is, the chief administrative officers. 
40  Cloete 1978: 231. 
41 Craythorne DL The Role of the Town Clerk in Municipal Government in South Africa (unpublished MPub 
Thesis, Univeristy of Cape Town, 1977) 130 (hereafter Craythorne 1977). 
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4) elected by the Institute Council.42 
Eligibility for election as an Associate required one to be 21 years of age or older, to have 
passed the Final Examination of the Institute, and either be a town clerk or have been employed 
in an administrative position on the staff of the town clerk for not less than five years. In 
addition, the Institute Council must certify him fit and proper for election. 
To be eligible for election as a Fellow, one had to be an Associate who was also a town clerk 
with no less than ten years’ experience in a town clerk’s department.43 He ought to also satisfy 
the Institute Council that the nature of his duties as a town clerk justified his election as a 
Fellow. 
There were also Special Class members, who might have been elected by the Institute Council 
as Fellows or Associates. This category was open to those who, although town clerks or on the 
staff of a town clerk, did not meet the above requirements of having been Associates, Fellows, 
and elected by the Institute Council. It was also open to those whose duties were similar to 
those of the town clerk. However, there was a proviso that persons in the Special Class category 
are not entitled to vote.44 
The membership requirements suggest that the Institute was catering for town clerks already 
in the employ of a local authority only. This means that one had to be employed by a local 
authority as a town clerk or in the office of the town clerk for a number of years45 first before 
the Institute could consider admitting him as a member. Essentially, the Institute was 
established to remedy the neglect of central and provincial authorities of not prescribing 
specific educational qualifications to the post of the town clerks and of at least encouraging 
local authorities to adopt appropriate educational levels for their chief administrative and 
executive officers. 
 
3.1.3.2 Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants 
Given that the office of the town clerk and that of the city/town treasurer were sometimes held 
by one person, the same disdain with which the office of the town clerk was treated was also 
extended to the office of the city/town treasurer. No particular form of study for qualification 
was required for the municipal finance official in South Africa. As was the case with town 
 
 
 
42 Craythorne 1977: 135. 
43 Craythorne 1977: 135. 
44 Craythorne 1977: 135. 
45 Five years or more in the case of an Associate and ten years and above for Fellows. 
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clerks, this void was somehow filled by the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants 
of South Africa (IMTA) which set qualification requirements for the positions of city/town 
treasurer and city/town accountant. 
IMTA was formed in 1929, with the aim to enhance the technical ability of municipal finance 
officials in South Africa.46 This body initially designed a Diploma curriculum which was 
offered at local lecture schemes and correspondence institutions.47 IMTA thereafter 
administered its own admission examinations for different levels of candidates. It was a 
condition of entry to all examinations that a candidate must be white, must register as a student 
member of IMTA and must have been employed on a full time basis in a Finance Department 
of a local authority.48 
IMTA’s curriculum changed a number of times in response to the needs of its members. First, 
the changes of 1972 brought a graduate status to IMTA’s qualifications.49 The new curriculum 
contained fourteen prescribed university courses offered by the University of South Africa and 
other residential universities.50 However, a candidate still had to write admission examinations 
after obtaining the fourteen courses. All the other conditions relating to race, student 
membership and continuous service in a Finance Department remained unchanged. The last 
change took place in the early 1980s and any one of the following degrees formed part of the 
curriculum: Bachelor of Commerce, Bachelor of Accounting Science, Bachelor of 
Accountancy, Bachelor of Business Science, or a degree approved by the Institute Council. 
The admission exams also fell away, signalling the formal acceptance of a general degree as a 
qualification for associate membership with relatively minor adaptations like the inclusion of 
five core courses and Accounting III Local Government. 
However, given that these Institutes operated on a voluntary basis, meaning that town clerks 
and town treasures/accountants were not obliged to become members and the standards set by 
these Institutes were not enforceable, the skills vacuum persisted for some town clerks. These 
standards were only enforceable, and effective for career advancement, to those officials who 
volunteered to be members. Thus until 1988, as will be seen in section 4.3 below, the system 
that operated was not meritocratic in the Weberian sense of the word. There was no emphasis 
 
 
 
46  De Lange 2009: 6. 
47 Cowden JW A History of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants: 1929-1989 (1993) 31 
(hereafter Cowden 1993). 
48  Cowden 1993: 20. 
49  Cowden 1993: 35. 
50  Cowden 1993: 34. 
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on qualifications or inputs. Side way entries to senior position as opposed to bottom up entry 
were the order of the day. Local authorities continued to employ people with no qualifications 
outside the Institute to the position of a town clerk. 
It took hard lobbying by the Institute for local councils to appoint appropriately educated and 
trained individuals as town clerks/treasurers or to encourage those that were in the employ of 
local authorities to become members of these Institutes for further training. It was only then 
that local councils started appointing Associates from the Institutes. As such, the importance 
of being a member was that preference was given to them when local authorities appointed 
people to the position of town clerk/treasurer. The stringent membership requirements of the 
Institutes made their members attractive because of their supposed technical and professional 
knowledge as well as their experience, and the knowledge that the Institutes enforced strict 
ethical code on its members. 
These Institutes therefore served as an in-service or on the job training mechanism for local 
authorities, though on a voluntary basis. Only those officials who wanted to enhance their 
performance and gain a bit of respect and prestige from peers became members. It was a matter 
of choice. There was no hard rule in this regard until 1988 when these Institutes were given 
statutory public recognition, putting an end to the voluntary nature of membership of these 
Institutes. 
 
3.1.4 Specialisation of tasks 
As has been noted already, municipal governance and administration took place within the 
limits laid down by acts of Parliament and ordinances passed by provincial councils. Local 
authorities were, therefore, obliged to perform only those functions prescribed for them by acts 
of Parliament and provincial ordinances. As also noted, each provincial council passed 
ordinances which provided for the creation of local authorities. These same ordinances detailed 
the specific matters which were entrusted to local government. In this regard, the provincial 
ordinances usually contained a long list of matters on which the local authorities might act. The 
typical functions on which almost all local authorities would always have to act included 
streets,  parks  or  other  open  spaces,  provision  of  water  and  electricity,  rubbish removal, 
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sewerage disposal, storm water drainage, traffic control, environmental health, and town 
planning.51 
The beginning of the formal recognition of specialisation occurred in the creation, by each 
council, of a number of functional departments/division for the performance of these 
functions.52 There was typically a town clerk’s department or division headed by the town clerk, 
treasurer’s department, city or town civil engineer’s department, city or town electrical 
engineer’s department, parks and recreation’s department, and a department of a medical 
officer of health53  to which the above matters or functions were allocated.54 
For the purposes of staffing, the work of these departments/divisions was divided into jobs or 
posts or offices so that decisions regarding recruitment, selection, placement, training, 
promotion and remuneration could be based on those jobs/posts/offices. This exercise entailed 
demarcating units of work which would be within the physical and mental abilities of 
individuals to staff these departments. An inventory of the tasks which were to be performed 
in a specific office was then compiled in such a manner that the requirements for the 
performance of each task were clear and the measurement of the extent of work to be done was 
undertaken. Then the experience, skills and qualifications necessary to do the work were 
determined.55 
This was then followed by the creation of a formal personnel establishment, in other words, a 
posts structure with hierarchy or ranking of posts within the department/division on the basis 
of demands made to the incumbent of the job. This was indispensable for the preparation of 
budgets. An establishment for each department was required so that personnel could be 
recruited to specific positions that they would specialise in.56 
In smaller municipalities, personnel officers (officers dividing tasks and establishing the posts 
structures) were usually the town clerks and/or one of their subordinates. In larger 
municipalities, a personnel officer had to be appointed to deal with all these issues. However, 
a trend developed in the cities where a service commission was created. For instance, the 
 
 
 
51  Cloete 1982: 256. 
52 Craythorne 1982: 9. 
53 Medical officers are only mentioned for the purposes of the discussion on specialisation of tasks. They are not 
discussed further. 
54  Cloete 1982: 261. 
55 Cloete JJN Personal Administration (1985) 100 (hereafter Cloete 1985). 
56 Cloete JJN Personnel Administration and Management (1997) 143 (hereafter Cloete 1997). 
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Durban Extended Powers Consolidated Ordinance 18 of 1976 provided, among other things, 
for the establishment of the Municipal Service Commission consisting of not less than three 
members appointed by the Administrator.57 The city council could, therefore, delegate some of 
its personnel powers to its Municipal Service Commission.58 In the Cape Town city council, 
the Municipality of Cape Town Administration Ordinance 24 of 1965 applied. Its provisions 
enjoined the Administrator of the Cape Province to appoint the members of the Municipal 
Service Commission for Cape Town, consisting of the chairman and three other members. Of 
the three men, one was nominated by the city council, one by the South African Association of 
Municipal Employees (SAAME as it then was, now IMATU), and one by the Cape Town 
Municipal Workers Union. Section 19 of the Ordinance prescribed the function of the 
commission.59 
The municipal service commissions established for Pretoria and Johannesburg were not 
provided for in provincial ordinances, as was the case elsewhere. Instead, they were established 
in terms of the regulations passed by the city councils pursuant to sections 62 and 80(2) of the 
Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939, regulations which were subject to the approval of 
the Administrator.60 
Personnel matters were, therefore, dealt with by these commissions, which ultimately ensured 
that specialisation of tasks between and within department occurred smoothly. 
 
3.1.5 Security of tenure 
It should be highlighted from the outset here that municipal employees had no fixity of tenure 
conferred upon them by statute. However, their conditions of service relating to remuneration, 
guarantees, indemnity, protection, pensions and gratuities made municipal authorities attractive 
careers to persons qualified in a variety of fields. In what follows, some of the conditions of 
service that made local authorities a career of choice will be looked at in some detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57  Section 89 Ordinance 18 of 1976. 
58  Cloete 1997: 141. 
59  Cloete 1977: 141. 
60  Cloete 1977: 141. 
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3.1.5.1 Remuneration 
The ordinances from all the four provinces cemented the security of tenure of municipal 
officials. They provided that every council should determine the emoluments and allowances 
to be paid to its employees through a special resolution.61 To pass such decisions, the majority 
vote of the total number of councillors was required. Randell notes that the 1951 version of the 
Cape Ordinance required a two-thirds majority of the total number of councillors.62 Such 
decisions could not be delegated to committees of the council or to an employee.63 This special 
resolution/determination, however, did not bar the council from inviting candidates for a 
position in the service of the council to state the notch in the scale of emoluments pertaining to 
such position at which he or she was prepared to accept such position or perform the duties 
attached to the position.64 
After this had been done and the appointment made, no council was permitted to reduce the 
emoluments or allowances of senior officials or alter their condition of service without their 
consent or that of the Administrator.65 As far as the town clerk and the treasurer were 
concerned, the determination or redetermination of their emoluments and allowances by 
council required prior approval of the Administrator. If no such prior approval was obtained, 
councils were completely barred from going ahead with the determination or redeterminations 
of such emoluments and allowances.66 It is argued that this served as a cushion against council 
and its councillors tempering with the remuneration of its employees. The employees in a sense 
were not beholden to councillors and the council for their positions and the concomitant 
remuneration, and, as such, their professional independence was secured. 
Furthermore, any alterations or changes to the emoluments or conditions of service of officials 
other than senior officials were regulated by the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
28 of 1958 (the Act).67 In an event where the council reduced the emoluments or altered the 
conditions of service of any employee other than its chief executive officer, such employee 
 
 
 
 
61  Section 63(1). 
62 Randell GH & Bax KC Handbook Relating to Municipal Law in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope South 
Africa (1961) 51. 
63 Randell G H & Bax K C Municipal Law in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope South Africa (1977) 74 
(hereafter Randell & Bax 1977). 
64  Section 61(1). 
65 Section 63(2) and (3) Cape Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974. 
66  Section 63(3). 
67  Randell & Bax 1977: 74. 
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could invoke the protection under the Act.68 This Act protected all the officials – except town 
clerks and treasurers, whose positions were sometimes occupied by the same person – such as 
secretary, chief medical officer of health, city or town engineer, city or town electrical engineer, 
city or town treasurer, manager or director of non-white affairs, manager or director of city or 
town transport, and clerk of the council.69 The town clerks and treasurers were not covered by 
the protection under the Act. Their protection depended on the fact that council’s intentions 
had to be referred to the Administrator for approval.70 Municipal councils were also required 
to inform the Administrator promptly about any dispute concerning the remuneration of senior 
officials.71 
In 1985, the conditions of service of town clerks and/or treasurers changed for the better. The 
Remuneration of Town Clerks Act72 classified town clerks into 15 classes for the purposes of 
determining their conditions of service. It then determined their remuneration according to 
these classes. This essentially meant that the salaries of town clerks were determined nationally. 
Furthermore, the Act provided for fringe benefits such as a housing and transport allowance.73 
 
3.1.5.2 Dismissal 
The provincial ordinances further provided that a municipal council could not dismiss the town 
clerk and other specified officials without the approval of the Administrator.74 Randell notes 
that the reasons for this provision, as far as the town clerk is concerned, was that in terms of 
section 2 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, any employee of a local authority designated   by 
 
 
 
 
68 In the case of Minister of Labour v Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1952 (2) SA 522 (AD), the employees union 
approached the Minister to appoint a Conciliation Board under section 64 of the Industrial Conciliations Act to 
test whether the employer had altered or given notice to alter the conditions of employment of his employee. The 
Minister refused, arguing that the proposed amendments would not alter the conditions of service of the said 
employees. Furthermore, he did not think it was expedient in any event to appoint the Board. The Eastern Districts 
Local Division held that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the Minister. In the Appellate 
Division, it was held that once an employer has altered or given notice to alter the conditions of employment of 
his employees, the employees have the right under section 64 to require the Minister to decide whether it is 
expedient to appoint the Board. Schreiner, J.A held that this right in no way depends upon the Minister’s view on 
the question whether what the employer has done or proposed to do amounted to an alteration of the conditions 
of service. If there is doubt as to the correct answer to that question it must be decided by the courts, and the 
Minister could no more refuse jurisdiction where the facts bring the case within the true meaning of ‘alter or give 
notice to alter’ (at 359-60). 
69  Randell & Bax 1977: 74. 
70  Randell & Bax 1977: 74. 
71 Section 63(4)(a) Cape Municipal Ordinance. 
72  Act 115 of 1985. 
73  Cloete 1997: 144. 
74  Section 67(2). 
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such authority as its chief administrative officer, as required by sections of the provincial 
ordinance discussed earlier, is not an employee for the purposes of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act. It did not apply to him or her, and as such he or she was deprived of the protection afforded 
by the Act to all other employees. In the place of such deprivation, the proposal of the council 
to terminate his or her service ought to be subjected to an enquiry requested by the town clerk 
or by the Administrator.75 A municipal council could also not dismiss a medical officer of 
health without the approval of the Minister of Health.76 
Furthermore, any suspension of any employee for any reason whatsoever by the mayor ought 
to be reported to the council no later than its next ordinary sitting after such suspension.77 A 
notice suspending the services of an employee was not to be seen as a notice terminating his 
employment. It was held in Gumede v Maphumulo Bantu School Board and Another78 that a 
subsequent letter terminating an employee’s service as from the date of suspension would not 
deprive the employee of the right to claim his salary for the intervening period. 
In the case of a town clerk, the council had a duty forthwith to report the fact of his or her 
suspension to the Administrator who could then reverse such suspension after taking into 
account all the relevant facts.79 
 
3.1.5.3 Pensions and gratuities 
Over and above the security of tenure enjoyed by municipal officials, there were also a number 
of fringe benefits, resulting in local authorities being attractive careers to people qualified in a 
variety of professions.80 For example, provisions were made in all the provinces for pension 
funds for municipal officials. First, municipal councils paid, with the approval of the 
Administrator, pensions and/or gratuities to employees who have been retired on grounds of 
superannuation or unfitness for duty and to the widows and dependants of employees who died 
while in service of the council.81 Such pension could not be revoked during the period for which 
they were granted. Secondly, municipal councils established a special fund for those employees 
who joined the service of the council below the age of 65 and were not members and/or not 
 
 
 
 
75  Randell & Bax 1977: 78. 
76  Cloete 1982: 260. 
77 Section 68(1) and (2). 
78  1961 (1) SA 639 (N). 
79 Section 68(1) and (2). 
80  Cloete 1982: 261. 
81 Section 72 Cape Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974. 
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eligible to become members of the pension fund. This means that no official was left without 
benefits on his retirement, or his dependants on his death. 
 
3.1.6 Conclusion 
It is pointed out in the foregoing discussion that there was no official recognition of the 
appropriate qualification for the positions of the town clerks and treasurer for the better part of 
the twentieth century. It is suggested that these positions did not have a special status in the 
official circles. Appointments to other positions below that of the town clerk and the town or 
city treasurer were regulated. It took the formation of professional associations by the town/city 
treasurers and town clerks themselves to get these functionaries somehow regulated. However, 
these institutions/association operated on a voluntary basis, setting standards without state 
sanction and recognition. Even after the formation of these institutes, which were very effective 
in their ‘watchdog’ role and for career advancement, it took central government six decades, 
in the case of town/city treasurers, and over four decades, in the case of town clerks, to 
recognise their qualifications through statute.82 
In essence, there was a very slow acceptance of the Weberian model in the top echelons of 
white local authorities as it relates to meritocracy. However, there was high level of 
professionalism, as spearheaded by the Institute and IMTA, which operated on a voluntary 
basis and were not recognised by the regulatory regime for white local government. 
 
3.2 Local government in coloured and Indian areas 
The coloured and Indian populations had no separate homeland of their own. They were 
destined to live and develop parallel to but separately from whites in the same area, i.e. the so- 
called white South Africa. The arrangements made for them differed from those made for 
Africans.83 The Group Areas Act of 195084 and the Population Registration Act of 195085 were 
the only measures for the segregation of South Africans (categorised into various racial groups) 
that had far-reaching effects on these two population groups. The Group Areas Act saw the 
 
 
 
 
82  See section 4.3 below in this regard. 
83 Vosloo WB, Kotze DA & Jeppe WJO Local Government in South Africa (1974) 38 (hereafter Vosloo et al. 
1974). 
84  Act 41 of 1950, which was amended in 1957, 1962 and 1965. 
85 Act 30 of 1950. This Act classified the population into different racial groups – white, Indian, coloured and 
black (African). 
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emergence of a network of separate residential areas in South African towns and cities. From 
the 1950s onwards, whites, coloureds and Indians had to live in their own racial group areas, 
with whites having the largest amount of, and generally the best, located land.86 
Sections 28 and 29 of the Group Areas Act provided for the establishment of local government 
institutions in three phases. These provisions were only carried out following the 1961 
Niemand Committee of Investigation, whose terms of reference were to investigate the 
development of local government for urban coloured and Indian communities. The three- 
phased development process contained in the Act was endorsed as part of the Committee’s 
recommendations. The first phase entailed the creation of consultative committees composed 
of nominated members. These structures functioned under the tutelage of a white local 
authority in whose area they were geographically situated; with advisory powers only.87 
The second phase entailed the establishment of management committees, with some members 
being elected and others nominated. Similarly, they were entrusted with advisory powers and 
were under the guidance of a white local authority in whose area of jurisdiction they fell.88 
However, in addition to these advisory powers, certain powers could be delegated by the 
‘parent’ white local authority subject to the conditions prescribed by the Administrator of the 
province.89 
The last phase culminated in the granting of fully-fledged municipal status to the management 
committees equivalent to that of white local authorities. However, certain prerequisites had to 
be met before the implementation of the last phase. These were, first, that a committee had to 
be appointed to investigate whether a specific management committee (a phase two structure) 
should become a local authority (a phase three structure) or not. Secondly, such management 
committee must have sufficient revenue, trained staff, minimum area size and the capability of 
being geographically consolidated.90 
The various provincial administrations were enjoined to give effect to the provisions of the 
Act. The Cape Province, Transvaal, and Orange Free State followed the three stages of 
 
 
 
 
 
86 Fourie C Land and the Cadastre in South Africa: Its History and Present Government Policy (2000) 15. 
87  Tsatsire et al. 2009: 138. 
88  Tsatsire et al. 2009: 138. 
89  Vosloo et al. 1974: 46. 
90  Tsatsire et al. 2009: 138. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
Chapter Three 
100 
 
 
 
development of local government for coloured and Indian communities.91 The Natal Provincial 
administration, on the other hand, varied slightly from the process outlined in the Act. Instead, 
a two-phased process was followed. For its first phase, purely advisory local affairs committees 
with nominated members, to which elected members were later added, were established. For 
the second phase of development, the province transferred executive and fiscal powers to the 
advisory committees, thus giving them the independent local authority status.92 
By mid-1971, there were 22 coloured management committees and 53 consultative 
committees. For Indians, there was one town board, 16 local affairs committees, and seven 
consultative committees.93 By the early 1980s it was decided that local government matters for 
the white, Indian and coloured populations would be an ‘own affairs’ matter of each house of 
parliament in terms of the 1983 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa94 which provided 
for a tricameral system of government. Section 14(1) read with item 6 of Schedule 1 to the 
1983 Constitution made local government institutions an own-affairs matter. This meant, in 
essence, that each house of parliament could decide what it does with ‘[l]ocal government 
within any area declared by or under any general law as a local government area for the 
population group in question’.95 It was up to the House of Representatives (for coloureds) and 
House of Delegates (for Indians) to lift the status of these bodies to full municipal status with 
powers similar to those exercised by white local municipalities. 
However, the coloured management committees and Indian local affairs committee never 
graduated to a full municipal status until they were subsumed by the Local Transitional 
Councils in 1993 after formal multi-party negotiations were initiated. There were still debates 
in 1989 about whether or not to give these bodies limited decision-making powers relating to 
development, namely housing and urban upgrading, which would not involve taking over local 
authorities’ traditional functions such as water and electricity supply.96 The Natal Association 
of Local Affairs Committees rejected an attempt to ‘foist extra decision-making powers on 
 
 
 
 
 
91  Vosloo et al. 1974: 47. 
92  Vosloo et al. 1974: 47. 
93  Vosloo et al. 1974: 47. 
94 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 110 of 1983. 
95 Item 6 of Schedule 1 1983 Constitution. 
96 Debates of Parliament, 20/3/1989: Cols. 3435-36; 17/6/1989: Col. 948 quoted in Cameron R ‘Managing the 
coloured and Indian areas’ in Swilling M, Humphries R & Shubane K (eds) Apartheid City in Transition (1991) 
395 (hereafter Cameron 1991). 
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LACs because it viewed this as a step toward eventual independent ethnic local authorities’.97 
Furthermore, the creation of a separate administration and infrastructure for these communities 
was rejected.98 This means that the enthusiasm in some quarters for extra decision-making 
powers was not shared by all at the coloured and Indian local government level.99 
The rationale of putting phases of development towards ordinary local authority was to enable 
the coloured and Indian communities to gain a bit of experience, under the tutelage of white 
local authorities, on their way to full local government in their group areas.100 As these 
structures were going up the rungs on the ladder to independent local authorities, they were 
given varied and added responsibilities. However, when the time was opportune for them to 
reach the status of independent local authorities, they did not take that opportunity. They 
rejected the creation of a separate administration and infrastructure, choosing instead to rely on 
the 'mother' white local authorities.101 They rejected attempts to impose additional decision- 
making powers, fearing that this was a slippery slope towards independent racial/ethnic local 
authorities, a position they ostensibly abhorred.102 
In the final analysis, these structures resembled the structures in African communities, 
discussed under section 3.3 below, in several material respects. First, they were not fully- 
fledged municipalities with their own infrastructure and administration. Instead, they relied on 
seconded officials, employed by parent white local authorities.103 This meant that after 1990 
there was a shortage of trained coloured and Indian staff, as they had to rely on the parent 
municipality. Secondly, they were appendages of white local authorities, with no powers 
similar to those exercised by white local authorities. Instead, greater executive powers could 
be delegated to them by their ‘parent’ white local authorities. Thirdly, they were characterised 
by little or no rates-generating commercial, industrial and mining areas. Neither did they have 
a rateable property. As in African areas, this lack of financial viability led to widespread 
community resistance which eventually rendered these committees unworkable.104 As a result, 
 
 
 
 
97  Cameron 1991: 395, quoting Sunday Tribune, 29/3/1987. 
98  Cameron 1991: 395. 
99  Cameron 1991: 395. 
100  Vosloo et al. 1974: 47. 
101  Cameron 1991: 395. 
102  Cameron 1991: 396. 
103 Heymans C & White R ‘Playing politics without power: The state of black local government in the South 
Africa of the 1980/90s’ (1991) 18(1) Politikon 14 (hereafter Heymans & White 1991). 
104 Ismail N, Bayat S & Meyer I Local Government Management (1997) 50 (hereafter Ismail et al. 1997). 
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since 1962, none of the Indian and coloured urban areas progressed to becoming fully-fledged 
local authorities.105 
The majority of these structures remained advisory bodies. They never progressed to being 
fully-fledged local authorities with proper administration and infrastructure. The administrative 
staff working in these structures were employed and accountable elsewhere. They belonged to 
the hierarchy of white local authorities. As such these structures did not exhibit Weberian traits. 
Even in 1982, when African people were given local authorities of their own, the majority of 
coloureds and Indians still fell under the jurisdiction of advisory bodies attached to white local 
authorities. 
 
3.3 Local Government in black urban areas 
It is worth noting that the institutions of government discussed in 3.1 above provided the formal 
decision-making apparatus for whites only. Although there were other races within their areas 
of jurisdiction, i.e. in the whites-only areas, these institutions were representative of white 
people only. Other races had substructures that were appendages of the institutions of 
government serving white people. This state of affairs was made possible, initially, by the 
policies of segregation pushed by the ‘Union government’, and later, by the policies of separate 
development (apartheid) of the National Party government which came to power in 1948. 
However, it would be remiss of me to apportion the root causes of divisions and separate 
development in our country to these two periods only. Such policies go far back in history to 
the first African-European encounter.106 The whites had always thought of themselves a 
superior and in a way different from Africans socially and culturally. This was compounded 
by religious dogmas, perceived differences in standards of development and advancement, and 
economic imperatives that led to the introduction of slavery into our shores.107 However, 
policies of segregation were still haphazard and sporadic; only prevalent in the economic field 
without much calculation.108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105  Reddy PS Readings in Local Government Management and Development: A Southern African Perspective 
(1996) 5. 
106  Vosloo et al. 1974: 32. 
107  Vosloo et al. 1974: 32. 
108  Vosloo et al. 1974: 32. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
Chapter Three 
103 
 
 
 
The first clearly calculated policy of segregation emerged in Natal after it became a British 
colony in 1843, designed by Shepstone in respect of Zulu people.109 Marais notes that the 
system of administration of Africans introduced by Shepstone in Natal prefigured later 
apartheid.110 Shepstone created a distinction between tribal and detribalised groups, confining 
the tribalised group to segregated communally owned reserves under the trusteeship of 
government and indirectly ruled through traditional tribal institutions.111 Those who were 
literate could apply to be classified as ‘detribalised’ and were then exempted from Bantu law 
and made subject to the Roman-Dutch system. They were then given a franchise, but subject 
to stringent requirements, namely that they had to be residents for 12 years, they had to have 
been exempted from Bantu law for seven years, they had to get a letter of recommendation 
from three white voters, and they had to get an endorsement by a magistrate. Vosloo notes that 
this was a skilful colour bar which barred Africans from registering as voters in 1907.112 
Similar policies were adopted in Transvaal and the Orange Free State,113 with special areas set 
aside for Africans tribes. Those Africans living within the republics were treated unequally in 
all spheres of life. Special locations were set aside and Africans were barred from residing 
outside those areas specifically set aside for them. No significant policy changes were made 
when these two republics became British colonies after the South African war, also called 
Anglo-Boer war.114 
 
3.3.1 From Union to tricameral parliaments 
At the National Convention in 1908, the question of political rights for other races almost 
overturned the efforts of establishing a Union. The ‘Cape Liberals’ wanted the extension of 
such rights to other provinces as was the practice in the Cape colony, albeit in the form of a 
qualified franchise. The former Boer Republics, including Natal (which had become the British 
colony in 1843 were completely against granting the franchise to other races.115 A compromise 
 
 
 
 
109 However, the first-ever separate area delineated for a particular racial group, the Hottentots, was proclaimed 
by De Mist on 3 October 1803 at Bethelsdorp, also known as Genadendal. 
110 Marais D South Africa Constitutional Development: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach (1989) 225 (hereafter 
Marais 1989). 
111  Vosloo et al. 1974: 32. 
112  Vosloo et al. 1974: 33. 
113 But only in respect to segregation as there was no attempt to allow Africans on the voters’ roll in the Transvaal 
and Orange Free State. 
114  Vosloo et al. 1974: 33. 
115  Vosloo et al. 1974: 33. 
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was reached by maintaining a status quo ante in each province and in essence retaining a 
qualified franchise in the Cape only. In accepting the South African Bill, the then British Prime 
Minister, Asquith, said that he did not want ‘this great weapon of freedom and reconciliation’ 
between the English and the Afrikaners in South Africa to be shipwrecked by the issue of 
extending franchise to non-Europeans.116 However, the former Boer Republics seemed to have 
won the day, as other races were excluded from standing to be elected to the Union 
Parliament.117 
The Union Constitution recognised Africans as separate and special communities subject to a 
system of differential rule. The control and administration of African affairs, derogatorily 
called ‘native affairs’, was vested in the Governor-General acting on the advice of the 
Cabinet.118 A Department of Native Affairs was then established to take over those areas 
previously administered by the different departments of native affairs of the four colonies.119 
Through this department, a number of policies were passed to diminish the political status and 
role of Africans in the dominant institutions and political systems in South Africa. Furthermore, 
these policies regulated inter-racial contact in every walk of life. 
The first batch of these policies was of an economic rather than socio-political nature. They 
dealt with work delimitation and were meant to counter what was called the ‘black peril’ in 
election campaigns.120 Most of these policies emanated from the Hertzog era, save for the first 
Acts passed in 1911 and 1913 during the Botha government. This batch was directed towards 
segregating Africans as a result of white fears.121 The overwhelming majority of Africans were 
forced to live in rural areas and isolated from the mainstream of the South African economy. 
The 1911 Mines and Works Act122 introduced a colour bar to the economy and job reservation 
to labour relations. The 1913 Native Land Act123 reserved 75 per cent of land in the country’s 
total surface area for whites and 8 per cent for Africans, and the rest was urban land and Crown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116  Marais 1989: 229. 
117  Vosloo et al. 1974: 33. 
118 Section 147 South African Act, 1909. 
119 Evans TI Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa (1997) 31. 
120  Marais 1989: 241. 
121  Vosloo et al. 1974: 34. 
122  Act 12 of 1911. 
123  Act 27 of 1913. 
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or state land.124 Much of the latter was demarcated for game reserves, forests, or other uses and 
only lightly occupied, but some was rented out to tenants.125 
 
3.3.2 Local governance structures for Africans 
Pursuant to the findings of the Stallard Commission, which recommended that Africans should 
only be permitted in urban areas, which were essentially white areas, to administer to the needs 
of white people and should leave from those areas when they cease to do so,126 there were no 
proper governance structures for Africans residing in urban areas until the 1980s. This is owing 
to the fact that their presence in so called white areas was ‘linked to their functionality for the 
urban economy.’127 Instead, the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923,128 which was passed to 
regulate the rapidly growing African population, created Advisory Boards to advise the white 
local authorities on how to administer Africans. This Act introduced territorial/residential 
segregation in urban areas and influx control measures129 and enabled white local authorities 
to establish African locations and the mechanisms to administer them.130 The reasons for the 
creation of this amorphous structure were that the homeland policy was based on the view that 
Africans would lose their South African citizenship and exercise their full political rights in the 
homelands.131 That was not to be, as millions of African people remained in the cities and, due 
to rural-urban migration and population growth, their numbers continued to grow.132 This 
necessitated some form of independent executive authority. 
As a result, from the early 1960s onwards, the central government devised various institutional 
mechanisms to deal with this reality.133 The Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961 introduced 
Urban Bantu Councils (UBC) to administer matters assigned to them by the Minister of Native 
Affairs (of Bantu Administration and Development since 1958).134 Similarly, these structures 
did not have powers; they relied on powers which might be assigned to them by white local 
authorities, subject to the approval of the Minister. It was up to a particular white local authority 
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to decide, after consultation with the Minister, to what extent and in what way its powers and 
functions would be assigned to its Urban Bantu Council.135 Furthermore, this system was 
rejected, by the people it was meant to serve, as an organ of apartheid. These structures were 
seen as ‘devices designed to inveigle them into the implementation of apartheid’.136 
Ten years later, the Urban Bantu Councils were scrapped and the central government took over 
the control of townships from white local authorities and introduced Administration Boards in 
1971.137 The Administration Boards were appointed by the Minister and consisted mainly of 
white officials. They were all responsible to the Minister.138 They were meant to ensure greater 
uniformity in the implementation of national policies relating to Africans, by excluding 
intermediary bodies that sometimes had discretion on whether to implement those policies or 
not.139 The chairman of each board was supposed to be someone who supported separate 
development. 
However, like the Urban Bantu Councils, these structures were rejected by the African people 
and their officials conflicted with township residents. That made them appear to be symbols of 
apartheid.140 Political instability ensued, also fuelled by the 1976 students’ uprising, which led 
to massacres. The source of revenue of these structures (beer halls) were also set on fire. This 
led to the rethink of government and the introduction of fresh initiatives which 
reflected an unprecedented official acknowledgement of the permanence of Africans 
outside the homelands and the legitimacy of their demands for political representation 
outside the homelands.141 
These fresh initiatives were community councils. 
 
In 1977, the central government introduced Community Councils in townships through the 
Community Councils Act 125 of 1977. They were a government response to the unrest that 
was spreading in African urban areas.142  These structures were still not fully-fledged local 
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governments comparable to white local authorities. When the community councils were 
introduced, it was said that they would be forerunners of fully-fledged municipal authorities 
for African urban areas.143 All residents, including homeland citizens, could vote in council 
elections. However, the powers of the community councils were limited; the Minister had final 
say over most of their activities.144 They had a weak financial capacity. They were viewed, 
similarly, as apartheid instruments the aim of which was to divert legitimate demands of 
Africans for full political participation.145 All the above reasons made these structures very 
fragile, and further reforms seemed inevitable. Black Local Authorities were, indeed, 
established five years later in 1982. 
In a similar way as local government structures for coloureds and Indians, all the structures 
discussed in the foregoing for Africans in urban areas were not fully-fledged local authorities, 
like the dominant political institutions in the white areas. They were advisory in nature, and as 
such did not have the kind of functional administration that lends itself to a proper Weberian 
analysis. They are included in this discussion for the sake of completeness. 
The Weberian toolkit does not come out clearly in these arrangements as they lacked powers 
and functions, and as such did not have a fully functional administration to administer and 
execute them. For example, these structures not only relied on personnel from white local 
authorities, but also had to report to white local authority.146 Moreover, white local authorities 
could, on their own initiative, establish these structures and assign to them some minor 
functions.147 This buttressed the idea that these were subordinate structures of white local 
authorities subject to the control thereof. These structures were only meant to cater for those 
‘temporary sojourners’ who would, after serving the needs of white residents, depart to their 
homelands ‘where they belonged’. They were therefore also temporary in nature. 
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3.3.3 Black Local Authorities 
In 1982, the central government passed the Black Local Authorities Act148 in terms of which 
black local authorities were established. These structures exhibited some elements of the 
Weberian model of service delivery, as will be seen hereunder. 
 
3.3.3.1 Rules and regulations 
The local authorities established in term of the Black Local Authorities Act to govern African 
townships were granted full municipal status comparable to that of white local authorities. 
Structurally and functionally, these local authorities were in no way different from white local 
authorities, even in terms of official designations.149 Mureinik notes that this Act was modelled 
on the Transvaal Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939, with some departures here and 
there.150 One such departure was that, unlike the white local authorities created under the 
Transvaal Ordinance, local authorities for Africans did not fall under the control of the 
provincial administration but under the national Department of Cooperation and Development. 
These structures replaced the community councils. However, the administration boards 
continued to exist side by side the new local authorities. 
The establishment, functioning, powers and the election of local authorities in Africa urban 
areas was therefore in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act, which was amended in 1986.151 
These were strictly enforced by the national departments under which these structures fell. 
However, provincial administration sometimes got involved. For example, Cameron notes that 
after the release of a report by Dr Simon Brand which proposed severe structural changes to 
address the fiscal predicaments in the Soweto City Council, all provincial administrations 
began to take punitive steps, in the form of withholding financial assistance, to get councils of 
Black Local Authorities (BLAs) to address their financial and administrative problems.152 
Some  of  these  administrative  problems  related  to  failures  to  provide  proper  services to 
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residents, failure to appoint staff in key positions, and to observe financial regulations.153 Local 
councils also made by-laws and rules of orders to regulate their internal arrangements. 
However, given that councillors and municipal property had since the mid-1980s become 
targets of physical attacks, the environment was not suitable for the proper making and 
application of rules and regulations.154 Allegations of corruption emerged as a result, which 
added fuel to the fire of the already volatile political situation.155 
 
3.3.3.2 Hierarchy of authority 
The majority of local government structures in African urban communities, from Advisory 
Boards of 1923 to Community Councils of 1977, generally did not have their own 
administrations, and remained little more than advisory structures to white local authorities on 
whom they relied for administrative, technical and financial support. Even later, when the 
Administration Boards were introduced and removed the responsibility for townships from 
white municipalities and had certain administrative and executive powers, the key areas of 
taxation and finance were still reserved for the white local authorities, resulting in a weak 
administration.156 Furthermore, they were staffed by seconded white officials headed by a chief 
director, township managers and superintendents.157 
Given that in practice only whites could become town clerks, departmental heads or hold senior 
positions, this had the effect that even within the BLAs these positions were the preserve of 
whites from white municipalities and the Administration Board’s personnel corps. Virtually no 
Africans held senior posts, chiefly because this was a new field of occupation among blacks 
and there was no pool of qualified black officials.158 Mashumi159 adds that the paucity of 
Africans trained for these positions was due to the job reservation measures contained in laws 
such as the Bantu Building Workers Act of 1951160  and the Apprenticeship Act of 1944.161 
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These Acts prohibited the employment of Africans in ‘skilled work’ in urban areas, and were 
used as ‘a safeguard against interracial competition’.162 
Apartheid effectively excluded Africans from acquiring vital managerial and technical skills. 
Municipal government administration as a career option, therefore, did not appeal to 
matriculated township youth and other African job-seekers.163 Furthermore, as discussed in 
section 3.6.4.3 below, it was risky for Africans – a matter of life and death – to hold senior 
positions in these structures.164 As a result, there was a heavy reliance on the limited number 
of skilled and experienced whites. The hierarchy in African local authorities was similar to that 
of white local authorities not only in terms of official designations but also in that the top 
echelons of African local authorities were lily white. As was the case in white local authorities, 
the hierarchy in the African local authorities was as shown in the diagram in section 3.1 above. 
 
3.3.3.3 Meritocracy 
Cameron notes that the newly created local authorities for Africans living in urban areas were 
‘administratively constrained, financially weak and politically controversial’.165 Their 
administrative structures were underdeveloped and not in a position to match those of their 
white counterparts. Even though the BLAs had a recognisable form, they lacked administrative 
and other skills because of the long history of exclusion, making them incapable of rendering 
services and development initiatives to the satisfaction of their communities.166 There were 
very few senior African officials and these municipalities often had to rely on seconded white 
officials from white local authorities or higher tiers of government, whose long term career 
plans often did not include African local authorities and were anxious to get back into the 
‘mainstream’ of civil service.167 It is suggested that this marked the roots of the over-reliance 
on consultants which has been the practice over the years and was once again decried by 
President Jacob Zuma in recent years.168 
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Furthermore, although the BLAs had full municipal status and their election procedure was on 
par with the elections of the existing white local authorities,169 they had a fragile political base. 
They were rejected by African communities on the basis that they limited the opportunities for 
expression of their political aspirations to the local level and thus expected them to settle for 
less than full political expression at the highest level.170 As such, no African official was willing 
to take a risk of working in such a volatile political environment in which municipal officials 
and municipal property became targets of physical attacks. Civic organisations and the protest 
movement seemed more prepared to interact with white officials whom they could clearly 
identify as agents of the state than with African officials and councillors whom they regarded 
as traitors of the political struggle.171 
This was also fuelled by the simultaneous adoption of the tricameral constitution, which 
entrenched perceptions about the exclusion of Africans from the national body politic. The 
regulations issued in 1984172 for the improvement of communication between the various local 
authorities similarly did not include African local authorities. Even though African 
communities rejected local authorities in their areas, these developments that seemed to bypass 
them added insult to injury. Furthermore, there were conflicts between the new BLAs 
councillors and old guard white officials of the Administration Boards who retained control of 
the township administration until 1986. These political problems also contributed to the failure 
of these new structures to attract the most competent African officials.173 For those who were 
already within the system, the political climate in which they had to carry out their duties 
impinged on their effectiveness and many of them eventually left fearing for their lives.174 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the earlier structures for Africans living in urban areas did not 
have an administration because Africans, in line with the recommendations of the Stallard 
Commission, were seen as temporary sojourners in urban areas ministering only to the needs 
of white people. Their presence was linked and strictly limited to their utility in the urban 
economy. Once they had finished to so minister, they were supposed to leave to the homelands 
‘where they belonged’. They were denied political rights at all levels, and only gratified  with 
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advisory bodies that had no fully-fledged administration with offices and officials put in place. 
This meant that there was no pool of black candidates with relevant experience and expertise 
from which to appoint. The absence of this pool was also made possible by the policies of job 
reservation, which meant that only whites could be appointed to certain vocations. This led to 
severe shortages of staff in certain specialised fields in African local authorities.175 
This was compounded by the exclusionary nature of the Institute of Town Clerks of Southern 
Africa and IMTA, the institutes that were meant to improve qualifications and infuse 
professionalism in the sector, discussed in section 3.1.3 above. There were two hurdles that 
had to be passed before one could become a member of these institutes, namely a colour bar 
and qualifications hurdle. The requirement that one had to be a white person in order to be 
accepted as a member of these institutes meant that there was no way Africans could become 
members of them; this served as an absolute bar until it was scrapped in 1988. It was another 
instance of a skilful exclusion of Africans from the professionalisation initiatives that took 
place since the 1920s. 
 
3.3.3.4 Security of tenure 
Municipal officials in African local authorities did not have all the benefits enjoyed by white 
local authorities in terms of ordinances passed in their respective provinces. They had to rely 
only on national legislation in this regard. As could be expected, there were no uniform 
conditions of service across the local government sphere. Individual local authorities were 
allowed considerate freedom to employ officials and to determine the conditions of service of 
their officials subject only to national legislation.176 
Furthermore, the national legislation that provided for a uniform system of remuneration for 
town clerks excluded local authorities for African people. It only catered for town clerks for 
white, coloured and Indian local government institutions throughout South Africa. In terms of 
the Act,177 town clerks in white, coloured and Indian local authorities were entitled to a fixed 
remuneration, which is 7.5 per cent higher than that of any other employee of the local 
authority.178 
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Furthermore, the fragility of these institutions, occasioned by their weak administrative and 
financial deficiencies and their political illegitimacy, threatened the tenure of these officials. 
The viability of African local authorities was in serious doubt as little was done to provide them 
with economically viable taxable sources.179 The rent and service charge boycotts, together 
with the destruction of beer halls, further weakened the already non-existent revenue base and 
thus added to the non-viability of these institutions. Officials could not have physical security 
of tenure when the political environment was hostile. Furthermore, they could not be paid 
enough when the local authorities were struggling to sustain themselves. They could not offer 
the benefits enjoyed by white local authorities. 
 
3.3.3.5 Specialisation of tasks 
The African local authorities were given the same functions and powers that the white local 
authorities had been exercising for all those years. They had to provide a variety of services to 
African people in line with the powers and functions they were given. It was, therefore, 
necessary that they structure their administration to consist of a number of departments or 
divisions, especially in larger towns and cities. As noted earlier, they were similar to white 
local authorities even in terms of official designations. Typically, there was the office of the 
town clerk which stood elevated above other departments, the licensing division, treasurer’s 
department, transport department, electricity department, engineer’s department, parks and 
recreation division, housing division, roads division, and water division.180 However, due to 
the shortage of skills noted above, African local authorities could not employ personnel 
according to their areas of specialisation into these divisions. Furthermore, in small local 
authorities, this specialisation of tasks was not as pronounced. A number of functions were 
performed by few departments. There was typically one foreman and a number of labourers 
under his or her control to perform a variety of tasks. 
 
3.4 Homeland local authorities 
It was stated in section 3.3 of this chapter that apartheid was not the beginning of geographic, 
institutional and social separation. Segregation was already a policy by the time apartheid was 
introduced in 1948. However, apartheid represented mostly a change in the intensity of the 
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application of the policies of segregation.181 It entrenched the segregation of black residents in 
urban townships and the homelands.182 The foundation of apartheid was premised on the 
formation of artificial black nations or homelands in the so-called ‘reserves’.183 In those 
homelands, where the majority of South Africa’s African population was relegated, democratic 
local authorities similar to those in the so-called ‘white South Africa’ did not exist. Instead, 
there existed a patchwork of different non-democratic institutions – different systems of 
traditional leadership – which varied from one area to the next as determined by the apartheid 
geography.184 These institutions, seen as the extension of the apartheid state – as they were 
used by the apartheid regime and were not accountable to their communities but to the entire 
political hegemony of apartheid – provided the public services normally associated with local 
government.185 
This patchwork of undemocratic institutions, however, dates back to the colonial era. It was 
ushered in by the Glen Grey Act of 1894,186 Native Affairs Act of 1920187 (which was amended 
in 1927),188and the Native Administration Act of 1927.189 The apartheid government added to 
this suit the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951190 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government 
Act of 1959,191 the epitome of apartheid. The Glen Grey Act introduced the Transkeian General 
Council and the Glen Grey District Councils, which were later changed to a local council under 
the Native Affairs Act as amended in 1927. This Act introduced local and general councils in 
certain areas reserved for Africans, including the Transkei.192 At the time that the Bantu 
Administration Act was promulgated (1951), there were 26 local councils in the Transkei, with 
the overarching United Transkeian Territories General Council. There were eight local councils 
in the Ciskei and a Ciskei General Council at the head. In Transvaal, there were five local 
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councils, three in Natal, and the Orange Free State had two reserve boards of management, 
with powers and functions similar to those of local councils.193 These councils did not have 
legislative powers; they were merely advisory bodies to the Native Affairs Commission, which 
in turn was advisory to the Minister of Native Affairs.194 
The Bantu Administration Act did not immediately alter the existing structures of local 
government. Instead, it envisaged the establishment, by the Governor-General, of three new 
structures, namely tribal, regional and territorial authorities which would use tribal chiefs and 
their tribal councils.195 However, it was made clear that the structures that then existed (the 
council system) would be gradually supplanted over time by these new structures (the authority 
system).196 Acting under the powers conferred by the Bantu Administration Act, in the Transkei 
in 1956 the Governor-General disestablished the United Transkeian Territories General 
Council and the 26 district councils under it.197 In their stead, 200 tribal authorities, 26 district 
authorities, seven regional authorities and one territorial authority were established.198 
Nationally the Act established seven territorial authorities for the different homelands.199 
A tribal authority consisted of the chief or headman of the tribe or community in question, and 
as many councillors as the Governor-General decided to appoint. It had the power to administer 
the affairs of the tribe or community for which it had been appointed.200 Its functions related to 
general administration, rendering of assistance and guidance to the chief or headman in 
connection with the performance of his functions, advising the government and any territorial 
or regional authority having jurisdiction over its area.201 The tribal authority and the chief had 
to exercise their powers in line with local laws and customs applying to Africans residing in 
the locality.202 Other areas, such as the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, further established 
community authorities in respect of two or more tribes. These consisted of chiefs and 
councillors elected by the adult male members of the community. A community authority was 
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represented on the regional authority by its chairman, plus, in each case, one further 
councillor.203 
A regional authority was established in respect of two or more areas of tribal authorities.204 It 
effectively replaced a local council. It consisted of elected representatives from the chiefs, 
headman and councillors of the tribal authorities within its area of jurisdiction. Its functions 
were to advise and make representation to the Minister of Native Affairs on matters of general 
interest205 and to exercise certain executive functions, similar to those of urban local authorities, 
such as the provision of education, roads and hospitals, subject to regulations and directions of 
the Minister. A regional authority also made by-laws in relation to these functions and levied 
poll tax, subject to the approval of the Governor-General.206 
A territorial authority207 was a local authority with the widest area of jurisdiction. It was 
established in respect of the areas of two or more regional authorities.208 The territorial 
authority effectively replaced general councils. It was composed of members elected from 
among the members of the constituent regional authorities.209 However, the Minister appointed 
officers of the public service to act in a supervisory capacity in relation to a regional or 
territorial authority. Such officers had the right to speak at meetings, but could not vote. A 
territorial authority had such number of powers vested in its constituent regional authorities 
assigned to it.210 This meant that the powers of a territorial authority were subtracted from the 
powers of regional authorities.211 However, the powers of a territorial authority were vastly 
expanded by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act to the position of a semi-homeland 
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or half-way homelands. However, at this stage the territorial authorities still acted as advisory 
bodies with no executive powers. Some of these powers included powers to recognise, appoint 
or depose chiefs or headmen, to provide for the markets and pounds, control of the erection 
and maintenance of buildings.212 
One of the priorities of the apartheid government was to create homelands or Bantustans in 
which to restrict black Africans in order to diffuse the growing pressure of black nationalism 
and channel it in the direction of ethnic nationalism.213 A step towards this goal was achieved 
when the Transkei Territorial Authority, on its own initiative, requested and was given self- 
government in 1963, with its own legislative assembly and executive council constituted from 
among the members of the legislative assembly.214 Even though it was said to be self- 
governing, certain powers were excluded from its legislative purview and the state president 
had the veto power over some of its enactments.215 Other Territorial Authorities had to be 
nudged in this direction by the passing of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act.216 Central 
government had to constitute legislative assemblies for them, and this was done in 1971 
(Tswana, Venda, Ciskei, Lebowa, Machangane and Basotho), and 1972 (KwaZulu), 
respectively.217 
Transkei, once again, was the ice-breaker in the move towards full independence, which it got 
on 26 October 1976.218 The Bophuthatswana government followed the following year, on 6 
December 1977,219 Venda on 13 September 1979,220 Ciskei on 4 December 1981.221 No changes 
were made in the system of local government in the new independent states. In terms of the 
Acts that conferred independence on these newly independent states,222 all existing laws were 
to continue until repealed or amended by a competent authority in each state. Consequently, 
the Bantu authority system remained intact. The only change was that the territorial authority 
became a ‘state’ or a homeland and other structures below it, namely   the 
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regional authority and tribal authority carried on with the functions of local government. In 
fact, the Bantu authority system seems to have outlived not just the homeland system, but also 
the transitional councils, established as part of the transformation of local government in terms 
of the Local Government Transitional Act. For example, the case of Amahlubi Tribal Authority 
and Another v Premier, North-West Province and Others223 reveals that tribal authorities were 
still in existence in 2001. 
The foregoing discussion means that the Bantu authorities were not incorporated as part of the 
structures of local government that needed transformation, even though they were a limited 
form of local government exercising local government powers and performing local 
government functions. The Interim Constitution states that at the local level, a traditional leader 
is entitled, ex officio, to be a member of an elected local government within whose jurisdiction 
his community is located.224 This means that those traditional structures in the homelands that 
performed local government powers were allowed to exist side by side local government, only 
participating in local councils on an ex officio status. 
In the final analysis, there was a limited form of local government in the homelands, starting 
with the councils system (which was ushered in during the colonial era as the extension of 
magisterial rule) and ending with the so-called Bantu authority system. One of the original 
objectives of the Bantu authority system was that Africans should take part in the government 
and administration of their homelands along traditional/tribal lines. In both systems, traditional 
leaders (chiefs and headmen) were doing the actual work of administrative and supervisory 
nature. As such, the administrative hierarchy consisted of the district magistrate at the helm, 
followed by chiefs, then headmen and lastly bureau clerks.225 At the end of 1970, there were 
26 districts authorities (with district magistrates), five paramount chiefs, 79 recognised chiefs 
and about 846 headmen226 
Vosloo et al. note, when it comes to meritocracy, that it was only the front-line staff (bureau 
clerks) who underwent some form of careful selection on the grounds of ability, education and 
 
 
 
223 [2001] ZANWHC 33. This case dealt with the expansion of the Amahlubi tribal area in Bophuthatswana in 
1990 to incorporate farms and trust land adjacent to it. This resulted in the reconstitution of the Tribal Authority 
of the Amahlubi tribe to include the chiefs, the headmen, the foremen of trust farms, and four other members of 
the tribe. This expansion meant that Government Notice No. 1279 of 19 June 1953, by which the AmaHlubi Tribal 
Authority was formed, was withdrawn. 
224  Section 182 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
225  Vosloo et al. 1974: 58. 
226 Vosloo et al. 1974. 1974: 68. 
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personal qualities.227 No such requirements applied to chiefs and headmen, who also performed 
administrative tasks under the supervision of the magistrates. Furthermore, short courses 
lasting less than a week were also held for local government bureau clerks. As such, there was 
an indistinct semblance of meritocracy at the lower levels of administration. Moreover, there 
was no fixity of tenure for these officials. However, as a result of the recruitment criteria 
applied and the in-service training and experience offered to officials in the tribal authorities 
in the homelands, their turnover had been very slow. 
Overall, the Weberian toolkit was not present in this patchwork of undemocratic local 
government institutions in the homelands. There was no fully-fledged administration 
comparable to structures in urban areas. These structures were only intended to be agents of 
the central state as regards local administration228 as well as local authorities for the provisions 
of services and assistance on development work.229 For example, tribal authorities only acted 
in an advisory capacity to regional authorities and government, and were generally responsible 
for the moral, social and spiritual well-being of the people they represent. Traditional leaders 
in the Bantu authority system, of whom most were aligned to the National Party government, 
performed very badly, doing only the minimum of work expected of them.230 Furthermore, 
they were not completely independent, since most of their decisions needed approval either by 
the state president or the relevant minister responsible for African affairs, and they relied on 
financial support from the apartheid government. 
 
4 Reform measures 
Seeing the writing on the wall for the demise of its hegemony, the apartheid government 
introduced a number of reforms in the 1980s such as the creation of inclusive, non-racial local 
government structures, rolling out training to municipal office-holders across races,231 
abolishing the racial requirement in the professional institutes and recognising the qualification 
requirements, for the first time, for town clerks and town treasurers. These reforms were also 
initiated to manage the tense political situation at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
227  Vosloo et al. 1974: 59. 
228 The provision of public works and the maintenance of public roads. 
229  Vosloo et al. 1974: 62. 
230  Vosloo et al. 1974: 63. 
231 The repeal of the Black Employees’ In-Service Training Act, 1976, by the Manpower Training Act means that 
the Act also applies to training in black local authorities. 
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4.1 Regional Services Councils 
In 1985 the apartheid state attempted to calm political tensions by passing the Regional 
Services Councils Act, which envisaged the establishment, for the first time, of some sort of 
non-racial local government structure, namely the Regional Services Councils. One of its major 
aims was to prop up the collapsing BLAs by redirecting resources from white areas to 
disadvantaged African townships.232 It initiated a system of ad hoc intergovernmental grants as 
a vehicle to channel resources to collapsing townships. These structures, Regional Services 
Councils, as well as Joint Services Boards (in Natal) were established as such vehicles. The 
Regional Services Councils also rendered bulk local services to adjacent municipalities, 
particularly to the worse affected African local authorities.233 
These structures took decisions that had an impact on a number of municipalities within their 
areas of jurisdiction. Decisions concerning bulk services such as bulk supply of water and 
electricity, sewerage purification, land usage and transportation planning, roads and storm 
water drainage, passenger transport services, to mention just a few, were taken at this regional 
level jointly by representatives of adjacent municipalities.234 As such, these structures were the 
first non-racial intergovernmental structures in South Africa that facilitated consensus seeking 
and joint decision-making between Africans and whites on the redistribution of resources on a 
district-wide scale through the allocation of RSC levies and intergovernmental transfers. 
However, these interventions were ‘too little, too late’ as they failed to counteract the fiscal 
failures of African local authorities and to quell community resistance and unrest.235 Instead, 
the majority of African local authorities were at the brink of collapse, some having been 
disbanded.236 By the late 1980s there was no effective local government in most townships and 
many homeland rural areas, as seen in section 3.4 above, and it was clear that African local 
authorities would never be viable.237 This further added to their legitimacy crisis and inflamed 
the increasingly politicised communities. The rejection of black local authorities was 
accompanied by popular uprising and rent/services boycotts in townships all over South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
232  In terms of the Regional Services Council Act 109 of 1985. 
233  Marais 1989: 249. 
234 Rudolph GH ‘Constitutional law’ Annual Survey of South African Law (1985) 6 (hereafter Rudolph 1985). 
235  Heymans & White 1991: 13. 
236  Binza 2005: 76. 
237  Green Paper 1997: 14. 
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that shook the foundations of the apartheid order.238 At this stage, the writing was on the wall 
for the collapse of apartheid order. 
 
4.2 Training Board for Local Government Bodies 
Another reform measure was the passing of the Local Government Training Act239 in response 
to the ‘crying need that existed countrywide, for a comprehensive strategy for the training of 
officials … and management…’.240 This Act establishes the Training Board for Local 
Government Bodies, which is empowered to approve a training course for capacitating local 
government officials, among others.241 
This Act followed an earlier Act passed in the early 1980s by the central government, also with 
the aim to increase the skills of the existing local government practitioners, namely the 
Manpower Training Act of 1981.242 This Act also created a training body, the Local 
Government Education and Training Board (LGETB). These two separately functioning 
boards were meant to coordinate local government training systems. 
The Local Government Training Act created a fund to finance the training of local government 
practitioners, namely the Local Government Training Fund. Both these boards had been funded 
primarily by national government grants and levies on municipalities. Both were responsible 
for the on-the-job training, focusing on technical skills. They conducted training through 
training centres located throughout the country.243 However, these attempts were too generic 
and their training of local government practitioners did not specifically address the problems 
of these two functionaries, town clerks and town treasurers. 
 
4.3 Statutory public recognition of IMTA and the Institute 
Yet another reform measure was the recognition of the institutes that capacitated town clerks 
and municipal treasurer for decades. For years, the office of the town clerks and that of the 
town treasurers were treated disdainfully by the provincial and central authorities, the 
provincial authorities simply giving the town clerk fancy titles such as ‘chief administrative 
 
 
 
238  Green Paper 1997: 14. 
239  Act 41 of 1985. 
240  Rudolph 1985: 7. 
241 Section 9(1) Local Government Training Act. 
242 Act 56 of 1981. 
243  White Paper 1998: 174 para. 4. 
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and executive officer’ without proper recognition of the personal qualities and qualifications 
expected of a chief administrative and executive officer. This state of affairs was responsible 
for the meaningless requirements seen in advertisements calling for applicants for vacant post 
of town clerks, for example, to have knowledge and experience in ‘organisation and 
administration’.244 This was then explained with reference to the specific functions expected of 
the town clerk to ‘organise and administer’ as well as the personal qualities and qualifications 
regarded necessary to ‘organise and administer’.245 
However, realising that generic initiative did not cater sufficiently for the town clerks and the 
treasurer, the central government again legislated and gave content to the personal qualities 
and qualification attached to the post of town clerks and town treasurers by enacting legislation 
that gave statutory public recognition to IMTA and the Institute. 
 
4.3.1 Profession of Town Clerks Act 
In 1988, the central government tightened the personal qualities and qualifications attaching to 
the post of the town clerk by giving the office of the town clerk a professional status through 
the Profession of Town Clerks Act.246 The object of the Act was to lend professional status to 
the profession of town clerks in South Africa. From 1988 on, the Institute of Town Clerks of 
Southern Africa was recognised by statute. The Act applied to all local authorities, including 
Black Local Authorities.247 There was a new intent from the central state to close the loophole 
that enabled local authorities to, first, employ individuals from clerical positions without 
adequate educational qualification for the post of town clerks, and secondly, not subject those 
individuals to undergoing some form of training. It is suggested that this sudden change of 
heart was occasioned by the ‘black peril’ mentality as the end of apartheid was imminent. 
Unlike the position that had obtained before 1988, where white town clerks had a choice 
whether or not to register with the Institute, the candidates for the post of the town clerk had to 
be registered with the Town Clerks’ Council first in order to be appointed by local authorities 
 
 
 
 
244  Cloete 1978: 229. 
245  Cloete 1978: 229. 
246 Act 75 of 1988 (hereafter Profession of Town Clerks Act). 
247 The Act defines ‘local authority' to mean any local authority referred to in the Promotion of Local Government 
Affairs Act, 1983 (Act 91 of 1983), and any other authority or body recognised by the council by notice in the 
Gazette as a local authority for the purposes of this Act and as such applies to black local authorities as well. Thus, 
officials from black local authorities who did not have the benefit of the 40 years of training their white 
counterparts had were suddenly expected to comply with the same requirements. 
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as town clerks.248 More than anything, this was a concerted effort to exclude Africans even 
further, by applying higher standards to them far stricter than those applied to white personnel 
for all those four decades. The fact that white personnel had had a 40-years’ head-start was not 
a factor. 
In section 4 of the Act, provision was made for the necessary requirements for a person to be 
appointed as a member or an alternate member of the Town Clerk’s Council. In addition to the 
requirement that a member ought to be a South African citizen, a person might only be 
appointed as a member or an alternate member if he or she was registered with the Town Clerks 
Council in terms of the Act.249 However, the Act granted the town clerks already in the employ 
of local authorities when it came into effect a period of grace with regard to this last 
requirement to allow them to register with the council.250 Section 18 provided that the registrar 
of the council should keep separate registers in respect of professional town clerks,251 registered 
town clerks252 and prospective town clerks.253 An applicant for registration ought to be 21 years 
of age or older, and ought to satisfy the registration committee that he or she was a fit and 
proper person and that he or she possessed the educational qualifications and the practical 
experience which the council prescribes.254 
Section 14 of the Act envisaged the establishment and constitution of an education advisory 
committee the role of which would be to advise the Town Clerks’ Council as regards the 
educational and other qualifications and requirements for the registration of persons as town 
clerks. This committee should consist of two persons designated by the Committee of 
University Principals to represent all universities in the Republic providing instruction in public 
administration or local government; three persons designated by the Federation of  Municipal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248  Section 19 Profession of Town Clerk Act. 
249 Section 4(1)(a)-(e) Profession of Town Clerks Act. 
250 Section 4(4) Profession of Town Clerks Act. 
251 Section 21(2)(a) of the Act defines a professional town clerk as any person who, immediately prior to the 
commencement of thisAct, is employed by a local authority as a town clerk and possesses the educational 
qualifications and the practical experience determined by the council as requirements for a professional town 
clerk. 
252 Section 1 of the Act defines a registered town clerk to mean a town clerk whose name appears in the register 
of the registered town clerks referred to in section 18(1)(b). 
253 Section 21(3) of Act defines a prospective town clerks as ‘[a]ny person who is not a town clerk but possess the 
educational qualification and the practical experience which the council determines as requirements for 
registration as a prospective town clerk’. 
254 Section 19 Profession of Town Clerks Act. 
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Employers’ Organisations; three persons designated by the Town Clerks Council; and two 
persons by the Training Board for Local Government Bodies. 
Out of this committee, the following qualification criterion for registration with the Town 
Clerk’s Council in terms of the Profession of Town Clerks Act was devised. This qualification 
criterion was determined in terms of grades of local authorities graded from 1-15.255 For 
professional and prospective town clerks of all grades of local authorities, the educational 
qualifications were an appropriate bachelor’s degree or academic equivalent, and membership 
of the Institute obtained through an examination conducted by the Institute. The experience 
required was dependent on a grade of the local authority concerned. For grades 10-15, the 
requisite experience was 10 years. Grades 7-9 required eight years’ relevant experience. Grades 
5-6 and 1-4 in turn required five and three years’ relevant experience, respectively.256 
For registered town clerks of grades 7-9 local authorities, the qualifications required were a 
diploma or other educational qualification of which at least one subject ought to relate to 
municipal government and administration up to third year level. The practical experience 
required was eight years.257 For grades 5-6 local authorities, registered town clerks ought to 
have had a diploma or other educational qualification of which at least one subject ought to 
relate to municipal government and administration to second-year level. The practical 
experience required was five years. Grades 1-4 local authorities only required standard 10 or 
equivalent plus three years appropriate experience. Any appointment of a person not registered 
with the Town Clerk’s Council was impermissible and in effect null and void.258 
 
4.3.2 Profession of Town Clerks Amendment Act, 77 of 1992 
Furthermore, to prove that these legislative developments were nothing more than a strategy to 
exclude blacks, particularly Africans, the bar was raised once again in 1992 to include ethics, 
code of conduct and professionalism. Ethics was defined to include values relating to human 
conduct, with respect to rightness or wrongness of particular actions and to the goodness or 
badness of the motives and ends of such actions.259 From 1992, prospective town clerks had to 
 
 
 
 
255 Mabuya B & Thornhill C Local Government is Training in South Africa. A Report Compiled on Request of the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (1993) 42 (hereafter Mabuya & Thornhill 1993). 
256 Mabuya & Thornhill 1993: 42. 
257 Mabuya & Thornhill 1993: 42. 
258 Section 20 Profession of Town Clerk Act. 
259 Mafunisa MJ Ethical Governance: A Training Manual (2001) 335. 
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write, as part of the Institute’s examination, additional modules relating to ethics, code of 
conduct and professionalism. Moreover, besides passing those modules, candidates also had to 
submit a script (5 000 words) on a subject prescribed by its examinations Committee.260 
 
4.3.3 Municipal Accountants Act 
Similarly, the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants received statutory public 
recognition in 1988 through the Municipal Accountants Act.261 This was some sixty years after 
IMTA was established. The object of the Act was the establishment of a corps of professional 
municipal accountants. The purpose of the Act was ‘[t]o make provision for the establishment 
of a Board of Municipal Accountants; for the registration of the Municipal Accountants and 
control over their profession…’262 
Section 2 of the Act provided for the establishment of a Board for Municipal Accountants, the 
authority of which was to regulate the profession of the municipal accountants and to train 
them. The Act prescribed the competencies for the municipal finance officers as well as 
compulsory registration at the Boards for Municipal Accountants before a person could be 
appointed as a chief financial officer and other municipal finance officers in a municipality. 
The Act enjoined the Board to determine the minimum qualifications required for a municipal 
accountant in order to be registered as such.263 Furthermore, section 6 of the Act determined 
the eligibility for membership of the Board for Municipal Accountants. It provided that no 
person shall be appointed as a member of the Board if he 
a) was not registered under this Act as a municipal accountant; 
 
b) was not employed by a local authority in a full-time capacity; 
 
c) … 
 
The Act provided that no local authority should employ a person who was not a municipal 
accountant and that any such appointment should be void.264  This in essence meant that 
 
 
 
 
260 Mashumi VE ‘Professionalising local government management: The post-institute of town clerks challenge’ 
(2013) 48(4) Journal of Public Administration 630. 
261 Act 21 of 1988. The name of the Institute was changed in the Act only to reflect ‘municipal accountants’, since 
municipal treasurers’ was regarded as confusing in the light of the varying designations for finance officers among 
local authorities in South Africa. 
262 The short title of the Municipal Accountants Act. 
263 Section 9 Municipal Accountants Act. 
264 Section 15(3)(a)and (b) Municipal Accountants Act 
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registered municipal accountants were members of IMTA. In fact, the Act criminalised any 
performance of the functions of the municipal accountant by a person who was not registered 
as a municipal accountant. It did that by ring-fencing the functions to be performed by 
municipal accountants for or in the employment of a local authority.265 These functions include 
the following: 
a) certify and sign the annual financial statements of a local authority; 
 
b) accept responsibility for the management of - 
 
i. the financial department or section of a local authority; 
 
ii. the annual budget and appropriation of financial resources; 
 
iii. the maintenance of financial records; 
 
iv. the income and expenditure of a local authority and the application of budgetary 
controls; 
v. the internal auditing function and drawing up of audit programmes; 
 
vi. the insurance and safeguarding of the assets of a local authority against financial 
risks; 
vii. financial reporting to a local authority; and 
 
viii. the raising and administering of loans and other funds, investments, and cash- 
flow management. 
The Act then provided that any person, other than the municipal accountant, who performs 
these functions or holds himself out or allows himself to be held out as a municipal accountant, 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R2 000 or in 
default of payment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or to both such fine 
and such imprisonment.266 This was yet another attempt to preserve the system for white 
officials only. Similarly, this Act put whites, who had had opportunity for training for 60 years, 
on the same pedestal with Africans who did not have opportunities for training at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
265 Section 15 Municipal Accountants Act. 
266 Section 15(2) Municipal Accountants Act. 
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In sum, the racial requirement for admission into the institutes was scrapped in 1988 with the 
promulgation of Profession of Town Clerks Act and the Municipal Accountants Act. Anyone, 
regardless of race, could now become a member of the Town Clerk’s Council or the Municipal 
Accountants’ Board, provided he or she met the membership requirements. The provisions of 
these Acts applied to all local authorities, including Black Local Authorities.267 In terms of 
these Acts the candidates for the post of the town clerk or municipal accountant had to be 
registered with these bodies first in order to be appointed by local authorities into those 
positions.268 This meant that they had to meet the qualifications and experiential hurdle 
prescribed for membership. 
This hurdle was that one must have had three to five years of continuous service experience at 
a finance department of a local authority, in the case of treasurers and accountants, or 10 years 
in a town clerk’s department in the case of town clerks. This requirement kicked in in 1988 as 
the first hurdle (the colour bar) could now be passed. However, to be appointed as a member 
of these institutes meant that African officials employed in 1982 would only satisfy these 
qualification requirements in 1987, in the case of treasurers and accountants, and in 1992, in 
the case of town clerks. So even in 1988, no town clerks could become members of the Town 
Clerk’s Council. Only very few treasurers and accountants could, those who were brave enough 
to risk their lives and remain in the employ of turbulent and volatile African local authorities 
during the 1980s. This was another clever scheme for excluding Africans from the mainstream 
of the civil service. 
However, officials who were already in the employ of African local authorities were saved 
from the strict entry requirements by a period of grace granted in terms of the two Acts. The 
Town Clerks Act granted the town clerks already in the employ of local authorities when it 
came into effect a period of grace to register with the Town Clerks Council. The Municipal 
Accountants Act in turn provided that from a date to be determined, only municipal accountants 
could perform certain accounting functions. This gave these officials an opportunity to acquire 
the requisite qualifications and register with the relevant bodies before the said date. This 
further changed the position that had obtained before 1988 where town clerks or town 
treasurers and accountants had a choice whether or not to register with the Institute. All local 
authorities were debarred from appointing officials who were not members of these bodies. 
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As such, although meritocracy was a general requirement applying to all local authorities, 
African local authorities experienced some administrative problems owing to their late start 
and skills and administrative deficiencies. This was compounded by the fragile political 
context, discussed in section 3.3.3.3 above, within which they had to operate. 
 
4.4 The high point of Weber followed by the NPM 
The central government legalised the professionalism and tightened up the professional 
standards pursued by IMTA and the Institute in 1988 through the promulgation of the two Acts 
of parliament, namely the Profession of Town Clerks Act of 1988 and the Municipal 
Accountants Act of 1988. This, therefore, was the high point of the Weberian model in South 
Africa. All municipal employees had to meet the prescribed qualification requirements and 
undergo the prescribed course of training. As a result, the element of meritocracy that has been 
missing for all those years, as far as the town clerks and the treasurers were concerned, was 
now complied with. 
It is suggested that these Acts were meant to close the loophole that allowed many town clerks 
and town treasurers to circumvent the route to membership of a professional association. It is 
further suggested that the changes brought about in 1988 were occasioned by the fact that the 
writing was on the wall for the end of apartheid and that as such the apartheid government was 
fearful that the current system, if not tightened up, would allow new unqualified African 
entrants in. So, these laws were an attempt to keep unqualified Africans out of the system. To 
get in, they had to meet strict requirements which were never applied to white personnel before 
1988, thus giving white personnel a head-start over other races. As a result, the Weberian model 
was exclusive and it was used to perpetuate racialism. As discussed in the next chapter, this is 
one of the reasons why the post-apartheid government had to introduce a different model, the 
NPM, in the place of the Weberian model 
 
5 Conclusion 
The main thrust of this chapter was to analyse the rise and peaking of the Weberian ideal-type 
bureaucracy in South Africa. The focus was on the Weberian toolkit or elements which Weber 
proposed that any modern bureaucracy should possess in order to be effective. The study shows 
that before 1988, the delivery of services was the primary function of local authorities. Private 
sector involvement in the delivery of services through outsourcing and corporatisation   never 
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featured in discussions. The primary concern was implementing a full Weberian model to 
empower personnel to do the job of service delivery. 
It is revealed in the foregoing that the Weberian model of service delivery was manifest most 
in white local authorities where there was a developed system of local government with a fully 
functional administration. Local authorities for blacks, coloureds and Indians were appendages 
of the ‘parent’ white local authorities and only served to advise white local authorities on how 
to deliver services in those areas. As a consequence, there was no fully-fledged and fully 
functional administration in local authorities for these racial groups. 
Even in white local authorities, there was a painstakingly slow process of the adoption of 
meritocracy, spanning over six decades. While other elements of the Weberian model were 
present in varying degree, meritocracy, especially for the higher-most echelons of municipal 
administration, was not present, and as such the systems did not fully embrace the Weberian 
model. No particular form of qualification was required for town clerks and municipal finance 
officials. Town clerks were merely glorified chief administrative and executive officer without 
proper recognition of the personal qualities and qualifications expected of such chief 
administrative and executive officer. 
The process of the adoption of meritocracy was started in 1928 with the formation of the 
Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants (followed by the Institute of Town Clerk of 
Southern Africa in 1946), as watchdogs guarding the profession of municipal treasurers and 
accountants and of town clerks, respectively. However, even though these institutes set their 
own standards and were very effective in terms of career advancement, they were merely 
voluntary institutions not sanctioned by the state and not able to force every official to become 
a member. As such, for over six decades, the municipal administration in white local authorities 
was non-Weberian in the sense that the requirements for meritocracy were not set in legislation. 
Municipalities could employ officials from outside the institutes. The voluntary nature of the 
institutes meant that not everyone was required to be a member before being appointed to local 
authorities. In fact, the reverse applied. Members of IMTA and the Institute had to be employed 
first before acquiring membership. This allowed a lot of sideways, and often unqualified, white 
entry into local government. 
Furthermore, this slow process of the adoption of the Weberian model was skewed in favour 
of white personnel because of a race bar. First, other races were not allowed to be members of 
these Institutes. Secondly, other races could not be members of these institutes because, as has 
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been pointed out, another requirement of entry was that one must have worked as a town clerk 
or a treasury or in the town clerk’s or treasurer’s department in a local authority for a number 
of years. Given that there were no local authorities in African, coloured and Indian areas with 
a fully-fledged administration for all those years and that for the structures that existed they 
had to rely on seconded white personnel, the requirement that one ought to have been employed 
in a local authority for a number of years in order to be a member of the Institutes also served 
as a bar. Thirdly, given that the apartheid laws prevented black people from getting equal 
education opportunities and that certain occupations were reserved for whites only, making 
them inaccessible to Africans, it was nigh impossible for them to acquire the requisite 
qualifications prescribed for membership. This had a significant impact on the skills base of 
Africans (both urban and in the homelands), coloured and Indian communities on which these 
structures relied. 
The adoption of meritocracy, which marked the high point of the Weberian model of service 
delivery, coincided with the changes in the political environment. First, local authorities were 
established for Africans living in urban areas as a measure to contain their struggles and 
uprising for inclusion that began in Soweto in 1976 and spread countrywide. That uprising 
profoundly changed the socio-political landscape in South Africa. Seeing that those structures 
were not performing as expected but that the uprising instead gathered momentum, with civics 
and other community bodies starting to organise, the government introduced an inclusive form 
of local government in 1985, the Regional Service Councils, to channel resources to collapsing 
townships and to quell the community resistance and unrest. 
However, these interventions came too little too late as there was no effective government in 
most townships and it was clear that African local authorities would never be viable. Seeing 
that there was no way out save for ending the system of apartheid, the government decided in 
1988 to adopt meritocracy in local government in the strict Weberian sense, thereby raising the 
bar to bar unqualified black entrants from getting in. It is suggested that this was a clever 
scheme of job reservation as the government was seeing the end of apartheid and was thus 
fearful of being overrun by unqualified blacks. 
Even though there was a period of grace opened for officials who did not have the requisite 
qualification, it is suggested that this was opened only for whites as the bar was too high for 
other races who had been excluded from equal education opportunities and the mainstream of 
the public service for all those years. Further requirements that never existed before were added 
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in 1992 relating to ethics and professionalism. As a result, come 1994, municipal 
administration was dominated by white professionals and thus the need during the restructuring 
process to abrogate these laws that were meant to preserve whiteness. For example, IMTA had 
over 800 members in 1989, but all of which were white. As far as the Institute is concerned, it 
was reported in 1996 that there were no more than five black registered professional town 
clerks,269 indicating that there were similarly no black town clerks in 1988. The colour bar 
requirements made sure that no Africans were registered with the Institute and IMTA. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, this led to ambivalence towards skills and professionalism, 
as they were used perversely to exclude other races. The changes introduced in 1988 were a 
clever strategy of maintaining the status quo of white domination in critical institutions of 
governance. The 1992 amendments were the final nail in the exclusion of African. As a result, 
the post-apartheid government believed that keeping these exclusionary laws would perpetuate 
apartheid exclusions and preserve whiteness in all spheres of economic and political life. The 
next chapter shows that, as a result, these statutes were abrogated in 1995 and 2003, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
The emergence of the New Public Management in South Africa 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM) in South Africa. It 
reveals that the seeds for the adoption of the NPM paradigm were sown in the 1980s, ostensibly 
as a response to the global economic crisis of the 1970s, among other things. That constituted 
the first phase of the adoption of NPM principles in South Africa. It is further revealed that the 
second phase of the adoption of NPM principles was when those seeds sown in the 1980s took 
root in the 1990s during the transformation of the public service. Initially, there were fears by 
the post-apartheid government that the NPM was an attempt by the apartheid government to 
denude the post-apartheid state of assets and retain the status quo ante of white ownership of 
economic wealth.1 However, the post-apartheid state was confronted by a dysfunctional system 
of governance and service delivery that resulted in huge infrastructure and service backlogs. 
The NPM was presented as the only model of governance and service delivery that could 
reverse the legacy of apartheid. It furthermore was used to change the demographic profile of 
the public administration. The NPM was, therefore, introduced as an alternative to the centralist 
hierarchical system of governance and service delivery that obtained in the previous 
dispensation. 
This chapter discusses the introduction of NPM principles in South Africa both during the 
dying days of the apartheid era and after the dawn of democracy. It focuses on legislative and 
policy developments underpinning the NPM. It discusses aspirational policy documents such 
as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP); RDP White Paper; White Paper 
on Transformation of Public Service and Administration (1995 White Paper); section 195 of 
the Constitution; the Growth Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR); the White Paper 
on Human Resource Management and Administration (1997 White Paper); the White Paper 
on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper); and the 
Presidential Review Commission (PRC), to demonstrate a shift in thinking from the old-style 
model of service delivery to the NPM. 
 
 
 
 
1 Greenberg S The State, Privatisation and the Public Sector in South Africa (2006) 11 (hereafter Greenberg 
2006). 
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All these policies, in one way or the other, have a bearing on the legislation of the NPM in 
South Africa. It is shown in the latter case that over and above the incorporation of NPM 
principles as part of the imperative to reform the public service characterised by racial 
domination, exclusion and job reservation, they were also introduced as part of the reform 
waves associated with the NPM that had engulfed both developed and developing economies 
alike. In this wave, the NPM was touted as ‘management for all seasons’ that would reverse 
the pathologies of the Weberian model and introduce efficiency, effectiveness and value-for- 
money in the rendering of services. In South Africa, the NPM was introduced to reverse the 
huge structural and service backlogs caused by a dysfunctional system of governance and 
overhaul the apartheid legacy. The multilateral institutions, the IMF in particular, which dictate 
the rules of the global economic game, also exerted enormous pressure on the post-apartheid 
government to adopt neoliberal policies as a condition for a loan received in 1993. 
 
2 Sowing the seeds 
The seeds for public service and local government reform in South Africa aligned to the NPM 
model were first sown by the National Party government in the 1980s. The impetus for such 
developments came from four fronts, which proved fortuitous for public sector reform.2 The 
first was the effects of the global economic recession of the 1970s.3 The second was the 
influence of the move towards a lean and mean state in the UK and other industrialised 
countries.4 The third was the apartheid government’s political and economic isolation in the 
late 1980s, which inhibited any inflows of capital.5 The fourth was an attempt by the apartheid 
government, when it became evident that its demise was imminent, to denude the post- 
apartheid state of assets and retain the economic wealth of the country. Afrikaner capital was 
already, by the mid-1970s, calling for a reduction in state ownership and control of key sectors 
of  the  economy  to  be  replaced  by  an  aggressive  entrepreneurship.6   The  response  of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Chipkin I & Lipietz B ‘Transforming South Africa's racial bureaucracy: New Public Management and public 
sector reform in contemporary South Africa’ (2012) Public Affairs Research Institute 1 4 (hereafter Chipkin & 
Lipietz 2012). 
3 Ayeni V Empowering the Customer: The Citizen in Public Sector Reform (2001) 40. 
4 Van Niekerk S, Pape J & Xali M et al. An Alternative View of Privatisation (1999) 26 (hereafter Van Niekerk S, 
Pape J & Xali M et al. 1999). 
5  Hirsch A Season of Hope: Economic Reform under Mandela and Mbeki (2006) 25. 
6 O’Meara D Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party 1948-2004 (1996) 272. 
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apartheid government to these calls for the policy on the reduction of state and control of key 
industries was the partial privatisation of Sasol in 1981.7 
Privatisation and deregulation became part of government policy thenceforth. In 1987 the 
National Party government published its White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation,8 
which made the case for privatisation and listed areas where the government had already fully 
or partially privatised its functions. With regard to the former, the motivation put forward by 
the 1987 White Paper for privatisation and deregulation entailed the following: 
 the size of the public sector and government spending needed to be reduced to open up 
investment opportunities for the private sector; 
 business must be allowed to develop and grow without state intervention and with 
minimum regulation; and 
 cutbacks on state spending and money raised by selling off state assets could provide 
much-needed funds for government.9 
With regard to the latter, the 1987 White Paper contained a full annexure of functions or 
activities that have already been fully or partially privatised by various government 
departments.10 Apart from non-essential functions such as catering, laundry, cleaning and 
security services, the list included construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, dams, 
water purification works, and some hospitals and institutions for the aged.11 Iscor was the first 
public enterprise to be privatised in 1989 after the partial privatisation of Sasol in 1981.12 It 
would seem, therefore, that the principles of the NPM had already taken root in South Africa 
at the fall of the apartheid order. 
The National Party government also sought to introduce private-sector management principles, 
values, practices and policies within the public sector.13 Realising that it was struggling to 
finance apartheid, owing to economic sanctions and the global economic slump, the  National 
 
 
 
 
7  Greenberg 2006: 10. 
8 The White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa (WPG87 August 1987) 
(hereafter White Paper 1987). 
9  White Paper 1987: 8. 
10  White Paper 1987: 15. 
11  White Paper 1987: 15. 
12 Jerome A Privatisation and Restructuring of State Assets in South Africa: Lessons from African Privatisation 
Experience (2003) (hereafter Jerome 2003). 
13  Greenberg 2006: 3. 
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Party government began a process of commercialising state-owned enterprises such as Eskom, 
Telkom and the Post Office so as to make them ‘efficient’ and prioritise profit-making.14 The 
Department of Privatisations was set up for the purposes of overseeing the sale of its portfolio 
of State-owned Enterprises and ensuring that restructuring along business lines took place.15 
Thenceforth, the government hastened to lay out a plan to commercialise Eskom, state-owned 
forests, national parks, the sorghum beer industry and the South African Transport Services. 
The South African Transport Services was transformed into a public company called Transnet. 
The Department of Post and Telecommunications in turn was transformed into two public 
companies, Telkom and the South African Post Office. The Post Office was corporatised with 
the aim of later privatising it. 16 
 
3 The need for the transformation of the public service 
‘The nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy 
of the ANC and a change or modification of our views, in this regard, in 
inconceivable’ – Nelson Mandela, February 1990 (quoted in Financial Mail 
31 May 1996) 
Since the democratic breakthrough in 1994, the new South African government committed 
itself to correcting the structural injustices of apartheid and colonialism and to improving the 
standards of living of all South Africans regardless of race.17 The economic tool it was intent 
on using was nationalisation, which had been its economic policy since the adoption of the 
Freedom Charter in 1956. However, the ANC at this stage did not have a clear model for service 
delivery. Although it was ambivalent towards the Weberian model, as adopting it would 
perpetuate apartheid dysfunctionality and exclusions, it also viewed the early attempts by the 
apartheid government to introduce the NPM model as an attempt to strip the post-apartheid 
state of assets and retain the status quo ante of white ownership of economic wealth.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14  Van Niekerk S, Pape J & Xali M et al. 1999: 26. 
15 Presidential Review Committee (2010) 9. 
16  Jerome 2003: 8. 
17 Maserumule MH ‘Engaged scholarship and liberatory science: A professoriate, Mount Grace, and SAAPAM 
in the decoloniality mix’ (2015) Journal of Public Administration 50(2) 200 213 (hereafter Maserumule 2015). 
According to Murray (2006), this was meant to shake off three centuries of oppressive, undemocratic government, 
first that of the Dutch and British and, in the twentieth century, that by white racist elite. 
18  Greenberg 2006: 11. 
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The strategic objectives of the post-apartheid government were to build an inclusive, non-racial 
and a non-sexist, democratic society that is developmental in character.19 In this regard, the 
public administration and the state in general became the objects of numerous interventions 
aimed at ‘transforming’ it. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, the Minister of Public Service and 
Administration from 1999 to 2008, stated that the basis of this transformation 
stem[med] from the need to address the profound inequities inherited from the 
past, the need to meet the moral, social and economic demands of the new 
South Africa and the challenge of national and international opportunities 
presented by the present climate of change …20 
According to the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, the post-apartheid 
government had eight priority areas to drive the process of transformation: 
1. rationalisation and restructuring to ensure a unified, integrated and leaner public 
service; 
2. institution-building and management to promote greater accountability and 
organisational and managerial effectiveness; 
3. representativeness and affirmative action; 
 
4. transforming service delivery to meet basic needs and redress past imbalances; 
 
5. the democratisation of the state; 
 
6. human resource development; 
 
7. employment conditions and labour relations; and 
 
8. the promotion of a professional service ethos.21 
 
The public service had to be transformed on all fronts because it was not only racist and 
exclusionary, it was also dysfunctional. In all these areas, the usefulness of the Weberian model 
of service delivery was questioned. The key priority areas for the purposes of this study relate 
to rationalisation and restructuring, institution-building and management, representativeness 
and affirmative action and transforming service delivery. These priority areas can be summed 
 
 
 
 
19 Fraser-Moleketi G Public Service Reform in South Africa: An Overview of Selected Case Studies from 1994- 
2004 (Master's thesis, University of Pretoria, 2006) 20 (hereafter Fraser-Moleketi 2006). 
20 Fraser-Moleketi 2006: 12. 
21 White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (GN 1227 GG 16838 of 24 November 1995) para. 5.1 
(hereafter White Paper 1995) 
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up into the following strategic goals, namely integration, inclusion, representation and 
restructuring. These are discussed hereunder in no particular order of significance. 
 
3.1 Integration 
The first strategic goal of the post-apartheid government was the integration or unification of 
the diverse and disparate apartheid-era bureaucracies into a single South African public 
administration that provides seamless services to the citizenry.22 Prior to 1994, the public 
service was styled and managed along racial and ethnic lines in terms of the various 
administrations, Bantustans and self-governing territories resulting in a highly fragmented 
public administration. There were eleven former administrations which included the Republic 
of South Africa, the ‘TBVC’ states, and the self-governing territories.23 This goal of 
transformation was, therefore, concerned with the amalgamation/integration of these public 
service machineries into a single South African public service extending across the national 
and provincial spheres of government.24 
At a local level, this strategic goal saw a radical transformation and overhaul of local 
government from over a thousand race-based, illegitimate and subservient institutions to 842 
wall-to-wall municipalities in terms of the Local Government Transition Act of 1993.25 The 
transformation of local government was impelled by a legacy of an ‘urban economic logic that 
systematically favoured white urban areas at the cost of black urban and peri-urban areas’, with 
‘tragic and absurd’ results.26 It was in response to these tragic results, highlighted in the White 
Paper on Local Government, that the wall-to-wall municipalities were established, designed to 
deliver services across the length and breadth of South Africa and thus realise a better life for 
all.27 The main aim of the new system of local government was to create and sustain humane, 
equitable and viable human settlements. Typically, each municipality now consists of several 
towns, as well as their rural hinterlands.28 
 
 
 
 
22 White Paper 1995 para. 8.1. 
23 White Paper 1995 para. 8.1. 
24 Fraser-Moleketi 2006: 63. 
25 Act 209 of 1993. In the year 2000, these municipalities were reduced further to 284. 
26 De Visser J ‘Developmental local government in South Africa: Institutional fault lines’ (2009) 2 Commonwealth 
Journal of Local Governance 8. 
27 Johnson V ‘Outsourcing of basic services: Contract analysis’ in De Visser JW & Mbazira C (eds) Water 
Delivery: Public or Private? (2006) 1. 
28 Atkinson D ‘Taking to the streets: Has developmental local government failed in South Africa?’ in Buhlungu 
S, Daniel J & Southall R et al. State of the Nation: South Africa (2007) 121. 
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This process was guided by the principle of promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the 
delivery of services.29 The Weberian model of service delivery was of dubious value as it was 
attacked from all fronts for being mechanistic and dysfunctional. It was also associated with 
the ills of apartheid. 
 
3.2 Inclusion 
Secondly, the government had to change the direction of public spending to include, for the 
first time, the majority African population. This goal was triggered by the need to address the 
legacy of apartheid, a racially skewed history of oppression and exploitation, which left large 
swathes of the population marginalised, poor and without any or adequate health, housing and 
water.30 The previous government’s funding to different regions and departments was grossly 
unequal. For example, in some areas discrepancies in funding per pupil or per patient in mainly 
white and black schools or hospitals were often huge, and if not addressed would make a 
mockery of the integration process and amalgamation of the various administrations.31 In this 
regard, the 1995 White Paper notes that ‘the system of service provision that developed under 
Apartheid was discriminatory and exclusionary, particularly towards black South Africans’.32 
As far as African communities were concerned, the apartheid public service was, true to the 
Weberian tradition, concerned more with the application of rules and procedures than with the 
delivery of services and development.33 This therefore necessitated a concerted effort to include 
this section of the population in the mainstream of delivery. The usefulness of the Weberian 
model of delivery in extending services to the previously neglected communities was doubted. 
 
3.3 Representation 
Thirdly, the government undertook efforts to change the demographic character of the public 
service to make it more representative of the people it serves (South Africa’s entire population), 
as enjoined by the Interim Constitution.34  Apartheid bequeathed a public service that was 
 
 
 
 
29  White Paper 1995 para. 8.1.1. 
30 Padayachee V The Development Decade? Economic and Social Change in South Africa, 1994-2004 (2006) 80. 
31 Maphunye KJ ‘The South African senior public service: Roles and the structure in post-1994 departments’ 
(2002) 36(4) Journal of Public Administration 312 316. 
32  White Paper 1995 para. 3.1.1. 
33  White Paper 1995 para. 3.1.1. 
34 Section 212 (2)(b) and Principle XXX of Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution stress the need for a public 
service broadly representative of South African society. 
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unrepresentative, with senior management dominated by white males, that lacked legitimacy, 
with public officials being closely associated with the apartheid state, that had low levels of 
service delivery, that used centralised control and top-down management, that lacked 
accountability and transparency, that had ineffective management information and poor 
financial control systems, that made inappropriate use of staff resources, that had poorly paid 
and demotivated staff, that operated conflictual labour relations, and that lacked a professional 
ethos and work ethic.35 
The ANC policy document ‘Ready to Govern’, which precipitated these reforms, had this to 
say: ‘The whole of the civil service will have to be opened up so as to make it a truly South 
African civil service, and not the administrative arm of a racial minority.’36 In this regard, the 
use of the Weberian model of delivery, with its insistence on inputs (prior qualifications and 
experience) would have perpetuated the exclusion of the African majority, contrary to what 
this strategic goal pursues. In this regard, the 1995 White Paper stated that the criteria and 
procedure for recruitment are ‘based on narrowly defined, culturally determined and exclusive 
view of qualifications, experience and achievement, rather than on a broad and more inclusive 
view of relevant competencies’.37 The White Paper on Human Resource Management in turn 
stated: 
It is essential to make the Public Service more accessible to external 
applicants, in order to include all sections of society and to inject fresh ideas 
and skills to assist the Public Service to achieve its transformation goals.38 
 
3.4 Restructuring 
Lastly, the new government had to take measures to ‘de-bureaucratise’ the public service in 
South Africa and restructure it by breaking down the hierarchical, racial oligarchy in an effort 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government departments.39 The apartheid public 
service, which was strongly oriented towards control of the majority Africa population, had 
 
 
 
35 White Paper 1995 para. 3.1.1. See also Pycroft C ‘Local government in the new South Africa’ (1996) 16(3) 
Public Administration and Development 1986-1988 233 235. 
36 African National Congress ‘Ready to govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa’ available 
at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=227 (accessed 15 June 2016). 
37 White Paper 1995 para. 10.2. 
38 The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service (GG 18594 of 31 December 1997) 
para. 4.5.1 (hereafter White Paper 1997a). 
39   Chipkin  I  ‘Transcending  bureaucracy:  State  transformation  in  the  age  of  the  manager’  (2011)     77(1) 
Tranformation 1 (hereafter Chipkin 2011). 
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become highly authoritarian, centralised and rule-bound in its operation.40  The White    Paper 
states: 
 
It was characterised in particular by the development of a vertical, top-down 
management structure. Democratic practices were discouraged, both 
internally and in interaction with the public. There was little or no incentive 
for creativity and responsiveness to the needs of citizens and clients.41 
Furthermore, there was little accountability for actions. Accountability within the service was 
limited to bureaucratic accountability in that employees were only held accountable for 
adherence to rules and procedures rather than for the consequences of their actions. Efficiency 
and productivity were also not a consideration in holding officials to account.42 As such, this 
priority area implies the removal of unnecessary tiers of reporting and decentralising decision- 
making and responsibility, while at the same time increasing accountability for performance 
against specified objectives.43 It also requires the introduction of a performance appraisal 
process in terms of newly defined job descriptions. It also implies contracting out state services 
on a competitive basis to private-sector organisations on a partnership basis.44 The restructuring 
goal further implies the changes in management philosophy and practice, in order to enhance 
the performance, responsiveness and accountability of state institutions.45 
This last goal of the transformation process was clearly a rejection of the Weberian model of 
service delivery, which opened numerous doors for the reception of NPM principles. The 
Weberian model was not seen capable of addressing the urgent need to redress past imbalances 
in service provision and to promote social equity and thus meet the basic needs of the 40 per 
cent below the poverty line.46 The next section examines early explicit moves towards the 
adoption of the NPM framework. 
 
4 Early moves towards the NPM 
The transformation process was foreshadowed and partly influenced by two consultative 
conferences which took place soon after the release of political prisoners and the return of the 
 
 
 
 
40  White Paper 1995 para. 3.1.1. 
41  White Paper 1995 para. 3.1.1. 
42  White Paper 1995 para. 3.1.1. 
43  White Paper 1995 para. 8.3(b). See also para. 9(a). 
44 White Paper 1995 para. 8.4. 
45  White Paper 1995 para. 9. 
46 White Paper 1995 para. 11.2. 
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exiles (during 1991-1992) at Mount Grace and Mont Fleur. These conferences were aimed at 
influencing theoretical approaches to public administration and the location of academic 
institutions in the practice of public administration. These conferences took place at the same 
time at opposite ends of South Africa and attracted different kinds of audiences. Mount Grace 
was purely academic, while Mont Fleur represented a cross-section of societal interests. What 
is common about these conferences is that they both were concerned with what the character 
of public service in South Africa should be. Their preoccupation was with the modalities and 
workings of the public sector in the new South Africa.47 In what follows, I look at these 
conferences in some detail and the impact thereof. 
 
4.1 Mount Grace I conference 
The Mount Grace I conference took place in November 1991 at Mount Grace Hotel in the 
Magaliesberg near Johannesburg to debate new models for the South African public service.48 
A group of public administration academics and practitioners came together and adopted what 
they called the ‘Mount Grace Resolution’ on public sector transition. The participants were 
both anti-apartheid activists recently returned from exile and those sympathetic to the 
democratic struggle in South Africa.49 With the African National Congress and other 
organisations recently unbanned and the end of apartheid in sight, their preoccupation was with 
the possible character of a post-apartheid public service and the model it would use in 
delivering services. Picard notes that there was a general fear that South Africa’s public service 
would face an identity crisis after 1990.50 
Mount Grace is a biblical construct from the Grace in the Sermon on the Mount, intended to 
enable people to see reality differently. This raises the question whether the Mount Grace 
resolutions on the direction of the public service enabled the new government to see reality 
differently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Chipkin & Lipietz 2012: 4. 
48  Picard LA The State of the State: Institutional Transformation, Capacity and Political Change in South Africa 
(2005) 201 (hereafter Picard 2005). 
49 Chipkin 2011: 45. Some anti-apartheid activists and academics, such Enos Ngutshane and Job Mokgoro, joined 
either the government or parastatals. 
50  Picard 2005: 200. 
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First, Cameron and Milne refer to the Mount Grace I conference as ‘the watershed conference 
which tried to shape Public Administration in times of turbulence’.51 The resolutions they 
endorsed called for a break with the public administration of the apartheid era and championed 
the NPM.52 Cameron notes that this conference was a decisive attack on old apartheid public 
administration.53 Mount Grace I was anti-bureaucratic, favouring markets and emphasising 
practitioners’ needs. Tshikwatamba54 argues that Mount Grace carried out the equivalent of a 
coup of old public administration. The participants launched a sharp critique of the ‘wholly 
outdated principles and methods that made the apartheid public service a bureaucratic, law- 
driven, hierarchical, multi-layered, departmentally fragmented, inward-oriented, racial 
oligarchy’.55 Instead, they sought to adapt Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government 
ideas to local circumstances, which called for governments to be customer-driven and market- 
oriented for the establishment of a new paradigm.56 This empowered the new government to 
see things differently and thus precipitated the adoption of the NPM paradigm. Here, the 
emphasis was on cultivating an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ to transform the public service.57 
Secondly, the apartheid public administration which was premised on the idea of a machine- 
like Weberian bureaucracy was juxtaposed with the corporate management approach, which 
recognised that public servants could not plausibly be conceived as obedient and neutral.58 The 
latter put emphasis on the ‘important’ role of bureaucratic discretion in interpreting and 
implementing policy. Ultimately, the Mount Grace I conference proposed that discretion or 
influence could be best safeguarded in the hands of managers, effectively allowing managers 
to manage.59 
Thirdly, one of the initiatives that came out of the Mount Grace I meeting was the establishment 
of the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the 
 
 
 
 
51 Cameron RG & Milne C ‘Minnowbrook, Mount Grace and the state of the discipline’ (2009) 44(2) Journal of 
Public Administration 380 380. 
52 Fitzgerald P ‘Towards a developmental public administration paradigm’ in Fitzgerald P, McLennan A & 
Munslow B (eds) Managing Sustainable Development In South Africa (1995) 512 (hereafter Fitzgerald 1995). 
53 Cameron RG ‘Public administration in South Africa’ (2008) 15(2) Administratio Publica 43 48. 
54 Tshikwatamba NE ‘A critical and inter-disciplinary analysis of the selected criticism levelled against public 
administration’ (2007) 2(8) Journal of Public Administration 40. 
55 Fitzgerald 1995: 514. 
56 Osbome D & Gaebler T ‘Reinventing government’ (1993) 16(4) Public Productivity and Management Review 
349 356. 
57  Chipkin 2011: 5. 
58  Chipkin 2011: 45. 
59 Fitzgerald 1995: 517. 
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Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. Its mandate was to train and form a new cadre of post- 
apartheid managers. As a result, a number of officials trained in this programme found their 
way to the Department of Public Service and Administration. These included the former 
Director-General (Robinson Ramaite), then Director of Service Delivery and Innovation 
(Khaya Ngema), a senior manager in the department (Salim Latib), former manager of the 
Capacity Building division (Lawrence Tsipane), and the former head of Corporate Services 
(Colleen Robinson). It was here that ideas around the NPM were formulated by what were to 
be the senior managers of the public service.60 
Furthermore, most schools and departments of public administration in institutions of higher 
learning in the country adopted the NPM as the basis of their curricular development or 
recurriculation efforts.61 Some even changed their designation from Public Administration to 
Public Management.62 Moreover, according to Theron et al.,63 the Mount Grace 1 resolutions 
influenced the framers of the new constitution. He insists that section 195(1)(c) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, which prescribed that ‘public 
administration must be development-oriented’, bears the imprints thereof. 
 
4.2 Mont Fleur conference 
The Mont Fleur conference was, among other things, convened to influence the economic 
model the new government was going to adopt.64 It took place in the Western Cape Winelands 
in Mont Fleur conference Centre near Stellenbosch, just outside Cape Town, in September, 
November 1991 and March 1992, and brought together a diverse group of 22 prominent South 
Africans from across the ideological divide to analyse South Africa’s social, political, and 
economic crises and craft a way forward. These included politicians, activists, academics and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60  Chipkin 2011: 46. 
61  Maserumule 2015: 213. 
62 Furthermore, academics and academic institutions were forced to operate as providers to education and training 
demands articulated and defined within government departments. Six schools of government (Pretoria, 
Stellenbosch, Fort Hare, Western Cape, Durban-Westville and Witwatersrand) formed, with the approval of the 
government, the Joint Universities Public Management Education Trust (JUPMET). The purpose of JUPMET 
was to build the institutional capacity of the participating providers to meet national management development 
needs. 
63  Theron F & Schwella E (eds) The State of Public and Development Management in South Africa (2000) 69. 
64 Beery J, Eidinow E & Murphy N (eds) The Mont Fleur Scenarios: What will South Africa be Like in the Year 
2002? (2009) 1 (hereafter Beery et al. 2009). 
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business people, notably Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni, Rob Davies, Saki Macozoma and 
Gugile Nkwinti, who all happened to be prominent members of the ANC.65 
Kahane, one of the facilitators in Mont Fleur, maintains that the purpose of Mont Fleur was 
‘not to present definitive truths, but to stimulate debate on how to shape the next 10 years’.66 
The critical message coming out of Mont Fleur was the warning emanating from one of the 
scenarios presented, namely ‘Icarus’. The warning was against the dangers of a new 
government implementing populist economic policies. They revelled in caricatures, 
particularly their characterisation of a ‘popularly elected government which tries to achieve too 
much too quickly’ and succumbs to macro- economic populism.67 In this regard, a warning was 
sounded in an ‘apocalyptic language [of] the country experienc[ing] an unprecedented 
economic crisis, resulting in social collapse and political chaos’.68 This characterisation 
appeared to have made a deep impression on the ANC elites as the chief spokesperson on 
economic affairs for the ANC, Tito Mboweni, was later heard on the fringes of the conference 
stressing that his movement would avoid ‘crowding out the private sector and over time 
destroying a whole set of macro-economic balances, leading up to sharp economic decline and 
collapse – a kind of Icarus now, crash later’.69 
This warning was sobering for the liberation movements, particularly the ANC, which had 
dreamed of launching a range of social welfare programmes, driven by the state machinery, to 
uplift their people who had been oppressed and discriminated against for so long.70 
In contrast to the warning of a disaster that was couched in apocalyptic language, they were 
sold a model or a scenario which implied that the private sector was going to be part of service 
delivery the ‘Flight of the Flamingos’.71 The ‘Flight of the Flamingos’ entailed adopting ‘sound 
 
 
 
65 The full list of the Mont Fleur participants contains the following names: Dorothy Boesak, Rob Davies, Howard 
Gabriels, Adam Kahane, Koosum Kalyan, Michiel le Roux, Pieter le Roux, Johann Liebenberg, Saki Macozoma, 
Tito Mboweni, Gaby Magomola, Mosebyane Malatsi, Thobeka Cikizwa Mangwana, Trevor Manuel, Vincent 
Thabane Maphai, Philip Mohr, Nicky Morgan, Patrick Ncube, Gugile Nkwinti, Brian O’Connell, Mahlomola 
Skosana, Viviene Taylor, Sue van der Merwe, Dr Winfried Veit, Christo Wiese. 
66 Le Roux P, Maphai V & Davis R et al. ‘The Mont Fleur scenarios: What will South Africa be like in the year 
2002?’ (1992) 7(1) Deeper News 18 (hereafter Le Roux et al. 1992). 
67 Mohr P ’Flight paths’ (1992) 11(5) Leadership 34 (hereafter Mohr 1992). 
68  Mohr 1992: 34. 
69  Mohr 1992: 34. 
70 Marais H South Africa: Limits to Change (1998) 105 (hereafter Marais 1998) argues that this flurry of 
interventions (economic scenarios and policy frameworks) aimed at forestalling the possible adoption of a new 
economic strategy that might be predicated on increased control over capital were aided by the ‘Washington 
consensus’ and the remnants of the high tide of Reaganism and Thatcherism. 
71  Beery et al. 2009: 14. 
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policies and observ[ing] macro-economic constraints … [within a] market-oriented economic 
system whilst promoting business confidence’.72 One of the necessary conditions for the 
successful take-off of the flamingos was the agreement that more efficient delivery systems 
would be the cornerstone of increasing effective service provision.73 The private-sector 
techniques became apparent when it was acknowledged that these efficient delivery system 
‘would enable a government to deliver more at the same cost to the treasury’.74 This is the 
value-for-money or more-for-less principle derived from the private sector. This was later 
expressed in the NPM principle of public-private partnerships. ‘The Flight of the Flamingos’, 
therefore, ‘combined strategies that lead to significant improvements in social delivery with 
policies that create confidence in the economy’.75 
Consequently, the representatives of the liberation movement arrived in Mont Fleur as 
convinced advocates of nationalisation, which was going to be driven by a centralist state, but 
came out embracing fiscal conservatism, which implied the active role of the private sector in 
the delivery of services. The Mont Fleur scenario planning broke ground by changing key ANC 
role players’ minds about pursuing a ‘growth through redistribution’ model.76 Thus, by the year 
1992, the former president Nelson Mandela was quoted as saying in the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, ‘We visualise a mixed economy in which the private sector would play a 
central and critical role to ensure the creation of wealth and jobs.’77 By extension, the private 
sector would play a central and critical role in the public service delivery. 
 
4.3 Letter of intent 
As noted earlier, the multilateral institutions that dictate the rules of the global economic game 
also played a role in shaping the direction of the public sector reforms in South Africa. To a 
large extent, it was the IMF that had an opportunity to influence the South Africa transitional 
government to switch to neoliberal policies associated with the NPM.78  The World Bank  had 
 
 
 
72  Beery et al. 2009: 17. 
73  Le Roux et al. 1992: 18. 
74  Le Roux et al. 1992: 18. 
75  Le Roux et al. 1992: 17. 
76 Van der Westhuizen C White Power and the Rise and Fall of the National Party (2007) 243. Trevor Manuel 
was especially impressed by Derek Keys, a former mining executive who was brought in by De Klerk as minister 
of finance. 
77  Greenberg 2006: 11. 
78 ‘Neoliberalism’ broadly means the project of economic and social transformation under the sign of the free 
market. The essential feature of free market neoliberalism is deregulation and allowing the market to operate in 
traditional public sector terrain. This is where neoliberalism and the NPM converge. 
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less influence on South Africa.79 In the early 1990s the transitional government, represented 
by both the apartheid government and the liberation movement, approached the IMF for a five- 
year loan, amounting to US $850 million, in terms of a special facility for countries suffering 
balance-of-payment problems, the IMF’s Compensatory and Contingency Financial Facility 
(CCFF).80 Greenberg maintains that the loan was used to support South Africa’s balance-of- 
payment problems caused by the drought, which resulted in a sharp drop in agricultural 
exports.81 
The condition of the loan was the obligatory signing of a controversial Letter of Intent82 which 
represented a statement of the kind of economic policies and financial discipline the 
government will endeavour to follow in the following five years or so.83 This letter was signed 
by the transitional government in 1993. The ANC was party to the signing of the agreement, 
thus binding itself to the macro-economic policies that formed part of the conditions.84 Some 
of the conditionalities contained in the Letter of Intent, as recorded by Padayachee, included a 
commitment to freezing real wages in the public sector, stressed the importance of controlling 
inflation, promised monetary targeting, trade and industrial liberalisation, and repeatedly 
espoused the virtues of ‘market forces' over 'regulatory interventions'.85 
For the purposes of this study, the key elements to take home are the expenditure containment, 
containing the civil service wage bill, and the refrain about the virtues of market forces over 
regulatory interventions.86 These imply a lean public service with a reduced role in the delivery 
of services to the population. In this regard, the state cedes ground to the private sector to play 
an increasingly active role in the delivery of services. This later found expression in the NPM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 Padayachee V ‘Development implications for South Africa of using IMF and World Bank loans and resources’ 
in Baker P, Boraine A & Krafchik W (eds) South Africa and the World Economy in the 1990s (1993) 190. Marais 
(1998: 151-2) notes that the World Bank took a different route to the ‘customarily strident injunctions’ of the IMF 
and opened channels to the ANC and the trade unions after their unbanning in 1990. 
80  Marais 1998: 104. 
81  Greenberg 2006: 13. 
82 Even though this letter was written by the borrowing government, it was initially drawn up by the Fund’s 
technical experts and provided a statement of the kind of economic policy and financial discipline the borrowing 
government would endeavour to follow in the following five years. 
83  Adelzadeh A & Padayachee V ‘The RDP White Paper: Reconstruction of a development vision’ (1994) 25(1) 
Tranformation 58 (hereafter Adelzadeh & Padayachee 1994). 
84  Greenberg 2006: 13. 
85 Adelzadeh & Padayachee 1994: 589. 
86 Padayachee V The South African Economy: 1994-2004 (2005) 549 (hereafter Padayachee 2005). 
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element of public-private partnership, and to a lesser extent, the creation of corporatised entities 
run on market principles. 
 
4.4 ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa 
The 48th national conference of the ANC held in Durban in July 1991 adopted a policy 
document for a democratic South Africa, published in 1992, entitled Ready to Govern. This 
policy document was meant to serve as guidelines for a democratic South Africa. It, in a sense, 
was a launch-pad for the public service reform in South Africa. The Ready to Govern policy 
document is the first policy document emanating from the liberation movement which marked 
the initial shift in thinking and the embracing of the market principles. In a section dealing with 
economic policy, the document begins by placing emphasis on ‘macroeconomic balance’ along 
with the role of a ‘dynamic private sector’ in job creation.87 It goes on to propose a mixed 
economic system where there will be ‘nationalisation, purchasing of shareholding in 
companies, establish[ment] of public corporations or joint ventures with the private sector, and 
reducing the public sector in certain areas in ways that will enhance efficiency…’.88 
It is clear from the language of this policy document that the liberation movement was 
beginning to adopt the neoliberal thinking associated with the NPM. For example, in the NPM 
parlance, some elements of the proposed mixed economy can be reduced to the following: 
 the establishment of public corporation is referred to as corporatisation; 
 
 joint ventures with the private sector are referred to as public-private partnerships; and 
 
 reducing the public service to enhance efficiency relates to lean and mean public 
services; this also has elements of privatisation, because reducing the functions of the 
public service means those same functions could be taken over by the private sector. 
I now turn to the policy levers of the transformation process, which will reveal the extent to 
which the NPM paradigm was legislated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 African National Congress ‘Ready to Govern’ clause D 1. 
88 African National Congress ‘Ready to Govern’ clause D 1. 
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5 Policy development for New Public Management 
As noted above, the Ready to Govern policy document constituted a launch-pad of the public 
service reform process. It re-stated the basic objectives of the incoming government as follows: 
 to strive for the achievement of the rights of all South Africans to political and economic 
self-determination in a united South Africa; 
 to overcome the legacy of inequality and injustice created by colonialism and apartheid, 
in a swift, progressive and principled way; 
 to develop a sustainable economy and state infrastructure that will progressively 
improve the quality of life of all South Africans; and, 
 to encourage the flourishing of the feeling that South Africa belongs to all who live in 
it, to promote a common loyalty and pride in the country and to create a universal sense 
of freedom and security within its borders.89 
The new government then embarked on a variety of transformational and developmental policy 
initiatives that sought to fulfil the objectives of the Ready to Govern document. These policy 
initiatives were clearly expressed in the RDP, developed back in 1993; RDP White Paper of 
1994, the WPTPS of 1995; GEAR of 1996; WPHRM of 1997, Batho Pele White Paper of 
1997; PRC in 1998; Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA), in 2006; the New 
Growth Path of 2010; and the NDP of 2012. 
All these developmental initiatives, with huge economic implications for the country, were 
aimed at transforming the models of service delivery in order to address the socio-economic 
challenges such as poverty, unemployment, and unequal distribution of resources that face the 
country. Public administration was expected to play a leading role in implementing the policies 
contained in the documents listed above.90 These policy initiatives served as levers of 
transformation and some, more than others, catalysed the emergence of the NPM model in the 
public service, as will be seen in what follows. This chapter will focus only on the policy 
initiatives from 1990 leading up to the year 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 African National Congress ‘Ready to Govern’ clause A 1. 
90  Maserumule 2015: 215. 
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5.1 Reconstruction and Development Programme 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) represents the first post-apartheid 
government’s policy to inform the process of the public service reform. It was aimed at 
redressing the socio-economic imbalances and extreme poverty that beleaguers many 
communities.91 The RDP pushed for a developmental-type state in a mixed economy. In this 
regard, the state was envisaged as playing a leading and enabling role in achieving 
reconstruction and development while allowing the private sector to thrive. The RDP was 
intended to be a vision for the fundamental transformation of the public service and South 
African society, with an emphasis on welfare rights of the poor.92 It provided a broad 
framework for meeting basic social needs, reducing inequality and promoting investment and 
growth.93 Its ultimate aim was to achieve social, political and economic justice through a 
process of ‘empowerment through participation’.94 Its central thrust was to reduce the poverty 
of the majority of South Africans and make services of an economic nature accessible to all. 
As can be seen, the ‘raison d’être of the RDP was the legacy of exceptional poverty, both 
absolute and relative’,95 unemployment, and inequality in the distribution of income and wealth 
facing post-apartheid South Africa. The question was which model should be used to achieve 
this. In this regard, the RDP states that ‘the public sector consist[ing] of the public service, the 
police and defence forces, the intelligence service, parastatals, public corporations and advisory 
bodies’ and local government had to be restructured to develop more efficient systems of 
delivery.96 
While not completely abandoning the Weberian model of delivery, the RDP marked an initial 
shift in government policy towards the NPM. This attests to the influences of the Mount Grace, 
Mont Fleur and the IMF’s Letter of Intent. It contained both the elements of the NPM and of 
Weberian model of service delivery. In regard to the latter, it envisaged a public service ‘based 
 
 
 
 
 
91 Lyons M Third Sector: The Contribution of Non-profit and Cooperative Enterprise (2001) 276 (hereafter Lyons 
2001). 
92 The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (GN 353 GG 16085 of 23 November 1994) para. 7 
(hereafter RDP White Paper). 
93 The Presidency Twenty Years Review South Africa 1994-2014 (2014) 85 (hereafter Presidency 2014). 
94  Lyons 2001: 276. 
95 Blumenfeld J ’From icon to scapegoat: The experience of South Africa’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme’ (1997) 15(1) Development Policy Review 66 (hereafter Blumenfeld 1997). 
96 African National Congress Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) 126 (hereafter RDP 1994). 
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on merit, career principles, suitability, skills, competence and qualifications’.97 Furthermore, it 
envisaged codes of conduct for all government officials, which would set the standards of 
professional service that all South Africa's people expect from the public sector.98 
In regard to the former, the RDP document envisaged corporatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, parastatals and state development institutions to ensure that they retain their 
independence from government departments.99 It created an arms-length relationship between 
these bodies and their respective ministries. In terms of this relationship, these bodies had to 
submit an annual director’s report to the relevant ministries, showing the use of allocated funds 
against the agreed-upon objectives.100 The RDP also envisaged a periodic measurement and 
review of parastatal and departmental performance as well as appraisal of staff performance.101 
This relates to the performance management system, which is a necessary tenet of the NPM 
paradigm. In essence, the RDP contains two key NPM principles, namely corporatisation and 
performance management. 
When the RDP party policy turned into the RDP White Paper, it become clear that the RDP 
document was viewed by the ANC leadership as just a mobilising tool for electioneering 
purposes. 
Five months after the RDP delivered the much-needed electoral victory in the 1994 elections, 
the ANC-in-government made an about-turn on its electoral promises. In September 1994 it 
released the RDP White Paper,102 which marked a sharp departure from both the goals and the 
ethos of the initial RDP document.103 The RDP White Paper watered down the radical approach 
of the RDP in favour of the neoliberal framework associated with the NPM paradigm dominant 
at the time.104 Unlike the RDP document, which placed emphasis on merit, career principles, 
suitability, skills, competence and qualifications, the RDP White Paper made coded references 
 
 
 
97 RDP 1994:127. 
98 RDP 1994:126. 
99 RDP 1994:128. 
100 RDP 1994:128. 
101 RDP 1994:128. 
102 This was a discussion document. The White Paper was published in November 1994. 
103 This can be attributed to the fact that the RDP document and the RDP White Paper were authored by vastly 
different constituencies: the former did not involve the participation of many academics, economists and business 
people, while the latter included mostly local business interests. 
104 Adelzadeh A ‘From the RDP to GEAR: The gradual embracing of neoliberalism in economic policy’ (1996) 
Tranformation 31(1) 66. The conservative commentator Kevin Davie remarked that ‘all signs now are that our 
policy-makers see that the objects of the RDP are wholly compatible with the three words [privatisation, 
liberalisation and convertibility] which so interest the money men’. See Marais 1998: 184. 
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to privatisation,105 and emphasised the promotion of private sector involvement in the delivery 
of public goods.106 
In order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the public service and its proper use of 
resources, the RDP White Paper envisaged a performance management system. It proposed 
that government ‘programmes must be based on clear business plans’.107 These plans ought to 
provide for clear and measurable outputs, and for the assessment of performance by means of 
defined indicators. The structure and format of business plans as well as key performance 
indicators were to be aimed at ensuring uniform performance appraisal.108 Furthermore, 
quoting President Mandela in his speech closing the Presidential Budget Vote debate, the White 
Paper proposed to introduce a new culture in the public service to ensure hands-on 
management.109  This relates to the NPM principle of letting managers manage. 
The NPM tenets that are relevant for the purposes of this study, coming out of the White Paper, 
are privatisation, managerial autonomy, and performance management. The Government of 
National Unity, for the first time, made positive references to the dreaded full-blown 
privatisation, which relates to the sale of state assets, and not just corporatisation, marking a 
clear shift in thinking toward the NPM and neoliberalism associated with it.110 However, as 
will be seen herein below and in Chapter Six, outright privatisation was later rejected both at 
national and local government levels. 
Padayachee argues that this shift was a delicate balancing act in an effort to get the model of 
delivery and development right.111 The pressures emanating from global sources and powerful 
local interest groups, especially internationally mobile Western capital, had to be balanced with 
the need to address the appalling legacy of apartheid characterised by racial oppression, 
exploitation and marginalisation, which resulted in the black majority being poor and without 
any or adequate health, housing and water.112 Moreover, the Mount Grace 1 and Mont Fleur 
conferences,  which  adopted  the  NPM  neoliberal  principles  as  an  alternative       national 
 
 
 
 
105 RDP White Paper para. 3.3. See also Klandermans B & Roefs M The State of the People: Citizens, Civil Society 
and Governance in South Africa 1994-2000 (2001) 19 (hereafter Klandermans & Roefs 2001). 
106 Webster E & Adler G ‘Towards a class compromise in South Africa’s “double transition”: Bargained 
liberalisation and the consolidation of democracy’ (1999) Politics & Society 27(3) 365. 
107 RDP White Paper para. 2.5.6. 
108 RDP White Paper para. 2.5.3. 
109 RDP White Paper para. 2.5.2. 
110 RDP White Paper paras. 2.3.7 and 4.1.2. 
111 Padayachee 2005: 549. 
112 Padayachee 2005: 549. 
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development policy, and the subsequent signing of the controversial Letter of Intent, also 
brought pressure which precipitated the adoption of the principles related to the NPM 
paradigm. 
What becomes apparent for our purposes is that the RDP White Paper marked the first official 
acceptance by the post-apartheid government of some elements of the NPM model. The White 
Paper was the official government policy that was meant to adopt the RDP policy of the ANC 
as the government policy. However, it changed it significantly, leaving out the radical welfarist 
commitments and putting it firmly within the NPM framework. 
 
5.2 White Paper on Public Service and Administration 
Transformation 
The second policy instrument in the process of transformation was the White Paper on the 
Transformation of Public Service and Administration published by the Ministry of Public 
Service and Administration in November 1995. The main aim of the 1995 White Paper was to 
serve as a broad framework of government policy during the process of transformation and 
reform of the public service.113 In its Chapter Five, the 1995 White Paper identified a number 
of priorities for the transformation of the public service. These included: (a) rationalising and 
restructuring the public service (including right-sizing and out-sourcing where appropriate) to 
ensure a ‘leaner’ and more unified and integrated service; (b) institution-building and 
management to promote greater accountability and organisational and managerial 
effectiveness; (c) increasing representation through affirmative action; (d) transforming service 
delivery to meet the basic needs and redress past imbalances; (e) improving internal democracy 
and external accountability; (f) human resource development and capacity-building; (g) 
improving employment conditions and labour relations; and (h) the promotion of a professional 
service ethos.114 
Bardill contends that the vision, mission and goals of the 1995 White Paper were also premised 
on a major shift from the former mechanical model of service delivery (with its emphasis on 
centralisation, hierarchy, the procedural observance of rules and regulations and insulation 
from the public) towards a more organic, strategic, developmental and adaptive model, one 
with an increasing emphasis on the transfer of decision-making power to managers; the 
 
 
 
113 La Grange R ‘Labour law: Legislation’ Annual Survey of South African Law (1995) 540. 
114 White Paper 1995 para. 5.1. 
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corresponding strengthening of managerial responsibility and accountability for results; the 
democratisation of internal work procedures; the establishment of flatter organisational 
structures; the introduction of improved forms of co-operation and coordination (both vertical 
and horizontal); the development of team work and a programme-based approach to work; and 
the development of new forms of task-related rather than rule-based cultures.115 
Of particular interest, the 1995 White Paper introduces NPM principles of ‘contracting-out of 
services through partnerships’,116 ‘devolution and decentralisation of managerial responsibility 
and accountability’,117  and performance auditing and appraisal.118 
The 1995 White Paper envisaged improvement in productivity and efficiency savings and the 
elimination of waste. It proposed to do this by ‘decentralising’ decision-making and 
responsibility to managers, while at the same time increasing accountability for performance 
against specified objectives.119 These changes would take place against the backdrop of a rule- 
bound and procedure-laden culture inherited from the past which constrained creative and 
visionary thinking and leading. The 1995 White Paper, therefore, proposed to move 
increasingly towards a system where managerial responsibility would be devolved and 
decentralised in order to ensure that effective, timeous and responsible decision-making takes 
place at all levels within the public service.120 
This would reduce the annoying and wasteful delays which resulted from the old system of 
referring even the smallest decision to a higher authority. All staff in the new public service 
would be encouraged to take decisions and solve problems within their own areas of 
competence. It also proposes a move towards the introduction of a ‘performance appraisal 
system’ in terms of newly defined job descriptions.121 This system would also entail the 
introduction of performance related promotion criteria, instead of the seniority and educational 
qualifications based promotion and merit systems.122 
 
 
 
 
 
115 Bardill JE ‘Towards a culture of good governance: The Presidential Review Commission and public service 
reform in South Africa’ 2000 20(2) Public Administration & Development 103 105 (hereafter Bardill 2000). 
116  White Paper 1995 paras. 2.4, 4, and 8.4. 
117 White Paper 1995 paras. 9 and 14.3.1, read to mean managerial autonomy. 
118 White Paper 1995 para. 5.2.4. 
119 White Paper 1995 para. 9(a). 
120  White Paper 1995 para. 9. 
121 White Paper 1995 para. 8.3. 
122 White Paper 1995 para. 8.3. 
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The 1995 White Paper also envisages ‘contracting-out’ of government services on a 
competitive basis in an effort to create an efficient and cost-effective public service.123 Of 
importance here is that the 1995 White Paper rejects outright privatisation,124 but instead opts 
for contracting-out, on a partnership basis, to private-sector and non-governmental 
organisations. According to the 1995 White Paper, 
[t]he move towards a leaner and more cost-effective public service in South 
Africa will therefore be based…, not on privatisation but on the creation of 
effective partnerships between government, labour, business and civil 
society, and the building of high levels of community involvement in the local 
delivery of services.125 
As can be seen, the 1995 White Paper sought to entrench NPM principles in the form of a 
policy. It therefore set the scene for the emergence of the NPM. Further evidence of the 
entrenchment of NPM principles will become apparent in what is to follow. 
 
5.3 Presidential Review Commission (1998) 
The 1995 White Paper contained a framework for a dramatic transformation of the public 
service in an effort to enable it to carry out the ambitious programme of reconstruction and 
development.126 To add impetus to the transformation process, the 1995 White Paper envisaged 
the creation of a number of new and additional structures.127 These proposed structures included 
a Presidential Review Commission (PRC) which was established128 to carry out a 
comprehensive review of the objectives, structures, systems and functions, staffing and 
financing of public service and its statutory bodies and to make recommendations for 
improving and accelerating the transformation process.129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 White Paper 1995 para. 8.4. 
124 According to Bardill (2000: 105), this was in recognition of the adverse effects of cost-cutting and privatisation 
in a number of developing countries, evidenced, for example, in declining service standards, worsening conditions 
of employment, rising unemployment and the increasing marginalisation of disadvantaged groups, in particular 
women and children. 
125  White Paper 1995 para. 4. 
126  Bardill 2000: 103. 
127 White Paper 1995 para. 6.2. 
128 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Transformation and Reform of the Public Service (Proclamation R10 in 
GG 17020 of 8 March 1996). 
129 White Paper 1995 para. 6.2.1. 
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A Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Transformation and Reform of the Public Service, the 
official title of the PRC, was established by President Mandela in March 1996,130 with the 
following terms of reference: 
To inquire into the structures and functions of the public service and its 
statutory bodies; to conduct an internal audit and review of each ministry, 
department, provincial administration, organizational component, office and 
agency concerning its objectives, structure, function, staffing, financing and 
related matters; to conduct a review and revision of the systems, routines and 
procedures of planning, budgeting and financial execution in the public 
service, to increase public accountability; (and) to make recommendations and 
proposals regarding transformation and reform as envisaged in the White 
Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service.131 
The role of the PRC was therefore to assist the process of transforming the public service from 
an instrument of discrimination and domination that was rule-bound, exercising centralised 
control and top-down management, into an enabling agency which serves and empowers all 
the people of the country in a fully accountable and transparent way.132 The ambit of the 
investigation that the PRC had to undertake was classified under four main themes, chief 
among which was the structure and functioning of the public service. A number of conclusions 
were made and recommendations taken. One conclusion stated that 
some of the main obstacles to the progress and success of the transformation 
process include the bloated and fragmented nature of the national machinery 
of government; the lack of effective systems for monitoring performance and 
evaluating policy outcomes; the persistence of a rule-bound culture and the 
existence of a wide range of procedural bottlenecks that continue to hamper 
prompt and efficient levels of service delivery; the lack of skills and capacity; 
low staff morale; and continuing waste and corruption in some quarters.133 
The PRC recommended managerial autonomy in terms of service delivery, which opens the 
way for developing flexible systems and approaches to service delivery.134 One of these 
approaches is multiple service delivery agencies (e.g. executive agencies), with varying degrees 
of institutional independence, responsibility and accountability.135  It stated that  these 
 
 
 
130  Proclamation R10 GG 17020 of 8 March 1996. 
131  Proclamation R10 GG 17020 of 8 March 1996. 
132  PRC 1998 para. 1.3. 
133  PRC 1998 para. 4.1.1. 
134 PRC 1998 64 para. 2.6.4. 
135 PRC 1998 64 para. 2.6.4. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
156 
139  PRC 1998 64 para. 2.6.4. 
140  PRC 1998 94 para. 3.6.5. 
141  PRC 1998 para. 7.2.1.10. 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 
agencies should operate within a framework of targets, outputs and outcomes.136 The PRC 
recommended the establishment of an effective system of performance monitoring and 
evaluation.137 The PRC also recommended using alternative service delivery options such as 
‘out-sourcing’ or public-private/public-community partnership.138 
In terms of management, the PRC recommended ‘full managerial accountability and discretion 
over critical functions such as expenditure, procurement, staff appointments, salaries and 
service benefits, and training’.139 It stated that this should occur within the framework of 
sufficient checks and balances and oversight. The PRC further recommended a move away 
from the traditional career-based public administration in favour of contract-based employment 
practices, especially at the management echelon.140 It further recommended the creation of 
opportunities for greater mobility and, by so doing, developing an all-round, professional 
managerial corps with experience in a range of portfolios throughout the public 
administration.141 
In essence, the PRC recommended corporatisation, public-private partnerships (outsourcing), 
managerialism expressed through greater managerial discretion and accountability, creation of 
a professional managerial corps (senior management service), performance management, and 
contract system. As far as performance management is concerned, the PRC proposed that it 
should operate at three levels, in line with international best practice, namely: 
 the supervisory level, where middle-managers such as deputy and assistant directors 
primarily require efficiency performance reports; 
 the executive managerial level, where DGs, Deputy DGs and chief directors require 
reports on the effectiveness of departmental strategy in meeting service level needs and 
objectives; and 
 the political level, where ministers and portfolio committee members require reports on 
the broader social impact and outcomes of government policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
136 PRC 1998 64 para. 2.6.4. 
137  PRC 1998 para. 7.2.1.12. 
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The PRC recommended a set of key performance measures and indicators that would allow 
proper monitoring and evaluation of policy processes, performance and outcomes. 
Accordingly, these measures ‘will need to be capable of measuring what they set out to do in 
a reliable and meaningful way, and thereby providing managers at different levels with accurate 
and relevant information that can be used to inform the on-going process of policy formulation, 
implementation and review’.142 The importance of a manageable set of meaningful indicators, 
and the sensitive interpretation of monitoring data (both quantitative and qualitative), were 
emphasised. Conversely, the use of such data in an over-simplistic way as conclusive proof of 
success or failure was warned against. The PRC emphasised that ‘such data should instead be 
used to try and obtain a realistic view of progress that has been made and to highlight those 
areas where scope exists for further improvement or investigation’.143 
As can be seen, the PRC’s recommendations were steeped in the NPM dogma. It contained all 
the relevant elements of the NPM in its recommendations. 
 
5.4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Section 195(1) of the Constitution sets out the basic values and principles governing the 
conduct of the public administration. These values and principles are couched in the form of 
duties of government.144 However, in a way comparable to the founding values in section 1 of 
the Constitution, they simply impose duties without giving rise to justiciable rights.145 Section 
195(2) in turn makes these duties applicable to the administration in every sphere of 
government, to organs of state and to public enterprises. 
What is clear from these values and principles is that the Constitution gives us an idea of the 
kind of public administration that was envisaged. It was to pursue the goals of professionalism, 
impartiality, excellence, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness 
and equity as well as have a developmental and service orientation.146 This marks a clear shift 
from the old-style public administration which valued procedural correctness over 
responsiveness  and  efficiency  and  whose  officials  were  not  putting  high  premium     on 
 
 
 
 
142  PRC 1998 3.8.2.5. 
143  PRC 1998 3.8.2.5. 
144  Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Others v African National Congress and Others 2005 (5) SA  39 
(C) at para. 40. 
145 Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others 2008 (3) BCLR 251 (CC). 
146 Section 195 Constitution. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
158 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 
accountability for their own actions regardless of the outcomes thereof. The Constitution insists 
that public administrators must be accountable not only for their actions but for the use of 
resources. In this regard, the resources must be used efficiently, economically and 
effectively.147 This shift is clearly towards the NPM model of service delivery. 
Furthermore, sections 195(1)(h) and (i) provide for the cultivation of good human resource 
practices to ensure that employment and personnel management practices are based on ability, 
objectivity, fairness and the need to redress the imbalances of the past in order to achieve broad 
representation.148 It is suggested that these provisions introduce the NPM principle of open 
recruitment system, in terms of which posts must be advertised to reach a larger pool of 
applicants. This is a direct assault to the closed system of recruitment of the Weberian model 
which relies on appointment from a closed list of qualified people and the promotion of old 
personnel already in the system. Reliance on internal promotion would frustrate the 
constitutional duties of objectivity, fairness, redress and broad representation. 
 
5.5 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme 
It would seem that that initial shift in thinking towards the neoliberal framework (which 
represented an alternative model of development and service delivery) apparent in the RDP 
White Paper, the 1995 White Paper, and later the Constitution and the PRC, marked the 
unravelling of the ANC’s national development policy. While the RDP was trotted out as 
representing the real development agenda of the ANC alliance, as early as August 1995 a new 
high-powered cabinet committee, chaired by then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, was 
established to coordinate economic policy and, in particular, to find ways to accord greater 
policy priority to promoting economic growth.149 Padayachee claims that this move was ‘in 
part to reassure jittery international financial and currency markets of its fiscal prudence’.150 
Although then Deputy President Mbeki was initially at pains to emphasise that early drafts 
were ‘an elaboration of the RDP base document and not its substitute’, the ANC in government 
quickly moved to consolidate its economic strategy by publishing, in June 1996, an    outright 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 Section 195(1)(b) and (f) Constitution. 
148 Section 195(1)(h)-(i) Constitution. 
149 Blumenfeld 1997: 69. 
150 Padayachee 2005: 560. 
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neoliberal GEAR plan which saw the closure of the RDP Office.151 There was a clear retreat in 
the thinking and practice of the Congress Alliance to macro-economic issues, indicating a 
victory for the increasingly powerful neoliberal political elite over the older radical left- 
tradition.152 GEAR appeared to favour growth concerns over the equity preoccupations evident 
in the RDP document.153 According to GEAR, government should not focus on owning assets 
or manufacturing enterprises. Rather, it should preoccupy itself with the following: 
 regulating the economy, rather than being an owner or producer; 
 
 encouraging foreign investment by providing a climate attractive to investors; and 
 
 cutting back on state spending.154 
 
Of importance for the purposes of this study is the section dealing with public service reform. 
In this regard, GEAR gave a ringing endorsement of the earlier moves towards devolution to 
line departments of all career-related personnel functions.155 When it comes to the NPM 
principle of privatisation, GEAR outlined the process of the restructuring of state assets, which 
included selling them off. According to GEAR, ‘[t]he nature of restructuring … may involve 
the total sale of the asset, a partial sale to strategic equity partners or the sale of the asset with 
government retaining a strategic interest’.156 
GEAR also stated that the implementation of the public sector asset-restructuring programme 
will lead off with the sale of non-strategic assets and the creation of public-private partnerships 
in transport and telecommunications.157 Essentially, GEAR advocated for privatisation, which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 Padayachee 2005: 549. This new strategy was put together by a team of mostly white, male economists and 
presented as ‘non-negotiable’, closing possibilities of a country-wide consultation as had happened in the case of 
the RDP document. That team was made out of 17 technical experts, of whom 16 were white and 16, men. Six 
were economists drawn from South African universities: three from UCT, two from Stellenbosch and one from 
Durban-Westville. Three worked at the Development Bank of South Africa, two at the World Bank, and two at 
the South African Reserve Bank. There was one representative each from the departments of Finance, Labour, 
and Trade and Industry, as well as from the Deputy-President’s office. 
152 This powerful neoliberal political elite within the Congress Movement included several moderate economists, 
such as Thabo Mbeki, Trevor Manuel and Tito Mboweni, who had risen to high positions in the ANC and were 
therefore in a position to influence thinking. 
153  Klandermans & Roefs 2001: 20-1. 
154  Van Niekerk S, Pape J & Xali M et al. 1999: 31. 
155  Republic of South Africa Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy (1996)  para. 
3.3 (hereafter GEAR 1996). 
156  GEAR 1996 para. 7.2. 
157 GEAR 1996 para. 2.2. 
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entailed the withdrawal of the central state from managing State-Owned Enterprises and the 
outsourcing of some of its core functions. 
On the partnerships between state and private organisations in order to supplement government 
spending, GEAR states: 
Recognising the limited capacity of the fiscus, government is committed to the 
applications of public/private partnerships based on cost recovery pricing 
where this can practically and fairly be effected.158 
GEAR therefore has also entrenched the NPM paradigm in the Republic. In this regard, 
Klandermans and Roefs state that following the publication of GEAR, the government started 
contacting out its services/business to private firms, which – as shown in the next chapter – in 
most cases resulted in the deterioration in the quality of the services.159 
 
5.6 White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public 
Service 
None of the policy documents discussed above, except the 1995 White Paper, directly 
addressed the reform of service delivery in the public service. Even though they all reveal a 
theoretical shift in the model of delivery, they only deal with this subject tangentially. The one 
policy document published to deal directly with this subject is the White Paper on Human 
Resource Management in the Public Service (White Paper 1997a) in 1997. The White Paper 
1997a was issued to usher in ‘a managerial revolution in the public service’.160 As the name 
suggests, the White Paper 1997a is only concerned with the internal restructuring of service 
delivery mechanisms. It sought to make a paradigm shift from personnel administration to 
human resource management.161 It sought to introduce a fundamental managerial shift from a 
centrally controlled, process-driven delivery mechanism to the one that is focused on service 
delivery outcomes, assigns managerial responsibility for results, and holds public servants 
accountable for their actions.162 
The White Paper 1997a explicitly rejects the Weberian model of service delivery that places 
emphasis on 
 
 
 
 
158 GEAR 1996 para. 7.1 
159  Klandermans & Roefs 2001: 21. 
160 White Paper 1997a para. 3.1.1. 
161  White Paper 1997a para. 1. 
162  White Paper 1997a para. 1. 
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 regulation and adherence to centrally-determined processes; 
 
 the rigid classification of tasks and lack of workforce mobility; 
 
 a strong sense of hierarchy and a reluctance to question those in higher authority; 
 
 formality in interpersonal working relationships; 
 
 the valuing of formal qualifications and seniority over other skills and experience; 
 
 lack of workforce and ‘customer’ participation; and 
 
 a tendency to exclude and discount the views and values of those outside the dominant 
group. 
White Paper 1997a advocated for managerialism or the transfer of responsibility for human 
resource management to line managers. It explains this to mean two things. First, it means a 
shift of final responsibility and accountability from the centre to the periphery, namely from 
the centre to managers.163 Secondly, it means the delegation or assignment of functions, powers 
and authority to a lower level.164 It further pushes for an open skills set to ensure that 
employment criteria such as qualifications, health requirements, probation, temporary 
employment, and ill-health are no longer manipulated to restrict the careers of those from 
previously disadvantaged groups and to avoid dealing with poor performers.165 
White Paper 1997a also advocates for short-term contracts and the increasing use of part-time 
employment and more flexible working patterns in order to absorb fresh skills and manage 
operational requirements efficiently and effectively.166 In this regard, it proposes three types of 
employment contracts, namely continuous employment contract, fixed-term employment 
contract, and temporary employment contract.167 It also advocates for performance 
management in order to recognise and reward good performance and identify and deal with 
bad performance.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 White Paper 1997a para. 3.1.2. 
164 White Paper 1997a para. 3.1.2. 
165 White Paper 1997a para. 4.1.5. 
166 White Paper 1997a para. 4.1.2. 
167  White Paper 1997a para. 4.3. 
168  White Paper 1997a para. 4.1.4. See also para. 5.9. 
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5.7 White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele) 
The transformation process did not only focus on reforming structures, organisations and 
systems; it also centred on the people, the human resources, that should effect change as well 
as the attitudinal and cultural changes that are essential to make this transformation a reality. 
On this score, the ANC government, in 1997, passed the White Paper on Transforming Public 
Service Delivery169 (Batho Pele White Paper), with the aim to creating a people-centred public 
service which is impartial, professional and committed to the public good.170 ‘Batho pele’, a 
Sesotho expression meaning ‘people first’, is the name of the South African government’s 
programme for transforming public service delivery from an inefficient bureaucracy, with an 
overemphasis on rules, to an efficient, streamlined organisation with a culture of customer care, 
in which the needs of all the citizens of South Africa are truly served, irrespective of race, 
gender or creed.171 Then Minister of Public Service and Administration Fraser-Moleketi stated 
that the aim of the Batho Pele White Paper was to introduce a new work ethic and culture to 
redress the apartheid injustices in public administration and the provision of goods and 
services.172 
The Batho Pele White Paper is one policy instrument in the process of transforming the public 
service to ensuring that it is responsive to the needs of the public it serves.173 It follows the lead 
of Chapter 10 of the Constitution,174 which outlines the basic values and principles that should 
underpin the public service.175 The Batho Pele White Paper shifts the transformation focus 
from development objectives and policies to improving the performance of the established 
institutions and the quality of public services. According to Fraser-Moleketi, this shift is from 
 
democratic transformation of the public service [to] modernisation of the 
public service in order to optimally utilise developments and improvements in 
technology and systems thinking, to improve on the effectiveness and 
efficiency in the administration. 
 
 
 
 
169 The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (GN 1459 GG 18340 of 18 September 1997) 
(hereafter Batho Pele White Paper). 
170  Presidency 2014: 33. 
171 Tsatsire I A Critical Analysis of Challenges Facing Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (unpublished doctoral thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, 2008) 170. 
172 Fraser-Moleketi 2006: 47. 
173  Presidency 2014: 26. 
174  Act 108 of 1996. 
175 Section 195 Constitution. 
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The Batho Pele White Paper contains eight principles, the so-called Batho Pele principles, 
which enjoin the public service and state institutions to solicit the inputs of the communities in 
their development programmes and inform them promptly or on request about the quality of 
services they are entitled to. The Batho Pele principles contain the NPM promise of efficiency, 
effectiveness, transparency, value for money and turning citizens into customers. Fraser- 
Moleketi agrees that the NPM is the basis of the philosophy of ‘putting the citizens first’, in 
line with the ‘citizens charters’ adopted in Britain.176 In her words, ‘[t]he rhetoric of the NPM 
did creep into the policy documents including the Batho Pele White Paper in their reference to 
“customers”.’ 177 
 
6 Conclusion 
It is clear from the foregoing that various policy instruments that aided the process of 
transformation introduced and entrenched NPM principles in the public services. All this was 
precipitated by the Mount Grace conference, which took resolutions that effectively rejected 
old-style public administration. The Mount Grace resolutions went as far as establishing an 
institution to train public sector officials. It is no wonder, then, that the majority of the policy 
instruments for transforming the state and public service made explicit reference to the 
principles of the NPM. Even though the RDP policy still favoured the active role of the state, 
associated with the Weberian bureaucracy, subsequent policies, in varying degrees, embraced 
the neoliberal posture associated with the NPM. 
The RDP White Paper marked the shift in the policy outlook of the post-apartheid government 
toward embracing NPM principles. All subsequent policies only served to entrench NPM 
principles in varying degrees. The 1995 White Paper launched a move towards a transfer of 
decision-making powers to manager, outsourcing, performance management and key 
performance indicators 
The PRC carried forward this shift by introducing alternative service delivery options such as 
out-sourcing or public-private/public-community partnerships. It also recommended 
managerial autonomy, performance-based contract appointment system and performance 
management system, which are all part of the NPM toolkit. The Constitution translated some 
of the NPM principles into duties of government. GEAR put the final nail in the old-style 
 
 
 
176 Fraser-Moleketi 2006: 62. 
177 Fraser-Moleketi 2006: 85. 
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administration by advocating for managerial autonomy, privatisation and partnerships between 
state and private organisations. 
The 1997 White Paper introduced a managerial revolution which completely rejected the old- 
style Weberian model of delivering service in favour of the NPM paradigm. Finally, the Batho 
Pele White Paper turned attention away from institutions to the people who were going to staff 
those institutions. It ensured that there was a mental shift towards NPM principles in the 
administration/management of the public administration by introducing such concepts as 
transparency, value for money and turning citizens into customers. This therefore meant that 
NPM principles did not only emerge during this period, but were also effectively entrenched. 
In sum, the key NPM principles that emerged out the transformation policy process are the 
following: transfer of decision-making power to line managers, fixed-contract employment 
system, performance management systems (collectively referred to as managerialism), 
corporatisation, private-public partnerships, and privatisation (although rejected by the 1995 
White Paper). Several other elements emerged, but this thesis will focus on the above, 
considered key for the purposes of this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
The implementation of the NPM paradigm at a national level 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the practical implementation of the NPM model of service delivery in 
South Africa. It reveals that the policy reforms discussed in the preceding chapter shaped a 
national framework of the NPM as well as the local government framework, the subject of the 
next chapter. In this regard, the NPM model of service delivery was implemented in two fronts, 
namely in the personnel management system and in the service delivery apparatus. This system 
and apparatus were transformed in line with the NPM paradigm of effective delivery of 
services. 
In regard to personnel management practices, the national public service transformed internally 
and embraced the NPM tenet of managerialism, which entails decentralising powers to 
managers and keeping those managers on their toes through the contract system of appointment 
and a performance management system. Transfer of powers to managers, short-term contract 
and performance management systems are collectively referred to as managerialism. 
On the service front, this chapter shows how some of the functions formerly performed by the 
state were restructured to reflect the NPM paradigm. This is referred to as external 
restructuring. The government resorted to alternative (external) modes of delivery, namely the 
NPM principles of corporatisation and public-private partnerships, with the ultimate aim to 
enhance the delivery of public goods and services. Some state services or functions were 
corporatised and outsourced (via PPP). As noted in the previous chapter, privatisation was 
rejected in South Africa. 
The chapter concludes by making a brief assessment of the lessons derived from the experience 
of implementing the NPM at national level. Those lessons with relevance to local government 
will be taken up in the discussion of the next two chapters dealing with local government. 
 
2 Restructuring the public sector 
As noted in the preceding chapter, after coming into power the new government made its 
intention very clear in the RDP White Paper and the White Paper on the Transformation of the 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Public Service1 that it would embark on a process of transformation designed to reshape the 
public service fundamentally in order to fulfil its service delivery role in the new dispensation. 
This process was meant to rid the public service of some elements of Weberian bureaucracy 
and a number of challenges and constraints inherited from the past, which are identified in the 
1995 White Paper. Chief among these constraints were lack of representativeness; lack of 
popular legitimacy; lack of service delivery; centralised control and top-down management; 
lack of accountability and transparency; absence of effective management information; low 
productivity; poorly paid and demotivated staff; conflicting labour relations; and a lack of a 
professional ethos and work ethic.2 
As can be seen in the likely targets to get rid of, part of this transformation process was the 
process of administrative reform, required by the 1995 White Paper, to ensure that the South 
African civil service remains in step with the changing needs and requirements of the domestic 
and international environments.3 There is no consensus on the use of terminology when it 
comes to the reorganisation of the public or civil service. Cameron and Thornhill state that 
Pollitt and Bouckaert4 in their seminal study refer to ‘public management reform’, while 
Corkery, Daddah, O’Nuallain and Land5 use the term ‘public sector reform’.6 However, there 
is also a narrower use of the term ‘public service reform’ that generally refers to the core 
public/civil service and excludes the parastatals and local government.7 
This study employs the latter distinction, and first discusses public service reform as it relates 
narrowly to the core public/civil service and parastatals. Under this rubric it focuses on 
personnel management and service delivery. In regard to personnel management, the tenet of 
managerialism and its attendant concepts of managerial autonomy, performance management 
and contract appointment are discussed. The study proceeds to canvass the reforms that took 
place on the service delivery front in state departments, with the focus on public-private 
 
 
 
 
1 GN 376 GG 16838 of 24 November 1995 (hereafter White Paper 1995). 
2 White Paper 1995: 8 para. 3.1. See also Muller JJ Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective: South 
Africa – A Country Study (1997). 
3  White Paper 1995: 3 para. 1.2. 
4 Pollitt C & Bouckaert G Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (2004) 195. 
5 Corkery J, Daddah TO & O’Nuallain C et al. Management of Public Service Reform: A Comparative Review of 
Experiences in the Management of Programmes of Reform of Administrative Arm of the Central Government 
(1998). 
6 Cameron R & Thornhill C ‘Public service reform in South Africa: 1999-2009’ (2009) Journal of Public 
Administration 44(4) 897 (hereafter Cameron & Thornhill 2009). 
7 Cameron & Thornhill 2009: 899. 
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partnerships and corporatisation. The other element of this distinction, which goes beyond the 
core of the public service and includes local government, is the subject of the next two chapters, 
Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
2.1 Transforming the personnel management system 
2.1.1 Transfer of powers to managers 
As discussed in Chapter Two,8 the NPM principle of managerial autonomy or transfer of 
powers to managers relates to the elevation of the role of the manager in the bureaucracy and 
enabling him or her to make professional decision. This is done by handing over human 
resource and management functions such as the organisation and staff issues, the appointment, 
promotion, dismissal and transfer of members of staff, performance management, and the 
obligations, rights and privileges of officers to managers. It was further noted in Chapter Two 
that this principle engenders three main ideas, namely an open skills set; wide discretion 
conferred on managers; and minimal political interference. 
 
2.1.1.1 Open skills set 
As stated in Chapter Two under the discussion of managerial autonomy,9 an open skills set 
relates to the phenomenon of opening up appointments to the public service to everyone and 
not reserving them only for those with skills, qualifications and experience. A track record in 
the private sector or elsewhere in the public service is also taken into account. Here the focus 
is on what managers can do, as opposed to what they bring to the organisation. This therefore 
allows for sideways or lateral entries into the public service, as opposed to the bottom-up 
employment practices of the Weberian bureaucracy. 
 
2.1.1.1.1 Regulatory Framework 
The principle of open skills set was first conceptualised in the 1995 White Paper, under the 
heading ‘Restructuring the Senior Management Echelon’. The 1995 White Paper stated: 
In the case of heads of departments and provincial administrations, the 
national norms and standards … were adjusted … to allow for the external 
advertisement of all posts, all of which are on a five-year contract basis.10 
 
 
 
 
 
8  At section 6.4.1. 
9  At section 6.4.1. 
10  White Paper 1995: 33 para. 8.2. 
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The 1995 White Paper further states: 
 
this was in recognition of the fact that the incumbents of such posts would 
have to play a major role in giving direction to the new national departments 
and administrations under changed circumstances.11 
In this regard, senior officials in the former administrations would compete for such posts with 
applicants drawn from outside the public service.12 
The Constitution13 and the Public Services Act14 read with the Public Services Regulations15 
took the principle of an open skills system of recruitment further by providing a legislative 
basis for it. The Public Services Act contains the idea of an open skills set in its definition of 
‘employment practice’. On this score, employment practice is defined to include ‘recruitment 
procedures, advertising and selection criteria’.16 Advertisement means opening up recruitment 
to the broader sections of the population. In line with the constitutional objectives of 
objectivity, fairness, redress and broad representation, the Act requires due regard to be had to 
equality and other democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution in the making 
of appointments and the filling of posts in the public service.17 In essence, qualifications and 
seniority are not the only consideration taken account of in appointment and promotion 
decisions, as is the case in the closed employment system. The Act further provides that ‘all 
the persons who qualify for the appointment, transfer or promotion shall be considered’18 and 
that the evaluation of persons shall be based on ‘training, skills, competence, knowledge and 
the need to redress the imbalances of the past’.19 
The Constitution in turn provides for the cultivation of good human resource practices to ensure 
that employment and personnel management practices are based on ability, objectivity, fairness 
and the need to redress the imbalances of the past in order to achieve broad representation.20 It 
is suggested that this militates against a closed system of recruitment that relies on appointment 
 
 
 
 
11  White Paper 1995: 33 para. 8.2. 
12  White Paper 1995: 33 para. 8.2. 
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
14 Public Services Act 103 of 1994. 
15 Public Service Act 103 of 1994: Public Service Regulations, 2001 (GNR 1 GG 21951 of 5 January 2001 (as 
amended by RGN 441 GG 22308 of 25 May 2001) (hereafter Public Service Regulations 2001). 
16 Section 1 Public Services Act. 
17 Section 11(1) Public Services Act. 
18 Section 11(2)(a) Public Services Act. 
19 Section 11(2)(b) Public Services Act. 
20 Section 195(1)(h)-(i) Constitution. 
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from a closed list of qualified people and the promotion of old personnel already in the system. 
Reliance on internal promotion would frustrate the constitutional objectives of objectivity, 
fairness, redress and broad representation. These principles require that post must be advertised 
externally to reach a larger pool of applicants. 
The Public Service Regulations in turn provide for an open skills set in an unambiguous 
language. They state that the posts of person recruited, selected and appointed to the Senior 
Management Service must, as far as possible, be filled through open competition.21 The 
Regulations further state that 
an executing authority shall ensure that vacant posts in the department are so 
advertised as to reach, as efficiently and effectively as possible, the entire pool 
of potential applicants, especially persons historically disadvantaged.22 
The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service23 also lends credence 
to the open skill system of recruitment. The White Paper 1997a envisaged the development of 
cost effective recruitment strategies to reach and attract candidates from all sections of the 
population.24 It further states that ‘selection criteria … will be based on competencies rather 
than undue over-emphasis on academic qualifications’.25 The White Paper 1997a also states 
that ‘positions in the Public Service will be filled by … open … competition’26 with the aim to 
identify the most suitable person for the job from the widest possible pool of 
talent; make the Public Service more accessible to all sections of society; 
achieve employment equity, and provide equal opportunities for advancement 
for people at all levels within the Public Service.27 
The Presidential Review Commission Report28 also weighs in on this NPM principle of opening 
the skills up to a wider pool of potential applicants. It recommends the development of clear 
Human Resources Provisioning (HRP) policies and procedures in terms of which 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Regulation A, part II Public Service Regulations. 
22 Regulation C.2 part II Public Service Regulations. 
23 The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service (GG 18594 of 31 December 1997) 
(hereafter White Paper 1997a). 
24  White Paper 1997a: 4 para. 17. 
25  White Paper 1997a: 4 para. 16. 
26  White Paper 1997a: 4 para. 16. 
27  White Paper 1997a: 4 para. 16. 
28 Presidential Review Commission Report of the Presidential Review Commission prepared for the State 
President of the Republic of South Africa (1998) (hereafter Presidential Review Commission 1998). 
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recruitment, selection and advertising policies are designed to attract the best possible 
candidates from the widest pool.29 
 
2.1.1.1.2 Practice 
Ncholo asserts that there was a deliberate move away from the closed employment system to 
an open employment system that opened all posts to competition.30 This was done to break the 
monopoly of filling posts exclusively by internal candidates, the majority of which were white 
males. In terms of this open system, all vacant posts are advertised externally to attract a pool 
of capable candidates both from the private and the public sector. Even though this practice 
bears the imprints of the NPM, in South Africa it also served the interests of the ANC 
government of creating a representative public service by attracting black candidates, 
particularly at management level into the public service.31 The closed system that hinged on 
long service would not have allowed the entry of black candidates who had been denied access 
to the mainstream of the public service by the discriminatory laws of the white regime. 
The goal of the open skills system, therefore, is to ensure that high-calibre individuals are 
attracted into the public service and that reliance is not placed on the old guard because they 
were viewed as inefficient and representing only white males. It was hoped that through 
advertising and opening up the pool of potential applicant even to those who might not have 
qualifications but a proven track record nevertheless, high-calibre individuals would be 
attracted. They would get on-the-job training, as opposed to prior training as described by 
Weber, to bring them up to speed with the requirements of the job. The focus was on outcomes 
as opposed to inputs, thus the use of performance agreements, as will be discussed under 
performance management system below. 
However, what has happened in practice is that, while attracting the required high-calibre 
individuals into the public service, the open skills system, through the representativeness 
considerations and the practice of cadre deployment, also allowed the entry of unqualified 
people into the system. Flexibility in hiring has opened doors to all kinds of irregular 
appointments.  Given  the  policy-making  and  as  such  the  political  nature  of  some  of the 
 
 
 
 
 
29  Presidential Review Commission 1998: 67 para. 2.7.1.2. 
30 Ncholo P ‘Reforming the public service in South Africa: A policy framework’ (2000) 20(2) Public 
Administration and Development 92. 
31  Cameron 2009: 928. 
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managerial positions, political office bearers exert a certain level of influence32 in top 
appointments and appointment of advisers.33 This is how the phenomenon of cadre deployment 
comes into play, as discussed under section 2.1.1.3 below. 
Furthermore, the open skills recruitment system has allowed employment of personnel not 
based on merit but on policy considerations such as affirmative action. Affirmative action is a 
legal requirement linked to the goals of ensuring equity and representativeness in the public 
service. However, the affirmative action measures and cadre deployment practice must take 
account of the job requirements and should not be prioritised over the latter.34 This was 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo 
Barnard.35 
 
2.1.1.2 Wide discretion 
As seen in Chapter Two,36 the other principle that underpins managerial autonomy is the wide 
discretion conferred on managers. One of the main ideas behind this principle is to give line 
departments greater autonomy to promote improved service delivery by transferring human 
resources to them. It seeks to let the managers manage by giving them more resources, tasks, 
and responsibilities, and greater discretion in how to use, perform or exercise them. 
 
2.1.1.2.1 Legislative framework 
The principle of giving managers wider discretion was implemented in the South African 
public service through the formation of the senior management service (SMS). This element of 
managerialism was introduced by the 1995 White Paper and section 9 of the Public Service 
Act, 1994, as amended, which called for the transfer of managerial responsibility and 
accountability37  in order to allow managers in the public service to lead and direct the change 
 
 
 
 
 
32 This influence relates to the fact that candidates for posts of director-general and deputy director-general are 
recommended by a selection panel, which include ministers and deputy ministers. Directors-general are appointed 
by the presiden, with the concurrence of the cabinet, whereas deputy director-generals are appointed by ministers 
after consultation with the cabinet. Again, all are required to meet knowledge, skills and competence criteria. 
33 Public Service Commission Building a Capable, Career-Oriented and Professional Public Service to Underpin 
a Capable and Developmental State in South Africa (2016) 9 (hereafter Public Service Commission 2016). 
34 Public Service Commission 2016: 30. 
35 [2014] ZACC 23. In this case, the majority judgment underlined the requirement that beneficiaries of affirmative 
action must be equal to the task at hand. They must be suitably qualified people in order not to sacrifice efficiency 
and competence at the altar of remedial employment. 
36  At section 6.4.1. 
37  White Paper 1995: 37 para. 9(a). 
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process in a creative and visionary way.38 In this regard, the 1995 White Paper proposed to 
give managers at all levels ‘the necessary flexibility, autonomy and resource control, 
particularly in relation to the recruitment of staff’,39 in order to ensure that effective, timeous 
and responsible decision-making takes place at all levels within the public service.40 
This was also aimed at doing away with the rule-bound and procedure-laden culture inherited 
from the past, which constrained managerial creativity and innovation.41 The 1995 White Paper 
stated that at that moment many committed and potentially innovative managers felt that they 
were hamstrung by a plethora of rules, regulations and legislation, and in particular by the way 
in which these were perceived to be controlled and operated by the Public Service 
Commission.42 The 1995 White Paper, therefore, envisaged 
empowering, challenging and motivating managers at all levels to be leaders, 
visionaries, initiators and effective communicators and decision-makers, 
capable of responding pro-actively to the challenges of the change process, 
rather than acting as the administrators of fixed rules and procedures.43 
This provided a basis for the creation of the SMS system. 
 
The Presidential Review Commission report also lent credence to the idea of giving managers 
greater autonomy and discretion by requiring legislative and other changes to afford managers 
the necessary autonomy over expenditure, procurement, recruitment, salaries and service 
benefits, and training functions.44 The report also required the provision of guidance and 
support to enable managers to exercise their decentralised powers efficiently and effectively.45 
The report further pointed out that the details of the devolution of managerial responsibility 
and accountability for human resources matters are spelled out more comprehensively in the 
White Paper 1997a. 
The White Paper 1997a required a fundamental change in human resource management within 
the Public Service in order to increase ‘the delegation of managerial responsibility and 
authority to national departments and provincial administrations and, within departments,  the 
 
 
 
38  White Paper 1995: 37 para. 9(a). 
39  White Paper 1995: 37 para. 9(a). 
40  White Paper 1995: 37 para. 9(a). 
41  White Paper 1995: 37 para. 9(a). 
42  White Paper 1995: 10 para. 3.1.2(h). 
43  White Paper 1995: 37 para. 9. 
44 Presidential Review Commission 1998: 175 para. 7.2.3.6, read with 63 para. 2.6.4. 
45 Presidential Review Commission 1998: 175 para. 7.2.3.6. 
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delegation of day-to-day management decisions to line managers’.46 Within this framework, 
the prime responsibility for day-to-day management of human resources should rest with line 
managers.47  The White Paper 1997a stated that this should mark 
a fundamental managerial shift from a centrally controlled, process-driven 
Public Service to a service which is representative of all the people of South 
Africa; … is focused on service delivery outcomes; assigns managerial 
responsibility for results, and for the resources consumed in producing them, 
to the lowest practicable level; [and] holds public servants accountable for 
their actions.48 
In keeping with the vision enunciated above, the Department of Public Service and 
Administration commissioned a report in 2000 on the establishment of a senior cadre of public 
servants.49 The report recommended the establishment of an SMS programme incorporating 
managers between the ranks of director and director-general, with a flexible remuneration 
system based on a total cost-to-employer package and a competency framework to assess and 
develop management competencies.50 In 2001, the senior management service was established 
in terms of the Public Service Regulations issued in 2001.51 This senior management corps 
consists of employees in the top four levels in the public service, namely the Director-General, 
Deputy Director-General, Chief Director and Director, and their equivalents in the provinces. 
The establishment of the SMS corps was in keeping with global theoretical shifts.52 The SMS 
system in South Africa was modelled on the senior executive systems (SESs) that were created 
in a number of countries that adopted the NPM paradigm, notably the United States, United 
Kingdom (Senior Civil Service), Netherlands (Senior Public Service), Australia, Hungary and 
New Zealand.53 Hughes contends that, with their emphasis on managerialism and efficiency, 
SESs have been a key component of the NPM reforms in many countries.54 Quoting Hughes, 
Cameron asserts that the SES concept was aimed at developing a pool of senior managers who 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46  White Paper 1997a: 3 para. 8. 
47  White Paper 1997a: 4 para. 9. 
48  White Paper 1997a: 2 para. 9. 
49 Department of Public Service and Administration 2007: 23. 
50 Department of Public Service and Administration 2007: 23. 
51 Public Service Regulations 2001. 
52  Muthien 2014: 129. 
53 Hughes 2003; Manning and Parison 2004. However, different names were used in different countries. 
54 Hughes 2003. 
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could be transferred between positions and departments and who could develop an SES identity 
rather than a departmental one.55 
The key objectives of the SMS system included the need to ensure autonomy; improve the 
recruitment, selection and retention of managerial candidates; design an appropriate 
employment framework in order to attract high-calibre individuals; and create a mobile and 
flexible public-service-wide pool of managers for utilisation throughout the public service.56 
The SMS programme was developed out of recognition of the critical role that management 
plays in the effective and efficient functioning of the public service. Strengthening leadership 
and management capacity in government is its core function.57 All of this was intended to create 
a better-calibre manager able to improve service delivery.58 
Thus, the NPM ethos saw the unbundling of the highly centralised hierarchical policy and 
administration functions and introduced greater managerial autonomy by devolving executive 
decision-making to line-function heads of departments.59 Managers have greater freedom to 
deploy their inputs, for example by diverting money from staff to equipment, but are under 
scrutiny as far as results are concerned, which leads us to the next NPM tenet, that of 
performance management system. What follows next is a look at how the principle of 
conferring wide discretionary powers on managers has worked in practice. This will be coupled 
with an assessment of how the SMS system has been working in practice. 
 
2.1.1.2.2 Practice 
Since its inception in 2001, there has been a massive expansion in the SMS, with a larger pool 
of applicants from outside the public sector having been attracted for SMS positions. The aim 
of external appointments was to deracialise the public service and improve service delivery.60 
However, the majority of appointments are still from within the public sector. Cameron and 
Milne report that in 2001 there were 4 623 employees in the top four levels.61 That number had 
 
 
 
55  Cameron 2009: 924. 
56 Public Service Commission Report on the Evaluation of the Training Needs of Senior Managers in the Public 
Sector (2008) 7 (hereafter Public Service Commission 2008a). 
57 Ministry of Public Service and Administration SMS Handbook (2003) 1 (hereafter SMS Handbook 2003). 
58 Public Service Commission 2008a: 7. 
59  Muthien 2014: 128. 
60 It will be remembered that the mainstream of the public service was mostly white during the apartheid era, with 
a few black faces here and there, most of whom were coloureds and Indians. As such, it would have been 
counterproductive to insist on employing only from the public service. This would have kept the public service a 
whites-only bastion to the exclusion of the black majority which had been debarred from the public service. 
61  Cameron & Milne 2008. 
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almost doubled by 2008, having risen to 8 592.62 During the 2008/09 financial year, the number 
of SMS members saw an increase of 20 per cent, by 2 165 to 10 943.63 Even though the 
subsequent financial period (2009/10) saw a decrease from previous year’s figure of 10 943 to 
10 637, the flexible remuneration package system has enabled departments to recruit and 
largely retain SMS members and has made the public service able to compete fairly with the 
private sector. Staff turnover, especially at director level, has decreased, resulting in a more 
stable SMS corps.64 As at March 2016, the total number of SMS members employed in the 
public service was 15 129.65  There were only 47 acting appointments.66 
The above picture attests to the growth of the SMS corps. The current corps has also met the 
representivity target of ensuring that 75 per cent of the public service is comprised of blacks 
by 2005. As at 2009, blacks made up 79 per cent of the SMS corps.67 As at January 2016, the 
demographic profile of the SMS corps comprised 80.4 per cent Africans, 8.8 per cent 
coloureds, 2.6 per cent Indians and 8.2 per cent whites.68 
 
2.1.1.3 Assessment 
As mentioned in the foregoing, the NPM principle of decentralising powers to managers, while 
given full effect to by the legislative framework underpinning the NPM, has had adverse 
effects. First, although the open skills recruitment system requires, at most, that a person 
appointed as a manager must have skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with 
the post in question, it does not specify what those are. As a result, the introduction of the open 
skills recruitment system has opened the flood gates for patronage appointments, appointment 
of unsuitable persons or appointments based on policy considerations. It is used as a licence to 
appoint unsuitable and unqualified persons. These appointments are sometimes justified on the 
basis of affirmative action and cadre deployment practice.69 
 
 
 
 
 
62  Cameron & Milne 2008. 
63 Public Service Commission Fact Sheet on the Duration of Employment per Grade of Senior Management 
Service Members (2011) 2 (hereafter Public Service Commission 2011). 
64 Department of Public Service and Administration 2007. 
65 Public Service Commission Vulindlela Human Resources Oversight Report (2016) (hereafter Vulindlela HR 
Oversight Report 2016). 
66 Vulindlela HR Oversight Report 2016. 
67 Public Service Commission The State of the Public Service Report (2010) 70 (hereafter Public Service 
Commission 2010). 
68 Vulindlela HR Oversight Report 2016. 
69 Cadre Policy and Development Strategy (1997) of the ANC. 
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These policies were used by the post-apartheid government for the same reason the open skills 
system was used, namely to advance its transformation imperatives of redressing the legacy of 
apartheid, service delivery backlogs, demographic representivity of the public service and 
expediting the implementation of developmental policies.70 The post-apartheid government did 
not trust the old guard enough with carrying out the much-needed transformation. However, it 
was forced to keep old apartheid civil servants as a result of the ‘sunset clause’, which created 
uncomfortable relationships between the political and administrative heads, with huge tension 
and suspicion.71 This was, according to the Presidential Review Commission, fuelled by a 
threat, real or perceived, of political sabotage by disloyal incumbents of the previous 
dispensation.72 The PRC recommended ‘political appointments’ within the service as a cushion 
against unsupportive public servants, but on an interim basis. However, the cadre deployment 
and affirmative action policies were used in a way that blemished the open skills recruitment 
system. Competent people were shunned, procedures flouted and instead cronies and unsuitable 
people appointed, possibly because there were no qualified black people and appointing whites 
would have perpetuated apartheid. 
The dictionary meaning of a ‘cadre’ is a small group of trained people who form the basic unit 
of a military, political or business organisation. Tshishonga states that in service delivery terms, 
a cadre should be a special unit of service men, forming a nucleus for 
expansion when necessary. The concept of a cadre or cadre deployment makes 
sense within the struggle, connoting a “group of activists in a communist or 
any revolutionary party who happen to be the members of such a group or 
grouping”.73 
Tshishonga further states that ‘a cadre is associated with tested commitment, trust, reliability 
and clear understanding of the organisational mandate assigned either to the individuals or a 
collective group’. From the foregoing, it becomes apparent therefore that the fundamental 
virtues of cadre deployment are discipline, skills, determination, conscientiousness,   capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
70  Habib A South Africa’s Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects (2013). 
71 Ndletyana M ‘Affirmative action in the public service’ in Habib A & Bentley K (eds) Racial Redress and 
Citizenship in South Africa (2008). 
72 PRC 1998: 21 para. 2.1.3. See also Mafunisa MJ ‘Separation of politics from the South African public service: 
Rhetoric or reality?’ (2003) 38(2) Journal of Public Administration 85 94. 
73 Tshishonga N ‘Cadre deployment and its implications on service delivery in South Africa: A human 
development capability approach’ (2014) Journal of Public Administration 49(3) 891 893 (hereafter Tshishonga 
2014). 
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and capability based on training.74 As can be seen, cadre deployment is not bad in itself, but it 
can be abused as is the case in South Africa. The public services both in China and Singapore, 
for example, can be termed ‘cadre organisations’.75 But in both countries, the ruling political 
parties have ensured that those deployed are qualified. The point, therefore, is not whether a 
ruling party deployed its cadres to public service positions but rather whether those deployed 
are qualified and have the ability to perform the job. In the South African case, instead of 
deploying suitably qualified, skilled and disciplined personnel, incompetent and lazy people 
are deployed. Cadre deployment is used in a way that reflects clientelism and patronage, and 
the open recruitment system has not been able to stop this abuse and furtherance of patronage 
networks. 
Similarly, the open skills recruitment system has allowed employment of personnel not based 
on merit but on policy considerations of affirmative action. As noted in the foregoing, 
affirmative action is a legal requirement linked to the goals of ensuring equity and 
representativeness in the public service. However, as stated in South African Police Service v 
Solidarity obo Barnard noted above, affirmative action measures and cadre deployment 
practices must take account of the job requirements and should not be prioritised over the 
latter.76 
Secondly, some of the members of the senior management service are political appointments. 
Unlike the case in most developmental states, such as Malaysia, Mauritius and Botswana, 
where politicians are not involved in the appointment of public servants,77 the appointment of 
senior managers in South Africa is made by the President, the Premier,78 the Minister of the 
department concerned, or a person to whom the power of appointment has been delegated,79 or 
the Members of the Executive Council (MEC). When it comes to appointment of DGs/HoDs, 
the power of appointment rests with the President or a Premier of a province, who can delegate 
to executive authorities (ministers or members of the provincial executive councils). The 
appointment of the DG by the president or of the HOD by the Premier is made with the 
concurrence of the Cabinet or the Executive Council. DDGs in turn are appointed by the 
 
 
 
 
74 Tshishonga 2014: 894. 
75 Public Service Commission (2016) 24. 
76  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard para. 186. 
77 Public Service Commission 2016: 24. 
78 Section 12 Public Service Act. 
79 Sections 3(7) and 9 Public Service Act. 
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Ministers after the concurrence of the Cabinet.80 In the developmental states mentioned, this is 
the responsibility of an independent agency, namely Public Service Commissions (Malaysia 
and Mauritius), Career Civil Servants (China) and Appointment Boards (Botswana).81 
Even though the system of political appointments of SMS members was impelled by the need 
to transform the apartheid public service,82 it is now undermining the NPM principle of 
bestowing discretionary powers to managers. The very idea of the creation of an independent 
and distinct cadre of senior managers transferable within the public service is undermined by 
the political involvement in the appointment process. It opens room for politicians to appoint 
tepid and weak officials simply to be able to remote-control them once appointed. 
Furthermore, given the policy-making and as such the political nature of some of the 
managerial positions, the political office-bearers exert a certain level of influence83 in top 
appointments and appointment of advisers.84 This results in the appointment of managers who 
show commitment and loyalty to individuals who influenced their appointment rather than to 
the organisation itself.85 The very fact of their being appointed by a politician means that these 
managers are at the beck and call of politicians, which undermines their independence. 
Furthermore, they can be dismissed if they do not follow a particular line, and this makes them 
beholden to political principals. As a result, the wide discretion conferred upon them is 
curtailed by the fear of crossing their political principals and risk being dismissed. 
In sum, the above reflections suggest that the new managerialism is not being properly 
implemented. As a result, it provides a mixed bag of results: while there are areas of success, 
there is also a vast room for improvement. The failure to appoint suitable people, the resultant 
instability which in turn causes disruption in service provisions, and the tumultuous 
relationship between HoDs and their political principals, all impact negatively on the 
performance of the SMS system and, ultimately, on managers’ discretion and independence 
 
 
 
80 Public Service Commission 2016: 29. 
81 Public Service Commission 2016: 24. 
82 Public Service Commission 2016: 29. 
83 This influence relates to the fact that, over and above the fact of their being political appointees, candidates for 
the posts of director-general and deputy director-general are selected by panels consisting of ministers and deputy 
ministers. The final act of appointment of directors-general by the president, with the concurrence of the cabinet, 
or of deputy directors-general by ministers, after consultation with the cabinet, has already been influenced by 
politicians involved in the selection process. 
84 Public Service Commission Recruitment, Retention, Career Pathing and Utilisation of Senior Management 
Service Members’ Expertise and Skills in the Public Service (2017): 19. 
85  In-Pang Fu 2015: 5. 
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2.1.2 Performance management system 
2.1.2.1 NPM principles 
As noted in Chapter Two,86 performance management is a mechanism to tie managerial 
independence to the delivery of services, and as such it is an accountability measure for senior 
managers. It is aimed at keeping managerial autonomy in check. In this regard, managers are 
supposed to enter into performance agreements which specify targets against which 
performance is measured. This provides an objective measure to assess managers’ performance 
and ensure that managers are judged on results. 
 
2.1.2.2 Legislative framework 
The 1995 White Paper proposes that the contracts of the senior management corps must be tied 
to the achievement of specific performance goals, in relation to service delivery and 
representativeness.87 The Constitution in turn enjoins the public administration to be 
development-oriented88 and accountable.89 It further requires the cultivation of good human 
resource management and career-development practices, in order to maximise human 
potential.90 These provision are interpreted to relate to performance management, as they 
require accountability and circumscribing the managerial autonomy to issues of development 
and delivery. 
The Public Service Amendment Act of 1997,91 the 1997 White Paper on the New Employment 
Policy in the Public Service92 and the Public Service Regulations of 2001 ushered in a new 
 
 
 
 
 
86  At section 6.4.2. 
87  White Paper 1995: 22 para. 6.1.3. 
88 Section 195(1)(c) Constitution. 
89 Section 195(1)(f) Constitution. 
90 Section 195(1)(h) Constitution. 
91 The relevant sections of the Act are 3(5), 3B, and 7(3)(b). Section 3(5) assigns powers and duties concerning 
the internal organisation of a department to its Executing Authority. This includes the career incidents of 
employees other than HoDs, such as performance management and discipline in a department. Section 3B in turn 
assigns the president and relevant premiers the powers and duties concerning the appointment and other career 
incidents of HoDs, which may be delegated. Section 7(3)(b) provides for the following responsibilities of HoDs: 
efficient management and administration; effective utilisation and training of staff; maintenance of discipline; 
promotion of sound labour relations; and proper use and care of state property. 
92 White Paper on a New Employment Policy for the Public Service: Managing People in a Transformed Public 
Service 9 September 1997 (hereafter White Paper 1997b). This lays the foundation for the regulatory framework 
regarding management of performance in the public service. White Paper 1997b states that the success of the 
public service in meeting its operational and developmental goals depends on public servants’ efficiency and 
effectiveness in carrying out their duties. 
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performance management system in South Africa for the SMS.93 A Director-General must enter 
into a performance agreement with his or her Minister, while in the case of a senior manager 
who is not a head of a department it would be with his or her immediate supervisor.94 
Chapter 4 of the Public Service Regulations of 2001, which establishes the SMS, provides for 
the process and requirements of performance management and development for members of 
the SMS.95 Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook96 read with the Public Service Commission 
Bargaining Council Resolutions (PSCBC)97 states that poor performance is among the 
misdemeanours that require disciplinary action. The SMS handbook and PSCBC Resolution 
10 of 1999 state that in the event of poor performance, the employer must give written reasons 
if he or she is of the view that an employee is not performing in accordance with the job that 
the employee has been employed to do.98 This must be followed by a process to improve 
performance, including agreeing on the time-frames by when performance should have 
improved.99 Thereafter, disciplinary sanctions can be taken, which include counselling or 
coaching, verbal warnings, written warnings, a final written warning, suspension without pay 
for no longer than three months, demotions, a combination of the above, and dismissal.100 
The White Paper 1997b states that the performance assessment process identifies strengths and 
weaknesses and the interventions which are needed to deal with challenges, including the 
employee’s future training needs and other developmental interventions, such as career 
counselling, coaching and mentoring.101 Recognising and rewarding employees who perform 
exceptionally well and whose skills are particularly valued are important. Where performance 
has not matched the requirements in the work plan, the assessment, both written and verbal, 
should be focused on identifying the reasons for this and on reaching mutual agreement on the 
steps to be taken to effect improvement. The steps may include interventions such as career 
counselling, mentoring,  retraining, developmental opportunities and re-deployment.  If     the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 Miller K Public Sector Reform Governance in South Africa (2005) 86-89. 
94  Cameron 2009: 929. 
95  SMS Handbook 2003 at Chapter 4. 
96 SMS Handbook 2003: 199 Chapter 7. 
97  Resolution 10 of 1999 and Resolution 1 of 2003. 
98  Subsection 4.1 of PSCBC Resolution 10 of 1999. 
99  Subsection 4.3 of PSCBC Resolution 10 of 1999. 
100 SMS Handbook para. 15.11 read with 6.1(7). 
101  White Paper 1997b: 27 para. 5.9. 
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desired improvement cannot be effected, dismissal on grounds of inefficiency can be 
considered, as the last resort.102 
 
2.1.2.3 Practice 
In giving effect to the policy framework outlined above, the Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) in 2002 introduced the Performance Management and Development 
System (PMDS) for the SMS as an accountability framework necessary for planning 
performance, tracking progress of performance and reporting on performance outcomes.103 The 
PMDS framework outlines the processes and provides the templates to be used by the SMS 
member and enables tracking of individual performance towards the attainment of the overall 
organisational goals. It also helps to clarify responsibilities, priorities and performance 
expectations between the SMS members and their supervisors through the signing of the 
performance agreement. The performance agreement then creates a sound basis for 
administrative decisions that include managing performance, recognising and addressing good 
and under-performance and ensuring accountability and delivery, when done properly.104 
This scheme of performance management, as mentioned, is meant to ensure that managers are 
judged on results. The Public Service Commission states that managing people’s performance 
through performance contracts is an effective way of enhancing accountability for 
performance.105 Monitoring is achieved through performance contracts and the specification of 
expectations within short-term contracts for staff at senior levels to provide the basis for a 
ministerial review of achievements.106 This is the system of performance management, the 
primary orientation of which is developmental in nature. It provides for effective feedback in 
response to inadequate performance and for recognising outstanding performance.107 
Given South African citizens’ heightened expectations of better service delivery, such an 
approach gives emphasis, through the principle of deconcentration, to improved individual and 
 
 
 
 
 
102  White Paper 1997b: 27 para. 5.9.2. 
103 Public Service Commission Report on the Implementation of the Performance Management and Development 
System for Senior Managers in the Free State Province (2012) (hereafter Public Service Commission 2012a). 
104 Public Service Commission 2012a: 2. 
105 Public Service Commission An Analysis of Performance Agreements as an Effective Performance Management 
Tool (2008) 24 (hereafter Public Service Commission 2008b). 
106  SMS Handbook 2003: 22-30 Chapter 4. 
107  SMS Handbook 2003: 22-30 Chapter 4. 
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organisational performance as key enablers to improved service delivery.108 As such, the focus 
has moved from measuring subjective personal qualities to measuring performance against pre- 
agreed outputs or outcomes. Through the application of the performance management system 
in the public service, the objectives and outputs agreed with individuals and teams are 
integrated with and support the achievement of organisational objectives.109 
The performance management system as implemented in South Africa has four key elements. 
The first of these is the mandatory assessment of demonstrated managerial competence of 
members of the SMS by means of the Core Management Criteria (CMC). This entails the 
mandatory signing of performance agreement, within three months of appointment and 
thereafter at the beginning of each financial year (31 March annually) by all members of the 
SMS.110 The performance of a member is reviewed on a quarterly basis. The criteria upon 
which the performance of senior managers is assessed consist of two components, both of 
which shall be contained in the performance agreement, namely Key Results Areas (KRAs) 
and Core Management Competence (CMC). The KRAs describe what is expected from a 
manager in terms of functional job requirements derived from outputs in the 
strategic/operational plan, while the CMC’s are based on 11 core competencies against which 
every senior manager should be assessed. Accordingly, the performance contract which 
incorporates KRAs and CMCs is used as a standard assessment instrument on which to base 
decisions on probation, rewards, promotion and skills development.111 
The second key element of the performance management system is the standardised rating 
scale to which performance based rewards must be directly related. The third element relates 
to a two-tier reward system comprising pay progression and performance bonuses. The last 
element relates to the introduction of personal development plans.112 
As noted in the foregoing, the SMS Handbook,113 read with the Public Service Commission 
Bargaining Council Resolutions114 and PSCBC Resolution 10 of 1999, outlines a procedure to 
be followed and sanctions to be imposed in an event of poor performance. The sanctions to be 
 
 
 
108 Public Service Commission Report on the Management of Poor Performance in the Public Service (2007) 41 
(hereafter Public Service Commission 2007). 
109 Public Service Commission 2007: 41. 
110  SMS Handbook 2003: 97 para. 8.1. 
111  SMS Handbook 2001 as updated in 2003. 
112  SMS Handbook 2001. 
113 SMS Handbook 2003: 199 Chapter 7. 
114  Resolution 10 of 1999 and Resolution 1 of 2003. 
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imposed are sequential and each sanction kicks in once the one before it fails to yield tangible 
outcomes. Of importance is that the performance management process is handled in a 
developmental rather than a punitive manner.115 
 
2.1.2.4 Assessment 
It would seem that the performance management system is poorly implemented. First, very few 
agreements are signed and there is less enforcement even to those agreements that have been 
signed.116 In this regard, the Public Service Commission raised a concern that the HoDs are not 
setting the right tone on the importance of concluding performance agreements.117 This concern 
emanated from the fact that during the 2006/07 to 2008/09, close to 20 per cent of HoDs failed 
to sign their performance agreements. Things became worse in 2009/10 when only 65 per cent 
of HoDs signed their performance agreement.118 This low level of compliance with the signing 
of performance agreements by senior officials is the case despite the fact that one of the apex 
priorities of government is to ensure that all SMS members sign their performance agreements 
timeously.119 Given the generally low compliance rates with the signing of performance 
agreements, the former president announced the signing of performance agreements as a 
priority in his State of the Nation Address in 2008.120 Furthermore, Outcome 12 requires 100 
per cent compliance with the signing of performance agreements by senior managers.121 
The failure to sign performance agreement presents a difficulty because senior managers 
cannot be held accountable for non-performance if there is no agreement in place that outlines 
key priorities for implementation during the fiscal year.122 The failure of HoDs to sign 
performance agreements has effectively compromised the entire value chain of the 
performance management system, as organisational performance has to be cascaded from the 
accounting officer to the entire staff compliment. This means, therefore, that an HoD   cannot 
 
 
 
 
 
115 Public Service Commission 2007: 8. 
116  Cameron 2009: 929-10. 
117 Public Service Commission The State of the Public Service Report (2010) 51 (hereafter Public Service 
Commission 2010). 
118 Public Service Commission 2010: 51-2. 
119 Department of Public Service and Administration Cabinet Lekgotla Report APEX Project 15: Regularise 
Employment and Performance Agreements at Designated Levels (2008) 
120 Mbeki T, President of the Republic of South Africa. State of the Nation Address. Joint Sitting of Parliament. 
Cape Town. 8 February 2008. 
121 Republic of South Africa The Government Pocket Guide to South Africa: Government 2010/2011 (2011) 20. 
122 Public Service Commission 2012a: 22. 
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effectively enter into performance agreements with subordinates when his or her performance 
agreement has not been concluded.123 
Secondly, there is a highly unsatisfactory level of performance evaluation. A number of Public 
Service Commission reports have raised this as a concern.124 For example, the 2004 report 
pointed out that performance assessment is still a major challenge facing the public service.125 
It described compliance with guidelines as erratic and inconsistent.126 Furthermore, 
performance is not managed on an ongoing basis and quarterly or bi-annual assessments do not 
take place as often as required.127 In instances where performance is reviewed, this is done 
haphazardly or takes place as an afterthought because of challenges that require urgent 
intervention. Non-compliance with prescribed time-frames for concluding performance 
assessments often results in huge backlogs.128 
In its investigations, the PSC has, over the years, consistently found that the majority of 
grievances are related to performance management and salary-linked matters.129 The 2006 
report revealed that 52 per cent of grievances related to the way performance assessments are 
conducted.130 The report of the subsequent year pointed out that in 2004/05 only 40 per cent of 
heads of departments were evaluated by their Executive Authorities.131 This situation only got 
worse in the 2005/06 financial year, with 50 per cent of HoDs at national level and 44 per cent 
at provincial level not having been evaluated.132 In 2010, only 51 per cent of HoDs had been 
evaluated. This represented a slight decline from the 56 per cent evaluation rate recorded in 
2009.133 For the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years, grievances relating to performance 
management  rated  the  highest  (2279)  and  account  for  27  per  cent  of  all  the grievances 
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lodged.134 This was also the case in previous financial years. In 2011/12, 33 per cent of all 
grievances were about performance assessments, and 24 per cent in 2012/13.135 
Thirdly, performance agreements are poorly formulated, resulting in appraisal outcomes that 
are biased towards or against the HoD.136 In these instances, the performance appraisals fail to 
show an adequate correlation between the performance of the HoD as an individual and the 
overall performance of the department for which they are responsible.137 Cameron points out 
that an interview with a senior official of the Public Service Commission cited the 
Commissioner of Police as an example of a manager getting a bonus while failing to perform 
the job of reducing crime adequately.138 
Furthermore, the PSC notes that ‘some of the performance agreements are finalised beyond the 
relevant financial year, thus raising concerns about their value as accountability 
mechanisms.’139 This is despite the fact that it is a legal requirement to finalise performance 
agreements within the stipulated time-frames.140 According to the PSC, by their very nature, 
performance agreements are supposed to translate departmental strategic plans into specific 
deliverables for employees.141 A failure to conclude a performance agreement for each 
employee within the stipulated time-frames, compromises accountability. Furthermore, it 
means that ‘training interventions will not be adequately aligned to developmental needs 
identified through the performance management process.’142 In addition, performance 
agreement is an instrument through which individual and organisational developmental needs 
are clearly articulated.143 A failure to sign a performance agreement, therefore, means a failure 
to articulate individual and organisational developmental needs. 
The foregoing discussion reflects the fact that the performance management system is not being 
implemented properly. Instead of tying the freedom enjoyed by the senior managers to 
performance, poor implementation of the performance management system, which    includes 
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non-compliance with time-frames, failure to monitor and review performance on a regular basis 
and lack of feedback to the employees has created gaps and loopholes in the system.144 For 
example, some managers get performance bonuses even though their performance leaves a lot 
to be desired.145 This sends a signal that relationships are assessed instead of actual 
performance. In some departments, a qualified audit report would be received, but senior 
managers would still be awarded performance bonuses.146 Furthermore, performance 
agreements are not always signed. If they are signed at all, their evaluation is not up to standard. 
Even though there are few pockets of excellence, overall the above reflection leads to the 
conclusion that there are not enough skills to implement the performance management. Where 
there is cadre deployment or cronyism, it compromises performance assessment, as the cadre 
deployment is often influenced from outside the public service. The result is that performance 
assessment and/or sanctioning for poor performance are unlikely. 
 
2.1.3 Contract appointments 
2.1.3.1 NPM principles 
It was seen in Chapter Two147 that the NPM pushes for a move away from a military-style 
public service of being employed for life to contingent forms of employment, such as greater 
flexibility in hiring, short-term employment contracts and the concomitant weakening of job 
security or pension entitlements. The NPM advocates for hiring on a fixed-term contract, 
rewarding according to performance, and sacking if work does not measure up. 
This individualised and contingent form of employment replaces the career civil service based 
on assured existence. Instead, it bases the political-administrative relationships more on 
individual accountability. Political leaders are supposed, through contracts, to specify targets 
and objectives more clearly, and performance should be controlled by use of quantitative 
indicators for monitoring results and for measuring efficiency. This removes the assured 
existence enjoyed by bureaucrats in the Weberian bureaucracy and creates incentives for 
mediocre time-servers to become innovative and work efficiently. The replacement of    time- 
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servers with innovators also means that greater attention should be paid to the value-for-money 
principle in the use of resources. This introduces the element of parsimony in resource use. 
Like the performance management system, the fixed-term contract system is an element of 
managerialism which seeks to enhance accountability for performance and resource use and to 
structure the autonomy enjoyed by managers. 
 
2.1.3.2 Legislative framework 
Implementing the contract appointment system, which was introduced in 1995 by the 1995 
White Paper, section 12(1) of the Public Service Act provides that any person appointed, 
promoted or transferred to the office of head of department shall occupy that office for a period 
of five years from the date of his or her appointment, promotion or transfer, or the shorter 
period approved by the relevant executing authority. Sections 9 and 11 of the Public Services 
Act provide that all other managers from the DDGs downwards are appointed in the same way 
as any other career public servant. This means that their appointment is permanent. However, 
once appointed or promoted to the post of HoD, they automatically lose their status as 
permanent employees.148 
The position with regard to the five-year term was changed by a cabinet decision in 1999. 
According to this decision, HoDs of national departments or organisational components must 
as a general rule be appointed for a period of three years.149 
 
2.1.3.3 Practice 
The adoption of this NPM tenet of contract appointment in South Africa heralded a move away 
from the closed Weberian career system towards the flexible tenure system which hinges on 
performance. Kaul states that this undermined the career system which relied on time served 
for promotion.150 The obsession with performance, according to Hughes, turned this long- 
standing tradition of long service on its head as it led to short-term appointments based on 
contract. People’s stay in the public sector now depends on their performance.151 If they do not 
perform according to performance expectations, then their contracts do not get renewed.  The 
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rationale therefore for the introduction of short-term contract appointment in South Africa was 
to keep senior managers on their toes. 
In practice, however, the NPM tenet of contract appointment has not been fully implemented 
in South Africa. It is applied only to the higher most echelons of the senior management system, 
the HoDs. The rest of the SMS corps still has assured existence. This tool of ensuring 
accountability and of holding managerial autonomy in check does not apply to the entire SMS 
corps; instead the Weberian career system is still applicable. This means, therefore, that South 
Africa is selective in its application of the NPM, and as such it is unrealistic to expect massive 
changes in the delivery of services as promised by the NPM. The employment regimes for 
managers differ. 
Furthermore, fixed-term contracts for the uppermost echelon of the public service, the HoDs, 
are linked to term of office of political head. This has led to the revolving-door phenomenon 
in which the incoming government cleans out the existing administration. 
 
2.1.3.4 Assessment 
The contract appointment system in South Africa, as applied to the elite, is not without its fair 
share of problems. Most of these problems relate to the high turnover of HoDs, which has been 
a source of concern to government.152 In its study on the duration of employment per grade of 
SMS members, the Public Service Commission found that the contract system contributes to 
the attrition of those SMS members it is applicable to, namely the HoDs. It found that one of 
the reasons for the majority of HoDs leaving the public service prematurely was the expiry of 
contract.153 Once their contracts expire, they do not get renewed. Furthermore, the short-term 
contract excluded capable individuals from applying to the public service because of the 
uncertainty it brings. 
The Public Service Commission conducted a study in 2008, assessing the turnover rate of HoDs 
during the 2003/04 to 2006/07 financial years in national and provincial departments. The 
recorded incidents of turnover during this period were 92 for the termination of service, 48 for 
transfers and 19 for the splitting of functions.154  This accounted for 59 per cent of termination 
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of contracts, 30 per cent of transfers and 11 per cent of splitting of functions.155 The most recent 
State of the Public Service quarterly bulletin reveals that the average number of years a 
Director-General serves on a five year contract is two years and seven month.156 This mean 
that they serves only half on their term of contract. 
In addition, the business opportunities and better pay presented by the private sector are pull 
factors. This leads to some HoDs, and other senior managers, prematurely terminating their 
contracts and exiting the public service because of better remuneration packages and working 
conditions in the private sector. They feel that if they do not grab the opportunities presented 
it might be too late for them to do so when their contracts formally expire.157 This indicates 
that the introduction of the contract system of employment did not necessarily make the public 
service compete fairly with the private sector. Furthermore, many HoDs expressed concerns 
about their future in the public service as they had to give up more permanent and secure 
positions in the public service in order to take on the HoD post.158 
The turnover of HoDs has a multiplier effect on the turnover of the SMS cadre because 
invariably new HoDs focus substantive attention on building their own teams and hence 
departments usually experience some level of senior management turnover when a new HoD 
is appointed.159 Consequently, the result of HoD turnover is that departments engage in 
exercises that result in changes to organisational structures, strategies and the overall operations 
of the department. Every time there is a change at the top, departments are reconfigured as the 
new HoD and/or political office bearer imposes his or her priorities and/or strategic 
perspectives.160 These changes can be disruptive and impact on departmental stability and the 
delivery of services as it takes about six months to a year for the new HoD to settle in.161 
In addition, it takes time to build relationships of trust and mutual respect in institutions, and 
once relationships are created, there is likelihood that energies, commitments and loyalties 
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would be channelled towards the attainment of common strategic objectives.162 Senior 
management has to adapt to the new style and vision of the new HoD, resulting in the first six 
months to a year of appointment being unproductive.163 Continuous changes in leadership over 
short periods affect the pace of the implementation of the strategic plan, as new leadership 
comes with its own priorities. Furthermore, the new HoDs are sometimes unable to account for 
work or progress that took place during the previous period.164 
In one of its studies conducted to evaluate the impact of HoDs’ turnover rate on the 
performance of departments, the Public Service Commission reported that in instance where 
HoDs have been in the post for longer than three years, the performance of their departments 
or institutions shows signs of continued improvement.165 In this regard, HoDs and senior 
managers were of the view that there is a need to review the contract appointment system as it 
tends to impact negatively on the stability and consequently, the performance of 
departments.166 Staff morale and organisational effectiveness are negatively affected by a 
constant change of leadership at the highest level.167 By contrast, stability in the senior 
management echelons enables departments to absorb a change in the political and 
administrative leadership more quickly than in instances where senior management is weak. 
Stability at top management impacts positively on the morale of staff, and thus contributes to 
effective service delivery.168 
Furthermore, the attrition of senior managers in the public service has a direct impact on the 
skills base therein. One of the concerns of government is to ensure that the expertise and 
experience of HoDs are not prematurely lost to the public service.169 The three- to five-year 
contracts were, accordingly, seen as problematic because they are oftentimes used as a political 
tool to punish those HoDs viewed as ‘recalcitrant’170 by their political heads. In these instances, 
contracts are not renewed. Furthermore, there have been a number of high-profile cases where 
HoDs have left office prematurely because of conflict with executive authorities. This conflict 
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takes the form of political, personal or organisational differences or a combination of all of 
these.171 This leads to the haemorrhaging of institutional memory and organisational 
knowledge.172 
Other reasons for the high SMS turnover rate relate to change in political leadership. It is 
suggested that the HoD turnover usually gains momentum four months after elections.173 This 
means that these incidents occur principally when there are certain developments such as 
changes in the political leadership. In this instance, the contract system is used as a revolving 
door where the political principal comes in with his new team and pushes out the old team. 
It is further suggested that one of the main reasons for the turnover centres on the relationships 
between the executive authority and HoDs.174 In this regard, the study shows that very few 
HoDs served more than one executive authority.175 The general suggestion by some HoDs is 
that it is this relationship, and not necessarily competence to perform the job, that determines 
the length of the tenure of a HoD. Of the HoDs who formed part of the study, 89 per cent 
believed that their security of tenure is directly linked to their relationships with executive 
authorities.176 This perception was confirmed by an earlier study on the effects of turnover 
rates, to the effect that in a number of cases, decisions to renew, extend or terminate the 
employment contract of a HoD are based purely on personal preferences rather than on 
performance management and development issues.177 This implies that personal preferences 
rather than service delivery imperatives decide the future of the most senior public servants.178 
In sum, the evidence suggests that the system of contract appointments – at least in its pure 
NPM form – has not been fully implemented. It is only applicable to the elite while the rest of 
the managers are still enjoying an assured existence or secure tenure. Furthermore, in instances 
where it is applied, the desired results of improving accountability for results have not been 
achieved. Instead, it has led to political manipulation. The renewal or not of a contract depends 
not on performance and results but on the relationship with politicians. This forces managers 
to endear themselves to politicians and erodes their independence. The three-year contract has 
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led to greater political control over senior officials in that it is used to punish those managers 
viewed as too independent. 
 
2.2 Reconfiguring the modes of service delivery 
The reforms that took place internally, namely at the management level, which involved 
devolving decision-making powers to manager and limiting that power through performance 
management and contract system, were not the only aspects of transformation that took place 
in the public service. External restructuring also took place in a number of departments in an 
attempt to improve service delivery, especially to previously disadvantaged communities. 
Traditionally, governments have been the main and sole providers of goods and services. 
However, after the introduction of the NPM model of delivery there has been a worldwide shift 
in focus from the traditional service delivery approaches to various innovative means, which 
are seen to be more effective, cost-efficient, customer-orientated, and flexible. With the 
introduction of the NPM in South Africa a point was raised that public service bureaucratic 
structures do not lend themselves to innovative, efficient, effective and responsive service 
delivery.179 
In order to address this problem, the post-apartheid government has sought innovative 
approaches to service delivery by looking at alternative organisation and governance 
arrangements. These involved the setting up of public enterprises or government agencies at 
arms’ length from the line department to deliver specific services (usually self-contained 
services) based on commercial principles, or formal partnership with players from the private 
or voluntary sectors.180 This saw the emergence of alternative service delivery mechanism such 
as corporatisation and public-private partnership (PPPs). As has been noted, privatisation was 
rejected by the 1995 White Paper and as such is not discussed herein. 
 
2.2.1 Corporatisation 
It was noted in Chapter Two181 that corporatisation relates to the phenomenon of establishing 
free-standing, semi-autonomous agencies or public entities which render public functions on 
behalf  of  departments. It  allows  for  the  separation  of  policy-making  and implementation 
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functions or responsibilities in terms of which governments focus on policy formulation, while 
the agencies expend time and energy on implementation. Corporatisation is intended to ensure 
an arm’s-length relationship between the entity or agency and government and thus discourages 
political interference. It is hoped that these business units will be less constrained by red tape 
and political interference and have greater managerial flexibility, which will lead to greater 
efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness. The use of corporatisation rather than full 
privatisation is aimed at taking advantage of private-sector efficiencies while maintaining 
public accountability. 
Transnet also defines corporatisation as a process of converting a state-controlled organisation 
into a company in terms of the Company’s Act,182 with the state remaining the sole 
shareholder.183 In essence, corporatisation is the transformation of state assets, functions or 
departments into state-owned corporations, in order to introduce corporate management 
techniques to their administration. 
 
2.2.1.1 Legislative framework 
The Public Service Act is the starting point of any discussion on public entities. In terms of the 
Public Service Act, the Minister of Public Service and Administration and the Minister of 
Finance are given the mandate to oversee the overall functioning of the Public Service.184 This 
is done by ensuring that any new or existing public function is allocated or transferred to the 
appropriate sphere of government, department and/or public entity and to eliminate any 
duplication of functions.185 The Minister of Finance comes in by allocating appropriate 
resources and establishing uniform reporting and listing of all public entities,186 nationally and 
in the provinces, to ensure that they are accountable to government.187 
Section 3(3)(a) of the Public Service Act enjoins the Minister of Public Service and 
Administration to advise the President regarding the establishment or abolition of any 
department or organisational component in the national sphere of government. Section 3(3)(b) 
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in turn empowers the Minister to make a determination regarding the allocation of any function 
to, or the abolition of, any department or the transfer of any function from one department to 
another or from a department to any other body or from any other body to a department. Section 
38(1)(m) read with section 54(2) of the PFMA enjoins the accounting officer of a department 
to consult with and seek prior written consent of the National Treasury on any new public entity 
which is intended to be established. 
In a nutshell, public entities can be established for a new or an existing function(s). The 
Minister of Public Service and Administration’s role is to make a determination regarding the 
allocation or transfer of such a function to the public entity so established. The Minister of 
Finance in turn allocates the concomitant resources to the public entity so established with 
effect from the start of a financial year.188 
 
2.2.1.2 Practice 
It is important to note that the post-apartheid government inherited well over 300 public 
entities.189 Currently, there are approximately 700 of them in South Africa, cutting across 
national, provincial and local spheres of government.190 This means that over 400 public 
entities were created in the new dispensation to provide services formerly provided by 
government. In line with NPM thinking, these public entities were established with the 
expectation that they would improve the performance of government, be it through their policy 
advice, regulatory role, or service delivery, depending on why they were established in the first 
place.191 
The present discussion on the restructuring of service delivery mechanisms does not seek to 
cover all of the public entities. It looks instead at whether the NPM principle of corporatisation 
was successful. Certain patterns emerged in the implementation of this principle at national 
level that provide an understanding of key problems confronting entities. These problems or 
difficulties relate to weak corporate governance; poor selection and development of board 
members; high turnover of board members; dysfunctional/conflictual working   relationships; 
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the fact that corporatised entities are prone to corruption; and the limits of applying private 
sector models in public entities. 
 
2.2.1.3 Weak corporate governance 
The governance structure of corporatised entities or state-owned enterprises, is made up of a 
board of directors which oversees the management of the entity.192 The board is accountable to 
its main shareholder, the Minister of a sector department under which the entity falls, through 
the performance management system. The Minister plays an active role in ensuring that an 
entity is managed in accordance with the interests of Parliament and the public, and so plays a 
key part in the governance framework for an entity.193 Members of the board are appointed, 
and can be dismissed, by Parliament, through the Minister. The board is responsible for setting 
the corporate objectives of an entity in line with government policies. The achievement of those 
objectives lies with the board.194 The board is also responsible for developing policies 
governing the day-to-day operations of an entity and ensuring good governance, or overseeing 
implementation of those policies through the chief executive.195 
However, there are a number of instances that indicate that the boards either do not know what 
they are doing or fail to pick up problems or intervene in time.196 This phenomenon is called 
corporate governance incompetence. A few examples of state-owned entities with weak 
corporate governance or corporate governance incompetence are listed below. First, the board 
of Eskom failed to steer Eskom in the right direction, resulting in power shortages which 
plunged much of the country into rolling blackouts and the shutting down of some major 
mining operations in South Africa, with enormous economic loss.197 Furthermore, the failure 
to steer Eskom in the right direction has led to a failure to make profit, resulting in the board 
making numerous requests for double-digit tariff hikes. In 2007, the board asked for 18.7 per 
cent increase, 60 per cent in 2008, 45 per cent in 2009, and 16 per cent in 2012.198 On all these 
occasions  the  National  Energy Regulator  (NERSA) refused  to  grant  the increases, instead 
 
 
 
192 National Treasury Governance Oversight Role over State-Owned Entities (SOEs) (2005) 15 (hereafter National 
Treasure 2005). 
193  National Treasury 2005: 16. 
194 Public Service Commission 2003: 17. 
195 Public Service Commission 2003: 17. 
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granting perfectly reasonable increases.199 The strategic direction and capital expenditure for 
Eskom was only determined in 2014, years after the problem was identified.200 Moreover, 
Eskom was nominated as the worst company in the world in 2013 in term of social 
responsibility. In addition, it was downgraded by Standard and Poor and Fitch on account of 
poor standards and was also cited as having a poor credit rating.201 The failure to steer Eskom 
in the right direction is indicative of corporate governance failures by the board. 
Secondly, the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the board of the Armaments Corporation 
of South Africa SOC Ltd (Armscor) were dismissed by the Minister of Defence for various 
reasons.202 The first reason was the various procurement projects which had failed to progress 
timeously as a result of the board’s decisions or inaction.203 The second relates to Armscor’s 
failure to conclude a service level agreement with the Department of Defence as required by 
the Armscor Act.204 The third relate to certain complaints which the Minister had received 
about Armscor from the defence industry, which led the Minister to infer that Amscor’s 
relationship with the industry had broken down.205 In sum, under their leadership, Armscor and 
its Board had failed to fulfil effectively its statutory mandate. 
Thirdly, the Public Protector report entitled When Governance and Ethics Fail found 
‘pathological corporate governance deficiencies at the SABC, including failure by the SABC 
Board to provide strategic oversight to the National Broadcaster as provided for in the SABC 
Board Charter and King III Report’.206 The report notes that this was occasioned by the failure 
of the executive directors (GCEO, COO and CFO) ‘to provide the necessary support, 
information and guidance to help the Board discharge its fiduciary responsibilities 
effectively’.207 The report further notes that Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng (COO) admitted to having 
caused the Board to make irregular and unlawful decisions.208 It was also found that the Board 
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was so dysfunctional that it allowed Dr Ben Ngubane (board chairperson) to act as an executive 
chairperson by authorising numerous salary increments for Mr Motsoeneng.209 The Board also 
allowed Mr Motsoeneng to operate above the law, undermining the GCEO, and causing staff 
to engage in unlawful conduct.210 
Fourthly, there are several other companies that have been in trouble over the years and which 
have cost the state billions of rands. These include the Public Investment Corporation Limited 
(PIC) and Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), Telkom, SAA, Denel, and the Post 
Office. McGregor states that ‘most of the problems could have been prevented had there been 
good corporate governance’. 211 He goes further to state that ‘those responsible for governing 
State-owned Companies could have provided the necessary checks and balances and taken the 
right measures’.212 
Fifthly, a recent court judgment on the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) reveals 
clear instances of corporate governance failures. In this case, the court invalidated a contract 
between SASSA and Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Limited (CPS) to provide services for the 
payment of social grants for a period of five years.213 However, the court suspended the order 
of invalidity subject to the award of a new five-year tender after following a proper procurement 
process. In the alternative, SASSA would take over the payment of social grants when the 
suspended contract with CPS came to an end on 31 March 2017. SASSA was ordered to report 
to the court on its progress in the new tender process and its outcome.214 Pursuant to this order, 
SASSA reported, in November 2015, that it had decided not to award a new tender, but to take 
over the payment of social grants from 31 March 2017. The court accepted this assurance. 
However, this assurance turned out to be baseless because in April 2016 SASSA became aware 
that it could not comply with the undertaking to the court that it would be able to pay social 
grants from 1 April 2017. In a way that violates corporate governance, SASSA decided to 
withhold this discovery from the court, only informing the Minister of Social Development in 
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October 2016. Like SASSA, the Minister did not do anything about this information, despite 
repeated warnings from advising counsel and CPS. At the time of writing, SASSA wanted to 
enter into a contract with CPS without a competitive tender process in order to continue the 
payment of social grants, on the grounds that CPS is the only entity capable of paying grants 
for the foreseeable future after 31 March 2017. In essence, SASSA seeks to do exactly what 
AllPay 1 warned it against. 
The court was only informed of these developments on 28 February 2017, when SASSA 
eventually launched an application for an order authorising it to extend the contract with CPS. 
However, the Minister ordered SASSA to withdraw the application and instead file a progress 
report. The Black Sash launched an urgent application which sought to rescue the situation.215 
The South African Post Office SOC Limited (SAPO) intervened, arguing that it has the 
capacity, immediately, or in the medium term, to take over the distribution of the grants.216 The 
court stated that SASSA has demonstrated an inability to get its own affairs in order.217 That 
inability has compromised the continued protection of access to their right to social assistance 
for grant recipients.218 However, the court put all the blame on the Minister, the person who 
holds executive political office. It stated that 
the office-holder ultimately responsible for the crisis and the events that led to 
it is the person who holds executive political office. It is the Minister who is 
required in terms of the Constitution to account to Parliament. That is the 
Minister, and the Minister alone.219 
Sixthly, most recently serious corporate governance failures became evident at PRASA when 
the acting CEO was fired for raising his remuneration by more than 350 per cent.220 This 
resulted in the dismissal of the entire Board by the Minister of Transport. The Minister was 
quoted as saying that the reasons she dismissed the Board was that ‘the Board disregarded [her] 
instructions to focus on pertinent issues and instead concerned itself with in-fighting and public 
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spats’.221 She further said that ‘this behaviour, coupled with declining performance, lack of 
governance and financial prudence at the agency had left her with no choice but to dissolve the 
Board’.222 
One major reason often cited for corporate governance failures is the shortage of experience 
and expertise in the boards and executive directors and the high turnover of directors.223 Poor 
selection and development of board members are contributing factors to this problem. 
 
2.2.1.4 Poor selection and development 
Government and ministers are often accused of making political appointments that pay no 
regard to the mix of knowledge and expertise needed on the boards of state-owned entities.224 
Moreover, government committees nominate board members and executives without 
consulting the board and, as such, without due regard to issues such as succession planning, 
development and retention of board members. In some instances, it is the board that makes 
irregular appointments that flout proper procedures. These have resulted in poor performance 
by state-owned entities and a high turnover of directors. Examples of this phenomenon are 
highlighted in what follows. 
First, the Public Protector, as mentioned above, investigated the acting COO of the SABC and 
found that his appointment and salary progression were irregular and constituted improper 
conduct and maladministration.225 It was further found that the Board violated the SABC’s 
Articles of Association dealing with appointments by allowing Motsoeneng to act without the 
requisite qualifications and Board resolution and to exceed the capped salary allowance.226 The 
SABC ignored the findings and recommendations of the Public Protector and instead appointed 
Motsoeneng as COO permanently.227 Motsoeneng’s appointment as COO was eventually set 
aside  by  the  court.228    However,  Motsoeneng  was  subsequently  appointment  as     Group 
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Executive: Corporate Affairs in a manner that flouted the law. This appointment was also set 
aside by the court.229 
Secondly, the GEPF consists mainly of political appointments. It is furthermore chaired by the 
ANC MP, thus making it difficult for independent directors to contribute meaningfully. In 
addition, the CEO finds difficulty in getting real value from the board.230 Thirdly, Telkom is in 
a similar position, with the majority of directors being political appointments, raising the 
dangers of a biased board. 231 
Political appointments might lead to high turnover of directors owing to the politically charged 
environment. They might also lead to poor performance. 
 
2.2.1.5 High turnover 
High turnover in key positions can have dire consequences for good corporate governance and 
the smooth running of state-owned entities. It can also disrupt succession planning and the 
development of directors, resulting in a loss of institutional memory. Examples of this are 
provided below. 
First, the CEO of the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), Elias Masilela, resigned in 2014 
with two years of his five-year contract left, this after recording concerns about a questionable 
deal.232 Masilela is reported to be highly efficient, having increased the PIC’s assets by 60 per 
cent since 2010. He also sought to back development projects to underpin economic growth 
and fought for domestic control of companies.233 Secondly, Telkom has had five CEOs and 
four Board chairpersons in seven years. Thirdly, eight of the 14 board members of the SAA 
resigned in 2012, citing a difficult working relationship with the Department of Public 
Enterprises. Fourthly, Armscor had a completely new board in May 2014, the tenure of the old 
board having expired in April 2014. The previous chairperson and deputy chairperson were 
dismissed the previous year (2013), in response to which the court stated that 
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pic-ceo-masilela-resignation-looms-transparency-speculation.html (accessed 27 January 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
Chapter Five 
201 
 
 
 
the Minister’s response as to why she dismissed only General Motau and Ms 
Mokoena was resoundingly sound and logical. Had she dismissed the entire 
Board, she would have left Armscor, which has crucial obligations to fulfil, 
disabled and completely rudderless. The less invasive approach was to dismiss 
only the leadership of the Board, and to leave the Corporation with the 
necessary institutional knowledge to continue functioning.234 
However, this statement was rendered nugatory when the Minister of Defence let the old board 
go and appoint a completely new board with no institutional memory. 
Fifthly, the resignation of the Minister of Communications, Dina Pule, who was found guilty 
of lying to Parliament by the Ethics Committee and by a subsequent Public Protector’s 
Report,235 left the Department of Communications under investigation. She also left a number 
of state-owned companies, such as the Post Office, in difficulties with large-scale board 
resignations. These resignations have reversed the progress made by these companies.236 
 
2.2.1.6 Dysfunctional working relationships 
Given that the government is the policy-maker and the owner of these entities, the rules it sets 
can come into conflict with the wishes of the management of these entities. The relationship 
between the board and the minister sometimes becomes conflictual and not in the best interest 
of the entity, Parliament and the public. In fact, poor relationships between some ministries and 
entities are common, often because boards feel that their work is being undermined and that 
they are not being treated with respect. These antagonistic, hostile, conflicting relationships 
and abusive power games take the focus away from the collaboration needed to achieve good 
results. A few examples of this problem are highlighted below. 
First, the dismissal of the chairperson of the Board of Armscor and his deputy followed a 
deterioration in the relationship between them and successive Ministers of Defence.237 When 
the current Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, took office in 2012, there was 
already a lively dispute between the chairperson of the Board and the Minister’s predecessor, 
Lindiwe Sisulu. Minister Sisulu attempted to dismiss the chairperson and appoint Ms Mokoena 
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in his stead, but the chairperson refused to accept the dismissal on procedural grounds. Minister 
Mapisa-Nqakula resolved the dispute by retaining the chairperson and appointing Ms Mokoena 
as his deputy. The relationship soured when the chairperson missed three meetings, and the 
deputy chairperson, one, convened by the Minister to address various governance issues. When 
the Minister expressed her displeasure to the chairperson, the chairperson replied by bemoaning 
the late notice of the meetings and the fact that Board members ‘make a living in other 
endeavours’. The chairperson further asked the Minister to schedule future meetings with the 
Board through him as the chairperson. The Minister responded by terminating the chairperson’s 
and the deputy chairperson’s membership of the board.238 
Secondly, the Public Protector, in its report When Governance and Ethics Fail, found the 
Minister of Communications, Dina Pule, to have acted improperly in the manner in which she 
unduly interfered in the affairs of the SABC, giving unlawful orders to the SABC Board and 
staff.239 This relates to the appointment of a certain Ms Duda to the position of CFO without 
her having applied for the position. Interviews and the selection process were conducted and a 
recommendation was made to the Minister, as the shareholder, to appoint Mr Msulwa Daca. 
However, the Minister rejected the recommendation and orchestrated the appointment of Ms 
Duda, who was interviewed, without having applied for the position, long after the recruitment 
and selection process had been closed. The Minister eventually appointed Ms Duda.240 
Thirdly, the poor working relationship between the Minister of Public Enterprises and the 
Board of SAA resulted in the resignation of eight members of the Board in 2012, including the 
chairperson, Cheryl Carolus.241 The SAA chairperson was quoted as saying: ‘The board has 
just become untenable, our reputation and professional integrity had just been dragged through 
the mud without any clarification or support, and I believe this had reached a point where the 
relationship has been broken irretrievably.’242 This prompted the acting chairperson of 
Parliament's public enterprises portfolio committee, Gerhard Koornhof, to express deep 
concern  about  the  resignations.243   He  was  quoted  as  saying:  ‘The  board  members   and 
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management of the parastatal need to find mechanisms to deal with the challenges that the 
airline is facing and find solutions.’244 
Fourthly, when the PRASA Board was asked what went wrong in the governance of the 
PRASA, it put the blame squarely at the door of the Minister of Transport. It stated that ‘this is 
just another example of the shareholder undermining the board, something that’s becoming an 
all-too common dynamic within South Africa’s state-owned enterprises’.245 The Board 
further noted that this trend ‘can be seen in the frequent chopping and changing of state-owned 
enterprises boards over the past few years’.246 This indicates the strained or dysfunctional 
working relationship between the minister, as the shareholder, and the boards. 
 
2.2.1.7 Prone to corruption 
The first example where a state-owned entity was embroiled in allegation of corruption and/or 
maladministration is the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). In a report entitled 
Derailed: A Report on an Investigation into Allegations of Maladministration Relating to 
Financial Mismanagement, Tender Irregularities and Appointment Irregularities against 
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), the Public Protector was asked to investigate 
37 complaints of corruption, maladministration and improper conduct. The gist of the 
complaint was that 
Mr. Montana, then Group Chief Executive Officer (GCEO) of PRASA, and/or 
PRASA, improperly awarded tenders; appointed service providers without 
following proper tender processes and allowed maladministration, corruption, 
conflict of interest and financial mismanagement, in the procurement of goods 
and services and managed human resources irregularly, including nepotism 
and the improper handling of whistle-blowers.247 
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The Public Protector found billions of rands of fruitless‚ wasteful and irregular expenditure at 
the agency.248 The Public Protector also found numerous instances of maladministration, 
corruption and nepotism.249 
Secondly, the Public Protector’s report When Governance and Ethics Fail further reveals 
instances of irregular appointments that border on corruption. First, it found with regard to the 
appointment of Mr Motsoeneng as the COO and Ms Motsweni into various position that the 
Board acted unlawfully.250 Secondly, it found in relation to their salary progressions, which 
were done without following proper procedures and in violation of applicable law, that the 
Board acted irregularly and that this constituted an abuse of power and maladministration.251 
Thirdly, the State of Capture report by the Public Protector found, with regard to the question 
of whether any state functionary in any organ of state or other person acted unlawfully, 
improperly or corruptly in connection with the appointment or removal of Boards of Directors 
of SOEs, that ‘the Board at Eskom was improperly appointed and not in line with the spirit of 
the King III report on good Corporate Governance’.252 As to whether any state functionary in 
any organ of state or other person acted unlawfully, improperly or corruptly in connection with 
the award of state contracts or tenders to Gupta-linked companies or persons, it was found that 
Eskom’s decision to award a contract to Tegeta to supply Arnot Power Station was made solely 
for the purposes of funding Tegeta and enabling Tegeta to purchase all shares in OCH. It was 
further stated that ‘the only entity which appears to have benefited from Eskom’s decisions 
was Tegeta’.253 
 
2.2.1.8 The limits of private sector techniques in the public sector 
The above discussion paints a gloomy picture of SOEs. In a sense, the majority of SOEs are 
problematic. However, that does not represent a full picture. There are some SOEs that are 
performing optimally. For example, the creation of the South African National Roads Agency 
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Limited (hereafter SANRAL)254 has improved service delivery.255 The construction, 
maintenance and management of roads were more efficiently and effectively undertaken under 
the agency than they had ever been by the Department of Transport before the establishment 
of the agency.256 As a result, the Public Service Commission endorsed corporatisation as an 
innovative service delivery model and a viable option in the regulatory transport 
environment.257 
A study by the Wold Bank found that ‘[m]ore than 95 per cent of the roads SANRAL manages 
are in good to very good condition and 100 per cent of its roads are under routine maintenance 
contracts’.258 This has led to the government agreeing to transfer some of the unmaintained 
provincial roads to the national road network managed by SANRAL. Furthermore, provinces 
regularly ask SANRAL to provide technical assistance and help implement provincial road 
programmes.259 As such, these success factors made SANRAL the preferred road network 
manager in South Africa.260 
Furthermore, the 2013/14 peer review by the Association of Southern African National Roads 
Agencies (ASANRA) indicated that SANRAL’s asset management meets PAS 55:2008 
requirements for certification and that SANRAL is an international leader in asset management 
in the roads sector.261 This review examined the status of asset management of the road 
agencies in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The PAS 55:2008 standards are the international norm for good asset 
management practices, based on the Institute of Asset Management of the United Kingdom. 
As of 15 of January 2014, these standards were replaced by ISO 55000 (International 
Organisation for Standardisation, Switzerland) and SANRAL has made an application for 
certification under the new standards.262 
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Furthermore, in 2015 the Top Employers Institute, based in the Netherlands, recognised 
SANRAL as a top employer. This is owing to SANRAL’s approach to performance 
management and the way it has transformed internally to better reflect South Africa’s 
demographics. It is suggested that this has led to very low staff turnover.263 SANRAL is also 
reported to have world-class capacity-building and development mechanisms for its 
employees.264 
However, the market principles of user-pay systems, cost-reflective pricing and cost recovery 
policies are not compatible with the public sector and are turning out to be the limits to 
corporatisation. For example, the user-pay system in the tolling of roads has generated 
opposition and public outcry from motorists, taxi associations, labour unions and political 
parties. As a result of this social pressure, the Minister of Transport suspended the tariffs and 
appointed a task team to review the fee structure. This, together with a number of court cases, 
delayed the implementation of the electronic tolling system and the collection of tolls. 
According to the Department of Transport, this has had a negative impact on the credit ratings 
for SANRAL and is said to be threatening the socioeconomic stability of the country.265 The 
negative impact on debt servicing of the delayed tolling of the GFIP has resulted in a ratings 
downgrade by Moody’s.266 However, when the toll collections started in 2013, SANRAL’s 
revenue collections increased significantly, resulting in Moody’s changing it outlook from 
negative to stable and affirming its Baa3-rating for SANRAL in June 2014.267 
Despite the revised tariff structure by the Department of Transport, opposition to the e-tolls 
have not subsided. The Constitutional Court has also weighed in on this matter on two 
occasions, both of which it found in favour of SANRAL and the user pay system through e- 
tolls.268 The public outcry also led to the establishment, by the Gauteng Premier after the bad 
showing of the ANC in the 2014 general elections, of an Advisory Panel on the socio-economic 
impact of the Gauteng e-tolls. The report of the Advisory Panel found e-tolls to have some 
benefits for the economy and the people of Gauteng.269  The Premier of Gauteng did not scrap 
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the e-tolls but reviewed it to address the questions of affordability, equity, fairness, 
administrative simplicity, and sustainability. 
Another review process, chaired by the Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa with the Gauteng 
province, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg Metro and the Tshwane Metro participating, was 
instituted. However, this review similarly did not scrap the electronic tolling system but altered 
it somewhat, effectively introducing a new and significantly reduced e-toll dispensation.270 
The e-tolls might be the only impediment in future developments as the public outcry still 
continued after the publication of the review findings. This is also causing uncertainty about 
the future financing policy of national roads. What is clear is that the private-sector cost 
recovery pricing policies might not be appropriate for a country like South Africa, which is the 
most unequal nation in the world. 
 
2.2.2 Public-private partnerships 
It was noted in Chapter Two271 that a PPP refers to a contract between a public institution and 
an individual or privately-owned or -controlled partnership, company, trust or other for-profit 
legal entity. In essence, PPPs are long-term contractual arrangements between the government 
and a private partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public services using a capital asset 
and sharing the associated risks. Public-private partnerships, therefore, serve two main 
purposes, namely to mobilise resources and skills from the private sector and to infuse business 
principles in the delivery of public services. 
The National Treasury272 defines PPPs as a commercial transaction – a contract – between a 
government institution and a private party where the private party performs an institutional 
function on behalf of the state and/or uses state property in terms of output specifications.273 In 
these instances, substantial financial, technical and operational risk in connection with the 
performance of the governmental function and/or use of state property is transferred to the 
private party. The private party receives a benefit for performing the governmental function or 
from utilising the state property, either by way of compensation from a revenue fund and 
charges or fees collected by the private party from users or customers of a service provided to 
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them, or by way of a combination of such compensation and such charges or fees.274 Creamer, 
quoted in Fombad, states that this partnership is centred on trust and on the notion of two parties 
coming together to harness the diverse interests of the nation for efficient delivery.275 
In South Africa, PPPs were introduced because it was thought that traditional bureaucracies 
were not equipped to urgently deal with the infrastructure backlogs and poor levels of service 
delivery inherited from the colonial and apartheid past. In order to generate economic growth, 
provide infrastructure and deliver services, the South African government sought to tap on the 
strengths of the private sector to make the economy more competitive because alone it could 
not meet the developmental needs of South Africa.276 PPPs, like corporatisation, were thus 
adopted as alternatives to traditional bureaucracy and in the interests of better service delivery. 
 
2.2.2.1 Legislative framework 
The main legislation governing PPPs at the national and provincial levels is the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA).277 Section 76 of the PFMA enjoins the National Treasury to make 
regulations for a range of matters to do with the effective and efficient management and use of 
financial resources. The National Treasury’s Regulation 16 gives effect to section 76, and 
provides precise and detailed instructions for PPPs. As such, the PFMA, together with the 
National Treasury Regulation 16,278 provides a mainstay of the legislative framework for PPPs. 
The National Treasury Regulation 16 defines three types of PPPs, namely where the private 
party performs an institutional function, where the private party acquires the use of state 
property for its own commercial purposes, and a hybrid of these two types.279 Payment in any 
of the above types takes place in one of the following three ways. First, the institution pays the 
private party for the delivery of the services. Secondly, the private party collects fees or charges 
from users of the service. Thirdly, payment is made through a combination of these.280 
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The National Treasury effectively regulates and controls the procurement process and, by 
extension, the PPPs. To this end, a PPP Unit281 was established in the National Treasury to 
supervise the PPP activities.282 This Unit was envisaged to ‘provide quality technical assistance 
to institutions embarking on PPPs, throughout the PPP project cycle, to help them achieve a 
quality PPP projects’.283 To this end, the PPP Unit has designed a generic PPP project cycle in 
terms of Regulation 16 to ensure that PPPs at national level are carried out rigorously. In this 
regard, the process begins with the procuring institution registering the project with the PPP 
Unit after identifying a project that may be concluded as a PPP.284 The second step is to appoint 
private sector advisors by the procuring institution to do a feasibility study to determine 
whether the proposed PPP is the most appropriate mechanism and is in the best interests of the 
procuring institution.285 This step of the PPP project cycle concludes with treasury approval 
being granted, signifying a successful completion of the feasibility study.286 
The third step in the PPP project cycle involves procurement.287 If the feasibility study shows 
that a PPP is a viable mechanism, the procuring institution must invite the market to submit 
bids for the particular project in question, namely the performance of an institutional function 
or the use of state property. However, the third step begins with the Treasury’s approval of the 
procurement documents, including a PPP agreement, before any issuing of procurement 
documents to any prospective bidders.288 After the market has submitted the bids and they have 
been evaluated, the procuring institution must submit a report for approval to the Treasury. 
This must take place prior to the appointment of the preferred bidder.289 After such approval, a 
suitable bidder may then be chosen. 
The fourth and final step involves project implementation and management. This step begins 
with the accounting officer of the procuring institution submitting a PPP agreement and a 
management  plan  to  the  relevant  treasury  for  approval.290   Once  such  approval  has been 
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obtained, a PPP agreement is then signed by the procuring institution and the successful bidder. 
The project is then implemented once a suitable bidder has been chosen and has signed the PPP 
agreement. While the successful bidder must implement the PPP project in line with the 
agreement, the accounting officer of the procuring institution must ensure that the PPP 
agreement is properly implemented, managed, enforced, monitored and reported on.291 
The various stages of approval in the PPP project cycle enable the Treasury to apply the three 
regulatory tests of affordability, value for money, and risk transfer at every stage of preparing 
for, procuring and managing a PPP agreement. Regulation 16 requires that the institution apply 
these tests throughout, and that specific treasury approvals enable the Treasury to test whether 
these tests have been applied at relevant stages of the project cycle. Treasury approval also 
applies for ‘any material amendments to a PPP agreement including any material variations to 
the outputs therein, or any waivers contemplated or provided for in the PPP agreement’.292 The 
tests are also applicable. 
What follows next is a discussion of how this NPM element was implemented in practice, with 
specific reference to the water sector. Some major difficulties are illustrated, namely failure to 
transfer sufficient risk to the private sector; failure to develop managerial, technical and 
training capacity of local governments; the cost of the project; poor workmanship; and inability 
to infuse business principles. The choice of the water sector is influenced by parallel PPP 
projects in the water sector undertaken at local level. This discussion seeks to offer 
predictability or draw parallels for local government. 
 
2.2.2.2 Public-private partnerships in the water sector 
The post-apartheid government inherited huge services backlogs with respect to access to water 
supply and sanitation. Bond states that the distribution of water in South Africa was even more 
unequal, measured in class, race and gender terms, than the distribution of income.293 About 
18 million people were without safe water supply and over 27 million without basic sanitation 
services.294  The new government was, therefore, facing a daunting task of developing and 
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implementing a systematic programme of rural water delivery almost from scratch.295 In order 
to ensure high standards of delivery and improved access in rural areas, the Department, in line 
with government policy to adopt the NPM as a model of delivery, embraced PPPs. It was driven 
to do as much as possible, as quickly as possible, to bridge the enormous gap in the living 
standards of its population.296 Rural water supply was one of the key priorities of the new 
government.297 
The new government was concerned that it would take more than 30 years to meet the basic 
water supply backlog if a rapid infrastructure delivery programme was not put in place.298 The 
PPPs were, therefore, seen as a solution to the huge backlogs and the need to improve the basic 
human needs related to infrastructure, especially access to water and sanitation, which are vital 
to many aspects of everyday life and a better balanced national and indeed international 
economy. The government believed that by so doing it would accelerate the supply of water 
services to rural communities previously denied water and sanitation services under apartheid 
and the homeland system and that it would improve efficiency in the delivery of, and ultimately 
enhance access to, such services.299 
Armed with that philosophy, in 1997 the Department roped in the private sector to carry out 
the rural water supply programme under a Build, Operate, Train and Transfer (BOTT) 
programme.300 The BOTT programme was organised around private sector companies which 
organised themselves into consortia to bid for provincial contracts.301  Cook notes that 
the rationale for the BOTT programme was to temporarily bypass the 
confusion and lack of capacity characteristic of the Transitional Local 
Councils (TLCs) while they were undergoing consolidations, re-structuring, 
re-staffing, and re-definitions of functional responsibilities.302 
 
 
 
 
 
295  Greenberg 2005: 206. 
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300 BOTT is one of the types of PPP in operation in South Africa. Others include DFBOTs (design, finance, build, 
operate and transfer), DFOs (design, finance and operate), DBOTs (design, build, operate and transfer), equity 
partnership, and facilities management contract. 
301  Greenberg 2005: 209. 
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To this end, BOTT was supposed to bring in greater managerial, technical and training capacity 
from the private sector to work with local government and communities so that they could hit 
the ground running in collecting the revenue and in operating and maintaining the infrastructure 
when ownership was transferred to them.303 In this regard, four provincial contracts were 
handed to the private sector consortia with cooperation of DWAF and relevant departments in 
the provincial and local governments.304 
The idea was to achieve economies of scale by designing and implementing as many large bulk 
water supply schemes as possible in the shortest possible period of time for the lowest possible 
cost per beneficiary.305 BOTT was promoted as being able to achieve various goals, namely 
accelerated delivery, sustainability, a programmatic approach, reduced management and 
administration costs, greater interaction with local government, cost-effective delivery and 
increased innovation.306 The BOTT tender documents also contained similar claims, with 
financing suggestions.307 The BOTT project was supposed to be completed between two to six 
years, depending on the scope of work and the time required to effect a handover to a local 
authority.308  The BOTT contract entailed: 
 carrying out initial investigations on water supply and sanitation projects in 
consultation with community representatives and local authorities; 
 preparing a business plan for each project, for which approval must be obtained from 
DWAF; 
 Preparing an area business plan for all projects within a planning area, for which 
approval must also be obtained from DWAF; 
 carrying out institutional and social development (ISD); 
 
 designing and constructing project(s); 
 
 operating and maintaining project(s) for a limited period of time; 
 
 
 
 
 
303 DWAF (2000) Community Water Supply and Sanitation (CWSS) Programme, part of the Government's 
Reconstruction and Development Programme: Build Operate Train and Transfer Programme 2. 
304 Cook CE (2011) 8(3) Service Delivery Review 87 (hereafter Cook 2011). 
305  Cook 2011: 87. 
306  Bakker K & Hemson D ‘Privatising water – BOTT and hydropolitics in the new South Africa’ (2000)   82(1) 
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307  Bakker & Hemson 2000: 6. 
308  Bakker & Hemson 2000: 6. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
Chapter Five 
213 
 
 
 
 
 transferring the water supply system to the Water Service Authority; and 
 
 mentoring the Water Service Authority. 
 
These private sector consortia were given the right to build the infrastructure, operate it while 
training local government and communities in operation and maintenance, and then, at a later 
stage, transfer the schemes to them.309 They gained a monopoly over rural water supply 
programmes in these four provinces, controlling 300 out of a total of 357 water projects.310 
Cook notes that DWAF appears to have given the BOTT programme the de facto technocratic 
authority of engineering professionals, which gave the consortia ‘virtual override authority 
concerning underperforming and/or recalcitrant civil servants at the provincial and local levels 
of government’.311 However, as noted above, the BOTT programme did not replace the ways 
of providing water and sanitation at that time in the four provinces. It came in to augment the 
managerial, technical and training capacity of local government and water boards.312 In 
essence, BOTT incorporated a local government capacity-building programme to ensure 
sustainability of the implemented projects. 
Given that the Constitution makes water services the responsibility of local government, these 
functions had to be transferred to elected local councils. Local government would take 
operational responsibility for new water supply schemes, together with the community. 
However, given that in many rural areas local government had to be built from scratch, targeted 
capacity-building support to local government had to be included in the BOTT contracts.313 
The BOTT Programme came to a natural end in early 2004 when all the water schemes were 
transferred to municipalities, in over approximately six years in operation.314 
 
2.2.2.3 Transfer of substantial financial, technical and operational risk 
The BOTT contracts were entered into before the NPM principle of PPPs was given full effect 
to in the legislative framework. There was no legislative framework at the time that provided 
for  risk  transfer,  and  the  private  sector  consortia  took  advantage  of  this  situation.  The 
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government tendered for BOTT as a conventional management contract for a guaranteed 
income.315 As a result, no transfer of substantial technical, operational and financial risk took 
place, as is required under a PPP transaction. The government retained financial responsibility 
for the service and provided operating and investment capital.316 In other words, funding for 
the infrastructure costs came from the state and the state itself bore the risk of losing that 
funding in cases of delays, poor performance or an act of nature happening. It paid for the 
establishment and running costs of offices at provincial and local level, which included office 
equipment, staff salaries, travelling costs, allowances for typing and printing and reproduction, 
while the BOTT consortia of private companies made no direct investment into the provision 
of water supply and as such bore no risks.317 The government also failed to create systems for 
monitoring the contracts before signing them, leaving the impression that ‘BOTT was created 
in a vacuum and then dropped into a void’.318 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the BOTT contracts ran contrary to the NPM ethos of a 
PPP transaction. It is suggested that the new government was still wet behind the ear at this 
stage and hence made basic but costly errors. On the strength of this and other early 
experiences, it moved swiftly to issue PPP Regulations and to create a PPP Unit to guide the 
PPP process moving forward.319 
 
2.2.2.4 The cost of the project 
The NPM tenet of PPPs embodies principles of affordability and value for money which were 
not yet incorporated into law at that stage. This has had some detrimental effects on cost 
containment in the implementation of the BOTT project. The false start in the legislative 
framework for PPP projects, especially the latter, has given rise to many issues encountered in 
the implementation of the BOTT programme. First, DWAF reported that the operators had 
inflated rates while not showing efficient delivery.320 In this regard, a study comparing the 
BOTT programme and a project of a similar size (Mvula Trust Projects) revealed that the  per 
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capita cost of BOTT was R1 640, compared with Mvula Trust’s per capita cost of R380.321 
DWAF’s KwaZulu-Natal regional office also raised concerns that the unit cost per borehole 
was significantly higher than would have been the case if the regional office or traditional 
implementing agents had managed construction. 322 
In essence, over and above the fact that the BOTT consortia of companies did not make any 
direct investment into the provision of water supply in South Africa, they were also wasteful 
and not cost-effective. This was contrary to the NPM ethos of affordability, value-for-money 
and cost-effectiveness. However, these principles were only embedded into South African law 
after the conclusion of these contracts. 
To add insult to injury, BOTT was reported to be on average 2.7 times more expensive than 
Mvula Trust projects, prompting the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry (as it then was) to 
admit ‘that it was not clear whether greater private sector involvement had “achieved either 
efficiency or sustainability”’.323 A study by Lobina and Hall revealed that, in fact, private sector 
involvement has resulted in inefficiencies. It stated: ‘Overall, public enterprises appear no less 
efficient than private companies, while being capable of development-oriented consideration 
of public interests.’324 
Numerous other studies and evaluations also came to the same conclusion that BOTT fell short 
of ‘rapid delivery’ expectations.325 For example, Hemson criticised BOTT for being more 
expensive than publicly provided services and blamed it for skewing development priorities by 
introducing a profit motive.326 An external review team also stated that the reduced throughput 
signified that the process had become more expensive, raising concerns of value for money.327 
Another external evaluation of BOTT by a team including World Bank staff suggested that 
there was ‘cost-padding’ resulting from the absence of competition. A DWAF review team 
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also severely criticised the work of BOTT in KwaZulu-Natal, even suggesting that the contract 
should be terminated because it was failing to achieve the BOTT objectives.328 It was further 
reported that during the transfer to municipalities, a lot of infrastructure was in a state of 
disrepair, yet municipalities were expected to immediately pay full cost for water.329 In essence, 
local government ‘inherited ‘white elephants’ with high price tags’.330 This was an instance of 
public money but private failure, with negative outcomes for rural households – typically the 
poorest and most under-serviced in the country. This points to the poor implementation of the 
NPM in South Africa. 
 
2.2.2.5 The limits of private sector techniques in the public sector 
The cost-recovery pricing policies pushed by the BOTT consortia proved problematic. These 
policies have served to undermine both the depth and the quality of water service extension to 
rural areas and raise troubling questions about the sustainability of a commercialised approach 
to water delivery in rural areas in particular and South Africa generally. These water companies 
did not view water as a right first rather than a commodity.331 In some instances, they used a 
prepaid meter price policy which forced consumers to pay for their water use in advance.332 
This caused serious problems relating to sustainability and consumer affordability.333 Flynn 
and Chirwa argue that charging rural communities the full cost of service delivery leads to 
higher rates, because of absence of infrastructure,334 and perpetuates the effect of unfair 
discrimination in the past.335 The general drive for cost-reflective pricing and cost-recovery 
policies has also contributed to sharp increases in water prices that are usually above 
inflation.336 
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This is inimical to efficient and customer-focused delivery of water supply services. These 
contracts were not financially sustainable for the poor. Those households that failed to pay for 
water bills lost their access to clean water, even the free basic access,337 and sometimes faced 
eviction from their homes or blacklisting.338 This forced many households in rural areas to use 
unclean water, which resulted in a cholera epidemic in the country during the year 2002.339 The 
people these initiatives sought to cater for were finding it difficult to pay the increased costs of 
these services.340 Instead of ensuring a steady supply of water to poorer communities, the 
partnerships, with their ‘full cost recovery’ model and the introduction of ‘pre-paid metres’ led 
to disconnections of water to those who are unable to pay, thus reducing access.341 Farlam 
states in this regard that early South African PPP projects suffered flaws and pitfalls such as 
the absence of pro-poor approaches.342 
The profit motives of private companies could not be matched adequately with the legacy of 
apartheid relating to poverty, unemployment, landlessness and inability to pay for services. 
This has had a detrimental effect on the goals of extending access to previously impoverished 
communities and inevitably impacted negatively on the right of access to sufficient water as 
well as, ultimately, on the enjoyment of other socio-economic rights and services such as food, 
housing and health care.343 Instead of ensuring cost-effective and customer-orientated delivery, 
the PPPs have left the poor sections of our population, the customers, in a similar position to 
what they were in before the BOTT programme was introduced. 
 
2.2.2.6 Failure to develop capacity of local governments 
Even though training and capacity-building support to local government was made part of the 
contract in order for local governments to take operational responsibility for the new water 
schemes, the overall results were ‘mixed at best and disappointing at worst’.344  There were 
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many obvious cases of poor value for money.345 In the Eastern Cape, it was reported that 
‘councils lacking capacity would still need substantial practical support from external sources 
to meet their obligations to community water and sanitation schemes’.346 Bond reports that 
there were ‘poor technical design, poor community control functions … systemic 
inconsistencies with neighbouring government-subsidised water schemes, and lack of training 
and transfer prospects’.347 This is despite the fact that BOTT was promoted as bringing in vastly 
greater managerial, technical and training capacity from the private sector to work with local 
government and communities so that many, many more projects can get going. This, plus the 
issue of poor workmanship, resulted in some municipalities refusing to take sole responsibility 
for the schemes. 
As a result, the transfers in the four provinces did not go smoothly. In KwaZulu-Natal, some 
municipalities returned certain of their projects to the BOTT consortia.348 The DWAF review 
team concluded in this regard that ‘BOTT had failed to accelerate the delivery of projects and 
had offered very inadequate or non-existent training on institutional and social development 
(ISD) and operations and maintenance (O&M)’.349 In this regard, the Regional Council 
involved demanded that the ISD be reworked at no additional cost to DWAF and the 
Councils.350 
A number of reasons have been identified for some of the problems above. First, the National 
Treasury argues that some of these problems are a result of lack of competition in PPP 
market.351 Secondly, a study conducted to identify the challenges in the delivery of social and 
economic infrastructures through public-private partnership procurement arrangements in the 
sub-Saharan region, using South Africa as a case study for the region, found that there is a lack 
of capacity, policy direction and clarity among the political leaders and implementing agencies 
in the delivery of services through PPP projects.352 This has resulted in inconsistency in the 
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commitment of the government agencies, which affects the long-term implementation of PPP 
projects as they require longer time for the projects to be delivered.353 This is compounded by 
the mistrust among government’s implementing agencies and a bias against PPPs.354 This also 
speaks to the lack of political will to address the challenges of infrastructure through PPP 
arrangements. 
The problem of lack of capacity was also identified by an earlier study of public-private- 
partnerships in South Africa, which concluded that the BOTT experience demonstrates that 
there is ‘a lack of public sector capacity in the implementation of public-private sector 
partnerships’.355 The 2014 study also indicates that there is lack of capacity among public 
officers to originate and implement PPP projects due to a lack of technical know-how, 
resources and authority.356 It was further reported that the resources in the PPP Unit are not 
capable of promoting the PPPs and helping to support the implementing agencies in developing 
same.357 
 
2.2.2.7 PPPs in terms of the current regime 
After these initial setbacks, there has not been enough enthusiasm for PPPs nationally. As a 
result, the number of PPP projects signed under Treasury Regulation 16 is relatively small. 
Since 2000 there are merely 24 signed PPP projects, only six of which are national PPP 
projects.358 The rest (18) are provincial PPP projects. The majority of the national PPPs concern 
non-essential services such as office accommodation, fleet management, information systems, 
and revenue collection. There are only two national projects on core national services, namely 
the State Vaccine Institute (health) and Moloto Rail Corridor Development (transport). 
 
3 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at how the personnel management practices and the provision of state 
services were transformed according to the NPM paradigm of service delivery. It was shown 
that the underlying consideration in both instances was to fast-track the delivery of services to 
the underprivileged and by so doing rectify the ravages of apartheid. It was thought that the 
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traditional bureaucracy that operated in South African prior to the introduction of the NPM was 
ill-equipped to reverse the legacy of underdevelopment, neglect and impoverishment caused 
by apartheid. The promise of transforming the personnel management practices and 
introducing innovative service delivery methods was therefore to fast-track the delivery of 
services to communities in a cost-effective, efficient, and customer-oriented manner. 
The assessment made in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the NPM model of service 
delivery was, in some instances, fully legislated and, therefore, incorporated into South Africa. 
This is particularly the case with regard to the NPM principle of managerialism and 
corporatisation. However, difficulties emerged in its practical implementation. In the first 
place, even though the NPM tenet of letting managers manage is given full effect, it has had 
adverse effects. For example, the open skills recruitment system has, through cadre deployment 
practice and the affirmative action policy, given politicians a licence to meddle in appointment 
processes. This has resulted in the appointment of unsuitable persons, sometimes for purposes 
of dispensing patronage or doing the politicians’ bidding. Managers then lose any semblance 
of independence and, instead, become beholden to politicians who influence their appointments 
and on whom they depend for promotion or during the performance appraisal process. This 
study further reveals that the preferential treatment given to those managers beholden to 
politicians has an impact on staff morale and leads to organisational conflict, management 
turnover and the disruption of organisational stability and the delivery of services. 
In the second place, the performance management system, while given full legal effect, is 
similarly not being fully and properly implemented in practice. First, even though the system 
has ensured that the free reign given to managers to manage is controlled through a system of 
accounting for performance, this study reveals that very few performance agreements have 
been signed and there is less enforcement even to the few agreements that have been signed. 
The failure to sign performance agreements holds severe repercussions for the entire 
performance management system in that senior managers cannot be held accountable for non- 
performance if there is no agreement in place that depicts key priorities for implementation 
during the fiscal year. 
Secondly, it is shown that, in some cases, performance agreements are poorly formulated, 
resulting in appraisal outcomes that are either biased towards or against a senior manager. 
These conditions result in situations where managers get a performance bonus while failing to 
perform adequately or vice versa. As such, instead of tying the freedom enjoyed by the senior 
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managers to performance, poor implementation of the performance management system, which 
includes failure to sign performance agreements, non-compliance with time-frames, failure to 
monitor and review performance on a regular basis and lack of feedback to the employees, has 
a detrimental effect on efficient public administration. While this suggests that there is lack of 
skills base to implement performance management, is also suggests wilful disobedience. As a 
result, the law and fact do not match up – the performance management system is given full 
effect in law, but it is not given effect in practice. 
In the third place, the contract system of appointment, which seeks to reduce poor performance, 
laxity and inertia in the public service has only been given effect to at the higher most echelon. 
Even at this level it routinely produces adverse results. Overall, it has not been given full effect 
to both in law and in fact. It is only applied to the elite and not the entire management team. 
Only HoDs and CEOs are appointed on a three-year contract. In terms of practical 
implementation, the contract system is used as a revolving door by politicians as it is more or 
less linked to the term of office of a political principal. As such, when a new political principal 
comes into office, he comes in with his or her own team and pushes out the old team. 
Moreover, the short-term contract system is not applicable to the rest of the management cadre. 
This means that the rest of the management cadre is still employed, as in the Weberian era, on 
a permanent basis. If they do not perform optimally, there is no contract system to induce 
performance by threatening not to renew. 
Thirdly, the contract system comes with a high level of uncertainty and no guarantee that 
managers can be redeployed when their term comes to an end. This has resulted in high 
turnover rate of senior managers. Concerns about future employment possibilities are the root 
cause of senior management turnover in the public service. The short-term contract also 
discourages capable individuals from applying to the public service because of this uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the relationships between the executive authority and HoDs has an impact on the 
NPM tenet of letting managers manage. The professional independence of senior managers is 
sometimes compromised by this relationship because length of service, and even promotion, 
in the public service sometimes hinges on this relationship. These conditions do not create an 
environment conducive to letting managers manage. 
In the fourth place, the introduction of the NPM tenet of corporatisation in South Africa was 
given full effect to in law in a manner that facilitated its implementation. However, the practice 
shows a gloomy picture, with few exceptions of excellence, as seen in section 2.2.1.2 above. 
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First, there was a complete collapse of corporate governance in a number of SOEs. Secondly, 
the dysfunctional working relationships between boards and the shareholders was manifested 
in the conflictual relationship between the chairperson, and his deputy, of the Board of Armscor 
and the Minister of Defence, which resulted in their dismissal. Thirdly, the SOEs are prone to 
corruption, as the Public Protector report on PRASA revealed. Fourthly, political appointments 
of board members of the SOEs that pay scant regard to the mix of knowledge and skills required 
on the boards play a role in the malaise in which the SOEs find themselves. Lastly, the selection 
of unsuitable qualified boards, coupled with the dysfunctional relationship between the boards 
and the executive authorities, leads to high turnover of board members. However, there are a 
few exceptional cases of excellence in this morass. SANRAL is one of them. 
In the fifth place, the PPP tenet was given full effect to in law in a manner that facilitated 
implementation, even though that was done as an afterthought. A few earlier PPP projects took 
place on the strength of the initial aspirational policies which did not provide the necessary 
details. Some of those projects did not comply with the ethos of the NPM, which was later 
incorporated in the legislative framework that was introduced. For example, there was no 
transfer of sufficient risks to the private sector in the PPP water projects, as demanded by the 
NPM. Instead, the funding came from the state and the state itself bore the financial, operational 
and technical risks associated with the project. Furthermore, the three-pronged regulatory test 
that ensures affordability and value for money had not been formulated at that stage. Moreover, 
systems for monitoring the project were not put in place. As a result, it became a case of public 
money and private failure. 
In sum, the evidence suggests that the manner in which the NPM model of delivery was given 
effect to at national level varied. There were instances where the legislative framework gave 
full effect thereto in a manner that facilitated its implementation. These instances relate to the 
open skills set, fixed-term contracts for the elite, performance management system, 
corporatisation and public-private partnerships. 
However, the implementation of some of these NPM principles produced negative outcomes 
while others were simply poorly implemented. On the one hand, while opening the window for 
fresh air, mosquitoes and bugs also came in through the open recruitment system. This allowed 
patronage appointments and corruption. The fixed-term contracts in turn resulted in the 
haemorrhaging of scarce skills and rapid turnover of HoDs. It was used as a political tool to 
whip managers into line and thus curtail managerial independence. It leads to politicisation and 
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insecurity, and ultimately, to instability at the top. On the other hand, the performance 
management system was badly implemented owing to lack of skills. The public-private 
partnerships had a false start. Some PPP projects were entered into before a regulatory regime 
was put in place, with absurd results. However, once the regulatory regime for PPPs was put 
in place, national government was no longer enthusiastic about PPP,359 even though, overall, it 
has not disappeared from the agenda. In fact, these Regulation have helped and the comments 
are positive. 
There were other instances where the legislative framework renders some of the NPM tenets 
unimplementable. The appointment of the SMS cadre by politicians renders the wide 
discretionary powers conferred on senior managers nugatory. Instead of exercising the freedom 
given to them to manage, they become beholden to their political principals in a manner that 
compromises their independence. Furthermore, limiting the application of fixed-term contracts 
only to the elite means that the rest of the public service still operates under the traditional 
model of service delivery. The rest of the public service is employed on a permanent basis in a 
manner that does not induce performance and personal accountability for own actions. 
The foregoing considerations raise a question regarding the suitability of some of the NPM 
tenets, such as contract appointments and performance management, in South Africa because 
there is a general skills shortage. These NPM elements were fully implemented but were not a 
success owing to lack of skills. While performance management relies on the existence of the 
skills base for proper implementation, the contract system is flushing out the limited skills that 
exist. It is, therefore, seen as an unaffordable luxury to have a contract system which leads to 
brain drain. Other elements were not fully implemented, resulting in no success. 
In the light of the overall national policy towards the NPM and the practice of it, the focus now 
shifts to local government. Given the problems at the national level, how has the 
implementation of the NPM fared at local government? First, how was it conceived and, 
secondly, how was it implemented, especially in the case of PPPs, noting that it is the national 
department that is implementing the PPPs at local government? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
359 As the PPP unit at the National Treasury seems not to be functional, PPP are no longer strenuously pursued. 
There is no longer enthusiasm for PPP, even though it has not disappeared from the agenda. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
Implementation of the NPM Principle of Managerialism at Local 
Level 
1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the transformation of the personnel management system1 to embrace the 
NPM tenet of managerialism which, as noted in Chapters Two2 and Five,3 includes 
managerial autonomy of decision-making, performance management and contractualism. It 
reveals that the restructuring of, or reforms in, local government, as was the case with the public 
service, were driven, among others, by the need to overcome the legacy of apartheid. The White 
Paper on Local Government outlines some of the ravages of the apartheid order to include: 
skewed settlement patterns which are functionally inefficient and costly; extreme concentration 
of taxable economic resources in formerly white areas; huge backlogs in service infrastructure 
in historically underdeveloped areas; great spatial separations and disparities between towns 
and townships, and urban sprawl; entrenched modes of decision-making, administration and 
delivery; and inability to leverage private sector resources for development.4 
The main purposes of restructuring local government, therefore, were to create viable 
municipal institutions for dense rural settlements and create municipal institutions which 
recognise the linkages between urban and rural settlements. It was also impelled by the need 
to rebuild relations between municipalities and the local communities they serve.5 In sum, the 
restructuring or reform of local government was motivated by the need to improve the 
democratic and developmental nature of local government;6 re-articulate the local government 
relationship with other spheres of government;7  change jurisdiction in relationship to spaces;8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This means the discussion is confined to section F of the White Paper. Reconfiguration of the modes of service 
delivery is the subject of the next chapter, Chapter Seven. 
2  At section 6.4. 
3  At section 2.1.1. 
4  White Paper 1998: 42 para. 4.1. 
5  White Paper 1998: 42 para. 4.1. 
6  White Paper 1998: 44 section B. 
7  White Paper 1998: 75 section C. 
8 White Paper 1998: 104 section D. 
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reconfigure modes of service delivery; 9 transform the personnel management system; 10 and 
introduce new financial systems.11 
Consistent with the NPM agenda of infusing greater efficiency, cost-effectiveness, value for 
money and improved delivery of services, the government sought to transform the systems of 
personnel management at local government. In the same way that personnel management was 
transformed in the public service, local government management, especially senior 
management, were given managerial autonomy and individual responsibility and appointed on 
short-term contracts in order to encourage effective delivery and ensure timely accomplishment 
of tasks.12 Performance contracts were to be used as tools to measure these goals.13 The post- 
apartheid government also pushed for its transformation imperatives by introducing affirmative 
action policies, with specific focus on senior management positions, to make the public service 
reflect the country’s demographics.14 This was important, inasmuch as the closed employment 
system that insisted on qualifications and years of experience15 would have excluded the 
majority of black South Africans. 
According to Morgan N, Chipkin I & Meny-Gibert S et al. the transformation of the personnel 
management system was meant to catalyse a move away from what was seen as the 
authoritarian, hierarchical, operational and closed or exclusive system.16 They neatly 
summarise this to mean that managers 
would be given more discretion to execute their work individually or in self-organised 
teams. Communication flows would also be improved, allowing for all [staff] to 
participate in organisational life. At the same time, a new staff training system would 
be developed, [one] more inclusive than the previous model [which] tended to exclude 
[black and] junior workers. It would also incorporate a wide range of skills development 
requirements and be delivered more systematically. Finally, local government training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 White Paper 1998: 154 section F. 
10 White Paper 1998: 154 section F. 
11 White Paper 1998: 180 section G. 
12  White Paper 1998: 160 para. 2.2.1. 
13  White Paper 1998: 65 para. 3.2. 
14  White Paper 1998: 161 para. 2.2.1. 
15 As influenced by the Institute of Town Clerks of Southern Africa and the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants, which insisted in basing membership on race. 
16 Morgan N, Chipkin I & Meny-Gibert S et al. ‘Hollowing out the local state: Managerialism and skills in the 
water sector’ (2015) Public Affairs Research Institute 20 (hereafter Morgan et al. 2015). 
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would be rationalised from two seemingly inefficient and wasteful systems into a single 
national system.17 
The White Paper adds that new system would be ‘flexible, decentralised, demand-led, and 
structured to ensure continuous evaluation and improvement’.18 
The sections below examine the NPM tenets of managerial autonomy, performance 
management and fixed-term contract system of employment. 
 
2 Managerial autonomy 
The meaning and significance of this NPM principle was discussed at length in Chapters Two19 
and Five20 and that discussion is not repeated here. Suffice it to say that managerial autonomy 
relates to letting managers manage. It encompasses three main ideas, namely an open skills set; 
wide discretion conferred on managers; and minimal political interference, which were also 
discussed previously.21 Of importance for present purposes is giving an idea of what each main 
idea relates to. Open skills sets involve opening up appointments to senior municipal 
administration to everyone and not reserving them only for those with predetermined sets of 
necessary skills, qualifications and experience. When it comes to the wide discretion conferred 
on senior managers, it is envisaged that senior managers will be given more autonomy to 
execute their work individually or in self-organised teams. Minimising political interference in 
turn entails freeing managers to take professional decisions and be held personally accountable 
for these decisions; constant political interference disturbs the NPM equation. 
 
2.1 Legislative framework 
As noted in the foregoing discussion, the NPM principle of managerial autonomy at local 
government level was systematically introduced through the White Paper on Local 
Government. The latter expounds the notion of elevating the role of the manager in the 
bureaucracy.22 The Structures Act, Systems Act and the MFMA give effect to the White Paper 
on Local Government and, as such, codify this NPM principle. 
 
 
 
 
17  Morgan et al. 2015: 20. 
18  White Paper 1998: 173-4 para. 4. 
19  At section 6.4. 
20  At section 2.1.1. 
21 See Chapter Two, section 6.4.1. 
22  White Paper 1998: 162 para. 2.2.1. 
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At local level, the principle is enforced in particular at the two most senior levels of municipal 
administration, namely at the level of the municipal manager and those managers directly 
accountable to him or her, collectively referred to as section 57 managers.23 These two levels 
constitute the executive echelon of municipalities, referred to as the senior management level.24 
Senior management level is defined to mean a management level associated with persons in 
senior management positions responsible for supervising staff in middle management 
positions.25 It includes the municipal manager of a municipality or the chief executive officer 
of a municipal entity; any manager directly accountable either to the municipal manager, in the 
case of a municipality, or the chief executive officer, in the case of a municipal entity; and a 
person that occupies a position in a management level substantially similar to senior 
management level, outside the local government sphere.26 
The new manager, who would replace the old figure associated with the apartheid state, was 
envisaged as dynamic and innovative.27 He or she would be unshackled from the old rules and 
enjoy greater discretionary power, in particular through a reduction of ‘procedural constraints 
on the handling of contracts, cash and staff’.28 
 
2.1.1 Open skills set 
The Structures Act states that the municipal council must appoint the municipal manager, who 
is the head of the municipal administration as well as the accounting officer for the 
municipality.29 The Systems Act contains similar provisions with regard to the appointment of 
a manager directly accountable to the municipal manager, but he or she must be appointed after 
consultation with the municipal manager.30 In the period between 1998 and 2006,31 these 
statutes did not prescribe any form of qualification and experience, simply stating in each case 
that a person appointed as a municipal manager or a manager directly accountable to the 
 
 
 
23 With reference to the provision in the Systems Act that provides for their appointment. 
24 Koma SB ‘The state of local government in South Africa: Issues, trends and options’ (2010) 45(1.1) Journal of 
Public Administration 111 116 (hereafter Koma 2010). 
25 Regulation 1 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act: Municipal Regulations on Minimum 
Competency Levels (GN R493 GG 29967 of 2007) (hereafter Competency Regulations). 
26  Regulation 1 Competency Regulations. See also Allen Paulse v Oudtshoorn Local Municipality and Others 
(unreported Case No 25790/2011). 
27  Morgan et al. 2015: 20. 
28   Chipkin  I  ‘Transcending  Bureaucracy:  State  transformation  in  the  age  of  the  manager’  (2011)    77(1) 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 31 46 (hereafter Chipkin 2011). 
29 Section 82 Structures Act. 
30 Section 56 Systems Act. 
31 The period under discussion saw the implementation of the NPM in South African local government. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
228 
Chapter Six 
 
 
 
municipal manager must have skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with the 
post in question, without specifying what those skills should be.32 
This essentially entrenches the idea of an open skills set, where the focus is on the performance 
of the duties associated with the position in question rather than on a closed and listed set of 
skills. Anyone whose skills and expertise, in whatever field, enables him or her to perform the 
duties associated with the post is eligible for appointment. Accordingly, this NPM principle 
was fully given effect in a manner that facilitated implementation. In the discussion of practice 
below, the question of whether or not it was fully implemented is considered. 
 
2.1.2 Wide discretion 
The laws regulating the structures, systems and finances of local government have elevated the 
role of senior managers in the functioning of a municipality in line with the NPM ethos of 
managerial autonomy. First, sections 55 and 117 of the Systems Act read with section 82 of 
the Structures Act state that the municipal manager is the head of the municipal administration, 
the champion of the IDP and performance management, the service delivery agent, the interface 
between council and administration, the accounting officer as well as the custodian of all 
records and documents of the municipality.33 Over and above these powers and functions, the 
municipal manager generally performs the functions and exercise the powers that are delegated 
to him by the municipal council, in which case, the discretion of the municipal manager is 
limited in the sense that the council can decide at any time to revoke those delegated powers. 
Such delegation does not divest the council of the responsibility for the exercise of those 
powers and the performance of those duties.34 
 
 
 
 
 
32 Sections 82(2) Structures Act and 56(2) Systems Act. 
33 Attendant on these roles is a full spectrum of powers and functions that can be exercised by the municipal 
manager only within the policy framework provided by the council. This is the fulcrum of the managerial 
responsibility and discretion conferred upon the municipal managers. The municipal manager has become hands- 
on in the management of municipal affairs. For example, as the interface between council and the administration, 
the municipal manager manages communication between administration and the municipality’s political structures 
and office-bearers. In the role as the IDP and performance management, the municipal manager is responsible 
for the implementation of the municipality’s IDP and ensuring that the administration operates in accordance 
with the municipality’s performance management system. In the role as the service delivery agent, the municipal 
manager is responsible for the management of the provisions of service to local communities in a sustainable 
and equitable manner. Lastly, the municipal manager has the duty to implement legislation. In all these 
responsibilities, the municipal manager works hand in glove with heads of departments who are intimately attuned 
with the workings of the departments. 
34 Section 59(1)(b) Systems Act. 
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However, the powers contained in sections 55, 117 of the Systems Act and 82 of the Structures 
Act are derived directly from the statute; they are not delegated by the municipal council.35 
This is where the municipal manager derives the autonomy and wide discretion envisaged by 
the NPM. The Constitutional Court underscored the importance and centrality of the municipal 
manager in the system of local government when it stated that the municipal manager is ‘a key 
structure of a municipality and not merely a personnel appointment as contemplated in section 
160(1)(d) of the Constitution’.36 Essentially, the appointment of a municipal manager is not an 
ordinary personnel appointment, and as such it requires regulation in terms of an Act of 
Parliament.37 It is now a statutory requirement that there must be a municipal manager for each 
municipality in the country.38 The national equivalents of municipal managers are directors- 
general. 
Secondly, in the case of section 56 managers or managers directly accountable to the municipal 
manager, the Free State High Court stated that these managers occupy ‘top management 
positions and are executive-style managers who should be working to meet targets, on a 
performance bonus system’.39 These managers occupy the same position as heads of 
departments, as discussed in Chapter Five. As heads of their departments, they have full charge 
thereof and are answerable to the municipal manager, who has the responsibility for municipal 
administration, and ultimately to the municipal council. 
However, the legal framework for local government contains certain conditions that constrain 
or impede the full implementation of this NPM element. First, there is a panoply of laws and 
regulation emanating from national government, prescribing certain actions and outcomes. 
Secondly, it is the council that appoints section 56 managers, even though the municipal 
manager, as head of the administration and the accounting officer, is charged with the 
formation of and development of an administration that is economical, effective, efficient and 
accountable.40 Thirdly, there is rivalry between three national departments vying for regulatory 
control  of  local  government,  which  results  in  the  issuing  of  parallel  but    contradictory 
 
 
 
35 Ntliziywana P ‘Insulating administrative decision-making relating to individual staff appointments from 
political meddling: Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal 49 
55 (hereafter Ntliziywana 2012). 
36 Executive Council of the Western Cape vs Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of 
the Republic of South Africa; Executive Council of KwaZulu-Natal vs President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC) (hereafter Executive Council) at para. 109. 
37 Executive Council paras. 107-109. 
38 Craythorne DL Municipal Administration: The Handbook (2006) 118 (hereafter Craythorne 2006). 
39  Dihlabeng Local Municipality vs Nthute [2009] JOL 23108 (O) at para. 116. 
40 Section 55(1)(a) Systems Act. 
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regulations for local government. This has a negative impact on managers in that it leaves them 
uncertain about which regulations to apply in a particular situation. These circumstances limit 
the full implementation of the legal framework giving effect to the NPM ethos of 
managerialism, and also constrains the discretion enjoyed by municipal managers. In what 
follows, these limits are explored in some detail. 
 
2.1.2.1 Overregulation 
The exercise of wide discretion requires that senior management operate in an environment 
encumbered by a minimum of regulations and red tape. Autonomy and managerial discretion 
presuppose that there are no orders being showered from other spheres prescribing what actions 
should be taken and the kinds of outcomes that should follow from them. Managerial autonomy 
is meant to increase responsibility, efficiency, and technical capacity in the delivery of services, 
the latter relating especially to the previously excluded communities, setting the management 
apart from the apartheid managers who took no personal responsibility for their own actions 
but only insisted on legal and procedural correctness. 
However, in the context of South African local government, the opposite obtains. South 
African local governments are excessively regulated by national government.41 It would seem 
that the national sphere of government, even though it has decentralised general and specific 
powers to local government, does not trust local government enough to exercise those powers 
free from further regulation and prescription. The flurry of laws regulating local government42 
are actually impeding or compromising the senior managers’ discretion and their ability to 
perform. Instead of expending their energy on devising innovative solutions of delivering the 
much-needed services and in discharging local governments’ developmental mandate, senior 
managers find themselves having to tick boxes and comply with hundreds if not thousands of 
‘musts’ scattered throughout local government legislations.43 This state of affairs has the 
potential to erode the managerial autonomy and relegate senior managers to being the 
implementing agents of other spheres. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Ntliziywana P ‘Adding injury to insult: Intrusive laws on top of a weak system’ (2016) VI Constitutional Court 
Review 32 48 (hereafter Ntliziywana 2016). 
42 Performance Regulations of 2006, Competency Regulations of 2007, Systems Amendment Act of 2011, 
Appointment Regulations of 2014, and Public Administration Management Act of 2014. 
43 Ntliziywana 2016: 48. 
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The gravity of overregulation on managerial independence is neatly illustrated by the following 
scenario presented by De Visser: 
The Municipal Manager of a small rural municipality needs to address the 
problem of a manager who is not performing, is possibly incompetent and is 
accused of mismanaging municipal funds. How many different laws must she 
consult to address this situation effectively and in accordance with the rule of 
law? On the issue of competency and performance, there are three laws …. 
The Municipal Manager may therefore have to consult at least six laws to deal 
with her problem, excluding internal council protocols and policies. Her 
efforts to deal with a real problem in line with the rule of law are thus 
complicated by [national overregulation of] … local government.44 
 
2.1.2.2 Appointment of section 56 managers 
Another issue that threatens the independence of senior managers is the appointment of senior 
managers. Even though the municipal manager, as a head of the administration and the 
accounting officer, is charged with the formation and development of an administration which 
is economical, effective, efficient and accountable, the law states that section 56 managers must 
be appointed by the municipal council, and not the municipal manager.45 This is despite the 
provisions of the Systems Act to the effect that the administration formed and developed by 
the municipal manager must be managed by the municipal manager in accordance with the 
laws governing local government.46 This raises the question of how municipal managers are 
expected to manage the administration if they cannot appoint their own team of executives. 
In this regard, the National Development Plan (NDP) states that the appointment of senior 
managers by the council rather than the municipal manager often complicates or distorts the 
lines of accountability between senior managers and the municipal manager.47 It makes it 
unclear whether they are accountable to councillors who appoint them or to the municipal 
manager who is the head of administration and the accounting officer of the municipality. As 
the author argues elsewhere in a slightly different context: 
This has the potential to compromise the position of the municipal manager. 
As the head of the administration, the municipal manager is answerable for his 
 
 
 
44 De Visser J ‘Editorial’ (2012) 14(3) Local Government Bulletin 1 1 (hereafter De Visser 2012). 
45 Section 56(1)(a) Systems Act. 
46 Section 55(1)(b) Systems Act. 
47 Republic of South Africa National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 (2012) 415 (hereafter National 
Development Plan 2012). 
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or her administration. As such, the municipal manager should have the task of 
appointing, dismissing and disciplining his or her staff. Should councillors 
arrogate the power to themselves, [as is the case with section 56 managers] the 
municipal manager would be exposed to increasing insubordination on the part 
of his or her staff since they had not been appointed by him or her, and would 
feel that they were responsible to the council alone.48 
This constrains the discretion given to municipal managers to form and develop economic, 
effective, efficient and accountable administrations which they must manage within the law. It 
also constrains the discretion given to section 56 managers, as heads of their own departments, 
in that their appointment by politicians decreases their independence. They are at the beck and 
call of politicians. The NDP also proposes that municipal managers must be given authority 
over the appointment of managers reporting to them, because, as things stand, they (municipal 
managers) end up being answerable for matter over which they have little or no control.49 The 
NDP states that this might lead to instability.50 
 
2.1.2.3 Minimal political interference 
The lawmakers have adopted a contradictory approach to the NPM tenets of conferring wide 
discretion to managers/managerial autonomy. While they empower managers fully when it 
comes to supply chain management, specifically procurement decisions, by excluding political 
involvement, they do not do so in human resource management, especially the appointment of 
senior managers. Section 117 of the MFMA, entitled ‘councillors barred from serving on 
municipal tender committees’, makes it clear that no councillor may be a member of a bid 
committee or any other committee evaluating or approving tenders, quotations, contracts or 
other bids, nor attend any such meeting as an observer. The MFMA draws a clear distinction 
between the policy aspects of supply chain management and the implementation thereof.51 It 
states that the development and the adoption of a supply chain management policy is the sole 
preserve of the council. However, once adopted, the implementation of the policy is the 
prerogative of the municipal manager.52 In this regard, the municipal manager is in full charge 
of the tender or procurement process. He or she appoints the three key-decision-making 
 
 
 
 
48 Ntliziywana 2012: 56. 
49  National Development Plan 2012: 414. 
50  National Development Plan 2012: 414. 
51  National Treasury 2005: 16. 
52 Ntliziywana 2012: 57. 
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committees53 that are involved in and supervise the tender process, all of them being composed 
of municipal officials.54 The principle was confirmed in Ortlieb and Associates v Camdeboo 
Local Municipal Council,55 where the court set aside an award of a bid because a councillor 
chaired the bid committee in contravention of section 117 of the MFMA.56 
The cushioning of administration from political influence in terms of section 117 of the MFMA 
is not limited to councillor membership of committees or attendance of their meetings. It 
extends to the entire tender process. This much was said in Thabo Mogudi Security Services 
CC v Randfontein Local Municipality and Another,57  where the court stated: 
[S]ection [117] was clearly enacted in order to ensure that politicians should 
not interfere in adjudication, recommendation or acceptance of tenders by a 
local authority … in order to maintain the impartiality and integrity of the 
process. Politicians are by their nature agents of constituencies, and not 
impartial as officials of an organ of state ought to be. The plain intention of 
the section is therefore to avoid any involvement of councillors in the 
process…58 
 
Furthermore, the wide discretion conferred on municipal manager by section 117 of the MFMA 
means that it is only the municipal manager who can reject a recommended bid59 or cancel a 
contract on grounds of corruption or fraudulent act during the bidding process.60 The case of 
Entsha Henra bk v Hessequa Munisipaliteit and Others61 lends credence to this assertion, in 
that it states that even the mayoral committee may not decide on the exclusion of any tender 
for reasons of suspected corrupt action.62 The only recourse the council has is to exercise 
oversight over the implementation of the supply chain management policy, but it may not 
review the municipal manager’s decision.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Namely the bid specification committee, the bid evaluation committee, and the bid adjudication committee. 
54  Regulation 26(1)(b) Local Government: Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations (GN R868 GG 
27636, 30 May 2005) (hereafter SCM Regulations). 
55 Ortlieb and Associates vs Camdeboo Local Municipal Council 2005 JDR 0408 E (hereafter Ortlieb case). 
56  See also Ntliziywana 2012: 57. 
57 [2010] 4 All SA 314 (GSJ) (hereafter Randfontein case). 
58  Randfontein case para. 33. 
59 Regulation 38(1)(e) SCM Regulations. 
60 Regulation 38(f)(i) SCM Regulations. 
61 [2008] ZAWCHC 25 (15 May 2008) (hereafter Hessequa case). 
62 Hessequa case para. 28. 
63 Hessequa case para. 28 quoting Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 14-29 
(hereafter Steytler & De Visser 2007). 
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Given that there are contextual similarities between supply chain management and human 
resource management and that they both have a propensity to attract political interference, it is 
perplexing that the lawmakers chose to treat these functions differently, thereby adopting a 
contradictory stance to the principle of managerial autonomy. It is inconsistent of the 
lawmakers to empower municipal managers only on supply chain management issues but not 
on human resource management issues as they both form an integral part of the principle of 
letting managers manage. They are the core functions of the municipal manager as the head of 
the municipal administration and as an accounting officer. Councillors should not be involved 
in the appointment of section 56 managers, which is the implementation of the recruitment 
policy.64 
When it decries political interference as one of the root causes of municipal dysfunction, the 
State of Local Government Report mentions staff appointment and procurement decision as the 
sites of such interference.65 Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for Councillors contains a 
provision that prohibits councillors from interfering in the administration.66 It is submitted that 
prohibiting councillors from interfering in the administration while allowing them to appoint 
the very same administration, is self-defeating. It is no use prohibiting councillor interference 
in the management and administration of any municipal department through the Code of 
Conduct for Councillors when heads of those departments are at the beck and call of politicians 
owing to their appointment. There is a possibility that the mere fact of appointment makes the 
administration beholden to the councillors who appointed them. A councillor would not need 
to interfere in the administration if he or she has a section 56 manager at his beck and call to 
do his or her bidding.67 This creates fertile ground for corruption. Some councillors would 
deliberately push for the appointment of their consociates or cronies on the understanding that, 
once they are appointed, they would return the favour in cash or kind. 
Furthermore, one of the duties of a municipal manager is the maintenance of discipline of 
staff.68  The role played by councillors in the implementation of the recruitment policy, which 
 
 
 
 
64 Ntliziywana 2012: 57. 
65 Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South Africa: 
Overview Report - National State of Local Government (2009) 72 (hereafter State of Local Government Report 
2009). 
66 Item 11 Schedule 1 Systems Act. 
67 Twala C ‘The African National Congress (ANC) and the cadre deployment policy in the post-apartheid South 
Africa: A product of democratic centralisation or a recipe for a constitutional crisis?’ (2014) 14(2) Journal of 
Social Sciences 159 159 (hereafter Twala 2014). 
68 Section 55(1)(g) Systems Act. 
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means that the municipal manager cannot appoint his or her team of executives, might have 
deleterious effects for the proper maintenance of discipline by the municipal manager and for 
the sound and stable municipal administration. 
First, it has the potential to cause confusion on where section 56 managers report, as they are 
appointed by the council. Some managers would be beholden, and prefer to account directly, 
to the council that appoints them. This distorts lines of accountability and compromises the 
position of the municipal manager as the head of the municipal administration. Secondly, as 
far as the maintenance of discipline is concerned, some managers could use the fact of their 
appointment to challenge the authority of the municipal manager. 
It is therefore submitted that the municipal manager should have the powers to appoint, 
discipline and dismiss staff as part of his or her role as the head of the municipal administration 
and as an accounting officer. Ultimately, it is the municipal manager, and no one else, who 
accounts for his or her administration. It is an inconsistent application of the NPM principle of 
managerial autonomy for the lawmakers to prohibit interference in one part of the municipal 
managers function but not in other respects. 
 
2.2 Practice 
2.2.1 Open skills set 
In practice, the fact that the laws do not require specific skills for senior management positions 
has opened the door for cadre deployment, the practice of assigning specific governance tasks 
to trusted members of a political organisation.69 This practice is mostly, but not exclusively, 
used by the ANC to push for its transformation imperatives and ideological mandate. It places 
high premium on the loyalty of its members to its programme and ideological agenda, 
sometimes ahead of merit and even competence.70 According to Chipkin, cadre deployment 
has seen the ‘movement of senior party officials into positions that maximise the fluid and often 
contradictory relationship between state and party’.71 
 
 
 
 
 
69 Booysen S The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power (2011) 397. 
70 Twala 2014: 164. This is possibly because the numbers of skilled people within the ranks of the ANC have been 
limited due to historic exclusions of black people. Hence the ANC advocates for on-the-job learning in order to 
speed up transformation. 
71 Chipkin I ‘Transcending bureaucracy: State transformation in the age of the manager’ (2011) 77 Transformation 
3 (hereafter Chipkin 2011). 
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However, the cadre deployment practice is not at variance with this aspect of the NPM principle 
of managerialism, given that it too does not insist on a specific skills set. The problem only 
arises when councillors recruit the majority of their workforce in a manner that flouts the 
procedures and policies of sound human resource practices.72 One instance of this is the case 
of a municipality where a former tea-lady was promoted to being its chief financial officer.73 
Even though the focus of this NPM principle is on outputs and outcomes as opposed to 
qualifications and experience, senior managers must still be able to perform the tasks at hand. 
It stands to reason that a tea-lady would find difficulty in performing the tasks of a chief 
financial officer of a municipality. Furthermore, the application of this NPM principle in South 
Africa requires, at most, that a person appointed as a municipal manager or a manager directly 
accountable to the municipal manager must have skills and expertise to perform the duties 
associated with the post in question. 
Accordingly, the problems prevalent at local government level are not a result of the 
introduction of the NPM but its inconsistent implementation. The example cited in the State of 
Local Government Report of parachuting a tea-lady to the position of chief financial officer is 
clearly a subversion of this principle of an open skills set. These kinds of practices are the 
reason that NPM principles are not living up to their promise of infusing efficiency, 
effectiveness and responsiveness in public service. 
 
2.2.2 Wide discretion 
This leg of the NPM principle of managerial autonomy was similarly not expressed in a manner 
that facilitates full implementation. First, the municipal manager is not permitted to constitute 
his or her own team of executives. Senior managers who report to him or her are appointed by 
the municipal council. Essentially, unlike the case in supply chain management practices, 
politicians are given free rein in human resource management practices. Their involvement is 
not only in the formulation and development of a recruitment policy, but in the actual 
appointments. This undermines the autonomy and discretion conferred on senior managers and 
invites untrammelled political interference in the running of the administration. This is how 
loyal cadres of political parties get appointed to dispense patronage. They then are beholden to 
 
 
 
 
72 Ntliziywana 2012: 50. See also The State of Local Government Report 2009: 31. 
73  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 31. 
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a political party and councillors who appointed them rather than the municipal manager. This 
is the first affront to the NPM principle of letting managers manage. 
Secondly, a number of national departments have been vying for regulatory control over local 
government and, in the process, issuing contradictory regulations that potentially choke 
managerial independence, innovativeness and flexibility. Furthermore, these departments have 
been throwing laws at local government with the aim to address the problems faced by 
municipalities and, by so doing, compromising and impeding the municipality’s ability or right 
to exercise its powers or perform its functions.74 Given that the senior management of a 
municipality is responsible and accountable for the administration and implementation of the 
municipality’s by-laws and other legislation,75 as well as the implementation of national and 
provincial legislation applicable to the municipality,76 throwing laws at local government has 
a direct impact on their exercise of managerial discretion. Instead of expending their energy on 
devising innovative ways of delivering the much-needed services to the already impatient 
public, senior managers find themselves having to tick boxes and comply with a flurry of laws 
and their prescriptive requirements.77 
In their haste and overzealousness to fix local government, these departments have 
inadvertently created a snare that traps senior management instead of creating an enabling 
environment for local government to discharge its responsibilities.78 It is submitted that this 
goes beyond the permissible limit of regulation in terms of section 155(7) of the Constitution. 
It encroaches on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of local government in a 
manner contrary to section 41(1)(g) of the Constitution, which states that each sphere of 
government must exercise its powers and perform its functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of other spheres. While the 
NPM gives wide discretion to managers, many laws take that discretion away. As indicated in 
the foregoing, because of these laws senior managers are reduced to ticking boxes instead of 
expending their energies devising and implementing new service delivery strategies. The courts 
have not invalidated laws because of overregulation in terms of section.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Ntliziywana 2016: 49. 
75 Section 55(1)(l) Systems Act. 
76 Section 55(1)(p) Systems Act. 
77 Ntliziywana 2016: 49. 
78 Ntliziywana 2016: 49. 
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2.2.3 Minimal political interference 
The failure to bar politicians in the exercise of section 55 powers, which is clear evidence of 
the government’s failure to give full effect to this NPM principle in a manner that facilitates its 
implementation, has invited numerous instances of interference in municipal administration. 
The most blatant recent instance took place in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
Municipality. After sustained political interference by the former executive mayor, Nkosinathi 
Benson Fihla and his deputy, Thando Ngcolomba, in the performance of her core functions, 
the former City Manager of the municipality, Dr Msengana-Ndlela, wrote a memorandum in 
exasperation to the Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs of the Eastern Cape (MEC) to no avail.79 On realising that the intervention she sought 
from the MEC was not forthcoming and that the interference continued unbridled, effectively 
amounting to a constructive dismissal, she tendered her resignation on 31 May 2013, barely 
five months in office. She then took the matter to court, suing the municipality for damages on 
grounds of breach of a contract of employment.80 
In her court papers, Dr Msengana-Ndlela’s complaint was five-pronged, with each of the 
prongs having to do with one form or another of undue political interference in the management 
of the municipality.81 First, she complained that she was unable to discharge her responsibilities 
as an accounting officer because of political interference. Secondly, she claimed that her 
attempts to protect the interests of the municipality and guard against possible irregular or 
unlawful expenditure were blatantly frustrated, thus hindering her in undertaking her 
accounting responsibilities in a collective leadership environment.82 Thirdly, and most 
importantly, she complained about political interference in the recruitment and appointment 
processes of senior managers. In this regard, the Executive Mayor and his Deputy intentionally 
placed undue political pressure on her by unilaterally rescinding council decisions relating to 
the macro-organisational structure, the enhancement of her office and the advertised 
positions.83 
 
 
 
 
 
79 Msengana-Ndlela v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (3282/2013) [2015] ZAECPEHC 31 
(hereafter Msengana-Ndlela) at para. 5. 
80 Msengana-Ndlela para. 1. 
81 This was in contravention of item 11 of the Code of Conduct for Councillors. 
82 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
83 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
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This goes to the heart of the inconsistencies in the implementation of the NPM conferring wide 
discretion on managers in that councillors not only set the recruitment policy to be implemented 
by the municipal manager, but also wanted to dictate the outcomes of the recruitment process, 
thus rendering the office of the municipal manager nugatory. This has not only hindered her in 
carrying out her responsibilities as Municipal Manager as contemplated in the Systems Act, 
but has compromised the position of the municipal manager.84 
The fourth prong of her complaint was that the Executive Mayor and his Deputy have placed 
undue political pressure on her to appoint a political advisor in the administration as an Acting 
Executive Director of Corporate Services and/or other senior managers, irrespective of that 
person’s competencies, qualifications and experience.85 Finally, she claims she was instructed 
to perform administrative acts that are contrary to government policies and procedures, in the 
name of ‘majority rule’.86 She claimed that she was threatened with violence and death by the 
Executive Mayor if she did not comply with such ‘majority rule’.87 She felt that her safety and 
security were severely compromised. She was furthermore instructed to appoint 16 members 
of the Mkhonto-Wesizwe Military Veterans Association (MKVA) as Close Protection Officers 
of the Executive Mayor and his Deputy, without due consideration of human resource policies 
and the availability of funds.88 After none of the implicated individuals testified and refuted her 
evidence, the Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth, found in her favour, awarding her the 
sum of R3.1 million in damages. 
This is a classic case of undue political interference that compromises the independence of 
senior managers in the discharge of their responsibilities. This shows that the implementation 
of the NPM in South Africa is fudged, resulting in some of the problems confronting local 
government. In this regard, the State of Local Government Report cites undue political 
interference of this kind as the root cause of dysfunction in municipalities.89 This points to the 
fact that the South African government has failed to fully implement the NPM tenet of 
managerial autonomy, resulting in what may be termed fudged managerialism. The latter finds 
expression in the South African reality of decentralised functions combined with   centralised 
 
 
 
 
84 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
85 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
86 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
87 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
88 Msengana-Ndlela para. 5. 
89  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 71. 
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politics, a situation where regional or even national political actors wish to prescribe outcomes 
in the recruitment and appointment processes. 
Whereas governance in South Africa has been decentralised, politics have not.90 The 
consequences of this are that 
while the local party caucus of the ruling party in the municipality should 
ideally be the platform for rigorous debate of municipal issues on the basis of 
local concerns, it is often a proxy for regional and sometimes even national 
politics.91 
As a result of this, political parties find it easy to unduly interfere in the affairs of the 
municipality, especially on whom to appoint. There is growing concern around the 
inappropriate relationship between regional party structures and municipalities.92 There are 
several reported instances where regional party structures seek to operate municipalities by 
remote control.93 In what follows I will highlight two further instances of fudged- 
managerialism and its unintended consequences. 
Another instance of outside influence in the running of municipal affairs that threatened the 
independence of senior management took place in the Amathole District Municipality in the 
Eastern Cape Province.94 After an intensive recruitment and selection process, the municipality 
shortlisted two candidates for the post of the municipal manager, namely Dr Mlokoti and Adv. 
Zenzile, as the two outstanding candidates. During the selection process, an assessment of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the two candidates was undertaken, the conclusion being 
that Dr Mlokoti was the better candidate. The selection panel expressed reservations about 
Adv. Zenzile’s lack of managerial experience.95 However, the municipal council came to a 
different conclusion and appointed Adv. Zenzile. The aggrieved Dr Mlokoti took the matter to 
court, challenging the decision of the municipal council. 
Outside interference, which was not refuted, was revealed in the judgment to the effect that 
‘the Regional Executive Committee of the ANC instructed the caucus to appoint Mr.  Zenzile 
 
 
 
 
90 De Visser J ‘The political-administrative interface in South African municipalities: Assessing the quality of 
local democracies’ (2010) 5 Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 86 88 (hereafter De Visser 2010). 
91 De Visser 2010: 88. 
92 De Visser 2010: 94. 
93 De Visser 2010: 94. 
94 Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality and Another (2009) 30 ILJ 517 (E) (hereafter Mlokoti case). 
95  Mlokoti case paras. 15-17. 
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and the caucus carried out the instruction’.96 This means that the appointed municipal 
manager’s independence would be compromised as he would be indebted to outside forces. 
The judgment reveals that the executive mayor was not comfortable with this state of affairs 
and solicited two legal opinions, both of which advised against the appointment of Adv. 
Zenzile. However, the ANC caucus decided to withhold the opinions from the full council and 
the council therefore appointed Adv. Zenzile without the full knowledge of the legality or 
otherwise of their actions. The Court held the instruction of the ANC Regional Executive 
Committee as amounting to 
an usurpation of the powers of [Amathole]’s council by a political body which, 
on the papers, does not appear even to have had sight of the documents 
relevant to the selection process including the findings of the interview panel. 
In my view, the involvement of the Regional Executive Council of the ANC 
in the circumstances described in [the papers] constituted an unauthorised and 
unwarranted intervention in the affairs of Amathole’s council.97 
The Court agreed with Dr Mlokoti that the appointment of Adv. Zenzile was, indeed, illegal 
owing to the unauthorised and unwarranted interference by the ANC Regional Executive 
Council, and went on to appoint Dr Mlokoti on behalf of the municipality.98 
This instance of unwarranted external interference in the running of municipalities is not an 
isolated incident.99 Interference of this kind threatens the newly acquired managerial 
independence of senior managers in that they are effectively accountable neither to the 
municipal manager nor the council but to external forces.100 In the majority of cases, people 
who are appointed as municipal managers or senior manager are leaders of political parties 
seeking to dispense patronage amongst themselves. For example, a regional chairperson would 
want to be a municipal manager and effectively distort the lines of accountability because in 
the party hierarchy he or she is superior, but in the municipal hierarchy he or she is   expected 
 
 
 
96 Mlokoti case para. 36. 
97  Mlokoti case paras. 36-37. 
98 Mlokoti case para. 39. 
99 See also the Allen Paulse case where the municipality shortlisted five candidates – TT Mnyimba, Mr T Paulse, 
Dr E Rankwana, Mr D du Plessis and Mr K Rosenberg – for the position of the municipal manager. The candidates 
were then subjected to the integrity and competency assessment. However, the outcome of this assessment was 
withheld from full council, which then appointed Mr Mnyimba on the basis of interview results. One of the 
aggrieved candidates, Mr Allen Paulse, took the matter to court, which declared the appointment null and void 
but refused to follow the Mlokoti precedent of appointing the right candidate itself. The Court furthermore did not 
decide on the issue of alleged political interference, which played out in the same way as in the Mlokoti case. 
There was overwhelming evidence that the selection process was manipulated to ensure a particular outcome. 
100  National Development Plan 2012: 415-6. 
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to report to the mayor who is his political junior. A 2009 study into the functionality of 
municipal governance arrangements reveals that 
at times, party officials are appointed in positions below the section 57 appointments, 
where [CoGTA] and Treasury’s competency rules are less of an impediment. The 
appointment of a party official who occupies a position higher than that of a councillor 
in party structures, to an administrative post, [plays] havoc with all the legal lines of 
accountability. For example, the distinction between the political and administrative 
functions of the municipality disappears where the official (who is a party office- 
holder) attends party caucus meetings. The council becomes subsidiary to the official 
and the latter gives the mayor and speaker instructions.101 
However, a change in approach was effected in 2011, in an attempt to arrest this phenomenon. 
The Systems Act was amended in a manner that introduced the Weberian separation of politics 
from administration. In this regard, municipal senior management were prohibited from 
simultaneously holding political office in a political party.102 Accordingly, senior managers are 
barred from simultaneously holding the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, 
deputy secretary or treasurer of a party nationally or in any province, region or other area in 
which the party operates.103 This was meant to ensure a clearer demarcation between the 
administrative and the political realms, and thus ensure that the administrative realm is properly 
cushioned from constant interference.104 Although it works for elected leaders, the role of 
senior management is supposed to be non-partisan and professional. 
This legislative intervention, which sought to forge a collective professional identity for senior 
managers by keeping this distinction clear, was invalidated on procedural grounds in South 
African Municipal Workers' Union v Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs.105 In an earlier judgment106 the Amendment Act was challenged and invalidated 
because it followed the wrong legislative procedure. The Constitutional Court confirmed this 
order of invalidity, but suspended the order of invalidity for 24 months in order not to disrupt 
the day-to-day administration of municipalities and to allow Parliament to remedy the 
procedural  defect.  This  means  that  the  Act  remains  valid  until  the  procedural  defect is 
 
 
 
101 De Visser J, Steytler N & May A The Quality of Local Democracies: A Study into the Functionality of 
Municipal Governance Arrangements (2009) (hereafter De Visser et al. 2009). 
102 Section 56A(1) System Act. 
103 Section 1 System Act. 
104 National Development Plan 2012: 411. 
105 [2017] ZACC 7 (9 March 2017). 
106  South African Municipal Workers’ Union v Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
[2016] ZAGPPHC 733. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
243 
Chapter Six 
 
 
 
 
remedied. Even though a substantive challenge was launched on the constitutional validity of 
section 56A, both the High Court and the Constitutional Court did not express an opinion on 
this challenge, leaving it to Parliament to weigh the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
section and the constitutional rights it allegedly limits. 
 
2.3 Assessment 
The preceding discussion suggests that some elements of managerial autonomy at local 
government are not expressed in a manner that facilitates their implementation while others 
are. In regard to the former, while managers are insulated in some instances, i.e. in procurement 
decisions, they are made vulnerable to constant political interference in others, namely in 
appointment decisions. In the latter case, politicians are, by law, allowed to meddle in the 
exercise of section 55 managerial powers. As a result, managers have not been fully 
empowered to be risk-taking, innovative and efficient because those appointed on the party- 
political ticket take instructions from those parties. This design flaw in the legislative 
framework for managerial autonomy, which I call fudged managerialism, has not rectified the 
damages of apartheid as the introduction of the NPM in South Africa had sought to achieve. 
Instead, De Visser et al. state that ‘undue interference in the administration is a very real 
hindrance to service delivery’.107 
The undue interference which hampers delivery has led to an ever-growing number of protests, 
which is indicative of the fact that communities are not satisfied with the level of services 
delivered to them.108 Other outward manifestation of discontent with municipal dysfunction 
include: the withholding of rates in some rural municipalities;109 the rising number of provincial 
interventions in terms of section 139 of the Constitution;110 the issuing of disclaimers, adverse 
and qualified audit reports by the Auditor-General for the majority of municipalities because 
of their poor financial management;111 and a plethora of court cases and reports on 
maladministration, corruption and fraud in the procurement of goods and services. 
 
 
 
 
 
107 (hereafter De Visser et al. 2009: 5. 
108 SALGA Community Protest: Local Government Perceptions (2015) 37. 
109 Powell D, De Visser J, May A & Ntliziywana P ‘The withholding of rates and taxes in five municipalities’ 
(2010) 12(4) Local Government Bulletin 9 9. 
110 Powell D, O’Donovan M, Ayele Z & Chigwata T Municipal Audit Consistency Barometer (2013) 8. 
111 Powell D, O’Donovan M, Ayele Z & Chigwata T Operation Clean Audit 2014: Why it failed and what can be 
learned (2014) 5. 
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A 2009 study by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs in each 
of the then 283 municipalities to assess the cause of poor performance or dysfunctionality 
revealed that these include a tension between the political and administrative interface; 
insufficient separation of powers between political parties and municipal councils; and poor 
compliance with the legislative and regulatory frameworks for municipalities.112 On the 
triggers of section 139 interventions, the study cites governance issues that include political 
infighting, conflict between senior management and councillors and human resource 
management issues.113 A 2014 study by COGTA, five years later, showed that the picture had 
not changed.114 
Some of the NPM tenets that were expressed in a manner that facilitated their implementation 
did not necessary produce the intended outcomes. Instead, they often produced adverse 
outcomes. For example, the open skills set has resulted in the appointment of managers unable 
to perform the task of that office. In other instances, the open skills set has been overtaken by 
policy considerations. 
 
3 Performance management system 
3.1 NPM principles 
A performance management system is both an accountability system for senior managers as 
well as a mechanism to tie managerial independence to the actual delivery of services. It was 
noted in Chapter Two115 that the NPM principle of performance management relates to the 
entering into agreement, written and negotiated, between government and managers in which 
quantifiable targets are set out for a given period of time and performance is measured against 
those targets at the end of it. The rationale is that the manner in which senior managers exercise 
their autonomy and professional independence must translate into efficiency, effectiveness and 
innovation in the delivery of services. 
Performance management also ensures that managers take personal responsibility for their own 
actions, instead of hiding behind rules and procedural correctness. In this regard, the emphasis 
is  on  performance  indicators,  evaluations  and  performance   related   pay,  and       quality 
 
 
 
 
112  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 10. 
113  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 10. 
114  Back to Basics (2014) 4. 
115  At section 6.4.2. 
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improvement. Taking personal responsibility for their own actions requires a clear statement 
of goals. 
 
3.2 Legislative framework 
The White Paper on Local Government introduced the performance management system as a 
tool and approach for making municipalities more developmental.116 In essence, there are three 
main reasons for the introduction of the performance management system in South African 
local government, namely to achieve development outcomes, to enable realistic planning and 
to enhance local government accountability.117 The function of holding managers accountable 
for their actions is not mentioned in the White Paper, but it can be inferred that the performance 
monitoring responsibility of municipal councils, audit committees and other spheres also serves 
as a counterweight to managerial autonomy.118  The White Paper states: 
Performance management is critical to ensure that plans are being 
implemented, that they are having the desired development impact, and that 
resources are being used efficiently.119 
Over and above introducing performance management as an instrument to ensure, among 
others, accountability, the White Paper states that accountability can also be achieved when 
communities are involved in developing some of the municipal key performance indicators.120 
The White Paper further states that performance monitoring indicators must be carefully 
designed in order to accurately reflect the efficiency, quality and value for money of municipal 
services.121 It states that poorly designed performance indicators can have a negative effect on 
delivery, and that it is critical that indicators focus on outcomes and not only outputs.122 The 
White Paper enjoins the national government to develop national performance management 
system which can be piloted by different municipalities.123 
 
 
 
 
 
116  White Paper 1998: 65 para. 3.2. 
117 White Paper 1998: 59 para. 3. The National Planning Commission defines ‘accountability’ as referring to 
institutionalised practices of giving an account of how assigned responsibilities are carried out and public 
resources used. In a democracy, it is crucial for political leaders and public officials to account to the citizens for 
their actions. This is usually achieved through a system of institutional checks and balances. 
118  White Paper 1998: 67 para. 3.2. 
119  White Paper 1998: 66 para. 3.2. 
120  White Paper 1998: 65 para. 3.2. 
121  White Paper 1998: 67 para. 3.2. 
122  White Paper 1998: 67 para. 3.2. 
123  White Paper 1998: 68 para. 3.2. 
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As can be seen from the foregoing, the White Paper introduces the performance management 
system to do more than is expected under the NPM. It introduces it as a tool to achieve 
developmental local government, to ensure realistic planning, as an accountability measure 
and, by inference, as a ballast to managerial autonomy. Another objective of the performance 
management system, as introduced by the White Paper, is to ensure ‘efficiency, quality and 
value-for-money’.124 As such, the White Paper uses the NPM tenet of performance 
management to best address local problems. 
The Systems Act 125 and the MFMA take forward this NPM tenet introduced by the White 
Paper. The Systems Act provides for the establishment and development of a performance 
management system for each municipality in the manner commensurate with its resources; and 
the manner in which it should be monitored and reviewed by the municipality.126 The 
performance management systems must set key performance indicators and targets and provide 
for the monitoring, review and reporting on municipal performance based on indicators linked 
to the IDP.127 The Act requires all municipalities to ‘promote a culture of performance 
management among its political structures, political office bearers and councillors and its 
administration’.128 
The Act states that a performance agreement must be concluded within 60 days of appointment 
and annually thereafter, within one month after the beginning of a financial year of the 
municipality.129 Failure to conclude the performance agreement within the specified periods 
results in the lapsing of the appointment. In the case of the municipal manager, the performance 
agreement must be entered into with the municipality as represented by the mayor or executive 
mayor, as the case may be.130 When it comes to a manager directly accountable to the municipal 
manager, the performance agreement must be entered into with the municipal manager.131 
The MFMA in turn enjoins the mayor to take all reasonable steps to ensure the performance 
agreements of municipal managers and section 56 managers are concluded and comply   with 
 
 
 
 
 
124  White Paper 1998: 67 para. 3.2. 
125  Act 32 of 2000. 
126 Sections 38, 39 and 40 Systems Act. 
127 Section 41 Systems Act. 
128 Section 38(b) Systems Act. 
129 Section 57(2)(i) and (ii) Systems Act. 
130 Section 57(2)(b) Systems Act. 
131 Section 57(2)(c) Systems Act. 
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the provisions of the Systems Act.132 The MFMA also requires the mayor to ensure that the 
performance agreements of said officials comply with the MFMA to promote sound financial 
management and that they are linked to the measurable performance objectives approved with 
the budget as well as to the service delivery and budget implementation plan.133 
The Systems Act spells out the contents of the performance agreement to include performance 
objectives and targets that must be met and the time-frames within which those objectives and 
targets must be met.134 The Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance 
Management Regulations,135 issued in 2001, are silent on what the performance agreement 
should contain. They simply state that a performance management system must be adopted 
before or at the same time as the commencement by the municipality of the process of setting 
key performance indicators and targets in accordance with its Integrated Development Plan.136 
Further content to the performance agreement is given by the Local Government: Municipal 
Performance Regulation,137 issued in 2006. These regulations sought to regulate how the 
performance of municipal managers and managers reporting directly to municipal managers 
will be uniformly directed, monitored and improved. Accordingly, the performance 
management system is designed to help the municipality to review the performance of senior 
managers and, in essence, hold them accountable for their actions.138 The Performance 
Regulations state that the performance objectives and targets are set by the employer in 
consultation with the employee.139 In giving content to the performance agreement, they state 
that performance objectives and targets spelt out in the principal Act shall include the 
following: 
(a) key objectives (the main tasks that need to be done); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 Section 53(1)(c)(iii)(cc) MFMA. 
133 Section 53(1)(c)(iii)(aa) and (bb) MFMA. 
134 Section 57(4) Systems Act. 
135 Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (GN R796 GG 22605 of 
2001) (hereafter Planning Regulations). 
136 Regulation 8 Planning Regulations. 
137 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly 
Accountable to Municipal Managers (GN R805 GG 29089 of 1 August 2006) (hereafter Performance 
Regulations). 
138  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 8-58. 
139 Regulations 25(2) and 26(3) Performance Regulations. 
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(b) key performance indicators (details of the evidence that must be provided to show that 
a key target has been achieved); 
(c) target dates (timeframe in which the task must be achieved); 
 
(d) weightings (relative importance of the key objectives to each other);140 and 
 
(e) core competency requirements.141 
 
These objectives and targets must be practical and measurable.142 They must measure 
efficiency, effectiveness, quality and the impact of the performance of the municipality, 
administrative component, structure, body or person for whom the target or objective has been 
set.143 They must also be consistent with the municipality’s development priorities and 
objectives set out in the Integrated Development Plan.144 
The performance agreement must also include a personal development plan aimed at 
addressing any developmental gaps.145 Furthermore, the responsibilities of the accounting 
officer, as contained in the Municipal Finance Management Act, form part of the performance 
agreement of a municipal manager.146 The Systems Act further provides that any regulations 
that relate to standards and procedures for evaluating performance of municipal managers or 
section 56 managers, and intervals for evaluation, must be regarded as forming part of the 
performance agreement.147 
In this regard, the Disciplinary Regulations148 deal with standards and define sub-standard 
performance as ‘poor work or unacceptable performance or failing to meet the required 
standards set for the post’.149 The Systems Act further provides that the performance agreement 
must include the consequences of sub-standard performance.150 The Disciplinary Regulations 
also regulate the procedure for dealing with sub-standard performance of municipal managers 
 
 
 
 
 
140 Regulations 25(2) and (3) Performance Regulations. 
141 Regulation 26(5) Performance Regulations. 
142 Section 57(5) Systems Act. 
143 Regulation 12(2)(b) Planning Regulations. 
144 Regulation 12(2)(e) Municipal Planning Regulations. 
145 Regulation 29 Performance Regulations. 
146 Section 57(4A) Systems Act. 
147 Section 57(4C) Systems Act. 
148 Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010 (GN 344 GG 34213 of 21 April 2011) 
(hereafter Disciplinary Regulations). 
149 Regulation 1 Disciplinary Regulations. 
150 Section 57(4)(c) Systems Act. 
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and senior managers.151 In this light, they too form part of the performance agreement. The 
Systems Act regards the monitoring, measuring and evaluating of the performance of staff as 
an appropriate system and procedure to ensure fair, efficient, effective and transparent 
administration.152 
The Performance Regulations subject the employment of a municipal manager and those 
managers reporting directly to him or her to the signing of a separate performance agreement,153 
with the aim of measuring and evaluating their performance.154 In terms of the regulations, the 
employer is enjoined to create an enabling environment that facilitates effective performance 
by its senior managers.155 This includes an obligation to maintain a workable relationship with 
the managers, consulting them whenever exercise of powers or decisions to be taken will have 
an effect on the performance of their function.156 When it comes to performance monitoring 
and evaluation, these regulations employ a carrot-and-stick approach to ensuring satisfactory 
performance. In the case of outstanding performance, the officials concerned are rewarded with 
a performance bonus for a job well done.157 In the case of unacceptable performance, systemic 
remedial, developmental support or corrective steps are provided to assist such employees to 
improve their performance before the problem worsens.158 
Performance reviews are conducted quarterly in a financial year.159 The performance of the 
municipal manager is evaluated by a panel consisting of the executive mayor; the chairperson 
of the performance audit committee, or of the audit committee in the absence of the 
performance audit committee; a member of the mayoral committee or executive committee, or 
a member of council in the case of plenary type municipalities; a mayor and/or municipal 
manager from another municipality; and a member of a ward committee, as nominated by the 
executive mayor or mayor.160 When it comes to the evaluation of the performance of managers 
reporting directly to the municipal manager, the evaluation panel consists of the municipal 
manager; the chairperson of the performance audit committee or of the audit committee in the 
 
 
 
151 Regulations 14-16 Disciplinary Regulations. 
152 Section 67 Systems Act. 
153 Regulation 4 Performance Regulations. 
154 Regulation 27 Performance Regulations. 
155  Regulation 30(1) Performance Regulations. 
156 Regulation 31(1)(c) Performance Regulations. 
157 Regulation 32(2) Performance Regulations. 
158 Regulation 32(3)(a) Performance Regulations. 
159 Regulation 28(1) Performance Regulations. 
160 Regulation 27(4)(d) Performance Regulations. 
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absence of the performance audit committee; a member of the mayoral or executive committee 
or another member of council, in respect of plenary type municipalities; and a municipal 
manager from another municipality.161 
The MFMA further requires each municipality and each municipal entity to have an internal 
audit unit which will advise the accounting officer and report to the audit committee on the 
implementation of matters relating performance management, among others.162 Furthermore, 
the MFMA requires the establishment of an independent audit committee in each municipality 
and each municipal entity to advise the municipality on matters relating to performance 
management and performance evaluation, among others.163 
 
3.3 Practice 
Overall, the performance management system is aimed at linking the relationship between 
overall performance of the municipality and the performance of individual senior officials. At 
a micro-level, performance management is aimed at, first, achieving developmental local 
government, secondly, achieving realistic planning, thirdly, enhancing the accountability of 
senior managers, fourthly, structuring managerial autonomy, and lastly, ensuring efficiency, 
quality and value for money. 
Furthermore, the performance management systems as applied in South Africa focuses on more 
than outputs by looking at outcomes as well. The White Paper on Local Government states that 
a performance management system which only measures outputs and not the outcomes will 
give a misleading picture of the effectiveness of the municipality’s actions.164 To clarify this 
point, it differentiates between these two concepts by using an example of a programme of 
cutting grass verges with the aim to maintain an orderly appearance in the streets and to 
discourage dumping of rubbish. In the case of an output, if a municipality cuts the grass 
regularly but fails to collect it, with the result of it becoming unsightly and leading to dumping 
of garden refuse by residents, it will have achieved it outputs. Outputs in this sense relate to 
the frequency of cutting the grass. The outcomes, on the other hand, relate to the intended goal 
of cutting the grass. The goal is to maintain an orderly appearance, and as such leaving the 
 
 
 
 
161 Regulation 27(4)(e) Performance Regulations. 
162 Section 165(1) and (2) MFMA. 
163 Section 166(1) and (2) MFMA. 
164  White Paper 1998: 67 para. 3.2. 
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grass uncollected defeats this purpose.165 That is why the Systems Act states that the key 
performance indicators, as a yardstick for measuring performance, must go together with 
outcomes and impact.166 As such, the performance management system as applied in South 
Africa sets the bar high for municipalities. 
Given that the NPM tenet of performance management has taken a life of its own in South 
Africa, it will be difficult to assess its success solely on the basis of the NPM’s original intent 
or promise, namely the external goals. The internal goals specific to the country in question 
must also be taken into account. As such, the assessment of the efficacy of the performance 
management system will look at whether it was fully implemented and, if so, whether it is 
achieving its internal goals. The assessment of its implementation in South Africa will look at 
the signing of performance agreement; monitoring the agreement; and acting upon the 
outcomes of monitoring. 
 
3.3.1 Signing of performance agreements 
The National Treasury states that despite the sound legislative framework outlined above 
governing the management of performance of senior managers in South African municipalities, 
municipal performance in the majority of cases remains poor.167 In this regard, the Auditor- 
General states that the majority of municipalities do not strictly apply performance 
management policies and procedures to ensure that poor performance is adequately 
addressed.168 
An earlier study conducted by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs in 2009 came to a similar conclusion. The study revealed that the challenges relating to 
poor performance and systemic failures in local government are partly due to the fact that many 
municipalities do not conclude performance agreements with their municipal managers and 
managers directly accountable to municipal managers at all or do not do so within stipulated 
time-frames.169 It was found that ‘there were frequent cases of performance management 
systems not established or complied with, and many municipal managers with non-signed 
 
 
 
 
165  White Paper 1998: 67 para. 3.2. 
166 Section 41 Systems Act. 
167  National Treasury 2011: 120. 
168 Auditor-General South Africa Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of Local Government 
2011/12 (2013) 86 (hereafter Auditor-General South Africa 2013). 
169  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
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performance contracts.’170 This points to a failure of governance and the fact that municipal 
managers, in relation to section 56 managers, are failing in their duties as champions of 
performance management. 
The magnitude of this non-compliance is such that out of 250 municipal managers in the 
employ of municipalities,171 only 174 (72 per cent) had signed performance agreements as at 
June 2008. This means that there were about 76 municipal managers and many more section 
56 managers country-wide whose employment was not subject to the signing of performance 
agreements. The number rises to 103 municipalities if one takes into account unfilled municipal 
managers’ positions during the same period. There was a slight improvement in 2009, with 196 
(78 per cent) municipal managers having signed their performance agreements as at June 
2009.172 
Although 76 (or 54 as at 2009) might suggest a relatively small degree of non-compliance, in 
order to achieve the goals set out in the legislative framework for performance management 
and thus rectify the devastations of apartheid, all senior managers must sign their performance 
agreements so that their performance can be assessed, to identify whether they are meeting the 
performance expectations related to their jobs. Furthermore, the performance agreement, as the 
yardstick for measuring performance, is the only basis for any rewarding of outstanding 
performance, including paying bonuses and progression to the next, and higher, remuneration 
package.173 It is also the only basis for correcting unacceptable performance174 and providing 
systemic remedial, developmental support or corrective steps.175 Getting a fuller picture of 
performance or lack thereof in the country therefore requires that all municipal managers 
conclude their performance agreements within the stipulated time-frames. 
It would seem that the problem of failure to sign performance agreements persists. The 
consolidated general reports on the audit outcomes of local government for the years 2011/12 
to 2014/15 still paint a bleak picture. The reports highlight that 36 municipal managers did not 
have signed performance agreements in place for 2011/12, while 37 municipal managers’ 
performance agreements for the same period did not comply with the provisions of the Systems 
 
 
 
170  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
171 The vacancy rate was 33 municipal managers, given that there were 283 municipalities at the time. 
172  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
173 Regulation 32(1) Performance Regulations. 
174 Regulation 32(2) Performance Regulations. 
175 Regulation 32(3)(a) Performance Regulations. 
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Act.176 In the 2012/13 reporting cycle, 41 municipal managers did not have performance 
agreements in place.177 A total of 34 municipalities did not adopt a performance management 
system in 2013/2014, while the system adopted by 41 was not compliant with the Systems 
Act.178 The reports also revealed that section 56 managers did not have any performance 
agreements in place in 33 (10 per cent) municipalities for 2011/12,179 40 (12 per cent) for 
2012/13180  and 26 (10 per cent) for 2013/14.181 
All of this indicates that the culture of performance management is not yet entrenched in South 
African local government. The NPM tenet of performance management is not fully 
implemented. This is the case despite the fact that a failure to sign a performance agreement 
within the stipulated timeframe results in the lapsing of the contract of employment,182 
constitutes a breach of contract and can be used as a ground for termination of the employment 
contract.183 The Auditor-General has also expressed concerns regarding local government’s 
failure to embed the principles pertaining to the performance and productivity of employees.184 
The failure by senior managers to conclude their performance agreements has the potential to 
collapse the entire system of performance management. To add insult to injury, acting 
managers, of which there are many, do not have to sign performance agreements because, by 
law, they can only act for three months, renewable for a further three months.185 First, as 
champions of the performance management, they are not setting the right tone regarding the 
importance of concluding performance agreements for the entire administration. The role of 
leadership is the most important human factor in the performance management system in the 
sense of encouraging, guiding and supporting their subordinates.186 As such, if the leadership 
or senior management does not show full commitment to performance management, the system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 Auditor-General South Africa 2013. 
177 Auditor-General South Africa 2013: 60. 
178 Auditor-General South Africa Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of Local Government 
2012/13 (2014) 69 (hereafter Auditor-General South Africa 2014) 
179 Auditor-General South Africa 2013: 105. 
180 Auditor-General South Africa 2014: 60. 
181 Auditor-General South Africa Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of Local Government 
2013/14 (2015) 81 (hereafter Auditor-General South Africa 2015). 
182 Section 57(2)(a)(i) System Act. 
183  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 31. 
184 Auditor-General South Africa 2013: 60. 
185 Section 56(1)(c) Systems Act. 
186 Salem H Organizational Performance Management and Measurement: The Lebanese Experience (2003) 8. 
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is bound to crumble.187 Secondly, as mentioned in Chapter Five188 in relation to SMS members 
at national and provincial level, it creates a culture of impunity in that senior managers cannot 
be held accountable for non-performance if there is no agreement in place that outlines key 
priorities for implementation during the financial year. 
Thirdly, the failure by municipal managers to sign performance agreements compromises the 
entire value chain of the performance management system as organisational performance has 
to be cascaded from the accounting officer to the entire staff to ensure the link between overall 
organisational performance and individual performance. How then can municipal managers 
enter into performance agreements with section 56 managers if they have not concluded theirs 
with the municipality as duly represented by the mayor or the executive mayor? They cannot 
effectively enter into performance agreements with subordinates when their performance 
agreements have not been concluded. Otherwise, that would mean there is no link between 
individual performance objectives and targets and the overall organisational objectives and 
targets. As such, a failure to sign a performance agreement by a municipal manager holds 
severe repercussions for the entire performance management system in a given municipality. 
Accordingly, even though the legislative framework governing performance management 
seeks to do more than is envisaged by the NPM, South African municipalities are failing to 
even meet the bare minimum set by the NPM, namely accountability and structuring autonomy. 
Without a performance agreement in place, municipalities may find it difficult to monitor 
whether employees are meeting the performance expectations related to their jobs and the goals 
and strategies set out in its IDP. 
This leads us to the question of whether or not municipalities and other relevant stakeholders 
are exercising their monitoring and evaluation role over the performance management system 
as demanded by the legislative framework highlighted above. 
 
3.3.2 Monitoring the agreement 
As highlighted in the legislative framework discussed above, there are three levels of 
monitoring performance agreements. The first two levels are done within the municipality 
through the internal performance audit and oversight committees and the quarterly performance 
 
 
 
 
187 Gaffoor S & Cloete F ‘Knowledge management in local government: The case of Stellenbosch municipality’ 
(2010) 12(1) SA Journal of Information Management 428. 
188  At section 2.3.1. 
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evaluation conducted by the municipality. The third level of monitoring is done by the upper 
spheres of government. In this regard, the Performance Regulations require municipalities, 
first, to submit copies of signed performance agreements to the MECs responsible for local 
government in the relevant province as well as the national minister responsible for local 
government within 14 days after their conclusion.189 This allows the MECs and the Minister to 
check whether all municipalities have concluded performance agreements with their senior 
managers and whether such agreements comply with the provisions of the Systems Act. 
Furthermore, the performance assessment results of the municipal manager must be submitted 
to the MEC for local government as well as the national minister responsible for local 
government within 14 days after the conclusion of the assessment.190 
Given this elaborate monitoring framework, the problems of failure to sign performance 
agreements should not be happening. Furthermore, the poor levels of performance by 
municipalities should be a thing of the past because senior managers are incentivised to perform 
better through rewarding of outstanding performance (performance bonuses) and correction of 
unacceptable performance, including the procedure for dealing with sub-standard performance 
contained in the Disciplinary Regulations.191 
However, the State of Local Government report indicates that in most municipalities 
performance management systems were either not developed or complied with.192 The report 
further highlights that many municipalities were not submitting copies of signed performance 
agreements to the MECs responsible for local government in the relevant province and the 
national minister as is required by law.193 The report concludes by stating that this is mainly 
because of the poor monitoring and oversight capability of provincial government.194 It is 
suggested that the national government is also failing in its responsibility to monitor local 
government. The foregoing indicates that it is not only municipal failures to monitor the 
performance management system that derail the culture of performance and good governance: 
other spheres charged with monitoring and supporting municipalities are also failing in this 
role. 
 
 
 
 
189 Regulation 4(5) Performance Regulations. 
190 Regulation 34(3) Performance Regulations. 
191 Regulation 16 Disciplinary Regulations. 
192  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
193  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
194  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
256 
Chapter Six 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the National Treasury states that given the fact that the performance management 
system is intended to create a nexus between the overall performance of the municipality and 
that of individuals employed in the municipality, it is puzzling that some senior managers are 
receiving performance bonuses when municipalities are clearly not performing.195 In this 
regard, it was reported in 2011 that of the 283 municipalities in the country then, 147 of them 
received adverse audit outcomes for poor financial management. Of concern is that 56 of those 
municipalities paid performance bonuses, despite the reported poor performance.196 
To make matters worse, performance bonuses are paid despite failures to sign performance 
agreements.197 In these circumstances, the National Treasury proposes that the ‘no performance 
contract, no bonus’ principle should apply.198 Sheoraj further reports that the performance 
management system is so weak that ‘managers are allowed to revise or change their 
performance targets late in the year to ensure that they receive their bonuses, [while] these 
changes do not align with organisational performance’.199 It was further revealed that ‘the 
largest non-compliance finding was that accounting officers did not take reasonable steps to 
prevent unauthorised, irregular and/or fruitless and wasteful expenditure in 253 
municipalities’.200 This puts the municipal manager, as the accounting officer, head of 
administration and the champion of the performance management system in a difficult position. 
Furthermore, the most common finding in the 2013/14 audit cycle was that municipalities did 
not maintain an effective, efficient and transparent system of internal control regarding 
performance management.201 This was the case in 59 municipalities. A further 44 
municipalities did not have mechanisms to monitor and review their performance management 
system.202 
This state of affair indicates that municipal councils, performance audit committees, oversight 
committees, provincial MECs, and national government are failing, first, to monitor whether 
senior managers have concluded their performance agreements and whether those agreements 
comply with the law. Secondly, they are failing to assess the performance of senior managers 
 
 
 
195 National Treasury Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review: 2003/04 - 2009/10 (2011) 120 
(hereafter National Treasury 2011). 
196 Child K ‘State to cap municipal manager salaries’ Mail & Guardian 20 September 2011 (hereafter Child 2011). 
197  Child 2011. 
198  National Treasury 2011: 121. 
199 Sheoraj R Overview of South Africa's Public Services: A Dialogue on Capacity Building Skills Readiness and 
Service Delivery (unpublished Doctoral thesis, University of Pretoria, 2015) 301. 
200  Auditor-General South Africa 2013: 12. See also Twenty Year Review 2014. 
201 Auditor-General South Africa 2014: 69. 
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in relation to the key performance indicators and targets contained in the performance 
agreements. That is why managers are awarded bonuses without having signed their 
performance agreements, which are the basis for any rewarding of outstanding performance or 
correcting of unacceptable performance. This collapses the performance management system. 
It also deprives the system of local government of an opportunity to review its performance 
more regularly, such that interventions in operational matters where poor performance or the 
risks occur can be made promptly. 
A good performance management system enables municipalities to appreciate the state of 
performance of its senior managers, and is used as an early-warning indicator which allows for 
appropriate intervention for correction or rewards.203 Quarterly reporting is supposed to be used 
to track the performance of senior managers and intervene where appropriate. The reward 
system should be used to motivate senior managers to maintain a culture of good performance. 
Failure to reward good performance, or rewarding of poorly performing managers, is 
demotivating and does not engender such a culture. Furthermore, poor monitoring results in 
poorly performing managers not getting the necessary developmental support they need. 
Accurate and truthful performance assessments are fundamental in reaching the necessary 
performance efficiency. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the NPM tenet of performance management which was 
codified into South African law is not being fully implemented. In this regard, Pulakos and 
O’Leary state that if performance management is not adequately implemented, it could damage 
senior manager’s confidence and harm their relationship with the municipality.204 Furthermore, 
Makwethu suggests that there is a correlation between poor audit results and weaknesses in 
performance management.205 CoGTA proposes to institutionalise a performance management 
system to effect the changes that are required in the system.206 In this regard, CoGTA proposes 
to develop Local Government Back to Basics Strategy indicators which will measure whether 
municipalities are performing in terms of the basics, these being: 
 
 
 
 
 
203 Sehoa MF Implementation of Performance Management System on the Performance of Municipal Section 57 
Managers in the Capricorn District Municipality, Limpopo Province (unpublished Doctoral thesis, University of 
Limpopo, 2015) 102 (hereafter Sehoa 2015). 
204 Pulakos ED & O’Leary RS ‘Why is performance management broken?’ (2011) 4(2) Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology 151. 
205 Auditor-General South Africa Media Release (2016) 8. 
206 Back to Basics (2014) 8. 
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 putting people first; 
 
 delivering basic services; 
 
 good governance; 
 
 sound financial management; and 
 
 building capacity.207 
 
However, the problem is not the lack of policies and a regulatory regime. The problem lies in 
the implementation of the extant framework. Until such time as that legislative framework is 
implemented and fully given effect to, these commitments ring hollow. They only add another 
layer of compliance to the existing unimplemented framework. 
 
3.3.3 Acting upon the outcomes of monitoring 
A study conducted by CoGTA in 2014 highlights that ‘the primary problem we face in the local 
government system is that we don’t recognise and reward good performance adequately, nor 
are there sufficient consequences for under-performance’.208 This means, as discussed in the 
preceding section, performance monitoring and evaluation is hardly done, and where it is done, 
the outcomes of such monitoring are either not taken seriously or are not acted upon. In some 
cases, this has resulted in non-payment of performance bonuses to well-performing employees. 
This general lack of consequences was also highlighted by the Auditor-General’s report, which 
stated that at least 73 per cent of municipalities 
showed signs of a general lack of consequences for poor performance. This is 
evidenced by the fact that modified audit opinions remained the norm. When 
officials and political leaders are not held accountable for their actions, the 
perception could be created that such behaviour and its results are acceptable 
and tolerated.209 
The Auditor-General further stated that more than half of the municipalities blame their mayors 
and councillors, for being unresponsive to the issues identified by the audits and for not taking 
 
 
 
207 Back to Basics (2014) 9. 
208  Back to Basics (2014) 8. 
209 Ministry for Performance Monitoring and Evaluations Twenty Year Review South Africa 1994 – 2014 available 
http://www.dpme.gov.za/publications/20%20Years%20Review/20%20Year%20Review%20Documents/20 
YR%20Local%20Government.pdf (accessed 15 January 2017) (hereafter Twenty Year Review). See also Auditor- 
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recommendations seriously, for their poor audit outcomes.210 The findings are that mayors and 
councillors are slow in taking up their responsibilities and do not take ownership of their role 
in implementing key controls. The report concluded by warning that if these widespread root 
causes are not addressed, they will continue to weaken the pillars of governance.211 
According to Nengwekhulu, the lack of accountability and the absence of an effective 
disciplinary system within local government are two major factors contributing to its failure to 
perform.212 Deloitte adds the absence of consequences for failure to perform or achieve 
objectives to the list.213 A study conducted by Afesis Corplan in partnership with the Eastern 
Cape’s Department of Traditional and Local Government highlights the absence of 
consequences for unethical behaviour and poor performance as contributing to senior 
managers’ lack of commitment to improve compliance and performance.214 There is lack of 
consequences for poor performance and transgressions despite the fact that the legislative 
regime is clear on the consequences of non-compliance with legislation and the steps to be 
taken to deal with such transgressions.215 In the 2014/15 audit report, the Auditor-General again 
decried the lack of consequences in local government for poor performance and transgressions 
as having contributed to slow response to the high levels of non-compliance, poor audit 
outcomes, supply chain management transgressions, and unauthorised, irregular as well as 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure.216 
 
3.4 Assessment 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the legislative framework gave full effect to the NPM 
tenet of performance management in a manner that facilitated its implementation. However, 
the proof of the pudding is in the eating. In this regard, the fact that there are numerous failures 
to establish a performance management system in some municipalities, or to conclude the 
performance agreement at all, or within the specified periods, without consequences such   as 
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Journal of Public Administration 356. 
213 Deloitte ‘Municipal Clean Audit Efficiency Series – Leadership Ownership’ available at 
http://deloitteblog.co.za.www102.cpt1.host-h.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Municipal-Clean-Audit- 
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the lapsing of the appointment, is telling. This failure indicates that the performance 
management system is not being fully implemented. There are many reasons for this non- 
compliance. One of them relates to the fact that the MFMA charges the mayors with the 
responsibility to take all reasonable steps to ensure the performance agreement of municipal 
managers and section 56 managers are concluded. Mayors also have to ensure that said 
agreements comply with the provisions of the Systems Act. In this regard, the majority of 
mayors lack the necessary capacity to draft performance agreements that comply with the 
relevant laws, to monitor adherence to them, and to enforce them. That is why there are reported 
cases of municipalities without a proper performance management system or senior managers 
without performance agreements. 
The other reason relates to the cosiness between senior managers and politicians who are 
charged with monitoring and enforcing the performance management system. This intimate 
relationship results in managers receiving performance bonuses even if they do not have 
performance agreements or have them but have not performed according to the employers’ 
expectations. Accordingly, although the performance management system is designed to help 
the municipality review the performance of senior managers on a regular basis and, in so doing, 
hold them accountable for their autonomy, this cosiness works against this principle. While the 
Systems Act requires the performance agreement to include consequences for sub-standard 
performance, mayors and councillors are tolerant. This fuels the culture of impunity and 
entitlement discussed above. A principle of ‘negative audit outcome, no performance bonus’ 
would stem this problem. It would also ensure that senior managers do not operate in silos, 
focusing on individual performance rather than organisational goals. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the sound legislative framework for performance 
management in South Africa is not matched by a performance culture at municipal level. This 
indicates that this NPM tenet is not fully implemented to infuse the culture of performance and 
accountability and thus enhance organisational efficiency and effectiveness. As a result, the 
culture of impunity that existed under apartheid still persists. These negative consequences do 
not flow directly from the NPM tenet of performance management because it has not been fully 
implemented. They flow from its half-hearted implementation due to lack of skills and political 
will. 
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4 Fixed-term contract 
4.1 NPM principles 
It was seen in Chapter Two217 that the NPM pushes for a move away from a military-style 
public service of being employed for life to contingent forms of employment, such as greater 
flexibility in hiring and rewards and the concomitant weakening of job security or pension 
entitlements. In this regard, managers are hired on a fixed-term contract, rewarded according 
to their performance, and can theoretically be sacked if their work does not measure up. 
Through contracts, political leaders are supposed to specify targets and objectives more clearly, 
and performance should be controlled by use of quantitative indicators for monitoring results 
and for measuring efficiency. This removes the assured existence enjoyed by bureaucrats in 
the Weberian bureaucracy and creates incentives for mediocre time-servers to become 
innovative and work efficiently. 
Like the performance management system, the fixed-term contract system or contractualism 
seeks to enhance accountability for performance and resource use and to structure the 
autonomy enjoyed by managers. In what follows, I look at whether this NPM principle is fully 
operationalised in South Africa and, if so, whether it is living up to its promise. 
 
4.2 Legislative framework 
The NPM tenet of contractualism or performance-based contract systems for senior 
management at local government level was also introduced by the White Paper.218 As seen in 
the preceding section and in Chapter Two, it entails giving senior management short-term 
contracts, with the employer (municipalities) reserving the right and the ability to let them go 
more easily and regularly if their performance is unsatisfactory. This tenet, therefore, also 
serves to structure managerial independence. Furthermore, in exchange for letting managers 
manage, municipalities, over and above the performance management system, use this device 
to hold senior management accountable for their own actions. The White Paper states: 
Performance based contracts can improve accountability and induce a focus 
on outputs. Municipalities should consider the introduction of performance- 
based contracts for the first two or three reporting levels of senior officials. 
 
 
 
217  At section 6.4.3. 
218  White Paper 1998: 160 para. 2.2.1. 
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These posts would remain professional appointments, but employment 
contracts would specify job outputs (results to be achieved) and performance 
standards. Contracts would be renewable based on an assessment of 
performance against specified targets.219 
The White Paper further states that management reform should involve building a culture of 
commitment to results and value for money and should include the introduction of 
performance-based contracts for senior staff.220 It is thought that performance-based contracts 
can improve accountability and induce a focus on outputs.221 This signals a shift from 
management that remains predominantly white and historically schooled in rigid, authoritarian 
and outdated management practices.222 Employment contracts would only be renewed based 
on an assessment of performance against specified targets.223 Therefore, contractualism, same 
as performance management, enables local government to adopt a zero-tolerance stance 
towards inefficiencies and lack of productivity and thus creates a municipality better equipped 
to deliver efficiently, economically and effectively on its promises to the people.224 
The Systems Act and the MFMA codify this tenet into law. Section 57(6) of the Systems Act 
prescribes only fixed-term employment as an essential term of the employment contract of the 
municipal manager, and this section also determines this fixed term.225 This employment 
contract is for a fixed term of five years.226 If the contract is concluded during the term of a 
council, it may not exceed one year after the election of the next council.227 In the case of 
section 56 managers, the Act leaves the employment terms to the parties to decide, but holds 
the door open for council to elect to also apply section 57(6) to a section 56 manager, in which 
case this fact must be recorded in the employment contract itself. 228 
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225  Uthukela District Municipality vs Khoza and Others (D 735/2013) [2015] ZALCD 19 (hereafter Uthukela 
case) at para. 48. 
226 Section 57(6) read with the repealed section 57(7) Systems Act. Given that this discussion is for the period 
2000-2006, the repealed section 57(7), which sought to extend the application of fixed-term contracts to section 
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227 Section 57(5)(a) Systems Act. 
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There should be no expectation that the contract will be renewed or extended beyond the expiry 
date;229 instead, the contract must provide for the cancellation thereof in the case of non- 
compliance with the employment contract or performance agreement or as a result of medical 
incapacity.230 Renewal or otherwise for a fixed period depends on the prior satisfactory 
attainment of identified performance objectives and targets.231 However, terms of renewal 
could be included, by agreement between the contracting parties, in the contract.232 This was 
the case in Maphumulo Local Municipality v Mhlongo and Others.233 In this case, the 
employment contract contained a term of renewal to the effect that ‘absent poor performance 
or incompatibility as determined by the Mayor, a municipal manager at the Maphumulo 
Municipality could expect a renewal of his fixed term contract’.234 The court, agreeing with the 
arbitration award of the CCMA, held that this clause created a reasonable expectation for 
renewal.235 
The appointment contract of a municipal manager and managers directly accountable to him 
or her is subject to the terms and conditions of the Systems Act, MFMA and any other 
legislation imposing obligations on these functionaries.236 The employment contract must 
include details of duties, remuneration, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment 
as agreed to by the parties, provided that such agreement is consistent with the Systems Act, 
and any regulation issued pursuant thereto applicable to municipal managers and section 56 
managers.237 The Systems Act further states that any regulations that relate to duties, 
remuneration, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment of municipal managers 
 
 
 
 
229 Regulation 4(3) Performance Regulations. 
230 Section 57(6)(b) Systems Act read with regulation 2(3)(b) Performance Regulations. 
231 Tshongweni v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (2012) 33 ILJ 2847 (LAC) at para. 33. 
232 Section 57(6)(b) Systems Act. 
233 (D1198/13) [2016] ZALCD 2 (hereafter Maphumulo case). 
234 Maphumulo para. 41. In terms of clause 3.3, the municipal manager 
shall have to prove that he has performed his duties under this agreement to the satisfaction of the 
Mayor, and the Mayor will have to be satisfied of the Municipal Manager’s work performance. In 
determining such work performance, the Mayor must be guided by the Municipal Manager’s 
performance in terms of the Performance Management System, as well as his compatibility with the 
Mayor and the Executive Authority, and provided that: 
3.3.1 All performance agreements concluded and required to be concluded between the Mayor 
and the municipal manager have been fulfilled, 
3.3.2 Any other terms must be a basis for renewal (e.g. same remuneration), 
3.3.3 the failure to renew or extend the period referred to in 3.2, which renewal or extension 
shall not be unreasonably withheld, could be a matter for arbitration. 
235  Maphumulo case at paras. 42 and 43. 
236 Regulation 4(1) Performance Regulations. 
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or section 56 managers must be regarded as forming part of the contract.238 Steytler and De 
Visser state that the contract must, in general, reflect the values and principles referred to in 
section 50 and 51 of the Systems Act.239 Furthermore, the Systems Act provides that it must 
reflect the values and principles embodied in the Code of Conduct for staff members.240 Finally, 
the municipality’s staff systems and procedures also apply to a municipal manager or a section 
56 manager.241 
The all-informing idea behind the introduction of the fixed-term contract system, according to 
the White Paper, was to ‘improve accountability and induce a focus on outputs’.242 The White 
Paper proposes that employment contracts be used to induce performance in that they would 
only ‘be renewable based on an assessment of performance against specified targets’.243 This 
is what the national government sought to achieve by the introduction of the fixed-term contract 
system, and it is in line with the rationale behind this NPM tenet of hiring on a fixed-term 
contract, rewarding according to performance, and sacking if work does not measure up.244 In 
this way, time-servers are jolted out of the system and replaced by people who are innovative 
and work efficiently, thus ensuring efficiency, cost-effectiveness and value for money. The 
fixed-term contract system also serves to structure managerial autonomy. 
At first blush, the foregoing discussion suggests that there is coherence between the classical 
NPM principle and its operationalisation in South Africa. However, a closer look reveals that 
section 57(6), which provides for a five-years’ fixed-term appointments for municipal 
managers, and section 57(7), which seeks to extend the application of section 57(6) to section 
56 managers, make a distinction between the municipal manager and the section 56 manager. 
This distinction relates to the fact that section 57(6) determines what the fixed-term is for 
municipal managers only. In the case of section 56 managers, any terms and conditions relating 
to their appointment would have to be determined by the council at its discretion, and this 
would include any fixed term of employment.245  The council therefore does not have a choice 
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when it comes to the municipal manager. In regard to section 56 managers, the council has a 
choice between a fixed-term appointment of five years, i.e. the extension of section 57(6) to 
section 56 managers, and any term of employment determined by agreement.246 It essentially 
leaves it to the council to decide whether to restrict the contract to the fixed term of five years 
in terms of section 57(7) or fixed term of any number of years determined by agreement or a 
permanent contract of employment. This means that not all senior managers are strictly on 
short-term contract. 
In practice, municipalities have been choosing all the three options, namely permanent 
appointment; a five-year fixed-term contract in terms of section 57(7); and any fixed term of 
employment. This means, therefore, that senior managers are subject to different employment 
regimes. Not all of senior managers are subjected to the system that induces a focus on outputs. 
This indicates that this NPM tenet is not fully implemented. Any assessment of the success or 
otherwise of the contract employment system in South Africa is, therefore, constrained by this 
reality. The original intent of the NPM tenet of short-term appointments was to weed the system 
of time-servers or turn them into innovators and thus improve accountability and induce a focus 
on outcomes. How can we weed out time-servers in the system in South Africa if a significant 
segment of senior managers is appointed on a permanent basis or on long-term contracts? 
 
4.3 Practice 
4.3.1 Insecurity of tenure 
As highlighted in the preceding chapter, instead of weeding out time-servers, the short-term 
employment system has had adverse effects on the commitment of senior management to 
organisational goals. Short-term contracts work against ‘long-term leadership and mission 
stability’ and invite interference by politicians in the appointment and operations of senior 
managers, ultimately leading to the rapid turnover of top-level managers seen in many 
municipalities.247 
The Maphumulo case neatly illustrates this point. In this case, despite there being a renewal 
clause and after Mr Mhlongo had made out a case for further renewal of his contract, the Mayor 
 
 
 
 
246 Uthukela case at paras. 48 and 49. 
247 Zulu Z Selecting an Appropriate Organisational Performance Management System for South African 
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sought to rely on the instructions of the Regional Working Committee (RWC) of the ANC for 
a final decision.248  At the CCMA, the arbitrator found that 
the probable cause of the non-renewal of Mhlongo’s fixed term contract was 
the decision of the ANC’s RWC. However, this body’s attitude towards 
Mhlongo had no statutory or contractual standing. It was the terms of 
Mhlongo’s contract, paired with the absence of any criticism from the Mayor 
that properly and reasonably conditioned his expectation of a renewal.249 
The Labour Court agreed with this finding and stated: 
 
Indeed, the arbitrator specifically found that the absence of a performance 
agreement was not the true cause for the non-renewal of Mhlongo’s contract. 
The true cause instead appeared to be the decision of a non-statutory body, the 
RWC of the ANC, to replace him. This was not a proper legal basis for a non- 
renewal, especially in light of the terms of the contract the municipality had 
signed with him.250 
This case shows that, in some instances, the renewal or not of municipal managers’ fixed-term 
contracts is susceptible to political influence. This makes the position of senior managers 
tenuous and reliant on patronage from or sucking-up to politicians. It would seem that the basis 
for renewal is not whether one is meeting the performance expectations of his contract and 
performance agreement, as envisaged by the NPM, but whether politicians find you useful or 
not. In this regard, when managers realise that their performance and efforts have no bearing 
on their rewards, their enthusiasm to do more is curtailed.251 Their best option is to endear 
themselves to politicians and compromise their independence in the process. 
The Municipal Demarcation Board, in its capacity assessment report of 2012, agrees that 
municipalities are ‘highly volatile organisations’ owing to insecurity of tenure.252 It is argued 
that the short-term contracts have resulted in less than 50 per cent of municipal managers’ 
contracts  being  renewed  after  five  years  in  office.253   Given  this  trend,  some  municipal 
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managers jump ship even before the end of their term. Furthermore, it was reported in 2012 
that one out of six section 57 managers exited their municipality in the course of the year.254 
As a consequence, the average number of years that municipal managers have been in their 
position as municipal managers is three years and three months.255 In the metros and secondary 
cities, the Municipal Demarcation Board reports that this figure is even lower.256 That is surely 
not conducive to improved accountability and focus on outputs, as envisaged by the contract 
management system. Rapid turnover rates at senior management level are costly, contribute to 
low staff morale, and affect organisational performance.257 
The anxieties about future job prospects which the short-term contracts raise mean that senior 
managers cannot have a single-minded commitment to their jobs of ensuring efficient and 
effective delivery of services and economic use of resources.258 Short-term contracts lead to 
senior management turnover, with the concomitant loss of skilled employees, reduction in 
knowledge, increased workloads and decreased staff morale.259 Replacing the lost capacity and 
rebuilding staff morale in order to improve service delivery is not an overnight enterprise. 
It can also be argued that the short-term employment system undermines the idea of managerial 
autonomy, as introduced in South Africa. The idea was that there would be a distinctive and 
experienced cadre of senior managers transferable within the public service, in this context 
within local government. Short-term contracts are forcing these managers out of the system to 
the private sector and other spheres of government. That is why, 18 years after the introduction 
of managerialism, we still sit with municipal managers having served, on average, only three 
years as municipal managers. Their overall experience at local government is 10.3 years.260 It 
stands to reason therefore that, on average, they have been in the system of local government 
for only two terms. This is despite the fact that we are in the fourth term of local government 
and 18 years since the introduction of managerialism in South African municipalities. If this 
trend continues, there is a likelihood that the current corps will leave the system, taking with it 
skills and institutional memory. 
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This picture is the same with respect to the length of relevant work experience of other senior 
managers. The Municipal Demarcation Board reports that chief financial officers generally 
have more experience as financials officials, at 11.24 years, but have been in their current 
position, that is as, as chief financial officers, for only four years on average.261 This means 
that senior manager are relatively new in their positions as senior managers, even though their 
experience of local government is just over two terms. The likelihood of their staying longer 
and establishing their own systems and carrying them through is slim because of fixed-term 
contracts and the political machinations associated with these. They are either removed or leave 
before establishing their ways of doing things, and this causes instability. 
As a result, for many municipalities the contract employment system is an impediment to skills 
retention. Some contracts are not renewed, while other managers exit the system prematurely 
to find alternative employment out of fear that their contracts will not be renewed. The absence 
of continuity at top management level and limited commitment to organisational goals 
therefore lead to poor performance. 
 
4.3.2 The revolving-door phenomenon 
Experience has shown that immediately after elections municipalities often dismiss, or enter 
into settlement agreements or so-called ‘golden handshakes’ with, senior managers for reasons 
that are normally not based on any legal basis.262 This practice happens mostly to managers on 
fixed-term contracts as they do not require a protracted disciplinary process before being fired. 
The contract of a manager on a fixed-term contract can be terminated on the agreement of a 
golden handshake. This practice usually takes place under the guise of cadre deployment and 
by replacing senior managers with senior managers that can be trusted – who will give effect 
to election promises. However, this practice also happens between factions of the same political 
party where there are no major ideological differences between the previous administration and 
the current one. It is a perversion of cadre deployment that borders on cronyism or a spoils 
system. 
The case of Abdullah vs Kouga Municipality and Another263 lays this practice bare. In casu, 
after the May 2011 election, the Kouga Municipality suspended Mr Abdullah, the Chief 
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Financial Officer of the municipality, for a period of 10 months for misconduct and 
incompetence. Mr Abdullah took the matter to the Labour Court for an order setting aside his 
suspension. An interim order was granted in his favour and was to be made final on 2 February 
2012. In a way that shows that the municipality simply wanted to get rid of him, they terminated 
his fixed-term contract two days after the interim order was granted on grounds of loss of trust 
and offered to pay the remainder of the contract, together with all leave due to him. The 
municipality also invited him to bring to the municipality’s attention any other monies due to 
him. The municipality sought, too, to withdraw all allegations of misconduct and poor work 
performance or incapacity.264 
Mr Abdullah argued that withdrawing all allegations of misconduct and poor work 
performance and seeking to expunge all reference in the council records to same was an implicit 
acknowledgement that there was no lawful basis for the termination of his contract. Mr 
Abdullah also argued that the failure to follow proper procedures for misconduct and poor 
performance in terms of the Disciplinary Regulations before terminating his services also 
constituted a breach of contract. 265 The court highlighted that the municipality is entitled to 
suspending a senior manager on pay if it does not want to make use of the senior manager’s 
services. However, it concluded that the summary termination of Mr Abdullah’s services was 
unlawful. The court refused to reinstate him, saying it would not be appropriate given the 
breakdown of trust alleged by the municipality.266 In the end, the municipality achieved what 
it sought to do, namely to rid itself of the chief financial officer for reasons that have no basis 
in law. 
Before the 3 August 2016 local elections, the Minister of Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs, Des van Rooyen, issued a stern warning to all municipalities against 
arbitrary dismissal of senior managers and giving them golden handshakes, saying that this is 
draining millions away from service delivery and compromising municipal budgets.267 Despite 
this warning, a number of municipalities that had a change of political administration have been 
involved in a witch-hunt to purge officials appointed by the previous administration. The 
Democratic Alliance (DA) has been conducting forensic audits in the number of municipalities 
is has won. The stated aim is to uncover wrongdoing which will give it the reason to   dismiss 
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the senior managers concerned. The first instance of purging following the said forensic audit 
took place in the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. Mayor Herman Mashaba is 
reported to have asked the City’s group audit and assurance services head, Ms Sinaye Nxumalo, 
to leave her post with immediate effect for failing to attend to cases of alleged corruption and 
for failing to hand over forensic reports of the alleged corruption to the Auditor-General.268 
The jury is still out in other DA-run municipalities who have conducted similar investigations. 
It is suggested that their ultimate objective is to dismiss and they are now looking for pretexts 
to achieve that purpose. 
 
4.3.3 Assessment 
It appears from the foregoing that some aspects of the fixed-term system of appointment were 
given full effect to in a manner that facilitates implementation, and others not. First, while some 
senior managers are employed strictly on fixed-term contracts, others are employed through a 
variety of differing employment regimes. These include contracts of five-year terms, contracts 
of any number of years and permanent appointments. Save for the fixed term of five years, 
other regimes do not improve accountability and induce a focus on outputs. Furthermore, they 
do not subject senior managers to accountability for their own actions and performance and, 
by so doing, weed time-servers out of the system. They actually do the opposite, by letting 
time-servers be. 
Secondly, even when the fixed-term employment system is consistent with the classical NPM 
tenet, as is the case with the employment regime for municipal managers, its implementation 
is frustrated by political realities on the ground. Given our past of racial domination, there is a 
level of distrust between those political parties who were part of the racist regime and those 
who were fighting against it. Accordingly, when there is shift in the balance of political forces 
in council, senior managers appointed by the previous administration become casualties. The 
rationale is that they cannot be entrusted with the mandate of carrying out their manifesto for 
fear of sabotage. However, this practice also happens between factions within a political party. 
Usually this is about jostling for resources and putting cronies or patronage networks into 
positions of responsibility with the aim to dispense patronage. In the end, the renewal of the 
contracts of senior managers is not dependent on their meeting their contractual obligation but 
rather on their endearing themselves to politicians. If they were appointed by the previous 
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administration or faction, they will have to endear themselves to councillors for survival, 
compromising themselves in the process. In the end, this NPM tenet is not being fully 
implemented in South Africa. 
It is further suggested that the NPM tenet of short-term contracts is tailored for a different set 
of circumstances where there is no shortage of skilled administrators. In those circumstances, 
the failure to renew a contract, and the attendant anxieties that lead to senior managers exiting 
the system prematurely, would not cause any headaches if there were a pool of equally skilled 
and competent people out there ready to take over. In the South African context, we do not 
have the luxury of a pool of skilled personnel waiting on the side-lines to be deployed to 
municipalities. The loss of skilled senior managers through short-term contracts leaves a void 
that is hard to fill and results failures to deliver services to communities. 
 
5 Conclusion 
It becomes apparent in the foregoing that the NPM tenets of managerial autonomy, 
performance management and fixed-term employment system are not yielding the desired 
outcomes. Two reasons for this emerge from the discussion above. 
First, some the NPM tenets, namely wide discretion and fixed-term contracts, were not 
expressed in a manner that facilitates their full implementation. In the case of wide discretion, 
senior managers are, first, not given the full spectrum of discretionary powers. While they are 
insulated in some instances, i.e. in procurement decisions, they are made vulnerable to constant 
political interference in others, namely in appointment decisions. The fact that the appointment 
of section 56 managers is, by law, the sole preserve of council invites political meddling in the 
exercise of section 55 managerial powers. A municipal manager, as the head of the 
administration and the accounting officer of a municipality, is not able to constitute, and by 
implication discipline and dismiss, his own team of executives. This is an affront to managerial 
independence as it weakens the position of the municipal manager. In the majority of cases the 
municipal manager has difficulty in disciplining his own team because they are beholden to 
politicians and owe him or her no allegiance. Senior managers appointed on the party-political 
ticket might feel they need to take instructions from those parties. 
In this sense, senior managers (both municipal manager and section 56 managers) have not 
been fully empowered to manage the municipal administration. They are vulnerable to the tug 
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and pull of political, if not factional, interests. This is a design flaw in the legislative framework 
for managerialism, one which was termed fudged managerialism. 
Secondly, there is a panoply of laws emanating from other spheres of government, mostly 
national government, that seek to direct how municipalities must go about doing certain things 
and even prescribing certain outcomes. These laws are compromising managerial discretion in 
that senior managers are reduced to ticking boxes in an attempt to comply with those laws 
instead of exercising their managerial independence in devising innovative solutions to the 
problems confronting local government and expending their energies implementing those 
strategies. Even though they are conferred managerial discretion and autonomy, they are 
relegated to being the implementing agents of other spheres. 
When it comes to the fixed-term system of appointments, there are varying contractual regimes 
for senior managers. While some senior managers are employed strictly on fixed-term contracts 
in line with the NPM ethos, others are employed through a variety of employment regimes, 
ranging from contracts of five-year terms and contracts of any number of years, to permanent 
appointments. These employment regimes do not cohere with the NPM ethos of 
contractualism. They do not improve efficiency and accountability by inducing a focus on 
outputs and subjecting senior managers to accountability for their own actions and performance 
and by so doing weeding time-servers out of the system. 
The second reason for the failure of these NPM tenets to yield the desired outcomes is that 
while some the NPM elements were expressed in law in a manner that facilitates their 
implementation, their implementation often produces adverse outcomes. In the first place, even 
though the fixed-term employment system for municipal managers was given full effect in a 
manner that facilitates implementation, its implementation encounters a different reality on the 
ground. First, it encounters a South African specific political reality. A shift in the balance of 
political forces in council results in senior managers appointed by the previous administration 
becoming casualties. This makes the renewal of the contracts of senior managers dependent on 
the relationship with politicians instead of the meeting of contractual obligation. 
Secondly, it meets the reality of an absence of skills base. In this regard, it is suggested that the 
NPM tenet of short-term contracts is tailored for a different set of circumstances where there 
is no shortage of skilled administrators. In those circumstances, there is a pool of skilled and 
competent administrators waiting to be deployed. A loss of a senior manager through short 
term contracts does not spell disaster for service delivery.  In South Africa, it takes months to 
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years to fill vacant posts because of shortage of skilled senior managers. The loss of skilled 
senior managers through short-term contracts leaves a void that is hard to fill and results in 
failures to deliver services to communities. 
In the second place, the performance management system has similarly encountered the reality 
of a shortage of skills and lack of political will. As a result, there are numerous failures to 
establish a performance management system in some municipalities, or to conclude the 
performance agreement at all, or within the specified periods. What is worrying is that this does 
not attract any consequences despite the law stating that in such case there should be severe 
consequences, including the lapsing of the appointment. To make matters worse, performance 
bonuses are paid in instances where there is no performance agreement in place and where 
performance is sub-standard. This indicates that there is no proper monitoring and oversight 
even though the law spells these responsibilities out clearly. Even in cases where monitoring 
does take place, there is no culture of acting upon the results of monitoring. This breeds a 
culture of impunity where there are no consequences for wrong doing in local government. The 
National Treasury and the Auditor-General have been warning against this culture for some 
time now. This indicates that the performance management system is not being fully 
implemented. It is not taken seriously. 
Some of the reason for non-compliance relate to the fact that the majority of mayors lack the 
necessary capacity to draft performance agreements that comply with the relevant laws, to 
monitor performance and to enforce the agreements. The other reason relates to the cosiness 
between senior managers and politicians who are charged with monitoring and enforcing the 
performance management system. This cosy relationship results in a situation where managers 
who do not have performance agreements, or who have them but are not performing according 
to the employers’ expectations, receive performance bonuses. This fuels the culture of impunity 
and entitlement discussed above. Poor performance is being rewarded in contravention of the 
performance management system. 
This suggests that even though the NPM tenet of performance management as introduced in 
South Africa is given full effect to in a manner that facilitates its implementation, South African 
municipalities are falling short in fully implementing it. Even though there is a sound legislative 
framework for performance management in South Africa, the performance management 
system has fallen short of creating a performance culture at municipal level. Instead, impunity 
and unaccountability for own actions characteristic of managers in the apartheid regime   still 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
274 
Chapter Six 
 
 
 
 
obtains. This is a result of a lack of skills and political will. Lack of political will results in 
half-hearted commitment and implementation of the performance management system. 
The three elements of managerialism were partially, but never fully, implemented in the legal 
framework. Where they were, their implementation in practice has often resulted in the opposite 
of the intended outcomes. Although the partial implementation of the NPM can be blamed 
for the failure of the NPM to deliver the intended results, the main reason for this is the difficult 
circumstances on the ground in which they had to take root: a skills shortage and rampant 
political interference. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
Implementation of the NPM Tenets of Corporatisation and PPPs 
at Local Level 
1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the practical implementation of key NPM tenets with regard to the 
reconfiguration of the modes of service delivery. It reveals that the need to resolve the problems 
created by apartheid has led to consideration of alternative mechanisms for the delivery of 
services. These mechanisms are public-private partnerships and corporatisation. The rationale 
for their introduction was to draw on private sector skills, resources and practices to speed up 
the delivery of services to communities and thus address the infrastructure backlogs and 
disparities characteristic of South Africa. Traditional methods of delivering services were 
viewed as anachronistic, monopolistic and wasteful. The idea is that an institution operating on 
business principles would be more efficient and cost-effective than an ordinary service 
department. 
In what follows, I give a brief background to the reconfiguration of modes of service delivery 
in South African local government. This is followed by a discussion of the NPM principles of 
public-private partnerships and corporatisation as reflected in policy and law. Privatisation is 
left out because the policy framework for local government militates against divesting 
municipalities of the responsibility to deliver core municipal services such as water, electricity 
and solid waste collection and disposal. 
 
2 Reconfiguring modes of service delivery 
The Green Paper on Local Government1 is the basis for the transformation of modes of service 
delivery in South African municipalities. The post-apartheid government viewed the traditional 
ways in which municipal authorities rendered services as inefficient and monopolistic as 
municipalities were solely responsible for all components of service delivery.2 Municipal 
authorities tended to  create line municipal departments  or  functions  as  a  way of providing 
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services to communities.3 The Green Paper in turn outlines the full spectrum of service 
delivery options for mobilising additional capacity and resources for effective service 
delivery.4 Among the panoply of options that municipalities could select in enhancing the 
provision of services were ‘public delivery, public utilities, public-public partnerships, public- 
private partnerships, and public-community partnerships’.5 
Other imperatives that impelled the introduction of alternative service delivery mechanisms 
included the need to achieve the objectives of the RDP and to rectify infrastructure deficits and 
disparities.6 Given that municipalities are no longer limited to delivering a narrow range of 
services yet also face decreasing revenue sources, an increase in the population they have to 
serve, and ever-increasing service delivery responsibilities,7 the post-apartheid government had 
to explore alternative and innovative means of delivering local services.8 The White Paper 
therefore suggested reforms that would allow other actors, including the private sector, non- 
governmental organisations and other state entities, to render services on behalf of 
municipalities. The White Paper states: 
Municipalities have a range of delivery options to enhance service provision. 
They need to strategically assess and plan the most appropriate forms of 
service delivery for their areas. Their administrations need to be geared to 
implement the chosen delivery options in the most effective manner and so 
ensure maximum benefit to their communities.9 
The White Paper further states that these options include building on existing capacity; 
corporatisation; public–public partnerships; partnerships with community-based organisations 
and non-governmental organisations; contracting out; and complete transfers of ownership 
(privatisation).10 In choosing an appropriate mix of service delivery options, the White Paper 
provides some guiding principles for municipalities, which include accessibility of services to 
all  citizens;  affordability  of  services;  quality of  products  and  services;  accountability for 
 
 
 
3 Nyamukachi PM Options for Urban Service Delivery in South Africa with Special Reference to the Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality (unpublished Doctoral thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005) 44 (hereafter Nyamukachi 
2005). 
4  Green Paper 1997: 42 para. 2.3. 
5  Green Paper 1997: 42 para. 2.3. 
6  The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships 2000: 5. 
7 Ntliziywana P ‘Adding injury to insult: Intrusive laws on top of a weak system’ (2016) VI Constitutional Law 
Review 34. 
8 Nyamukachii 2005: 44. 
9 The White Paper on Local Government (9 March 1998) 159 para. 2.2 (hereafter White Paper 1998). 
10  White Paper 1998: 159 para. 2.2. 
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services; integrated development and services; sustainability of services; value for money; 
ensuring and promoting the competitiveness of local commerce and industry; and promoting 
democracy.11 The White Paper further states: 
In assessing the appropriateness of different service delivery mechanisms, the 
choice is not between public and private provision. Rather the real issue is 
finding an appropriate combination of options which most effectively achieves 
their policy objective.12 
The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships13 gives impetus to the adoption of 
alternative service delivery mechanisms. It focuses exclusively on municipal service delivery 
options and builds on and refines the provisions of the previous White Paper on Local 
Government.14  Its stated aim was 
to provide a clear framework within which to leverage and marshal the 
resources of public institutions, CBOs, NGOs, and the private sector towards 
meeting the country’s overall development objectives.15 
The two assumptions therefore appear to be that ‘flexibility’ and a ‘commercial’ management 
style are beneficial to service delivery and that the typical municipal way of operating tends 
not to exhibit these qualities.16 
The Systems Act takes these reform proposals of configuring modes of service delivery 
forward and concretises them into law. Chapter 8 of the Systems Act outlines the options 
available to municipalities as well as the criteria to be used when deciding on service delivery 
mechanisms. Section 78 of the Systems Act, for example, sets out the criteria and procedure 
that would help municipalities in deciding what the most viable option would be to provide 
the service. This section guides municipalities in choosing between delivering the service 
themselves or appointing an external service provider to do so in terms of a service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11  White Paper 1998: 159 para. 2.2. 
12  White Paper 1998: 79 para. 2.3. 
13 The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (GN 1689 GG 21126 of 26 April 2000) 1 (hereafter White 
Paper 2000). 
14 Johnson CV Outsourcing Basic Municipal Services: Policy, Legislation and Contracts (unpublished LLM 
thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2004) 2 (hereafter Johnson 2004). 
15  White Paper 2000: 1. 
16  Johnson 2004: 7. 
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delivery agreement. A complete list of service delivery mechanisms is contained in section 76 
and these are categorised as either internal or external mechanisms.17 
Another piece of legislation with a bearing on alternative service delivery mechanisms at local 
level is the MFMA.18 The MFMA, dealing with the financial management of municipalities 
and municipal entities,19 contains specific provisions relating to public-private partnerships and 
deals with feasibility, procurement, contracting, security and debt.20 For example, section 120 
specifically requires a feasibility assessment to be carried out before a public-private 
partnership is concluded.21 
In what follows, I look at the two alternative service delivery mechanisms that were applied in 
South African municipalities, namely public-private partnerships and corporatisation. When it 
comes to privatisation, the 1995 White Paper rejected privatisation, while the 1998 White 
Paper indicates that ‘the transfer of ownership is not an option for core municipal services, 
particularly water, electricity and solid waste collection and disposal.’22 It further states that 
such services play a central role in meeting the material, social and economic needs of 
communities, and that as such ownership of infrastructure and assets associated therewith 
should ideally be kept in the public sphere.23 This effectively also rules out privatisation of core 
municipal services such as the ones listed above. As a result, there has not been any form of 
privatisation of core municipal service at local government. Municipalities have, instead, 
resorted to mechanisms that do not divest the council of control, such as corporatisation and 
public-private partnerships. 
 
3 Public-private Partnerships 
3.1 NPM principles 
As has been highlighted in Chapter Two,24 public-private partnerships are defined as long-term 
contractual arrangements between the government and a private partner whereby the latter 
delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks. They are 
 
 
 
17 Section 76(a) and (b) Systems Act. 
18 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. 
19 Long title to the MFMA. 
20 Section 120 MFMA. 
21 Section 120(4) MFMA. 
22 White Paper 1998: 168-9 para. 2.2.7. 
23  White Paper 1998: 169 para. 2.2.7. 
24  At section 6.3. 
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an NPM strategy through which the private sector participates in the delivery of public services 
to serve the aim of imbuing the public service with the efficiency, effectiveness and value-for- 
money approaches associated with business practices. As in other strategies, the ultimate aim of 
this strategy is to break down the monolithic structure of the bureaucracy into small service 
delivery agencies that operate on business principles. This was in reaction to the large 
bureaucracies that were consuming significant amounts of state funding. As a result of the 
fiscal challenges this posed, the NPM proposed that states should mobilise alternative funding 
for service delivery from the private sector. 
PPPs, therefore, serve two main purposes, namely to mobilise resources and skills from the 
private sector and to infuse business principles in the delivery of public services. However, the 
functions are still controlled by the state, which then enters into partnership with external or 
private providers. This relationship is controlled through contracts. 
 
3.2 Legislative Framework 
The legal foundation for municipal PPPs is section 78 of the Systems Act. The regulations 
issued in terms of section 168 of the MFMA supplement the Systems Act by defining PPPs.25 
In a way that mirrors the definition proffered by Regulation 16 discussed in Chapter Five26 in 
relation to national government, the PPP Regulations define public-private partnerships as 
 
a commercial transaction between a municipality and a private party in terms 
of which the private party – 
(a) performs a municipal function for or on behalf of a municipality, or acquires the 
management or use of municipal property for its own commercial purposes, or both 
performs a municipal function for or on behalf of a municipality and acquires the 
management or use of municipal property for its own commercial purposes; and 
(b) assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection with 
 
(i) the performance of the municipal function; 
 
(ii) the management or use of the municipal property; or 
(iii)both; and 
 
 
 
25 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act: Municipal Public-Private Partnership Regulations 
(GN R309 GG 27431 of 1 April 2005) (hereafter Municipal PPP Regulations). 
26  At section 3.4. 
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(c) receives a benefit from performing the municipal function or from utilising the 
municipal property or from both, by way of – 
(i) consideration to be paid or given by the municipality or a municipal entity under 
the sole or shared control of the municipality; 
(ii) charges or fees to be collected by the private party from users or customers of a 
service provided to them; or 
(iii) a combination of the benefits referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii).27 
 
The private party that is party to this PPP transaction is in turn defined as excluding a 
municipality, a municipal entity or an organ of state.28 From this definition of public-private 
partnerships, one can identify three types of public-private partnerships. In the first place, this 
definition talks about a public-private partnership where the private party perform a municipal 
function29 for or on behalf of the municipality. In the second place, the definition refers to a 
partnership where a private party acquires the management or use of a municipal property30 for 
its own commercial purposes. In the third place, the regulations identify a hybrid of the two 
types.31 
Payment in any of the three types takes place in the following manner. First, the municipality 
itself can pay the private party for the delivery of the service. Secondly, the private party, on 
its own initiative, can collect fees or charges from users or customers of the service. Thirdly, a 
municipality can pay a portion, while the rest is recuperated through the collection of fees or 
charges from the users of the service.32 In any event, the private party assumes substantial 
financial, technical and operational risk in connection with the performance of the municipal 
function or the management or use of the municipal property, or both the performance of a 
municipal function and the management or use of the municipal property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Regulation 1 Municipal PPP Regulations. 
28 Regulation 1 Municipal PPP Regulations. 
29 A municipal function is defined to include a municipal service and any other activity within the legal 
competence of a municipality. It is thus broader than a municipal service. 
30 A municipal property is defined as any movable, immovable or intellectual property, owned by or under the 
control of the municipality; or a municipal entity under the sole or shared control of the municipality. 
31 National Treasury & Department of Provincial and Local Government Municipal Service Delivery and PPP 
Guidelines of 2007: 6 (hereafter PPP Guidelines of 2007). 
32  PPP Guidelines of 2007: 6. 
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Steytler and De Visser state that ‘the partnership element of the [public-private partnership] is 
restricted to the continuous involvement of the municipality in the service delivery through its 
monitoring and authority function’.33 This is a goal-oriented relationship. The accounting 
officer (municipal manager) is responsible for managing the PPP contract by measuring 
outputs, monitoring and regulating performance, liaising effectively, and settling disputes.34 
 
3.2.1 Section 78 Systems Act 
As an alternative (external) delivery mechanisms, PPPs are regulated by Chapter 8 of the 
Systems Act. The Systems Act states that a municipality ‘exercises its legislative or executive 
authority by providing municipal services to the local community, or appointing appropriate 
service providers’.35 Section 78 sets out the procedure that a municipality must follow when 
choosing between delivering the service itself or appointing an external service provider to 
deliver the service in terms of a service delivery agreement. The Systems Act lists five such 
external mechanisms, which include ‘any other institution, entity or person legally competent 
to operate a business activity’.36 It is suggested that this refers to the private sector and any 
partnership with such institutions, entities or persons is a public-private partnership. 
When a municipality has to decide on a mechanism to deliver a particular service, it has to 
follow the procedure outlined in section 78 of the Systems Act. The section 78 procedure entails 
a four-step process. First, an initial review of the way the municipality currently provides a 
particular service must be conducted.37 Secondly, if the use of an external provider is 
contemplated or explored, a further inquiry must be held.38 Thirdly, if private actors are 
considered, a competitive bidding process must be embarked upon. Lastly, certain procedural 
and substantive requirements must be met when negotiating a service delivery agreement. In 
what follows, I look at this process in some detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 9 - 36 (hereafter Steytler & De Visser 
2007). 
34  PPP Guidelines of 2007: 6. 
35 Section 11(3)(f) Systems Act. 
36 Section 76(b)(e) Systems Act. 
37 Section 78(1) Systems Acts. 
38 Section 78(3) Systems Acts. 
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3.2.1.1 Initial internal review 
When conducting the review to decide on the appropriate mechanism for the delivery of a 
particular service, the municipality must focus on three areas: the municipality as the service 
provider, general labour issues and broad social and economic considerations.39 
With regards to the first area, namely, the municipality as a service provider, the assessment 
must be on the direct and indirect costs and benefits associated with the project if the service 
is provided by the municipality.40 The municipality must further assess whether it has the 
‘capacity and potential future capacity to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary’ 
for the internal provision of the service.41 It must also assess the extent to which the re- 
organisation of its administration and development of human resource capacity could be better 
utilised to provide the service internally.42 Regarding labour issues, the enquiry considers what 
the likely impact will be on development, job creation and employment patterns in the 
municipality.43 In this regard, the views of organised labour must be considered.44 The third 
line of enquiry is discretionary and deals with the broad economics of service delivery. In this 
regard, the municipality may take into account any developing trends in the sustainable 
provision of municipal services generally. Steytler and De Visser state that this may include 
general information on the prevalence, effectiveness and economics of outsourcing municipal 
services. 
Having concluded this review, the municipality has two avenues to pursue. First, it may decide 
to keep the provision of the service in-house, namely through an internal mechanism.45 In such 
an event, the municipality must allocate sufficient human and financial resources to provide a 
proper service and transform the provision of that service in accordance with the requirements 
of the Systems Act.46 Secondly, before arriving at the decision to provide the service in-house, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-27. 
40 Section 78(1)(a)(i) Systems Act. 
41 Section 78(1)(a)(ii) Systems Act. 
42 Section 78(1)(a)(iii) Systems Act. 
43 Section 78(1)(a)(iv) Systems Act. 
44 Section 78(1)(a)(v) Systems Act. 
45 Section 78(2)(a) Systems Act. 
46 Section 79 Systems Act. 
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it may explore the possibility of providing the service through an external mechanism.47 This 
option requires yet a further enquiry to be conducted, accompanied by a feasibility study.48 
 
3.2.1.2 External mechanism review 
In exploring the use of an external provider, the focus of the inquiry is on which category of 
external providers would be the most suitable. To determine this, the municipality must follow 
the lines of enquiry similar to those in the initial internal review discussed above.49 First, the 
municipality must ascertain the views of the local community. To this end, the municipality 
must give notice to the community of its intention to explore the option of using an external 
provider.50 The High Court underscored the importance of this requirement when it displayed 
willingness to nullify a service agreement because no effective community consultation 
occurred.51 
The second line of inquiry focuses on possible service providers. In this regard, ‘the direct and 
indirect costs and benefits associated with the project, including the expected effects of any 
service delivery mechanism on the environment and on human health, well-being and safety’ 
must be taken into account.52 Other issues to take account of are the capacity of the prospective 
providers to deliver the service.53 
The third line of inquiry deals with developmental, economic and labour issues. In this regard, 
the likely impact of delivering the service through an external mechanism ‘on development, 
job creation, and employment patterns in the municipality’ must be taken into account.54 The 
views of organised labour must also be taken into consideration.55 
A further enquiry was added into the existing enquiries by an amendment to the Systems Act 
in 2003. It added a feasibility study which takes account of a number of factors. First, there 
must be a clear indication of the services that the municipality is considering providing through 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Section 78(2)(b) Systems Act. 
48 Section 78(3) Systems Act. 
49 Section 78(3) Systems Act. 
50 Section 78(3)((a) Systems Act. 
51 Nkonkobe Municipality v Water Services SA (Pty) Ltd [2001] ZAECHC 3 (hereafter Nkonkobe case). 
52 Section 78(3)(b)(i) Systems Act. 
53 Section 78(3)(b)(ii) Systems Act. 
54 Section 78(3)(b)(iv) Systems Act. 
55 Section 78(3)(b)(v) Systems Act. 
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an external service provider56 and how long such externalisation will be.57 Secondly, the 
projected outcomes of providing the service through an external service provider must be 
shown.58 In this regard, there must be an assessment of the extent to which the externalised 
service will provide value for money, address the needs of the poor, be affordable for the 
municipality and residents, and transfer appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to 
the provider.59 Thirdly, the projected impact on the municipality’s staff, assets and liabilities 
must be shown.60 Similarly, the projected impact on the municipality’s integrated development 
plan,61 and its budget and income generation62 must be indicated. 
Section 78 leaves room open for the Minister for local government to prescribe any other matter 
that must be considered.63 In this regard, the following may be included in the feasibility study: 
 the strategic and operational costs and benefits of an external mechanism in terms of 
the municipality’s strategic objectives; and 
 an assessment of the municipality’s capacity to effectively monitor the provision of the 
service through an external mechanism and to enforce the service agreement.64 
As can be seen, the scope of the feasibility study is extensive and, as a corollary, toilsome and 
costly. In this regard, the national or the relevant provincial government is enjoined, in 
accordance with an agreement with a municipality, to assist in carrying out the feasibility study 
and thus alleviate the burden of toil and costs.65 
After the second enquiry relating to the use of external mechanisms, the municipality must 
make the choice between an internal or external provider. It is guided in its choice by the 
general principles relating to the provision of municipal services.66 These principles require 
municipal services to be: 
 equitable and accessible; 
 
 
 
 
56  Section 78(3)(c)(i) Systems Act. 
57 Section 78(3)(c)(ii) Systems Act. 
58 Section 78(3)(c)(iii) Systems Act. 
59 Section 78(3)(c)(iv) Systems Act. 
60 Section 78(3)(c)(v) Systems Act. 
61 Section 78(3)(c)vi) Systems Act. 
62 Section 78(3)(c)(vii) Systems Act. 
63 Section 78(3)(c)(viii) Systems Act. 
64 Section 86A(1)(k) Systems Act. 
65 Section 78(6) Systems Act. 
66 Section 78(4) Systems Act. 
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 provided in a manner that is conducive to prudent, economic, efficient and effective use 
of available resources, and the improvement of standards of quality over time; and 
 financially and environmentally sustainable.67 
 
The Minister for Local Government may also, through regulations or guidelines, prescribe 
criteria that must be taken into account when assessing the options.68 Steytler and De Visser 
contend that given the very general nature of the guidelines provided in the Systems Act, which 
could include all manner of considerations, a cost-benefit analysis between internal and 
external mechanism69 would be appropriate at this stage70 to guide the choice between an 
internal or external provider. Johnson in turn argues that ‘the decision to outsource cannot be 
made solely on commercial principles, but must also take place within the wider context of the 
municipality’s constitutional obligation to give priority to the basic needs of the community’.71 
If the choice falls on an external provider, further processes may follow, depending on whether 
the provider is from the public or private sector.72 If the provider is another municipality, that 
municipality must conduct its own feasibility study.73 However, where the external service 
provider is a private actor, a competitive bidding process is required.74 In all other instances, 
where the provider is a municipal entity or a national or provincial organ of state, negotiations 
towards a service delivery agreement with such provider may commence.75 Given that this 
discussion is about public-private partnerships, defined above to mean a commercial 
transaction between a municipality and a private party, the next cause of action is competitive 
bidding. 
 
3.2.1.3 Competitive bidding for private actors 
Competitive bidding is the third step in the four-step process prescribed by Chapter 8 of the 
Systems Act. It is triggered if the choice falls on an external provider that is a private actor, 
whether for profit or not. In this regard, the Systems Act states that a service delivery agreement 
 
 
 
 
67 Section 73(2) Systems Act. 
68 Section 86A(1)(f) Systems Act. 
69 This is an issue that should be canvassed thoroughly in the feasibility study that the municipality must undertake. 
70  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-30. 
71  Johnson 2004: 42-43. 
72  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-30. 
73 Section 80(3) Systems Act. 
74 Section 80(1)(b) Systems Act. 
75  This is examined in the discussion below of corporatisation. 
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may only be concluded after a competitive bidding process prescribed by the MFMA has been 
followed.76 Over and above the municipality’s supply chain management policy framework, 
the Systems Act adds a few general principles of sound procurement.77 
First, the selection process must allow all prospective service providers equal and simultaneous 
access to information relevant to the bidding process.78 Secondly, the process must take into 
account ‘the need to promote the empowerment of small and emerging enterprises’79 which 
must take place in terms of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act.80 The Systems 
Act also provides for preferential procurement. It states that a municipality ‘may determine a 
preference for categories of service providers in order to advance the interests of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’.81 However, the manner in which such preference is 
exercised must not compromise or limit the quality, coverage, cost and developmental impact 
of the services.82 Thirdly, the competitive bidding process must ‘minimise the possibility of 
fraud and corruption’.83 In this regard, the selection process ‘must be fair, equitable, 
transparent, cost-effective and competitive’.84 Its design and execution must ‘make the 
municipality accountable to the local community about the progress with selecting a service 
provider, and reasons for any decision in this regard’.85 
When selecting a service provider, a municipality must apply the criteria listed in section 78, 
as well as any preferences for categories of service providers it has identified.86 In regard to 
the latter, ‘once a municipality has determined the goals of its preferential procurement policy, 
it must obviously abide by them’.87 The criteria relevant for the awarding of a contract relates, 
among other things, to ‘the capacity and potential future capacity of prospective service 
providers to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of services’,88 
as  well  as  providing  value  for  money,  affordability  for  the  municipality  and  transfer of 
 
 
 
 
76 Section 83(1)(a) Systems Act with reference to Chapter 11 of the MFMA. 
77  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-31. 
78 Section 83(1)(b) Systems Act. 
79 Section 83(1)(e) Systems Act. 
80  Act 5 of 2000. 
81 Section 83(2) Systems Act. 
82 Section 83(2) Systems Act. 
83 Section 83(1)(c) Systems Act. 
84 Section 83(3) Systems Act. 
85 Section 83(1)(d) Systems Act. 
86 Section 83(4) Systems Act. 
87  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-32. 
88 Section 78(3)(b)(ii) Systems Act. 
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appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to the provider.89 Once a preferred bidder 
has been selected, the next and final step in terms of the section 78 procedure is to conclude, 
through negotiations between the municipality and the selected private party, a service delivery 
agreement. 
 
3.2.1.4 The service delivery agreement 
A service delivery agreement is an agreement between a municipality and an external service 
provider to provide municipal services on behalf of the municipality. It is linked to the delivery 
of identified outputs as they relate to the service. The conclusion of a service delivery 
agreement is preceded by negotiations of its terms and conditions on the basis of the bidding 
documents and any addenda, amendments or variations thereto that were provided to all 
bidders.90 The modifications, amendments and variations during the negotiations, however, 
may not materially affect the integrity of the bidding process.91 If the municipality fails to reach 
an agreement with the preferred bidder within a reasonable time, the municipality may 
negotiate with the next-ranked bidder.92 Overall, the service delivery agreement must comply 
with a framework prescribed by the Systems Act. However, the Minister for local government 
may also prescribe the minimum content of the service delivery agreement by regulation.93 
Furthermore, the Minister may provide municipalities with a standard draft agreement to help 
them deal with the complexity of service delivery agreements.94 
Importantly, when the municipality opts for using an external provider, it cannot divest itself 
of its responsibilities to provide that service to the community. The contents of the service 
delivery agreement must, therefore, reflect the municipality’s continuous responsibility for the 
proper delivery of that service.95 In this regard, section 81 of the Systems Act explicitly 
provides that ‘a municipality remains responsible for ensuring that the service is provided to 
the local community in terms of the provisions of this Act’.96 In view of this, the municipality 
must regulate the provision of the service by subjecting it to its performance management 
 
 
 
 
89 Section 78(3)(c)(iv) Systems Act. 
90 Section 84(1) Systems Act. 
91 Section 84(1) Systems Act. 
92 Section 84(2) Systems Act. 
93  Section 86A(1)(j) Systems Act. 
94  Section 86A(1)(i) Systems Act. 
95  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-33. 
96 Section 81(1) Systems Act. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
288 
Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
system.97 This means that the service delivery agreement must either set appropriate key 
performance indicators, as well as measurable performance targets in line with the development 
priorities and objectives contained in the municipality’s IDP, or be accompanied by a 
performance agreement setting out the same. Thereafter the municipality must monitor and 
assess the implementation of the service delivery agreement within the framework of the 
performance management system98 by imposing appropriate reporting obligations. 
Furthermore, the contract/agreement must be made subject to the changes that may result from 
the periodic review of the IDP, as the service remains subject to the development priorities and 
objectives of the municipality in terms of the IDP.99 
Furthermore, the appointing municipality must continue to control the setting and adjustment 
of tariffs in line with its own tariff policy.100 However, the service delivery agreement may 
make provisions for the provider to adjust tariffs, as long as this is done strictly within the 
parameters set by the municipality.101 Furthermore, in negotiating the agreement, the 
municipality must ‘generally exercise its service authority so as to ensure uninterrupted 
delivery of the service in the best interest of the local community’.102 More specifically, there 
must be provisions in the service delivery agreement that ensure the continuity of the service 
if the provider, for whatever reason, is unable to perform its functions.103 As any service 
delivery contract has a limited lifespan, provision must be made for the municipality to take 
over the service, including all assets, when the agreement expires or is terminated.104 Finally, 
the service delivery agreement must provide for a dispute-resolution mechanism to settle 
dispute between the municipality and the service provider.105 
The Systems Act gives a municipality wide discretion to negotiate the terms of a municipal 
service delivery agreement. These terms relate to the broad planning and operational 
responsibilities for a service, the provision of subsidies for the poor, the use of the 
municipality’s workforce,106 and assignment of particular responsibilities that the municipality 
 
 
 
97 Section 81(1)(a) read with section 41 Systems Act. 
98 Section 81(1)(b) Systems Act. 
99 Section 81(1)(c) Systems Act. 
100 Section 81(1)(d) Systems Act. 
101 Section 81(3) Systems Act. 
102  Section 81(1)(e) Systems Act.  
103  Section 81(2)(d) Systems Act. 
104  Section 81(2)(e) Systems Act.  
105 Section 81(2)(bA) Systems Act. 
106  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-34. 
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usually exercise to a service provider.107 Assignment in this instance should be read to mean 
delegation, since the overall import of section 81 militates against divestment of responsibility 
for the rendering of municipal services.108 The municipal responsibilities that may be assigned 
or delegated include: 
(a) developing and implementing a detailed service delivery plan within the framework of 
the municipality’s IDP; 
(b) the operational planning, management and provision of the service; 
 
(c) undertaking social and economic development that directly relates to the provision of 
the service; 
(d) customer management; 
 
(e) managing its own accounting, financial management, budgeting, investment and 
borrowing activities within a framework of transparency, accountability, reporting and 
financial control determined by the municipality; and 
(f) the collection of service fees for the provider’s account in accordance with the 
municipality’s tariff policy and the municipality’s credit control measures.109 
These assigned responsibilities should be exercised within the overall policy framework of the 
municipality. In this regard, a service delivery plan must fit into the framework of the 
municipality’s IDP, and the collection of service fees must be in accordance with the council’s 
tariff policy.110 A service delivery agreement may also provide that the municipality must pass 
on funds to the service provider for the subsidisation of services to the poor111 in line with 
national policies providing free basic services to the poor.112 This must take place through a 
transparent system, subject to performance monitoring and auditing.113 A municipality may 
also second or transfer any of its staff members to the service provider, subject to the 
concurrence of the staff members concerned and in accordance with the applicable labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 Section 81(2)(a) Systems Act. 
108 Section 81 Systems Act. 
109 Section 81(2)(i)-(vi) Systems Act. 
110 Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-34. 
111 Section 81(2)(b) Systems Act. 
112  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-34. 
113 Section 81(2)(b) Systems Act. 
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laws.114 Finally, the Minister for Local Government may regulate the furnishing of performance 
guarantees by service providers through regulations or guidelines.115 
Since the impact of service delivery will be directly felt by the local community, the 
municipality must follow a mandatory public consultation process. This process is three- 
pronged. The first prong of consultation should take place before the conclusion of a service 
delivery agreement until the agreement has been concluded. In this regard, the municipality 
must establish ‘a programme for community consultation and information dissemination 
regarding the appointment of the external provider and the contents of the service delivery 
agreement’.116 This process includes communicating the contents of the agreement to the 
community through the media.117 The second prong of consultation takes place once the final 
terms of the agreement have been settled and the contract concluded. In this regard, copies of 
the service delivery agreement must be made available at municipal offices during office 
hours.118 In order to reach the local communities, the municipality must also give notice of the 
particulars of the service that will be provided under the agreement, the name of the provider 
and the place and period where copies of the agreement are available for inspection. 119 
The third prong takes place when an agreement with the private actor has to be amended. In 
this regard, since the appointment of the private actor was subject to competitive bidding, the 
agreement may only be amended after the local community has been consulted.120 This requires 
that the community must be given reasonable notice of the intention to amend the agreement 
and the reasons for the amendment, as well as sufficient opportunity to make representations 
to the municipality.121 Johnson suggests that this onerous duty to consult must be taken to relate 
to material amendments only, not minor ones, as there are bound to be a lot of minor 
amendments in a long-term agreement.122 
I have gone purposefully into the details of the provisions to show that the procedure for 
outsourcing the provision of municipal services is prohibitively onerous and convoluted. This 
mechanism  involves  complex  contractual  and  operational  arrangements  which      require 
 
 
 
114 Section 81(2)(c) Systems Act. 
115 Section 86A(1)(l) Systems Act. 
116 Section 80(2) Systems Act. 
117 Section 80(2) Systems Act.  
118  Section 84(3)(a) Systems Act. 
119  Section 84(3)(b) Systems Act. 
120  Section 81(4) Systems Act. 
121 Section 81(4) Systems Act. 
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financial and legal skills as well as technical and project management expertise. Moreover, 
despite this complexity, the MFMA adds another layer of daunting legal requirements for 
outsourcing municipal services through PPPs. Over and above the four-pronged procedure in 
terms of section 78, further layers of procedures and compliance await municipalities in the 
MFMA. 
 
3.2.2 Section 120 of the MFMA and Regulations 
The complexity of outsourcing the provision of municipal services is compounded by section 
120 of the MFMA, which adds a further layer of regulation to PPP transactions. As a result, 
there is a certain level of overlap between the provisions of the section 78 of the Systems Act 
and section 120 of the MFMA, although Steytler and De Visser gamely propose a harmonious 
reading of these statutes that avoids conflict.123 Moreover, yet another layer of regulation was 
added in 2005 with the issuing of an extensive set of regulations governing the implementation 
of PPPs.124 This discussion will look at both section 120 of the MFMA and the PPP Regulations 
issued in terms of the MFMA. 
Section 120 of the MFMA applies when a municipality considers entering into a PPP as defined 
in the PPP Regulations.125 So, over and above the section 78 procedure prescribed in terms of 
the Systems Act, the MFMA, through section 120, introduces an additional procedure that must 
be followed when a municipality considers entering into a PPP. However, the two procedures 
are distinguishable, on two fronts. First, the application of section 120 procedure is more 
limited than the procedure prescribed in the Systems Act, as it applies to only two of the five 
external service delivery mechanism listed in section 76 of the Systems Act, namely a private 
party and NGOs. This idea is derived from the definition of a PPP as a commercial transaction 
between a municipality and a private party, with the latter defined as excluding a municipality, 
a municipal entity or an organ of state.126 Essentially, the Systems Act in turn applies to all five 
external service delivery mechanisms. 
Secondly, the ambit of section 120 is, at the same time, broader than that of the Systems Act, 
in that PPPs also include the outsourcing of activities that do not entail municipal services.127 
 
 
 
 
123  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-37. 
124 PPP Regulations of 2007. 
125 Regulation 1 ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ PPP Regulations. 
126 Regulation 1 ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ PPP Regulations. 
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So, for example, when a municipality wants to outsource the management or use of its property 
to a private party, the municipal property does not constitute a municipal service but can be 
subject to a PPP transaction. Provisions of the Systems Act do not find application, as this is 
not a municipal service. Similarly, when a municipality wants to outsource its information 
technology requirements for its internal functioning to a private firm, this falls outside the ambit 
of Chapter 8 of the Systems Act as it does not entail a municipal service.128 However, both 
these examples, while falling outside the ambit of the Systems Act, are still subject to the 
requirements of section 120 of the MFMA. 
Section 120 also contains an elaborate process that must be followed before concluding a PPP. 
First, a feasibility study must be conducted. Secondly, a broad consultation process must be 
undertaken. Thirdly, if the PPP will have multi-year budgetary implications for the 
municipality, then additional procedural requirements must be met. 
 
3.2.2.1 Feasibility study 
In a way similar to externalising a municipal service, a municipality must conduct a feasibility 
study before concluding a PPP.129 However, in this case the municipal manager must first 
notify the National Treasury and the provincial treasury in writing of the municipality’s 
intention and also provide information about the municipality’s ability to comply with the 
requirements of section 120 of the MFMA.130 The National Treasury or provincial treasury 
may in turn instruct the municipal manager to appoint a person with appropriate skills and 
experience, either from within the municipality or outside, as the transaction advisor to assist 
and advise the municipality on the preparation and procurement of the PPP.131 
Once the feasibility study has been initiated, it must focus on the following aspects. First, it 
must explain the strategic and operational benefits of the PPP for the municipality in terms of 
its objectives.132 In essence, it must describe how the agreement will provide value for money 
to the municipality, be affordable, transfer appropriate technical, operational and financial risks 
to the private party, and impact on the municipality’s revenue flows and its current and future 
 
 
 
 
 
128  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-36. 
129 Section 120(4) MFMA. 
130 Regulation 2(1)(a) PPP Regulations. 
131 Regulation 2(1)(b) PPP Regulations. 
132 Section 120(4)(a) MFMA. 
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budgets.133 Secondly, it must describe in specific terms the nature of the private party’s role in 
the PPP, as well as the extent to which this role, both legally and by nature, can be performed 
by a private party.134 Thirdly, the feasibility study must explain the capacity of the municipality 
to effectively monitor, manage and enforce the agreement.135 Fourthly, the study must take into 
account all relevant information.136 Finally, in terms of the PPP Regulations, the study must 
recommend an appropriate plan for the procurement of the proposed PPP if outsourcing is the 
preferred option.137 
As with the feasibility study prescribed in terms of section 78 of the Systems Act, which 
requires skills, resources and time, the national government may assist municipalities in 
carrying out the feasibility study in terms of section 120 of the MFMA.138 As this feasibility 
study would overlap with the one prescribed in section 78 of the Systems Act, Steytler and De 
Visser maintain that duplicating the process can be avoided.139 In this regard, where 
outsourcing through a PPP is contemplated, the assessment and the feasibility study done in 
term of section 78(3)(b) and (c) of the Systems Act, respectively, will suffice.140 However, the 
assessment and the feasibility study must cover the issues prescribed in the PPP Regulations 
and the reports on the assessment and the feasibility study must be included in the documents 
that are eventually submitted to the council.141 
 
3.2.2.2 Consultation process 
After the completion of the feasibility study, the next step is the broad consultation process 
before the matter is served before the council for a decision.142 This consultation process 
entails, first, that the municipal manager must make the particulars of the proposed PPP, 
including the report of the feasibility study, public within 60 days before the council considers 
the matter.143  In this regard, the local community and other interested persons must be invited 
 
 
 
 
 
133 Section 120(4)(b)(iii) MFMA. 
134 Section 120(4)(b)(i) and (ii) MFMA. 
135 Section 120(4)(d) MFMA. 
136 Section 120(4)(c) MFMA. 
137 Regulation 3(1)(d) PPP Regulations. 
138 Section 120(5) MFMA. 
139  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-38. 
140 Regulation 3(3) PPP Regulations. 
141 Regulation 3(3) PPP Regulations. 
142 Regulation 4(2)(a) PPP Regulations. 
143 The procedure is prescribed in section 21A Systems Act. 
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to make comments and representations.144 Secondly, the views of the municipality’s 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) partners145 must be solicited.146 After receiving the 
comments of interested parties within the stipulated 60 days’ period, the municipal manager 
must submit the report of the feasibility study and other relevant documentation to the council 
for a decision. The council must then make a decision, in principle, on whether the municipality 
should continue with the proposed PPP.147 Once this decision is made, the council falls out of 
the picture if the only decision left is the selection of the appropriate private partner. The usual 
rules of procurement then kick in to identify the preferred private party in line with the Systems 
Act. However, where the PPP will have multi-year budgetary implications, section 33 of the 
MFMA must be complied with.148 
 
3.2.3.3 Long-term PPPs 
A municipality may enter into long-term contracts that may impose financial obligations 
beyond the three years covered in its budget.149 The MFMA imposes a number of additional 
procedural requirements in such cases. First, a consultation process akin to the section 
120(6)(b) process discussed immediately above must be followed. In this regard, the 
municipality must consult with the community and the national and provincial governments.150 
Secondly, the council must consider the matter, taking into account the projected financial 
obligations for every year of the contract, the impact on future tariffs and revenue, and the 
comments of the parties whose views were sought.151 Lastly, if the council decides to conclude 
the contract, it must adopt a resolution which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 Section 120(6)(b) MFMA. 
145 Namely the National Treasury, the Department responsible for local government, the responsible department 
in the case of the provision of water, sanitation, electricity or any other prescribed service and any other national 
or provincial organ of state that may be prescribed. The views and recommendations of the National Treasury 
must be sought on the following matters: 
(a) the proposed terms and conditions of the draft PPP agreements; 
(b) the municipality’s plan for the effective management of the agreement after its conclusion; 
(c) the preferred bidder’s competency to enter into the PPP agreement and its capacity to comply with 
the obligations in terms of the agreement (regulation 4(3) PPP Regulations). 
146 Section 120(6)(c) MFMA. 
147 Section 120(6)(a) MFMA. 
148 Section 120(7) MFMA. 
149  Section 33(1) MFMA. 
150 Section 33(1)(a) MFMA. 
151 Section 33(1)(b) MFMA. 
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 determines that the municipality will secure a significant capital investment or derive 
significant financial income or benefit from the contract; 
 approves the contract as it is to be executed; and 
 
 authorises the municipal manager to sign the contract on behalf of the municipality.152 
The final step in the procedures prior to the conclusion of a PPP is the procurement process. 
3.2.3.4 The procurement process 
The supply chain management system also applies to PPPs as well.153 Moreover, the PPP 
Regulations have added more requirements. First, the municipal manager must solicit the views 
and recommendation of the National Treasury and the provincial treasury on the proposed bid 
documentation at least 30 days before the bids are publicly invited.154 Secondly, the views of 
the treasuries must also be sought on the evaluation of the bids and any preferred bidder at least 
30 day before any award is made.155 In this regard, both the bid evaluation and the bid 
adjudication committees involved in the two distinct phases of the procurement process need 
to solicit the views of the treasuries. However, the treasuries’ views are only advisory, as the 
committees concerned would have to make the recommendations and take the final decisions, 
respectively. The final award to a preferred private party leads to the second-last step in the 
MFMA procedure of concluding an agreement. 
 
3.2.3.5 PPP agreements 
The PPP Regulations set a number of qualitative requirements for PPP agreements. First, the 
object of the agreement must be to provide value for money and be affordable for the 
municipality.156 Secondly, the nature of the private party’s role must be described in specific 
terms.157 In this regard, the agreement must also impose financial management duties on the 
private party, including transparent processes relating to internal financial control, budgeting, 
accountability and  reporting.158  Thirdly,  the  agreement must  confer  effective power on the 
 
 
 
 
152 Section 33(1)(c) MFMA. 
153 Regulation 4(1) PPP Regulations.  
154  Regulation 4(1)(a) PPP Regulations. 
155  Regulation 4(1)(b) PPP Regulations. 
156 Regulations 5(1)(a) and (b) PPP Regulations. 
157 Regulation 5(1)(c) PPP Regulations. 
158 Regulation 5(1)(e) PPP Regulations. 
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municipality to monitor the private party’s performance under the agreement and to manage 
and enforce the agreement.159 Fourthly, there must be provision for the termination of the 
agreement if the private party fails to comply with its terms and condition or deliberately 
provides incorrect or misleading information to the municipality.160 
Fifthly, a number of anti-corruption measures must be included. In this regard, the private party 
must be restrained, for the full duration of the agreement, from offering employment, 
consultancy or other contracts to an official161 of the municipality or a municipal entity under 
the sole or shared control of the municipality, otherwise than in terms of the agreement.162 The 
same prohibition applies to a person who was an official at any time during a period of one 
year before the offer was made.163 The agreement must further restrain a private party from 
offering employment, consultancy or other contracts to an employee of the municipality 
directly involved in the negotiation of the agreement164 for a period of three years. The private 
party is also prohibited from employing any municipal employee who participated in the 
negotiations of the PPP agreement, except if participation was peripheral, for a period of three 
years.165 Sixthly, the provisions of section 116(1) of the MFMA apply, including the 
requirements that the agreement must be in writing, that dispute-resolution mechanisms be 
included, and that periodic review of the agreement take place where it is for longer than three 
years.166 
The PPP agreement is concluded once the municipal manager appends his or her signature,167 
following the fulfilment of all the procedural requirements such as council approval of the long- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 Regulation 5(1)(d) PPP Regulations. 
160 Regulation 5(1)(f) PPP Regulations. 
161 An official in this case is defined in section 1(1) MFMA as: 
(a) an employee of the municipality or municipal entity; 
(b) a person seconded to a municipality or municipal entity to work as a member of the staff of the 
municipality or municipal entity; or 
(c) a person contracted by a municipality or municipal entity to work as a member of the staff of the 
municipality or the municipal entity otherwise than as an employee. 
162 Regulation 5(1)(g)(i) PPP Regulations. 
163 Regulation 5(1)(g)(ii) PPP Regulations. 
164 Regulation 5(1)(h) PPP Regulations. 
165 Regulation 5(2) PPP Regulations. 
166 116(1) MFMA. 
167 Regulation 6(1) PPP Regulation. 
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term contracts.168 However, the conclusion of the PPP agreement is not the end of the road for 
a municipality. It must still play an active role in the ‘maintenance’ of the contract.169 
 
3.2.3.6 Contract maintenance 
The municipality, through the municipal manager as accounting officer, must take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that the PPP agreement is enforced and the outsourced activity is 
effectively and efficiently carried out in accordance with the agreement.170 If it is the municipal 
property that is the subject of the PPP, the municipal manager must ensure that the property ‘is 
appropriately protected against forfeiture, theft, loss, wastage or misuse’.171 In essence, the 
municipal manager must monitor the performance of the private party on a monthly basis.172 
This requires the municipal manager to establish the capacity in the administration to assist 
him or her in performing this function and overseeing the day-to-day management of the 
contract.173 To this end, the municipal manager must appoint a project officer, from either 
inside or outside the municipality, who has the appropriate skills and experience.174 Finally, 
the municipal manager must regularly report to the council on the management of the contract 
and the performance of the contractor.175 
A PPP agreement may be amended according to the rules of the MFMA.176 First, the reasons 
for the proposed amendment must be tabled in the council.177 Secondly, the municipality must 
give reasonable notice to the local community of the intention to amend the contract or 
agreement and invite representations on the issue.178 Overall, the amendment must be 
‘consistent with the basic essentials’ of the agreement as set out in the PPP Regulations.179 
Finally, the municipal manager must solicit the views and recommendations of the National 
Treasury and the provincial treasury on the reasons for the amendment at least 60 days before 
the agreement is amended.180 
 
 
 
 
168 Section 33 MFMA read with regulation 6(2) PPP Regulations. 
169 Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-41. 
170 Regulation 8(a) PPP Regulations. 
171 Regulation 8(b) PPP Regulations. 
172 Section 116(2)(b) MFMA. 
173 Section 116(2)(c) MFMA read with regulation 8(c) PPP Regulations. 
174 Regulation 7 PPP Regulations. 
175 Section 116(2)(b) MFMA. 
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3.3 Coherence with the NPM 
It was noted in the foregoing that the rationale behind PPPs is to mobilise resources and skills 
from the private sector, transfer substantial risk to the private provider and infuse business 
principles in the public sector, thereby ensuring that the delivery of public services is based on 
principles of efficiency, effectiveness and value for money. There seems to be coherence 
between this rationale of the classical NPM tenet of public-private partnerships and how PPPs 
were conceived and operationalised in South Africa. 
First, the principle of mobilising resources and skills from the private sector finds expression 
in the legislative framework governing PPPs in South Africa. In this regard, one of the issues 
that form part of an enquiry required in exploring the use of an external provider is the capacity 
of the prospective providers to deliver the service.181 Furthermore, the Systems Act provides 
that the capacity and potential future capacity of prospective service providers to furnish the 
skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of services form part of a criteria 
relevant for the awarding of a contract.182 
As such, the private party to a PPP must display the capacity now and in the future to furnish 
the necessary skills and resources for the provision of a service. A private party, for example, 
must not only design and build but also finance, operate and maintain the facilities for the 
provision of the service under a long-term contract. At the end of the contract, the facilities so 
built are transferred to the municipality.183 In essence, a municipality purchases a complete and 
fully maintained facility or service. Every investment made by the private party remains local 
government’s property at the end of the contract period.184 Furthermore, during the duration of 
the contract, the expertise for the provision of the service is provided by the private party. 
Secondly, the legislative framework buttresses the need for the transfer of financial, technical 
and operational risk to the private provider. In the first place, the definition of a PPP states that 
the private party must assume substantial financial, technical and operational risks in 
connection with the performance of the municipal function, or the management or use of the 
municipal property, or both. In the second place, the Systems Act and the MFMA are replete 
 
 
 
181 Section 78(3)(b)(ii) Systems Act. 
182 Section 78(3)(b)(ii) Systems Act. 
183 The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (2004) 7. 
184 Mitchell D Capacity Development for Partnerships in South Africa: Increasing Service Delivery through 
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with provisions providing for the transfer of risk to the private party. As seen in the discussion 
of the legislative framework above, the Systems Act requires an assessment, during the 
feasibility study, of the extent to which the externalised service will transfer appropriate 
technical, operational and financial risk to the provider.185 Furthermore, during the competitive 
bidding stage, the Systems Act uses the transfer of appropriate technical, operational and 
financial risk to the private provider as part of a criteria relevant for the awarding of a 
contract.186 The MFMA in turn provides that the feasibility study must describe how the 
agreement will provide value for money to the municipality, be affordable, transfer appropriate 
technical, operational and financial risks to the private party.187 
Thirdly, the NPM principle of retaining ownership and control of the outsourced service or 
property or both in the municipality is sufficiently reflected in the legislative framework. 
Section 81 of the Systems Act makes it clear that when the municipality opts for using an 
external provider, it cannot divest itself of its responsibilities to provide that service to the 
community. A municipality remains responsible for ensuring that the service is provided to the 
local community in terms of the provisions of this Act.188 To this end, the contents of the service 
delivery agreement must reflect the municipality’s continuous responsibility for the proper 
delivery of that service.189 In negotiating the agreement, the municipality must also exercise its 
service authority so as to ensure uninterrupted delivery of the service in the best interest of the 
local community.190 To this end, there must be provisions in the service delivery agreement 
that ensure the continuity of the service if the provider, for whatever reason, is unable to 
perform its functions.191 Furthermore, provision must be made for the municipality to take over 
the service, including all assets, when the agreement expires or is terminated.192 
Moreover, the municipality must regulate the provision of the service by subjecting it to its 
performance management system,193 and monitor the implementation of the service delivery 
agreement  within  the  framework  of  the  performance  management  system194  by imposing 
 
 
 
185 Section 78(3)(c)(iv) Systems Act. 
186 Section 78(3)(c)(iv) Systems Act. 
187 Section 120(4)(b)(iii) MFMA. 
188 Section 81(1) Systems Act. 
189  Steytler & De Visser 2007: 9-33. 
190 Section 81(1)(e) Systems Act. 
191 Section 81(2)(d) Systems Act. 
192 Section 81(2)(e) Systems Act. 
193 Section 81(1)(a) read with section 41 Systems Act. 
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appropriate reporting obligations. In this regard, the agreement must confer effective power on 
the municipality to monitor the private party’s performance under the agreement and to manage 
and enforce the agreement.195 Likewise, the agreement must be made subject to the changes 
that may result from the periodic review of the IDP, as the service remains subject to the 
development priorities and objectives of the municipality in terms of the IDP.196 Additionally, 
the municipality must control the setting and adjustment of tariffs in line with its own tariff 
policy.197 As a result, the legislative framework for PPPs gives full effect to NPM principle of 
PPP. 
 
3.4 Practice 
Overall, the incidence or use of PPPs in South African municipalities is minimal. As at 2014 
there are only 27 active municipal PPPs in 21 municipalities registered as current projects in 
the National Treasury PPP Unit.198 Three of these are in the water sector, three in waste 
management, seven in tourism, three in accommodation, six in the energy sector, one in the 
fleet environment, one in the housing sector, and the rest in an undefined category called 
‘other’.199 
This poor showing in the incidence of PPPs, or lack of interest in the use of PPPs by the 
majority of municipalities, can be explained by concerns that have been raised since the current 
PPP regime came about in 2003 and 2005. One such concern is that the legislative framework 
is cumbersome and complex, thus requiring additional capacities within municipalities in terms 
of skills, institutional structures and legal prowess.200 This poses a challenge to the majority of 
South African municipalities, especially the non-metros. Although the risks are transferred to 
the private sector, the cost and toil of the extensive sections 78 and 120 procedures is 
prohibitive. 
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196 Section 81(1)(c) Systems Act. 
197 Section 81(1)(d) Systems Act. 
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As a result of the complexity of the PPP regime, the transaction costs, defined to mean the costs 
to establish and maintain a partnership, the legal, financial and technical advisory costs for both 
the public and the private partners, as well as the costs for organising the bidding process, are 
high. As a result, only 21 out of 257 municipalities201 have ventured to use PPPs as a 
mechanism to deliver services.202 Furthermore, even though the majority of these current PPPs 
were initiated in 2011, none of them has actually reached the final stage, namely the signing of 
the PPP agreement. Even the private sector has shown signs of reluctance to get involved in 
municipal PPPs, which are relatively smaller projects. It considers that the complex rules that 
have to be followed for the implementation of PPPs make sense for large-scale projects, which 
are profitable over a longer period of time, allowing the important initial investment to be 
covered. The existing rules are viewed as too restrictive for smaller projects.203 
Given that the national government is enjoined, in terms of both section 120 of the MFMA204 
and section 78 of the Systems Act,205 to assist municipalities in carrying out the feasibility 
studies is established a PPP Unit, situated in the National Treasury, to do the following. First, 
the PPP unit provides technical assistance to municipalities through project feasibility studies, 
procurement and management.206 Secondly, the PPP Unit is aimed at promoting an enabling 
environment for PPPs by facilitating certainty in the regulatory framework, developing best 
practice guidelines, and providing training, among other things.207 However, there does not 
seem to be certainty in the regulatory framework for PPPs, and the technical assistance offered 
to municipalities does not seem to sway them into opting for the PPP route when contemplating 
the modes of service delivery. As things stand, municipalities have to consult the Systems Act, 
the MFMA and its attendant PPP Regulations, and sector legislation governing the particular 
service to be outsourced. 
Furthermore, the PPP Unit has not been active in assisting municipalities in carrying out the 
prescribed procedure for outsourcing and so ensuring that compliance with the various   legal 
 
 
 
 
 
201 This is the latest number of municipalities after the redemarcation that took effect after the August 2016 local 
elections. 
202 National Treasury Public-Private Partnership. 
203 Castalia Strategic Advisors & Ukhamba Advisory Services, 2007: i-ii. 
204 Section 120(5) MFMA. 
205 Section 78(6) Systems Act. 
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provisions is not too daunting for small municipalities.208 As a result, the complexity and 
elaborate nature of the outsourcing procedures are swaying municipalities against the 
outsourcing route.209 
The second possible reason for the minimal use of the PPPs is the fact that even after 
outsourcing the service, the municipality is still required by law to play an active role in the 
maintenance of the PPP contract. First, the municipality must still play an active role in 
ensuring that the PPP agreement is enforced and the outsourced activity is effectively and 
efficiently carried out in accordance with the agreement. Secondly, if a municipal property is 
the subject of the PPP, the municipality must ensure that such property is appropriately 
protected against forfeiture, theft, loss, wastage or misuse. Thirdly, the municipality must 
monitor the performance of the private party on a monthly basis. 
As seen herein above, this requires the municipal manager to establish the capacity in the 
administration to assist in performing this function and overseeing the day-to-day management 
of the contract. This also includes the appointment of a project officer, from either inside or 
outside the municipality, who has the appropriate skills and experience. So much for 
outsourcing the service or property to a private provider. It looks much as if the municipality 
is still actively involved in the provision of the service rather than having outsourced it. There 
are hence no incentives for a municipality to go through a bruising section 78 and 120 
procedure only to play an even more active role than before in the provision of the service, to 
the extent of establishing additional capacity or appointing project officers. 
The next section examines examples of public-private partnerships in the water sector at local 
level. Although water is a key service that municipalities must deliver, one that requires 
engineering skills and resources, there are few public-private partnership contracts in the water 
sector. The majority of municipalities, especially in rural areas, do not have the necessary skills 
and resources.210 To complicate matters further, the Water Services Act211 contains additional 
requirements for outsourcing water and sanitation services. A striking feature in the 
requirements of the Water Services Act, which sets it apart from the Systems Act and the 
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MFMA, is that a municipality is obliged, when assessing and selecting a potential providers, 
first to consider all known public sector providers ‘which are willing and able to perform the 
relevant functions’ before it can look at the private sector.212 Furthermore, the municipality is 
required to publicly disclose its intention to enter into or renew a contract with an external 
provider.213 The potential water services provider must also disclose any other interests it may 
have with the municipality and the rate of return on investment, if any, it will gain from the 
contract.214 
This demonstrates an ambivalence towards outsourcing water and sanitation services that is 
contrary to the ethos of the 1998 and 2000 White Papers, both of which encourage outsourcing 
to and involvement of the private sector where appropriate.215 As seen above, the 1998 White 
Paper states categorically in this regard that the issue is not one of choosing between public 
and private providers but finding the most appropriate combination of options for achieving a 
policy objective. 
A further set of regulations governing contracts entered into with external water service 
providers was issued in 2002.216 These provide for matters that must be included in a water 
services contract, many of which overlap with Systems Act and MFMA requirements.217 The 
matters include setting performance targets,218 protection of assets,219 annual reports,220 and 
dispute-resolution mechanisms.221 Furthermore, the regulations prohibit a contract from 
exceeding 30 years in duration.222 The regulations also provide that the contract ‘must provide 
an incentive for the water service provider to perform efficiently and effectively’.223 
Johnson maintains that even though the Water Services Act and the regulation issued pursuant 
thereto are adding to, and to some extent duplicating, the already existing requirements for a 
municipality  to  outsource  its  services,  they  can  be  easily  dovetailed  with  the      overall 
 
 
 
212 Section 19(2) Water Service Act. 
213 Section 19(3) Water Service Act. 
214 Section 19(4) Water Service Act. 
215  Johnson 2004: 65. 
216 Water Services Provider Contract Regulations (GN R980 GG 23636 of 19 July 2002) (hereafter Water 
Regulations). 
217  Johnson 2004: 61. 
218 Regulation 5 Water Regulations. 
219 Regulation 11 Water Regulations. 
220 Regulation 19 Water Regulations. 
221  Regulation 22 Water Regulations. 
222 Regulation 9(a) Water Regulations. 
223 Regulation 12(a) Water Regulations. 
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outsourcing framework contained in the Systems Act.224 However, that does not change the 
complexity of outsourcing requirements for the majority of municipalities. A small rural 
municipality which is considering outsourcing some of its services due to its limited size and 
resources has to consult, depending on which outsourcing options are chosen, at least three 
different pieces of legislation, conduct at least three different public participation processes and 
conduct at least three assessment and/or feasibility studies, all of them slightly different. This 
is unduly burdensome for the majority of municipalities, hence the minimal use made of PPPs, 
especially in the water sector. 
As a result, there are only three municipalities countrywide with active public-private 
partnership water projects, namely Sedibeng District Municipality, eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality225 and Lephalale local municipality.226 The one water project at Lephalale local 
municipality is at feasibility-study stage. The Lephalale local municipality’s IDP of 2014 stated 
that the ‘[s]ection 78 process with regard to determination of appropriate mechanisms for water 
provisioning’ would only be finalised in 2016.227 Consequently, Lephalale local municipality 
similarly does not lend itself to proper analysis as there is no track record of implementation 
as yet. 
The water PPP projects that lend themselves to analysis, owing to the period of time in 
operation, are projects that predate the current PPP regime. One of them was concluded in 1999 
between the Mbombela local municipality (formerly Nelspruit Town Council) and a British 
company, BiWater, which is the parent company of Greater Nelspruit Utility Corporation, now 
operating under the name Sembcorp Silulumanzi.228 This transaction was entered into because 
of the water constraints in the newly amalgamated municipality.229 
 
 
 
 
224  Johnson 2004: 62. 
225 In 2005 the eThekwini Municipality started the section 78 process to review of the way in which it is structured 
to deliver water services, with the overall intention of improving the efficiency, affordability and sustainability of 
the delivery of water services within its area of supply. A report on the results of the section 78 feasibility study 
was submitted in 2008, at which time the decision was made not to change the current arrangement for the 
provision of the water service. 
226 National Treasury database, available at 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Lists/PPP%20Project%20List%20Master/Water.aspx (accessed 26 September 2016). The 
database was last updated in March 2013. 
227 Lephalale 2014-2016 IDP: 191. 
228 Bender P & Gibson S Case Study for the 10 Years of the Mbombela (Nelspruit) Water and Sanitation 
Concession, South Africa (2010) 15. In July 2010, Silulumanzi was sold to Sembcorp of Singapore and became 
Sembcorp Silulumanzi. 
229 Gibson S ‘Service delivery solutions for water services – Learning from private business: water and 
wastewater’ (2012) 37(1) IMIESA 33. 
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Prior to 1995, the Nelspruit Town Council served a population of only 25 000 residents, all of 
which received full reticulation, at high pressure, of water supply and waterborne sanitation 
services.230 This changed in 1995 with the formation of the Nelspruit Transitional Local 
Council and later Mbombela local municipality, as the population served by the new 
municipality increased ten-fold to 250 000,231 all of which predominantly relied on the tax base 
of the town of Nelspruit.232 The majority of the newly added areas had never been serviced 
with water and sanitation before, placing considerable strain on existing resources. 
Furthermore, the Nelspruit Transitional Local Council’s capital budget, only a third of which 
was set aside for water services (R8.5 million) was ‘woefully inadequate to meet service 
needs’.233 The municipality, therefore, entered into a PPP for 30 years with Greater Nelspruit 
Utility Corporation. 
As it is a public-private partnership, all fixed assets remain the property of the municipality – 
none of the assets can be sold without permission of the municipality. Sembcorp Silulumanzi 
will return the assets in a specified condition at the end of the 30-year contract.234 At the time 
this thesis was written, the contract was in its seventeenth year and was therefore ripe for 
assessment. Given that the concession was entered into before 2000, the changes in municipal 
boundaries following the 2000 elections have inadvertently resulted in half of the population 
in Mbombela local municipality being served by a private company, with the other half served 
by the municipality itself.235 
This PPP was ‘hailed as the type of public-private partnership that is needed to ensure 
investment to extend and sustain water services’.236 Indeed, infrastructure was extended to 
previously excluded areas.237 In this regard, the Institute of Municipal Engineering of Southern 
Africa (IMESA) reported in 2012 that ‘virtually every household in the concession area  now 
 
 
 
 
230 Brown J Water Service Subsidies and the Poor: A Case Study of Greater Nelspruit Utility Company, Mbombela 
Municipality, South Africa (2005) 9 (hereafter Brown 2005). 
231 A number of townships and the previous Kangwane self-governing territory were incorporated into the new 
entity. 
232 Smith L, Gillet, A & White F ‘Public money, private failure: Testing the limits of market-based solutions for 
water delivery in Nelspruit’ in McDonald DA & Ruiters G (eds) The Age of Commodity: Water Privatization in 
Southern Africa (2003) 9. Nelspruit, the principal town of Mbombela, is also the capital of Mpumalanga province. 
233  Smith et al. 2003: 9. 
234  Brown 2005: 25. 
235 Mbombela Local Municipality is both a Water Service Authority and a Water Service Provider. 
236 De Visser JW & Mbazira C Water Delivery: Public or Private? (2006) 48 (hereafter De Visser & Mbazira 
2006). 
237 Smith, Gillet & White 2004: 135 quoted in De Visser & Mbazira 2006: 48. 
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has some access to water’.238 This means that 94 per cent of households in 2012 had some form 
of access to the formal water system, compared to 45 per cent in 1999, and 88 per cent was 
receiving water on a daily basis.239 IMESA further reports that the ‘water and effluent quality 
is excellent in the systems operated by the concessionaire’.240 This was corroborated by the 
Blue and Green Drop Awards received by the company from the Department of Water 
Affairs.241 Furthermore, water and sanitation tariffs are similar to, even lower than, those in 
comparable municipalities.242 
However, this transaction is not without its challenges. The concessionaire, GNUC, has had 
major difficulty in navigating South Africa’s realities of deep poverty, which have resulted in 
non-payment for water services.243 The market principles of cost reflective pricing and cost 
recovery systems attendant to a PPP transaction were rendered nugatory by the grinding 
poverty, combined with the legacy of non-payment as a means of protest against illegitimate 
apartheid local authorities. Smith therefore argues that the application of some of NPM 
principles is not appropriate for the South African reality.244 The abstract principles of the NPM 
flounder when they hit the concrete reality on the ground. 
Another example of a PPP transaction that proved unsuited for the South African reality also 
predates the current PPP regime. In this case, in 1995 the former Fort Beaufort Transitional 
Local Council, later called Nkonkobe local municipality,245 awarded a 10-year contract to 
Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (WSSA), a subsidiary of a French water multi- 
national Suez Lyonnaise.246 The contract entailed that WSSA would manage and operate water 
and  sanitation  services  in  return  for  management  fees.247    Similarly,  Nkonkobe       local 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Gibson S ‘Service delivery solutions for water services - learning from private business: water and wastewater’ 
(2012) 37(1) IMIESA 33 (hereafter Gibson 2012). 
239  Gibson 2012: 33. 
240  Gibson 2012: 33. 
241 Department of Water and Sanitation Blue Drop Report (2014) 3. See also 2011 Green Drop Report. 
242  Gibson 2012: 33-4. 
243 Smith L, Mottiar S & White F Testing the Limits of Market-based Solutions to the Delivery of Essential 
Services: The Nelspruit Water Concession (2003) 8 (hereafter Smith et al. 2003). 
244  Smith et al. 2003: 9. 
245 Nkonkobe Local Municipality was disestablished after the 3 August 2016 municipal elections and merged with 
Nxuba Local Municipality to form Raymond Mhlaba Local Municipality. 
246  Nkonkobe case: 2. 
247 De Visser JW ‘Water privatisation contract cancelled’ (2002) 4(2) Local Government Bulletin 11. 
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municipality is comprised of poverty-stricken rural areas where people are unable to pay for 
services. It includes Alice, Fort Beaufort, Middledrift and Seymour.248 
When the municipality could not pay the management fees, owing to non-payment by residents 
and to the fact that the fees had started absorbing a fifth of the municipality’s budget,249 
problems in the contract emerged. WSSA threatened to discontinue water delivery to municipal 
residents, and the municipality in turn sought a court intervention. The municipality was saved 
by the court, which found the contract invalid on grounds that the public participation 
procedures were not followed before the contract was entered into. The court then nullified the 
contract in 2001.250 
These contracts have proved difficult for consumers, workers and for the water companies 
alike, because they are based on a rigorous cost recovery system in terms of which water is 
provided on the basis of the ability to pay rather than as a basic need.251 When this system of 
commodification of water hits the reality of grinding poverty on the ground, it is turned on its 
head. This supports the assertion that some NPM principles are not suitable for application in 
their pure form in the South African context. 
 
3.5 Assessment 
It emerges from the forgoing that the legislative framework for municipal PPPs did not give 
expression to this NPM principle in a manner that facilitates proper implementation. The 
procedures for outsourcing the provision of municipal services are prohibitively onerous and 
convoluted. First, the section 78 procedure is impossible to implement. It entails four stages, 
all of which require some form of an elaborate assessment or a feasibility study. Secondly, 
section 120 of the MFMA and PPP Regulations further complicate the procedure for 
externalising services by imposing additional layers of compliance. As a result, the use of PPPs 
in local government is minimal. The CEO of the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA), Xolile George, has added his voice to the complex nature of this procedure, stating 
that ‘legal requirements for public-private partnerships are daunting for municipalities, 
especially smaller non-metros with limited capacity’.252  As a result, only 21 out of 257 
 
 
 
248 Hall D, Bayliss K, Lobina E Water Privatisation in Africa: Municipal Services Project Conference (2002) 11. 
249  Smith et al. 2004: 159. 
250 Nkonkobe case: 17. 
251  De Visser and Mbazira 2006: 49. 
252 George X Municipal Public-Private Partnerships for the Delivery of Sustainable Human Settlements: 
Opportunities and Constraints (2013) 6. 
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municipalities countrywide have attempted externalising services using public-private 
partnerships. 
Even though there might be coherence between the classical PPP and how it is operationalised 
in South Africa, the process towards the conclusion of the South African PPP is shrouded in 
layers upon layers of procedure and compliance. These procedures require time, resources and 
know-how within the staff of the municipality contemplating originating and implementing a 
PPP. The unfortunate reality is that all or most of these preconditions are lacking in the majority 
of municipalities in South Africa. The PPP Unit has not been active in providing the technical 
assistance required at different stages of externalising the service through public-private 
partnerships. As a result, the PPP process takes a considerable amount of administrative time 
and cost.253 The duration of the overall PPP process from inception to procurement, takes 
between two to five years to complete, depending on the capacity of a municipality.254 As at 
2014, of the 27 projects initiated in 2011, seven were still at an inception stage, 10 at a 
feasibility study stage, seven at a procurement stage and three at a negotiations stage.255 
By overprescribing the use of PPPs, as a direct result of pressure from the unions, which argued 
that PPPs were the preliminary step towards privatisation,256 the government demonstrated that 
is not serious about making PPPs work. It is submitted that central government did not trust 
municipalities enough to go about PPP professionally, and thus prescribed at length how things 
should be done. The ill-effects of mistrust are real given the fact that about a quarter of 
municipalities are dysfunctional.257 
It also emerges that there is a policy bias, in the water and sanitation sector, toward traditional 
public procurement and against PPPs. The Water Services Act, for example, in complete 
disregard of the purport of the 1998 and 2000 White Papers, places an obligation on 
municipalities, when assessing and selecting potential providers, to first consider public sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
253  National Treasury Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review (2015) 43. 
254 Republic of South Africa Public–Private Partnership Manual Module 6: Managing the PPP Agreement (2004) 
384. 
255 National         Treasury         PPP          Unit         Public-Private         Partnership          available          at 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Lists/PPP%20Project%20List%20Master/Municipal.aspx (accessed 18 June 2017) 
(hereafter PPP Unit Public-Private Partnership). 
256  Hemson D Privatisation, Public-Private Partnerships and Outsourcing: The Challenge to Local Governance 
(1997) 18. 
257  Back to Basics (2014) 4. 
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providers before they can look at the private sector. This means that municipalities are 
discouraged from taking the PPP route when outsourcing their water and sanitation services. 
It is further apparent that even when an external company is appointed to provide a service to 
communities on behalf of the municipality, the municipality still remains responsible for 
ensuring that those services are delivered properly. This serves as a disincentive for most 
municipalities wishing to opt for the PPP route in delivering services. Why should 
municipalities go through a toilsome and expensive PPP procedure trying to get a private 
company to deliver services to communities on their behalf if they are still, by law, required to 
regulate the provision of the service, monitor and assess whether the service provider is keeping 
to the agreement, including how well it is performing the service, and use their authority and 
resources to make sure that services are delivered without interruption and in the best interests 
of the local community? 
The majority of municipalities thus have little option but to insist on performing the functions 
themselves even though they are not doing well in this regard. The resources and expertise that 
come with partnering with a private company are offset by the transaction costs of establishing 
and maintaining a partnership. It is suggested that this is prohibitive for both the municipality 
and the private provider, since the complex rules that have to be followed make sense only for 
large-scale projects, which are profitable only over a longer period of time that allows the 
important initial investment to be covered. There is therefore a lack of fiscal imperative to use 
municipal PPPs. 
Furthermore, and linked to the issue of lack of fiscal imperatives, the rationale of transferring 
significant risks to the private provider collides head-on with the concrete reality of grinding 
poverty and underdevelopment in South African municipalities. In the majority of cases the 
private company is expected to recovery its management fees or payment for performing the 
municipal function or for utilising the municipal property, by way of charges or fees it collects 
from users or customers of a service provided to them. However, given the fact that majority 
of South African municipalities are servicing poor residents, coupled with the culture of non- 
payment, the NPM market principles of cost-reflective pricing and cost-recovery systems 
attendant on a PPP transaction are proving futile. Instead, enforcing strict credit control 
measures to improve payment levels, such as water cut-offs, removing meters, and reducing 
the 24-hour supply to intermittent hours during the day and night, have resulted in  increasing 
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levels of illegal reconnections.258 This reinforces the assertion that the abstract ideals of the 
NPM are found wanting when they hit the concrete realities on the ground. PPPs are not suited 
for the South African reality of poverty and joblessness. 
 
4 Corporatisation 
4.1 NPM principles 
Corporatisation is another item on the NPM menu, one which entails converting line 
departments of government into free-standing agencies or establishing semi-autonomous 
agencies or public entities, run by their own boards of directors, that render public functions 
on behalf of departments.259 This allows for the separation of policy-making and 
implementation functions or responsibilities in terms of which governments focus on policy 
formulation while the agencies work on implementation. The provision of public services is 
transferred from the realm of government into a corporation or agency, which has a contract- 
like, arm’s-length relationship with the parent municipality. In terms of this relationship, the 
parent municipality appoints the management of these entities, which then report to it at 
specified times. The agency would be run like a business 
 
4.2 Legislative framework 
The White Paper on Local Government defines corporatisation, in the context of local 
government, as the separation of service delivery units from council, the aim being to offer the 
management of service units greater autonomy and flexibility in introducing commercial 
management practices in the delivery of services.260 The rationale for the creation of semi- 
autonomous or self-standing entities is to ensure an arm’s-length distance between the entity 
and the parent municipality. The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit further defines 
corporatisation as a creation of an independent separate legal corporate entity to manage the 
provision of a municipal service, the ownership of which remains with the municipality but 
which operates with the freedom and flexibility associated with private sector business261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258  Smith 2003: 12. 
259 See Chapter Two, section 6.2 for more information. 
260 White Paper 1998 163 para. 2.2.2. 
261  Service Delivery Options 2003. 
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Corporatisation therefore proposes to separate service delivery units from the bureaucratic 
environment of municipalities, thus ensuring that they operate in a deregulated environment. It 
is also aimed at addressing some of the administrative problems that emanate from an old 
system which is ‘controlled and managed through rigid and top-down procedures, which have 
hindered responsiveness and stifled initiative …’.262 It is hoped that institutions operating on 
business principles will have greater managerial flexibility and thus be more cost-effective, 
efficient and responsive than ordinary service departments.263 For example, the municipality 
must demonstrate ‘a need to perform that function or power in accordance with business 
practices in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the municipality more efficiently’ before 
establishing a private company.264 As a counterweight, the municipal council must set policy 
and service standards and hold the unit to account against those standards.265 The council must 
clearly define ‘reporting requirements and accountability mechanisms’.266 
 
4.2.1 Types of entities 
Before the enactment of the Systems Act in 2000, municipalities created municipal entities in 
a variety of legal clothes. These included companies, co-operatives, trusts, or other corporate 
entities.267 The enactment of the Systems Act did not fundamentally change the situation but 
allowed instead for greater flexibility in the creation of municipal entities, provided they were 
under the control and ownership of a municipality.268 This legal position was fundamentally 
altered in 2003 when the MFMA and the amendments to the Systems Act introduced an entirely 
new regime which is extensively regulated. Section 82 of the Systems Act was repealed269 and 
a new Chapter 8A was added, setting out three types of municipal entities and their governing 
structures.270 Currently, there are only three types of municipal entities that may be established 
by municipalities, namely a private company; a service utility for a municipality, or a multi- 
jurisdictional service utility catering for more than one municipality.271 
 
 
 
 
262  Green Paper: 78 para. 1. 
263 Kaul M Management Reforms in Government: A Review of International Practice and Strategies (2000) 86. 
264 Section 86E(1)(b)(1)(i) Systems Act. 
265  White Paper 1998: 163 para. 2.2.2. 
266  White Paper 1998: 163 para. 2.2.2. 
267 Steytler N, Ntliziywana P & De Visser J A Study into Policy Intent and Practice as Regards Municipal Entities 
(2010) 6 (hereafter Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010). 
268 Section 82(1)(a) Systems Act. 
269  Repealed by section 14 Act 44 of 2003. 
270  Inserted by section 18 Act 44 of 2003. 
271 Section 86(B)(1) Systems Act. 
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The MFMA prescribes a process to be followed when establishing or acquiring an entity. This 
process entails, first, the consideration of the relevant factors, and, secondly, consultation with 
the relevant parties on the basis of the consideration made. The relevant factors that require 
consideration are as follows: 
 the financial implications of establishing or participating in an entity, which 
includes the implications of acquiring an interest in a private company that would 
render that company a municipal entity;272 
 the precise function or service that such entity would perform on behalf of a 
municipality;273 and 
 the impact that the shifting of the function to the entity will have on the 
municipality’s staff, assets and liabilities.274 
The second aspect of the process entails consulting with the public275 and inviting comments 
from the local community, organised labour and other interested persons within 90 days before 
the meeting of the council at which the proposed establishment of the entity is to be considered 
for approval.276 The municipality must also solicit the views and recommendations of the 
following relevant parties: 
 the National Treasury and the relevant provincial treasury;277 
 
 the national and provincial departments responsible for local government; 278 and 
 
 the MEC for local government in the province.279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
272 Section 84(3) MFMA. 
273 Section 84(1)(a) MFMA. 
274 This includes the assessment of the number of staff to be transferred; the number that would become redundant; 
the consequent cost of retrenchment or retention of redundant staff; whether assets will be transferred to the entity 
or become obsolete; and whether to cede (or retain) any debt or liabilities to the entity (section 84(1)(b)(i)-(vii) 
MFMA). 
275 Section 84(2)(a)(i)(aa) MFMA. 
276 Section 84(2)(a)(i)(bb) MFMA. 
277 Section 84(2)(a)(ii)(aa) MFMA. 
278 Section 84(2)(a)(ii)(bb) MFMA. 
279 Section 84(2)(a)(ii)(cc) MFMA. 
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At the meeting considering the matter, the council must consider the assessment report and the 
comments and recommendations of the parties who have been consulted.280 In what follows, 
the three types of municipal entities will be examined in some detail. 
 
4.2.1.1 Private company 
A municipality may establish or acquire a private company or an interest in such a company in 
one of following three options. First, a municipality may establish a company or acquire full 
ownership of a private company.281 Secondly, it may jointly with other municipalities and/or 
national or provincial organs of state, establish or acquire a company.282 This company only 
becomes a municipal entity when the municipality has effective control over it.283 In the case 
where the national and/or provincial organs of state are in control, the company is referred to 
as the public entity284 governed by the PFMA.285 Thirdly, a municipality may acquire or hold 
an interest in a private company jointly with a party other than an organ of state, provided that 
the company is in the effective control of the municipality, singly or collectively with other 
municipalities. 286 In all these three options, the crucial requirement is that organs of state must 
have effective control of the private company. A municipality may thus have a minority interest 
only when an organ of state holds effective control.287 
The Systems Act sets three basic requirements for the establishment or acquisition of a 
company.288 First, the purpose must be to use the company as a mechanism to assist in the 
performance of any of the municipality’s functions and powers.289 Secondly, and more 
demandingly, the municipality must be able to demonstrate that there is a need to perform that 
function or power in  accordance with  business  practices  in  order to  achieve the    strategic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
280 Section 84(2)(b) MFMA. 
281 Section 86C(2)(a) Systems Act. 
282 Section 86C(2)(b) Systems Act. 
283 Section 86D(1)(a) Systems Act. 
284 Section 86D(1)(b) Systems Act. 
285  Act 1 of 1999. 
286 Section 86C(2)(c) Systems Act. 
287 Section 1 of the Systems Act defines effective control as the power of a shareholder to appoint or remove at 
least the majority of the board of directors or to control at least the majority of the voting rights at a general 
meeting of the company. 
288 Section 86E(1)(c) Systems Act. 
289 Section 86E(1)(a) Systems Act. 
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objectives of the municipality more effectively.290 Thirdly, a demonstrable case should also be 
made that the company would benefit the local community.291 
Further requirements are added when two or more municipalities intend to establish or acquire 
a company. First, they must have reached an agreement on proposals for shared control of the 
company. Secondly, they must consider cash flow projections on the company’s proposed 
operations for at least three financial years.292 Furthermore, when the company is to be used as 
a mechanism to provide a municipal service, the requirements of Chapter 8 of the Systems Act 
must be met.293 
The establishment or acquisition of the company is done in terms of the Companies Act294 and 
any other law regulating companies. Similarly, the internal governance structure of the private 
company is governed by the Companies Act.295 However, in case of conflict between the 
Companies Act or any other applicable legislation and the Systems Act, the Systems Act 
prevails.296 The private company which is a municipal entity must restrict its activities to the 
purpose for which it is used by the parent municipality.297 It cannot have functions or powers 
wider than those of the parent municipality or municipalities. A municipality may transfer 
ownership or otherwise dispose of a wholly-owned company in accordance with the provisions 
of the PFMA.298 Of importance is, first, that the permanent disposal of ownership of a capital 
asset that is needed to provide the minimum level of basic municipal services is prohibited. 
Secondly, the disposal may not result in the remaining shareholding municipalities losing 
effective control over a company to a non-state investor.299 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 Section 86E(1)(b)(i) Systems Act. As the decision to establish an entity rests with the council, it is the council 
that must be convinced that there is a demonstrable need and benefit. A full motivation must be submitted to the 
council and other interested parties who must be consulted on the decision. 
291 Section 86E(1)(b)(ii) Systems Act. The benefit to the local community should refer to better service delivery 
in terms of costs, quality and sustainability. 
292 Section 86F(b) and (c) Systems Act. 
293 Section 86E(2) Systems Act. 
294  Act 71 of 2008. 
295 Section 86C(3) Systems Act.  
296  Section 86C(3) Systems Act. 
297  Section 86D(2)(a) Systems Act. 
298  Section 86G(a) Systems Act. 
299 Section 86 S 86G(b)(ii) Systems Act. 
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4.2.1.2 Service utility 
A service utility is a municipal entity established in terms of a by-law that creates a juristic 
person under the sole control of the municipality.300 As the by-law is the legal basis of the 
utility, the municipality cannot confer on the utility any functions or powers that fall outside 
its competence.301 The same three basic requirements for the establishment or acquisition of a 
company also apply to setting up a service utility.302 Similarly, when a utility is to be used as a 
mechanism to provide a municipal service, the requirements of Chapter 8 of the Systems Act 
must be met.303 
The by-law establishing the utility must set out all aspects of its governance and operations in 
a manner consistent with the Systems Act and the MFMA.304 Section 86H(2)(a)-(d) spells out 
what those governance and operational aspects of the utility should be and they are not repeated 
here. The municipality may disestablish a utility by repealing the by-law.305 In such an event, 
all assets, liabilities, rights and obligations of the utility vest in the municipality.306 
Furthermore, staff of the utility must be dealt with in terms of the applicable labour law.307 
 
4.2.1.3 Multi-jurisdictional service entity 
A multi-jurisdictional service entity is established by more than one municipality by a written 
agreement that creates a juristic person in the same manner as any partnership is formed.308 
However, the Minister for Local Government can, in the national interests and in consultation 
with the cabinet member responsible for the functional area in question, also request two or 
more municipalities to establish such an entity.309 This type is created to perform any functions 
or powers of the participating municipalities, within their respective areas of jurisdiction or  a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 Section 86I(1) Systems Act. 
301 Section 86I(2)(b) Systems Act. 
302 Section 86J(2)(c) Systems Act. However, further conditions may be prescribed by the minister responsible for 
local government. 
303 Section 86J(2) Systems Act. 
304 Section 86H(2) and (3) Systems Act. 
305 Section 86K(1) Systems Act.  
306  Section 86K(2)(a) Systems Act. 
307  Section 86K(2)(b) Systems Act. 
308  Section 87 Systems Act. 
309 Section 88 Systems Act. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
316 
Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
designated part of those areas.310 This means the utility is restricted in its activities to the objects 
of its establishment and the competences conferred upon it by its founding agreement.311 
The agreement, which is the legal basis for the formation of the multi-jurisdictional service 
utility, must describe the totality of its structure and functioning, including the rights, 
obligations and responsibilities of the parent municipalities.312 This includes the amendment of 
the agreement and any other matter necessary for the proper functioning of the utility.313 
Section 89 of the Systems Act spells out what the agreement should contain and this is not 
repeated here. The utility is terminated automatically when there is only one municipality left 
or when the parent municipalities so decide by a written agreement. Termination may also 
follow automatically upon the termination date or the fulfilment of any condition that was set 
in the agreement314 
 
4.3 Coherence with the NPM 
There seems to be, at first glance, coherence between the NPM tenet of corporatisation and 
how it is operationalised in South Africa. Even though the modalities or the particular brands 
used in South Africa might be unique, their overall purpose is in line with the original intent of 
this NPM tenet. First, the idea of creating a free-standing entity outside the parent department 
or ministry is to establish an institution which operates at arm’s length from the parent 
municipality. The Systems Act clearly encapsulates this principle when it provides that the 
parent municipality must allow the board of directors and the chief executive officer (CEO) to 
fulfil their responsibilities.315 This instruction applies also to mayors, who must exercise control 
over the entity. Such control should not impede the entity in the performance of its 
operational responsibilities.316 When the mayor monitors the operational functions of the entity, 
it must be done without interfering in the performance of those functions.317 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
310 Section 87 Systems Act. 
311 Section 90(2) Systems Act. 
312 Section 89 Systems Act. 
313 Section 89(i)(ii) and (iv) Systems Act. 
314 Section 93 Systems Act. 
315 Section 93A(b) Systems Act. 
316 Section 56(1)(b) MFMA. 
317 Section 56(2) MFMA. 
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Furthermore, the mayor is the official link between the entity and the council.318 This means 
that councillors play no role in the functioning of the entity. In instances where councillors 
purport to interfere in the financial affairs of the entity or the responsibilities of the board, the 
CEO must promptly report such interference to the speaker of the council and thereby enforce 
this separation between the council and the entity.319 The Systems Act further ensures this 
arm’s-length relationship with the municipality by disqualifying councillors or officials of a 
parent municipality from being a director of the municipal entity.320 Furthermore, the Chief 
Executive Officer of a municipal entity, appointed by the board, is accountable to the board for 
the management of the entity.321 While the municipality sets the upper limits of the salary, 
allowances and other benefits of the CEO and senior managers, the board determines the 
remuneration package. This is meant to ensure the financial independence of the CEO. 
Secondly, the municipality must exercise effective control over the entity. The primary duty of 
the parent municipality is to ensure that the entity ‘is managed responsibly and transparently, 
and meets its statutory, contractual and other obligations’.322 There are a number of 
mechanisms through which the municipality does this. First, the municipality participates in 
the making of some decisions and must authorise others. In this regard, the municipality must, 
by agreement with the entity, set and monitor annual performance objectives and indicators.323 
The councils must, each financial year, also approve the entity’s proposed budget submitted to 
it by the board.324 The parent municipality also exerts control by exercising shareholders rights 
and powers that it has over the entity.325 This entails the mayor convening any meeting of 
shareholders of a company or other general meeting comprising the board of directors and 
municipal representatives in order for the board to account for any of its actions.326 Other 
instances of exercising effective control relate to the monitoring and intervention measures the 
parent municipality has at its disposal. These range from having a municipal representative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
318 Section 93D(2) Systems Act. 
319 Section 103 MFMA. 
320 Section 93F Systems Act. 
321 Section 93J(2) Systems Act. 
322 Section 93A(a)(ii) Systems Act. 
323 Section 93B(a) and (b) Systems Act. 
324 Section 87(1) and (2) MFMA. 
325  Section 93A(a) Systems Act.  
326 Section 93D(2)(b) Systems Act. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
318 
Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
attend board meetings,327 regular reporting,328 appointment of an audit committee for the 
entity,329 removal of directors,330 imposing a financial plan,331 to the liquidation of the entity.332 
Furthermore, there exists an extensive regulatory framework in terms of which the municipality 
exercises firm control over the entity. In this regard, the directors are subject to the Code of 
Conduct applicable to councillors, and the CEO and staff of the entity to the Code of Conduct 
applicable to municipal staff.333 Furthermore, the same formal regulatory regime applicable to 
municipalities also applies to the entities in a manner that runs counter to the principle of letting 
managers manage. For example, the tight financial regime that the MFMA imposes on 
municipalities is also applicable to municipal entities. The tight regulatory control of the entity 
might impede the proper implementation of corporatisation. The other rationale for creating a 
stand-alone entity away from the parent municipality is precisely to cushion it from the 
strictures of regulation and red-tape. It would seem that in South Africa municipal entities are 
subject to the same laws and regulation as the parent municipality, which does not cohere with 
the original intent of the NPM tenet of corporatisation. As such, the manner in which the 
legislative framework gives expression to this NPM tenet impedes its proper implementation. 
South Africa is not alone in subjecting entities to the tight regulatory regime applicable to 
municipalities. Even a developed nation such as Norway seems to be in the same boat. A study 
of 12 Norwegian municipalities that were corporatised compared to those that were not, found 
that ‘these municipalities did not differ from Norwegian municipalities generally’. The division 
of administration into four departments, each headed by a department manager, did not differ. 
The corporatised entities mirrored the service departmental structure, with a system of political 
boards elected by the municipal council. The price for increased freedom for operational 
managers, in Norway as is the case in the UK and South Africa, has been an increase in efforts 
for more coordination and control from the strategic level.334 
 
 
 
 
 
 
327 Section 93I(1) read with section 93D(1)(a) Systems Act. 
328 Sections 87(11), 88(2), 127(1), 128(a) and (b), 104, 102(1), 173 MFMA. 
329 Sections 166(4)(a), 166(5) and 166(2) MFMA. 
330 Sections 93G(b) and (c)(i), and Schedule Systems Act. 
331 Section 109(b) MFMA. 
332 S93C(b) Systems Act. 
333 Section 93L Systems Act. 
334 Torsteinsen H ‘Why does post-bureaucracy lead to more formalism?’ (2012) 38(3) Local Government Studies 
327. 
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Singapore, which according to the UN country classification report335 is a developing nation 
such as South Africa, falls in another category. Corporatised entities in Singapore are not 
suffering from the bureaucratic clutches associated with service departments. They enjoy 
‘substantial discretion in prioritizing their programmes, apportioning financial and other 
resources, and delivering services’. These entities are sufficiently autonomous in Singapore, 
which is proving to be a success story among developing countries.336 
 
4.4 Practice 
4.4.1 Prevalence of municipal entities 
The extent of corporatisation in South African municipalities after the introduction of the new 
regime in 2003 is minimal, because corporate entities are no different from ordinary municipal 
administration and as such there is no incentive to corporatise services. Before 2003, 91 
municipal entities, which existed in a variety of legal clothes, were in existence. Gauteng 
province had the highest number, recording 44 of these municipal entities. The situation 
changed with the introduction of the new and elaborate regulatory regime in 2003. As at 30 
June 2014, there were 62 municipal entities countrywide.337 It would seem that despite changes 
in the law that limited the choice of municipal entities to three, the pre-2003 forms of entities 
are still operational. In this regard, the majority of section 21 companies and other private 
companies and trusts established before the 2003 amendments, are still in existence, with 
section 21 companies remaining the most commonly used to date. For example, of the 62 
municipal entities in existence as at 2014, there were 32 private companies; 18 section 21 
companies; seven service utilities and five trusts.338 In 2010, approximately 13 per cent of 
municipal entities in South Africa were classified as service utilities. Private companies and 
section 21 companies including trusts accounted for 87 per cent of municipal entities, per 
type.339  This is despite municipalities’ having been encouraged to take all the necessary steps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
335 United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2017: Country Classification available at 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/2017wesp_full_en.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
336 Sarker AE ‘New Public Management in developing countries: An analysis of success and failure with particular 
reference to Singapore and Bangladesh’ (2006) 19(2) International Journal of Public Sector Management 195. 
337  National Treasury Municipal Entities Report (2014) 2. 
338  National Treasury Municipal Entities Report (2014) 4. 
339 National Treasury Updated Municipal Entities Report (2010) 4. 
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to convert non-compliance structures such as section 21 companies, trusts and other forms into 
the three appropriate entities. 
These municipal entities perform the following municipal functions: 
 
 27 perform economic development and planning including business development; 
 
 seven perform housing-related services; 
 
 five entities perform sanitation or sewerage function; 
 
 five support community facilities; 
 
 four oversee transport and roads; 
 
 three perform tourism functions; and 
 
 the rest are divided between electricity services, finance and administration, 
markets, public safety, solid waste, and water.340 
Overall, there is only one municipality that has fully embraced corporatisation and taken the 
route of establishing municipal entities for rendering the majority of its core services. While 
other municipalities are experimenting with a variety of service delivery mechanisms, with the 
majority resorting to traditional methods of delivering services, the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality has gone all-out on the corporatisation route. In this regard, there 
are 12 municipal entities in the City of Johannesburg alone, compared to four in the City of 
Tshwane, three in Ekurhuleni Metro, three in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, two in EThekwini 
Metro, and two in the City of Cape Town.341 The City of Johannesburg is thus the only example 
of the NPM being in full effect in this regard. 
However, the City council, elected on 3 August 2016 is considering re-incorporating all its 
entities into mainstream municipal administration because of apparent lack of coordination and 
wastage.342 Other reasons cited for this mooted move to absorb municipal entities are, first, that 
some of them have been accused of mismanagement and corruption,343and secondly, that this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
340  National Treasury Municipal Entities Report (2014) 4. 
341  Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 17-19. 
342 Sekhotho K ‘City of Joburg approves integration of local SOEs’ EyeWitness News 29 January 2017. 
343 Mashego P ‘Joburg mulls absorbing municipal entities’ Business Day 8 November 2016. 
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move is meant to foster accountability and improve service delivery to the residents.344 In the 
words of Mashaba, the Executive Mayor of the City of Johannesburg: ‘With the service 
delivery challenges we have inherited in our city, the governance structure of entities is 
cumbersome and inefficient.’345 
In what follows, I discuss one example of a municipal entity of the City of Johannesburg to 
explain how the city’s system worked.346 
 
4.4.2 Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) 
The Johannesburg Roads Agency (Pty) Ltd is one of the private companies that operated in the 
previous regime and survived the amendments introducing the current regime. It was 
established in late 2000 as a company under the old section 82 of the Systems Act.347 One 
major consideration for its establishment was the ‘ring-fencing’ of staff from the Roads and 
Stormwater Departments of the City of Johannesburg.348 It was then incorporated in the same 
year under the Companies Act as a section 21 company349 and commenced its business on 1 
January 2001.350 The City of Johannesburg is the sole shareholder of the Company, making the 
company a Municipal Entity.351 The 2014/2015 Annual Report states that this municipal entity 
was 
 
formed as an alternative service delivery mechanism and [its] establishment 
and management is regulated under Chapter 8A of the Municipal Systems Act. 
The main purpose of the [municipal entity] is to ensure efficient and cost- 
effective service delivery. Although the [Johannesburg Roads Agency] is 
formed under the MSA it remains a registered State-owned Company (SOC) 
and is thus also regulated by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies 
Act) and exists as a separate legal entity from its shareholder. It is thus 
mandatory for the business and affairs of the [Johannesburg Roads   Agency] 
 
 
 
 
344 Magubane K ‘Joburg metro set to take control of municipal entities’ Business Day 30 January 2017 (hereafter 
Magubane 2017). 
345 Magubane 2017. 
346 Other entities in the City of Johannesburg are City Power; Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo; Johannesburg 
Development Agency; Joburg Market; Johannesburg Social Housing Company; Pikitup; Johannesburg Water; 
Metrobus; Metropolitan Trading Company; Joburg Theatre Company; and Johannesburg Property Company. 
347 JRA 2014/15 Annual Report: part 3. 
348 Dlamini MAV, Froneman ZJ & Clarke WSD Transformation of The Roads Delivery Process and System: The 
Johannesburg Initiative (2001) 1. 
349 JRA 2005/6 Annual Report states that it is an association incorporated under section 21. 
350 JRA 2009/10 Annual Report: 4. 
351 JRA 2014/15 Annual Report: part 3. 
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to be managed by the Board while taking into account its authority, and 
responsibility, as an accounting authority in relation to the City.352 
In terms of the founding documents of the company, and the Service Delivery Agreement 
entered into between the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and the company, 
the mandate of the company is to design, construct and maintain roads and roads-related 
infrastructure within the jurisdiction of the City of Johannesburg.353 The Johannesburg Roads 
Agency has been at the forefront in planning, designing, construction, operation, control, 
rehabilitation and maintenance of the roads and storm water infrastructure in the City of 
Johannesburg.354 
The company is managed by a Board of Directors, comprising of both executive and non- 
executive directors.355 All non-executive directors are appointed by the main shareholder 
annually and the selection process is driven solely by the shareholder in accordance with the 
City’s governance framework.356 The executive directors have five-year fixed-term contracts 
with the company and they report the City of Johannesburg, the shareholder, on their 
performance.357 The annual reports of the company state that it works in partnership with 
SANRAL, the public entity responsible for construction and maintenance of roads nationally, 
discussed in Chapter Five. After the 2006 local government elections, the City of Johannesburg 
adopted a new governance model, the cluster system. In terms of this model the company was 
clustered with another municipal entity, Metrobus, under the Transportation cluster/sector of 
the City. The company and Metrobus now have to account to the Member of the Mayoral 
Committee (MMC) responsible for transportation.358 
 
4.5 Assessment 
It was mentioned in the foregoing discussion that the legislative framework for alternative 
service delivery mechanisms introduced in 2003 hampered the implementation of 
corporatisation. It is elaborate and onerous. From a process point of view, the most demanding 
aspects of the exercise are the initial steps attendant on the decision to transfer the delivery of 
 
 
 
352 JRA 2014/15 Annual Report: part 3. 
353 JRA 2014/15 Annual Report: 6. 
354 JRA 2014/15 Annual Report: part 3. 
355 All the directors are non-executive, save for the Managing Director and the Chief Financial Officer, with the 
role of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer being separate. 
356 JRA 2015/16 Mid-Year Report: 6. 
357 JRA 2015/16 Mid-Year Report: 6. 
358 JRA 2014/15 Annual Report: part 3. 
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a municipal service to an entity. In this regard, section 78 of the Systems Act prescribes the 
procedure that a municipality must follow when choosing between delivering the service itself 
or appointing an external service provider to do so in terms of a service delivery agreement. 
An elaborate review must be conducted when deciding which mechanism (whether internal or 
external) is to be adopted for a particular service. 
The process entails a three-step process. First, an initial review of the way the municipality 
provides a particular service must be conducted.359 Secondly, if the use of an external provider 
is explored, a further enquiry, which includes a feasibility study that takes into account a 
number of factors, must be held.360 Finally, certain procedural and substantive requirements 
must be met when negotiating a service delivery agreement.361 
In the absence of case studies on why municipalities have not opted for corporatisation, a 
number of reasons are advanced. First, these elaborate processes, which are extremely difficult 
and expensive for some municipalities, are possibly why the majority of municipalities have 
decided to overlook establishing municipal entities as an option. Given the expenses involved, 
this mode of service delivery is not widely used by all categories of municipalities. It is used 
mostly by metros, district municipalities and secondary cities. All the metros have one form of 
a municipal entity or another, not all the district municipalities have them, and very few small 
municipalities have them.362 However, other metros have not opted for municipal entities as a 
mechanism to provide basic municipal services. The City of Cape Town and EThekwini metro 
have decided to use entities almost exclusively for convention centres.363 Because of the 
onerous nature of the current regime, the majority of municipalities with municipal entities that 
predate, and are not compliant with, the current regime are not prepared to convert them into 
any of the three permissible entities. 
Secondly, there is a further layer of procedural requirements to be met after deciding to adopt 
municipal entities as an external service delivery mechanism. These tight and inflexible legal 
requirements make the advantages that corporatisation would provide of dubious value, and as 
such corporatisation is an unlikely option for the majority of municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
359 Section 78(1) and (2) Systems Act. 
360 Section 78(3) Systems Act. 
361 Sections 80 and 84 Systems Act. 
362 National Treasury: Annexure A to the Municipal Entities Report as at 31 October 2014. 
363 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
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Thirdly, the other reason that led municipalities not to opt for corporatisation is opposition from 
the unions. They have always been vehemently opposed to corporatisation, arguing that is a 
precursor to privatisation, an end-result that is inimical to their interests and a people-centred 
service model.364 Corporatisation, therefore, was a battle many municipalities were not 
prepared to wage. The political environment was not favourable towards corporatising 
municipal services. 
Lastly, placing municipal entity in the same regulatory regime as municipalities has proven to 
be costly. Local government is an overregulated environment as it is. Establishing municipal 
entities as an alternative service delivery mechanism only adds an extra layer of governance 
and cost into the system. In this regard, an official of the City of Cape Town pointed out that 
the cost of compliance for the Cape Town International Convention Centre is R5 million per 
year, as at 2010.365 If municipal entities have to comply with the elaborate legal regime 
regulating local government in the same way that municipalities do and bear the same cost of 
compliance, then there is no incentive for municipalities to opt for municipal entities. 
Municipalities might as well do the job themselves. As a result, South African municipalities 
have resorted to the traditional and conventional ways of rendering services, ones which were 
viewed by the Green Paper as inefficient and monopolistic, solely responsible for all 
components of delivering core municipal services. 
In the final analysis, due to union pressures and the felt need for uniformity, the NPM tenet 
was never fully expressed in law. A trend is that where a municipality has the necessary 
capacity and expertise to provide basic services, there is no incentive to opt for 
corporatisation.366 However, where a particular area falls outside the traditional activities of the 
municipality, and as such there is no established capacity and expertise in that area, then 
corporatisation is seen as a viable option. A few examples of this trend are in the large metros 
of EThekwini and Cape Town. First, they both opted for municipal entities as a vehicle to run 
convention centres in Durban and Cape Town, which are not core municipal services. 
Secondly, the EThekwini metro established a municipal entity called Durban Marine Theme 
Park, with the aim of stimulating economic growth. Because running a theme park is not a core 
municipal business, a municipal entity was created for this purpose. Thirdly, the City of Cape 
 
 
 
364 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
365 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 31 
366 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
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Town resolved to establish a company to operate its rapid bus transport (BRT) system. Given 
that the provision of public transport was a new venture for the City, the operation of the BRT 
was to be entrusted to a municipal entity in the form of a private company.367 
All of this indicates that the original intent of this NPM tenet – separating service delivery units 
from the municipality to offer them greater autonomy and flexibility and to introduce business 
practices to achieve greater efficiency – is not the main consideration in opting for 
corporatisation. It would seem that only Johannesburg metro has opted for corporatisation as a 
mechanism for effective delivery of its core municipal services. However, deeper digging 
shows that even in this case corporatisation was used to counter the exodus of skilled personnel 
after 1995.368 Even though it is the only metro to corporatise most of its core municipal services, 
its motive was not to ensure an arm’s-length distance and to introduce business practices with 
the aim to achieve greater efficiency. The motive was to attract and/or retain skilled personnel 
during the turbulent period of transformation.369 
On the basis of this assessment, it is suggested that corporatisation, as with other NPM tenets, 
is not fully implemented in South African municipalities either. Where it is used as an 
alternative service delivery mechanism, it is used for the wrong reasons, namely to supplement 
a shortage of skills or lack of expertise in a particular area. 
The other indication that corporatisation in South Africa is wrongly implemented is in the area 
compliance with the regulatory regime applicable to municipalities. The requirement that the 
entity must be at arm’s-length but under the effective control of a municipality is misread to 
mean corporatised entities are subject to the same regulatory regime as municipalities. 
Municipal entities in South Africa are subject to the same tight procurement regime, 
competency level requirements, and to the latest budget and reporting regulations.370 Effective 
control is not the same thing as overregulation. These are two different things. Effective control 
relates to monitoring and reporting requirements, not subjecting the entity to the same 
overregulated environment. This defeats the purposes of creating a stand-alone entity. It is 
supposed to operate in a deregulated and flexible environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
367 City of Cape Town Business Plan: Phase 1A of Cape Town’s MyCiTi Integrated Rapid Transit System (2010) 
67. 
368 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
369 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
370 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 31. 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at how the modes of delivering services were reconfigured to include a 
full spectrum of service delivery option aligned with the NPM paradigm. This marked a sharp 
departure from the traditional and conventional methods in which municipal authorities 
rendered services to communities. These were viewed as inefficient and monopolistic as they 
tended to be responsible for all components of service delivery – jacks of all trades but masters 
of none. The introduction of alternative delivery mechanisms such as PPPs and corporatisation 
was meant to infuse private sector practices and techniques into municipalities and thereby 
ensure that the delivery of services becomes more efficient and cost-effective, and yields 
greater value for money, than an ordinary service department. Other imperatives that impelled 
the introduction of these service delivery options were the developmental needs of South 
Africa. These options were meant to draw resources and expertise from the private sector in 
order to help in rectifying the damages of apartheid manifested in infrastructure deficits, 
structural disparities, service backlogs and grinding poverty. 
However, the use of these alternative service delivery mechanism has been parsimonious. Very 
few municipalities make use of these alternative mechanisms for the delivery of services. 
Currently, there are only 62 municipal entities in operation and 27 active PPPs. This is largely 
owing, first, to the introduction of the new regulatory regime in 2003 which is much more 
elaborate and inflexible than before, impeding the proper implementation of these NPM 
principles. The section 78 process for deciding on a service delivery mechanism is burdensome 
and costly for municipalities and in fact serves as a disincentive for opting for external 
mechanisms of service delivery. Before the introduction of this new regime, a municipality 
could establish a company, or partner with an existing company in the case of a PPP, and be 
governed by the generic rules of company law and the service delivery agreement. 
This flexibility was negated by the 2003 amendments and the subsequent National Treasury 
regulations, effectively subjecting the private company to the same tight procurement regime 
applicable to municipalities. In the case of municipal entities, the same competency level 
requirements and budget and reporting regulations also apply, thus placing them in the same 
regulatory regime as municipalities. This added an extra layer of costly compliance, one that 
raises serious concerns about the value of these alternative service delivery mechanism. To 
avoid the extra compliance cost, the majority of municipalities have resorted to doing the job 
themselves. 
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Secondly, even after an alternative external mechanism is established to provide a service to 
communities on behalf of the municipality, the municipality still remains responsible for 
ensuring that those services are delivered properly. This serves as a disincentive for most 
municipalities in choosing alternative delivery mechanism. Municipalities would rather 
provide the service themselves than subject themselves to additional and costly responsibilities. 
It would seem that municipalities are not prepared to go through a toilsome and costly section 
78 procedure in order to get a private company to deliver services to communities on their 
behalf only to be actively involved again in the provision of the service(s). The law requires 
municipalities to regulate the provision of the service, monitor and assess whether the service 
provider is keeping to the agreement, including how well it is performing the service, and use 
its authority and resources to make sure that services are delivered without interruption and in 
the best interests of the local community. A municipality needs to have a parallel department 
with the necessary skills to be able to monitor the provision of a service(s). Even though the 
private company is meant to bring resources and skills into the partnership, that benefit is 
cancelled by the transaction costs of establishing and maintaining a partnership. These benefits 
would only be realised if the PPP Unit were to bear the cost and responsibility of a section 78 
process for deciding on a service delivery mechanism. 
Thirdly, there is a policy bias in some sectors against the use of external mechanism for the 
delivery of services and towards traditional public procurement. In the water and sanitation 
sector, for example, municipalities are enjoined to first consider public sector providers before 
they can look at the private sector. This discourages municipalities from using these external 
mechanisms for the delivery of their water and sanitation services. The unions have also exerted 
huge pressure against the use of alternative modes of service delivery, given that these 
mechanisms are seen as precursors to full-blown privatisation that threatens job security. 
Furthermore, in instances where the alternative modes of delivery are used at all, they are not 
used for their original intent. Corporatisation and PPPs are increasingly being used to plug the 
capacity gaps or lack of expertise in the few municipality that have opted for external modes 
of delivery. For example, municipalities with the necessary capacity and expertise to provide 
basic services do not use municipal entities or PPP to deliver services on their behalf. They 
deliver the services themselves. However, where a particular area falls outside the traditional 
activities of a municipality, and as such there is no established capacity and expertise in that 
area, then these alternative modes of service delivery are used. 
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A few examples of this trend, as far as corporatisation is concerned, are in the large metros of 
EThekwini and Cape Town which opted for municipal entities as a vehicle to run convention 
centres in Durban and Cape Town, and Theme Park (in Durban) which are not core municipal 
services. Moreover, the City of Cape Town aims to establish a company to operate its rapid 
bus transport (BRT) system, the provision of public transport being a new venture for the City. 
All of this indicates that the original intent of this NPM tenet of separating service delivery 
units from the municipality to offer them greater autonomy and flexibility and to introduce 
business practices to achieve greater efficiency is not the main consideration for opting for 
corporatisation. 
Fourthly, these tenets seem to be inappropriate for use in the South African context. For 
example, the rationale of transferring significant risks to the private provider in PPPs is 
undermined by the concrete reality of grinding poverty and underdevelopment in South African 
municipalities. In terms of this rationale, the private company is expected to recover its 
management fees or payment for performing the municipal function or for utilising the 
municipal property, by way of charges or fees it collects from users or customers of a service 
provided to them. However, given the fact that the majority of South African municipalities 
are servicing poor communities, coupled with the culture of non-payment, the NPM market 
principles of cost reflective pricing and cost recovery systems attendant to a PPP transaction 
are rendered futile. Instead, enforcing strict credit control measures to improve payment levels 
has led to increasing levels of illegal reconnections and lawlessness. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
The Resurgence of Weberian Bureaucracy at the Local Level 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the resurgence of the Weberian model of service delivery in local 
government. Throughout the three previous chapters, it was shown that the Weberian model of 
service delivery was not displaced. Instead, the NPM model which sought to supplant it never 
took off as envisaged – it was too difficult to implement. In instances where the NPM was 
implemented, it often produced adverse outcomes such as patronage, corruption, 
maladministration, to mention just a few. As a result of the failures by the NPM model of 
delivery to produce the intended goods and the unintended consequences it brought about, there 
has been a resurgence of Weberian model of governance alongside the NPM model. National 
government has been incrementally reintroducing qualifications-linked meritocracy side by 
side with the NPM’s performance-linked meritocracy in local public administration in a 
manner that reinforces professionalisation of the sector. These developments lend credence to 
the critique that the NPM is unsuitable to developing countries, South Africa included. 
As seen in the introduction to this thesis, this resurgence is spearheaded by three national 
departments, then DPLG1 (now CoGTA),2 the National Treasury,3 and Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA),4 which introduced regulations, new legislation and 
amendments to existing legislation, respectively, to provide for qualifications and experience 
requirements. Over and above the enforceable qualification criteria, the Systems Amendment 
Act requires an additional element of ‘suitability’,5 which reinforces both the Weberian and the 
NPM models. This means that the bar has somewhat been raised as both the Weberian and the 
 
 
 
1 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly 
Accountable to Municipal Managers (GN R805 GG 29089 of 1 August 2006) (hereafter Performance 
Regulations). 
2 Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 7 of 2011. As noted in Chapter Six, in South African Municipal Workers' 
Union v Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs [2017] ZACC 7 this legislative amendment 
was invalidated for want of compliance with provisions relating to its passage through parliament. However, it 
remains operative until such time as the defect is rectified. CoGTA also issued Local Government: Regulations 
on Appointment and Condition of Employment of Senior Managers (GN 21 GG 37245 of 17 January 2014) 
(hereafter Appointment Regulations) to give flesh to some of its amendments. 
3 Local Government: Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels (GN R493 GG 29967 of 15 June 
2007) (hereafter Competency Regulations). 
4 Public Administration Management Act 11 of 2014. 
5 Section 54A(2) Systems Act. 
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NPM elements form part of appointment requirements. The resurgence of the Weberian 
bureaucracy is further expressed through the separation of politics from the administration,6 
and resurrection of the idea of professional institutes that would train and discipline members. 
The Weberian elements that are re-emerging, and which also reinforce the NPM, namely 
qualifications, experience, suitability, professional independence, ethics and professional 
institutes, can be summed up in the broad appellation of ‘professionalism’. They reinforce the 
idea of professionalisation of local government. Professionalisation is defined to include the 
appointment on the basis of professional qualifications and knowledge and subjection to a code 
of professional ethics in order to maximise human potential and ensure efficient, economic and 
effective use of resources.7 This chapter, therefore, is only concerned with why these 
requirements are being brought back and how they find application. 
 
2 Constitutional framework 
The idea of professionalism in South African public administration is rooted in the 
Constitution. The constitutional basis for professionalisation of local government lies in section 
195(1) and (2).8 Section 195(1)(a)-(i) outlines the principles and values governing public 
administration, which include promoting and maintaining a high standard of professional ethics 
and cultivating good human resource management and career-development practices to 
maximize human potential, promote efficient, economic and effective use of resources, and 
ensure accountable and transparent administration. As such, the values and principles contained 
in section 195(1) reinforce the idea of professionalisation of the public administration as 
defined above and in Chapter Two. 
Section 195(2) of the Constitution in turn provides that these principles of professionalism 
apply to  administration  in  every sphere  of  government.  In  essence,  these  principles  find 
 
 
 
 
 
6 In terms of section 56A Systems Amendment Act. This section was a substantive challenge in South African 
Municipal Workers' Union v Minister of Co- Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs. It was challenged 
for limiting the constitutional rights of senior managers, some of whom happened to be members of SAMWU. 
Both the High Court ([2016] ZAGPPHC 733 of 23 February 2016) and the Constitutional Court refused to 
entertain this substantive challenge, remitting the matter instead to parliament. 
7 School of Government, UWC Desk-Top Study Towards the Development of a National Professionalisation 
Framework for Local Government: Draft Concept Paper (2012) 9. 
8 Motala Z & Ramaphosa C Constitutional Law: An Analysis and Cases (2002) 195. See also Ntliziywana P 
Professionalisation of Local Government: Legal Avenues for Enforcing Compliance with the Competency 
Framework (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2009) 24 (hereafter Ntliziywana 2009). 
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application to the local sphere of government as well.9 This was confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court in Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA which held that 
Chapter 10 applies to all aspects of public administration prescribing the basic 
values and principles that have to be adhered to, making it clear that they apply 
to administration in every sphere of government.10 
The courts have also underscored the importance of these principles and of adhering to them. 
In Hardy Venture CC v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality11 the High Court was concerned 
with the failure by the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to consider the application for 
approval of outdoor advertising and then the failure to address suitably the applicant’s 
correspondence in connection therewith. The Court held that the basic values and principles 
governing public administration as set out in section 195 of the Constitution were applicable 
and needed to be adhered to by the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.12 The Court held 
further that the failure to adhere to these principles has a potential of generating inefficiency 
and unfairness and consequently of lapsing into a bureaucratic culture, which is inimical to the 
constitutional ethos. Furthermore, it held that professionalism, efficiency, fairness, 
accountability, transparency and accessibility are discrete values that ensure cost-effective 
governance and administration.13 
Over and above providing for the principles and values of professionalism which should govern 
administration in all spheres of government, the Constitution enjoins national and provincial 
governments to regulate the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority in order to 
ensure that municipalities perform their functions effectively.14 Essentially, national and 
provincial governments can and are empowered to use the powers of regulation to enforce the 
values and principles contained in section 195 of the Constitution so that municipalities can 
exercise their powers and perform their functions effectively. To this end, the national 
government, through  the Municipal Systems  Act and  the MFMA,  and  regulations    issued 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Ntliziywana 2009: 25. 
10 Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA, 1999 (4) BCLR 382 (CC) (hereafter 
Premier, Western Cape) at para. 44. 
11 Hardy Ventures CC v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2004 (1) SA 199 (T) (hereafter Hardy Ventures). 
12  Hardy Ventures para. 9. 
13  Hardy Ventures para. 9. 
14 Section 155(7) Constitution. 
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pursuant thereto, sets out the parameters within which municipalities must structure their 
administration to reflect the values and principles outlines above.15 
The power of regulation conferred on the upper spheres of government by section 155(7) of 
the Constitution only entails setting parameters within which local government can operate and 
responsibly exercise its functions.16 It does not extend to the prescription of details of what 
local government has to do. In the words of the Constitution Court in the First Certification 
judgment, the term ‘regulate’ means ‘a broad managing or controlling rather than a direct 
authorisation function’.17 This was confirmed in the Habitat Council judgment, where the 
Constitutional Court held that section 155(7) does not entail the usurpation of the power or the 
performance of the function itself, but permits national and provincial government to determine 
norms and guidelines.18 
 
3 Legislative framework 
As noted in the preceding section, the Systems Act and the MFMA are the primary pieces of 
legislation giving effect to the provisions of section 155(7) of the Constitution. These statutes 
are aimed at seeing to the effective performance by municipalities of their functions by 
regulating their human resource management and financial administrations to reflect the values 
and principles of professionalism outlined above, among other matters. 
 
3.1 Systems Act 
The Systems Act, in particular, augments these constitutional values and principles of a high 
standard of professional ethics in municipal administration. Section 195(1) has provisions 
relating to the duties of the municipal council,19  the duties of the municipal  administration,20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Ntliziywana P ‘Insulating administrative decision-making relating to individual staff appointments from 
political meddling: Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal 49 
54 (hereafter Ntliziywana 2012). 
16 Ntliziywana 2012: 49. 
17 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para. 377. 
18 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC) at para. 22. 
19 Section 4(2) Systems Act. 
20 Section 6 Systems Act. 
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and the principles that should guide the municipality in establishing and organising its 
administration.21 
The Systems Act also envisage the promulgation of regulations to give further effect to the 
regulation of recruitment practices, ethics and discipline and thus ensure adherence to the 
values and principles governing local public administration.22 The Systems Act has most 
recently been amended23 to modify certain provisions dealing with the recruitment of staff in 
the upper echelons of municipal administration.24 Certain provisions were amended to provide 
for new procedures and competency criteria for appointments, and for the consequences of 
non-compliant appointments. 
 
3.2 Performance regulations 
Section 72 of the Systems Act enjoins the national minister responsible for local government 
to make regulations dealing with capacity-building within municipal administration25 and, by 
so doing, giving effect to the values and principles of professionalism. The regulations 
envisaged by section 72 were promulgated in 2006 as the Performance Regulation discussed 
in section 3.2 of Chapter Six.26 Even though their main focus is to regulate how the performance 
of municipal managers and managers reporting directly to municipal managers will be 
uniformly directed, monitored and improved, as seen in the preceding chapter they contain a 
generic framework for competency requirements for the posts of municipal managers and 
managers accountable to them.27 
The Performance Regulations, in their competency framework, prescribe minimum 
qualification and experiential requirements for the appointment of the municipal staff at a 
management level. This means that the appointment of senior managers is made subject to the 
candidates’ meeting predetermined qualification standards.28 In this regard, the Performance 
Regulations provide that the municipal managers must have a recognised bachelor’s degree in 
 
 
 
 
21 Section 52 Systems Act. 
22 Section 120 read with section 72 Systems Act and section 168 MFMA. 
23 Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011. 
24 Ntliziywana P ‘Adding injury to insult: Intrusive laws on top of a weak system’ (2016) VI Constitutional Court 
Review 32 41 (hereafter Ntliziywana 2016). 
25 Section 72(1)(d) Systems Act. 
26 Performance Regulations. 
27 Regulation 38 Performance Regulations. 
28 Ntliziywana 2009: 31-2. 
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relevant fields, a minimum of five years’ experience at senior management level, core 
managerial competencies, and core occupational competencies providing for knowledge, skills, 
communication and exceptional and dynamic creativity to improve the functioning of the 
municipality.29 Regulation 4(b) specifically provides for ‘the submission of original certificates 
or certified copies thereof of the employee's academic and professional qualifications and proof 
of previous employment prior to the signing of the employment contract’.30 Accordingly, the 
regulations make it an inherent requirement of the job that such managers must have a 
recognised bachelor’s degree in a relevant field, five years relevant experience and core 
managerial and occupational competences.31 
It is submitted that the inclusion of a qualification and experience requirement alongside the 
NPM performance management system in the 2006 Regulations signalled an initial theoretical 
shift in thinking away from NPM tenets toward Weberian ones. After five years of the 
implementation of the performance management system in terms of the 2001 Municipal 
Planning and Performance Regulations, coupled with in-service training, the government 
decided to tighten up the performance management system by introducing two key instruments, 
namely employment contracts and performance agreements meant to ‘ensure a basis for 
performance and continuous improvement in local government’.32 These instruments were also 
meant ‘to create an enabling environment for enhanced performance and accountability’.33 The 
Weberian tenet of a qualifications-linked meritocracy was also introduced because the NPM 
tenet of performance-linked meritocracy facilitated patronage rather than performance. 
The courts have had an opportunity to test the effectiveness of the Performance Regulations in 
Allen Paulse v Oudtshoorn Local Municipality and Others.34 This case was highlighted but not 
discussed in the preceding chapter. The court in Allen Paulse was concerned with the review 
of the appointment of a municipal manager against the new section 54A of the Systems 
Amendment Act,35 which provides that the appointment of a senior manager is null and void if 
he or she does not possess the prescribed qualifications and competencies.36  Given that the 
 
 
 
 
29 Regulations 38 and 8 Performance Regulations. 
30 Regulation 4(b) Performance Regulations. 
31  Regulation 38 Performance Regulations. 
32 Preamble to Performance Regulations. 
33 Preamble to Performance Regulations. 
34 Allen Paulse v Oudtshoorn Local Municipality and Others (unreported Case No 25790/2011) (hereafter Allen 
Paulse). 
35 The Systems Amendment Act is discussed in some detail in section 3.3 below. 
36 Allen Paulse para. 35. 
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regulations that were meant to give content to the competency criteria, the Appointment 
Regulations, were not yet promulgated at the time, the court relied on the competency criteria 
contained in the Performance Regulations. 
The facts of the matter are, as highlighted in Chapter Six, that the Oudtshoorn Local 
Municipality (the municipality) shortlisted five candidates for the position of the municipal 
manager. The candidates were then subjected to the integrity and competency assessment in 
terms of which Mr Mnyimba scored a competence rating of 4 out of 13 competencies, 
prompting the selection panel to remark that he lacked managerial experience but demonstrated 
potential. Mr Paulse, on the other hand, obtained a competency rating of 8 out of 13, prompting 
the selection panel to state that he is an experienced, client-oriented manager with sound 
judgment. In terms of the interview results, Mr Mnyimba was the top candidate with 485 points, 
followed by Mr Paulse at 402. However, the outcomes of the competency assessment were 
withheld from full council, which then appointed Mr Mnyimba on the basis of interview 
results.37 
The unsuccessful candidates, Mr Paulse, was aggrieved by the outcome and took the matter to 
the Western Cape High Court for the review and setting aside of the appointment of the new 
municipal manager (Mr. Mnyimba). Mr Paulse argued that Mr Mnyimba did not possess the 
competencies and the experience required in terms of regulation 38 of the Performance 
Regulations and that he could not be saved by an interview. 
The central issues in this matter turned on whether an interview is determinative in the 
recruitment process without objective facts such as the prescribed competency criteria, and on 
the meaning of ‘senior management level for the purposes of determining the requisite five 
years’ experience at senior management level’. In regard to the former, Mr Paulse argued that 
the competency assessment showed that Mr Mnyimba did not have the requisite competencies 
and experience prescribed by regulation 38 of the Performance Regulations and that he could 
not be saved by an interview. In support, Mr Bredell argued that an interview should not be the 
primary deciding factor for making appointments. Objective factors should take precedence. 
In relation to the latter, Mr Paulse argued that Mr Mnyimba did not have the requisite five 
years’ experience at senior management level as required by regulation 38 of Performance 
Regulations. Mr Bredell in support argued that the highest level at which Mr Mnyimba had 
 
 
 
37 Allen Paulse para. 45. 
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ever served while at Eden District Municipality was that of an assistant director (level three), 
which is below senior management level. At that level, he was accountable to the compliance 
manager who in turn reports to the municipal manager. Mr Bredell further argued that the 
executive mayor’s reliance on Mr Mnyimba’s experience as a manager of his own business 
was absurd, as only relevant experience should count. 
In deciding on the role of the interview in the recruitment and appointment process, the Court 
lent credence to the results of the competency assessment and said they speak for themselves 
in that Mr Mnyimba did not meet the minimum competency criteria. He could only lay claim 
to only four of the 13 tested competencies. On the meaning of ‘senior management level’ in 
regulation 38 for the purposes of determining the relevant experience, the Court defined the 
concept to mean ‘the level at which the following categories of persons are employed: a 
manager directly accountable to the municipal manager or a person who occupies a 
substantially similar position outside the local government sphere’.38 Accordingly, the Court 
was not convinced that running a small consultancy company on a part-time basis could be 
equated with senior-management-level experience. 
The Court further held that Mr Mnyimba’s position at Eden District Municipality was not as 
the manager of performance management but as assistant director, a position below senior 
management level. As a result, the Court nullified the decision to appoint Mr Mnyimba as a 
municipal manager and any contract concluded with him in consequence of such decision. The 
Court found Mr Mnyimba’s lack of relevant qualifications and experience a just cause to set 
aside his appointment. 
This case provides clear evidence that the resurgence of Weberian model, with its emphasis on 
inputs, through the Performance Regulations has put an abrupt stop to the open skills 
recruitment system with its patronage appointments, to the shock of many. The reaction of the 
executive mayor and the provincial executive structure of the ANC bears testimony to this 
shock. Even after the Court had pronounced itself on the issue of qualifications-based 
meritocracy and thus  effectively clarified the legal  position  with  regard to  the  competency 
 
 
 
38 This definition has been expanded in the Appointment Regulation to the effect that ‘senior management level’ 
means a management level associated with persons in senior management positions responsible for supervising 
staff in middle management positions; such persons include the municipal manager of a municipality or the chief 
executive officer of a municipal entity; any manager directly accountable either to the municipal manager or the 
chief executive officer; and a person who occupies a position in a management level outside the local government 
sphere which is substantially similar to senior management level. 
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criteria, the executive mayor of Oudtshoorn municipality, Mr Gordon April, instructed lawyers 
to appeal the court decision.39 
When this decision to appeal the court decision was itself reversed at a council meeting of 26 
July 2012, 15 days later the mayor and the municipality launched an urgent interdict in the 
Western Cape High Court to reverse the council's decision, to which the Court ruled that the 
matter was not urgent and would be heard in November.40 Even the provincial executive 
structure of the ANC threw its weight behind the executive mayor. Then ANC provincial 
secretary Songezo Mjongile pledged the party’s support for the actions of the Oudtshoorn 
municipality, adding that the court's ruling was based on a technical argument about the 
requirements of a municipal manager. He further said that politically there was ‘a deeper 
background to the story’.41 
The appointment of Mnyimba is clear evidence of exactly the kind of patronage appointments 
the Weberian model seeks to eradicate. This case shows that the Performance Regulations 
actually have teeth, although they do not contain an enforcement mechanism but instead rely 
on a court process. Not quite convinced that the Performance Regulations went far enough in 
dealing with patronage and the jobs-for-pals phenomenon, the National Treasury tightened the 
qualifications-linked meritocracy even further by issuing Competency Regulations, which are 
discussed next. The promulgation of the Performance Regulations marked the unravelling in 
government’s theoretical thinking as this move was soon followed by a comprehensive set of 
regulations issued by the National Treasury, followed by yet another set of regulations issued 
by CoGTA, both containing a competency framework. 
 
3.3 Municipal Finance Management Act 
Another piece of legislation that gives effect to the principles of professionalism contained in 
section 195 of the Constitution is the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). It 
regulates financial administration of municipalities with the ultimate aim to ‘secure sound and 
sustainable management of the financial affairs of municipalities…’.42  The MFMA    governs 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Makinana A ‘ANC won't give up on 'incompetent' cadre’ Mail & Guardian 17 Aug 2012 (hereafter Makinana 
2012). 
40 Makinana 2012. 
41 Makinana 2012. 
42 MFMA ‘Long title’. 
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the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities.43 In giving effect to the principles of high 
standards of professional ethics in municipal administration, the MFMA requires officials to 
meet prescribed competency criteria in financial and supply chain management.44 
It further enjoins the National Treasury to make regulations or issue guidelines that prescribe 
financial management competency levels for senior management, among others.45 The 
Regulations envisaged by the MFMA were promulgated in 2007.46 The MFMA further provide 
that the prescribed competency criteria is not only applicable in appointment stages, but is also 
relevant for the purposes of the development and training of staff to meet the prescribed 
competency levels and thus maintain a high standard of professionalism demanded by section 
195.47 In this regard, the National Treasury or provincial treasuries are enjoined to assist 
municipalities in the development and training of its officials.48 
 
3.4 Competency Regulations of 2007 
The Competency Regulations provide for general and minimum competencies required of 
senior and middle managers.49 These competencies relate to higher education qualifications; 
work-related experience; core managerial and occupational competencies; and competency in 
unit standards that senior and middle managers must have before they could be employed as 
such.50 The National Treasury has also issued guidelines for the competency levels of each 
category of senior and middle managers to give further content to the Competency Regulations. 
In this regard, there exist separate guidelines for the competency levels of accounting officers 
(municipal managers), section 56 managers, chief financial officers, finance officials at middle 
management, and for heads of supply chain management and supply chain senior managers. 
All of these are aimed at explaining the Competency Regulations with specific reference to the 
relevant category of a senior or middle manager in question.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 Ntliziywana 2009: 27. 
44 Sections 83, 107 and 119 MFMA. 
45 Section 168 MFMA. 
46 Competency Regulations. 
47 Section 83(2) MFMA. 
48 Section 83(3) MFMA. 
49 Regulations 2-12 Competency Regulations. 
50 Regulations 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 12 Competency Regulations. However, the focus in this thesis is on senior 
managers. 
51 Ntliziywana 2009: 28. 
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In the ensuing section, the contents of the minimum competency framework contained in the 
Competency Regulations as they relate to senior managers will be discussed. Focus will be 
devoted to the competency requirements for managers and officials at the senior management 
level contained therein. These relate to higher education qualifications, work-related 
experience and core competencies as well as proficiency in competency areas. 
 
3.4.1 Higher education qualifications 
The first competency requirement giving effect to the constitutional principles of 
professionalism enunciated above is higher education qualifications. The Competency 
Regulations prescribe minimum qualifications for the appointment of the municipal officials 
at a management level. This means that in order to be appointed into management positions, 
one has to meet predetermined qualification requirements. For the post of the municipal 
manager, the Competency Regulations require at least NQF level 6 or a Certificate in Municipal 
Financial Management.52 
In terms of the Guideline for Municipal Competency Levels: Accounting Officers,53 the type 
of qualification at NQF level 6 is a first degree and Higher Diplomas.54 However, in terms of 
the National Qualifications Framework Act,55 which repeals the South African Qualifications 
Authority Act56 in its entirety, read with the recent amendments to the National Qualifications 
Framework Act,57 NQF level 6 is equivalent to a National Diploma and Advanced certificate.58 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the discussion focuses on the bachelor’s degree because 
the Competency Regulations define the NQF as referring to the National Qualification 
Framework prescribed in terms of SAQAA.59 Accordingly, in order to be appointed as a 
municipal manager one must have a bachelor’s degree and a Higher Certificate. Alternatively, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Regulation 3 Competency Regulations. 
53 Guideline for Municipal Competency Levels: Accounting Officers Municipal Regulations on Minimum 
Competency Levels (2007) 2. 
54 Isaacman J, Elliott G & Pahad M et al. Understanding the National Qualifications Framework: A Guide to 
Lifelong Learning (1997) 24. 
55  National Framework Act 67 of 2008. 
56 South African Qualifications Authority Act 58 of 1995 (SAQAA). 
57 National Qualifications Framework Act (67/2008): Amendment to the determination of the sub-framework that 
comprise the National Qualification Framework (GN 891 GG 36803 of 30 August 2013) (hereafter Amendment 
NQF Act). 
58 Schedule to Amendment NQF Act. 
59 Regulation 1 Competency Regulations. 
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one must have a Certificate in Municipal Financial Management, which is also at NQF level 6, 
in order to be appointed as a municipal manager. 
With regard to the latter, the National Treasury, working with the South African Qualifications 
Authority (SAQA) and the Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority 
(LGSETA), has put together the Municipal Finance Management Programme (MFMP), which 
is a training programme structured to meet the competency areas contained in the Competency 
Regulations.60 Accordingly, in as far as qualifications are concerned, to be appointed as a 
municipal manager one must have a bachelor’s degree or a Higher Certificate, failing which 
one must do or have done the MFMP. 
As regards the qualification requirements for senior managers (managers reporting directly to 
the municipal manager), the Competency Regulations make a distinction between different 
categories of municipalities relative to their budget size.61 The first category relates to low- 
capacity municipalities with an annual budget below R500 million. In this category, the 
regulations require either a bachelor’s degree in relevant fields and Higher Diplomas or a 
Certificate in Municipal Financial Management.62 In the case of high-capacity municipalities 
with the annual budget of a value equal to or in excess of R500 million, the Competency 
Regulations prescribe an honours degree, a post-graduate certificate and a diploma in a relevant 
field.63 A chief financial officer is treated slightly differently from other senior managers. 
Instead of being required to do the Municipal Finance Management Programme and thus have 
a certificate in Municipal Financial Management as an alternative to an honours degree, a post- 
graduate diploma and a diploma in a relevant field, the alternative for chief financial officers 
in high-capacity municipalities is to become chartered accountants in South Africa.64 
 
3.4.2 Work-related experience 
Work-related experience is the second competency requirement prescribed by the Competency 
Regulations. In a clear shift from the NPM ethos of appointing at a lateral level, the 
Competency Regulations relax the practice of looking to the private sector for solutions and 
instead requires a mix of local government-related experience at senior management level and 
 
 
 
60 Ntliziywana 2011: 17. 
61 Regulations 5 and 7 Competency Regulations. 
62 Regulations 5 and 7 Competency Regulations read with Guideline for Senior Managers 
63 Regulations 5 and 7 Competency Regulations read with Guideline for Senior Managers. 
64 Regulation 5 Competency Regulations read with Guideline for Chief Financial Officers. 
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experience outside local government but in a management level substantially similar to senior 
management level.65 Given that local government is a very complex animal, the aim is to ensure 
that senior managers hit the ground running in capably and diligently discharging the 
responsibilities and performing the tasks conferred upon them by the Constitution, the Systems 
Act, the MFMA and other legislation applicable to local government.66 
With regard to the municipal manager, the Competency Regulations require a minimum of five 
years’ experience at senior management level.67 The Competency Regulations again make a 
differentiation between categories of municipalities when it comes to the work-related 
experience required from senior managers according to their budget size. In the case of low- 
capacity municipalities or medium-sized municipalities with an annual budget valued below 
R500 million, a senior manager must have five years’ experience at middle management 
level.68 In the case of high-capacity municipalities, the work-related experience required of 
senior managers is the same across the board – no distinction is made between senior managers 
and chief financial officers. Accordingly, all senior managers must have seven years work- 
related experience, five at senior management level and two at middle management level.69 
 
3.4.3 Competency areas 
The other competency requirement that gives further effect to the principles of professionalism 
concerns competency areas.70 These are financial and supply chain management skills specific 
to a particular post that are deemed essential for proper and effective execution of the 
responsibilities attendant to that post. 
In this regard, the Competency Regulations contain at most 11 competency areas, which are 
accredited against the published South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) registered 
unit standards. As a result, each of the competency areas is divided into a number of Unit 
Standards (US ID) that match the skills and knowledge required in respect of the competency 
areas.71 Each competency area has one or more unit standard(s) attendant on it. For example, 
in the case of a municipal manager and the Chief Financial Officer, the competency area of 
 
 
 
65 Regulation 1 Competency Regulations. 
66 Ntliziywana 2009: 32. 
67 Regulation 3 Competency Regulations. 
68 Regulation 7 Competency Regulations. 
69 Regulation 7 Competency Regulations. 
70 Ntliziywana 2009: 33. 
71 Guideline for Accounting Officer: 1. 
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‘operational financial management’ is made up of five unit standards while ‘risk and change 
management’ has only one unit standard.72 Operational financial management as it relates to 
senior managers other than a municipal manager and Chief Financial Officer has three unit 
standards.73 The Competency Regulations provide that senior managers must be competent in 
all unit standards prescribed for each competency area.74 
As noted above, the National Treasury, working with SAQA and LGSETA, has put together a 
comprehensive training programme, the MFMP, structured to address all the unit standards 
prescribed by the Competency Regulations.75 The unit standards are registered on the National 
Qualifications Framework by the South African Qualifications Authority.76 The MFMP for 
senior managers is equivalent to qualifications at NQF level 6, namely the prescribed National 
Certificate in Municipal Financial Management, SAQA ID 48965.77 The LGSETA has also 
accredited a number of training providers for the purposes of undertaking the training of senior 
managers on the MFMP towards obtaining the Certificate in Municipal Financial 
Management.78 Furthermore, LGSETA has registered assessors whose role is to determine the 
extent to which qualifications and experience meet the prescribed competency areas.79 In this 
regard, the Competency Regulations require municipal managers to ensure that the 
competencies of all senior managers are assessed in order to identify competency gaps and 
address them through the MFMP.80 
The Competency Regulations enjoin municipalities to assist their senior managers by providing 
resources and opportunities for training to attain the required competency levels.81 
Furthermore, the National Treasury has made available funding in the form of the Financial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Regulations 3 and 5 Competency Regulations. 
73 Regulation 7 Competency Regulations. 
74 Regulations 3, 5 and 7 Competency Regulations. 
75 MFMA Circular 47 Capacity Building and Training 2009: 1. 
76 National Treasury, NQF level 6 Municipal Financial Management: iii. 
77 MFMA Circular 47 Capacity Building and Training 2009: 1. 
78 MFMA Circular 47 Capacity Building and Training 2009: 2. A list of these training providers, or so-called 
Education Training and Development (ETD) providers, is available on the National Treasury website under 
‘Training and Validation’. Only these accredited ETD providers can offer the Certificate in Municipal Finance 
Management. 
79 MFMA Circular 47 Capacity Building and Training 2009: 3. See also Guidelines for Accounting Officers, 
CFOs and senior managers. 
80 Regulation 13 Competency Regulations. 
81 Regulation 17 Competency Regulations. 
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Management Grant to all municipalities, which may be applied towards the cost of financial 
management training in accordance with the grant criteria.82 
 
3.4.4 Core managerial and occupational competencies 
The Competency Regulations also prescribe core managerial and occupational competencies, 
as described in the Performance Regulations issued in terms of the Systems Act, discussed 
above. These core competencies form part of the competency framework that is aimed at 
professionalising local government. Under core competency requirements, the Performance 
Regulations distinguish between core managerial competencies and core occupational 
competencies.83 However, there is a significant overlap between the competency areas 
discussed immediately above and the core competency requirements. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the MFMP would also cover core managerial and occupational 
competency to a large degree, except for soft skills such as integrity, honesty and 
communication. For example, while the eleven competency areas are made up of 21 unit 
standards, the MFMP training offer 28 unit standards. The discussion of the core competency 
requirements is hence subsumed by the foregoing discussion of competency areas. 
These requirements are not consistent with the Weberian tenet of meritocracy, as articulated in 
Chapter Two, in that lateral entries from the private sector and other spheres into local public 
administration are not completely abandoned. Even so, the focus has shifted from the NPM 
outputs or outcomes to Weberian inputs. Unlike previously, persons appointed from outside 
local government will have to prove their skills, expertise, qualifications, experience and 
competencies before appointment. They cannot simply be appointed on condition that they will 
produce results later; they must prove competence upfront. This means that the focus is no 
longer on what they can deliver post-appointment but what they bring to the organisation which 
is verifiable upfront. Despite having proven capabilities elsewhere, if a person does not comply 
with entry requirements, then he or she is excluded. 
The Msengana-Ndlela debacle is a case in point. Dr Msengana-Ndlela had run the national 
department responsible for local government successfully for five years, receiving successive 
 
 
 
 
 
82  MFMA Circular No. 47 Capacity Building and Training 2009: 3. 
83 Regulation 38(3) Perfomance Regulations. 
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clean audits. However, her proven capabilities and experience fell short of the qualification 
requirements demanded for the post of municipal manager of a metropolitan municipality.84 
 
3.5 Implementation 
The Competency Regulations took effect on 1 July 2007, but gave a five-year period of grace 
within which all senior managers throughout the country were required to attain the minimum 
competency levels.85 This grace period started on 1 January 2008 and was supposed to end on 
31 December 2012.86 At the time, the National Treasury knew that many senior officials in 
local government did not yet meet these requirements.87 The staggered implementation was 
thus meant to give municipalities sufficient time to address skills gap and ensure compliance 
with the prescribed competency criteria in a way that did not disrupt day-to-day operations.88 
However, the National Treasury extended this deadline thrice by, first, issuing a circular on 20 
April 2012 in which the deadline was shifted to 30 June 2014.89 This circular applied only to 
‘special merit cases’ (those who required more time to complete the few remaining unit 
standards) and the Treasury would decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not a particular 
official was a ‘special merit case’.90 
Secondly, this deadline was further extended on 14 March 2014 for 18 months to 30 September 
2015, effectively extending the period of grace to eight years.91 This extension came after the 
realisation that officials in 269 of the country’s 278 municipalities were still not compliant.92 
Unlike the 2012 extension which catered only for ‘special merit cases’, the 2014 extension 
covered every official until 30 September 2015. Given the length of this special dispensation, 
eight years, one cannot think of a reason why municipal officials would be found non- 
 
 
 
 
84 Msengana-Ndlela v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (3282/2013) [2015] ZAECPEHC 31. 
85 Regulation 15 Competency Regulations. 
86 Regulation 15 read with regulation 18 Competency Regulations. 
87 Ntliziywana P & De Visser J Talking Good Governance Blog (2014) available at 
http://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/mlgi/talking-good-governance/sorry-sir-but-my-dog-ate-my- 
ipad-2013-minister-gordhan2019s-leniency-for-municipalities (herein Ntliziywana & De Visser 2014). 
88  MFMA Circular No. 60 of April 2012. 
89 MFMA Circular No. 60 of April 2012 
90  MFMA Circular No. 60 of April 2012: 4. See also Stevens v Cape Agulhas Local Municipality and Others 
(A358/15) [2016] ZAWCHC 57 at para. 47. 
91 Local Government: Exemption from Regulations 15 and 18 of Municipal Regulations on Minimum 
Competency Levels, 2007 (GN 179 GG 37432 of 14 March 2014) (hereafter MFMA First Exemptions Notice). 
92 Magome M & Sidimba L ‘Gordhan throws municipal staff a lifeline’ Sunday Independent 6 April 2014 available 
at http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/gordhan-throws-municipal-staff-a-lifeline-1671752 (accessed 15 October 
2016). 
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compliant. Thirdly, even though the Minister of COGTA, Pravin Gordhan, and Minister of 
Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, issued a media statement that no further extension would be granted,93 
one was granted on 3 February 2017 for another 18 months.94 This Exemption Notice applies 
to both existing officials and new appointments. As a result, the effective date of the 
competency framework is 1 September 2018. 
The Competency Regulations sternly provide that no municipality may, with effect from 1 
September 2018, employ a person as a senior manager if that person does not meet the 
competency levels prescribed therein.95 For those managers already in the employ of 
municipalities when the Competency Regulations took effect, the municipal manager is 
enjoined to assess their competencies to identify gaps.96 If this assessment indeed reveals gaps 
in their existing qualifications and experience and that they thus do not meet the minimum 
competency levels, then their continued employment is made conditional on them attaining the 
requisite competencies within the prescribed time-frame.97 Regulation 16 provides that if an 
official not meeting the competency levels is appointed, attainment of the prescribed 
competency levels within the period of grace must be included in his or her performance 
agreement as a performance target. Regulation 17 enjoins the municipalities to assist their 
officials to attain the competency levels.98 
 
3.6 Interpretation difficulties 
These regulations, however, raised difficulties of interpretation around a number of complex 
issues. These issues relate to who is affected by the Competency Regulations; the legal 
consequences thereof for non-compliant officials relative to when they were appointed; 
whether the Regulations apply retrospectively; whether the competency requirements are in the 
alternative (i.e. whether meeting some, not all, will do); whether the exemptions and extensions 
apply to existing or new appointments; the actual legal consequences for non-compliant senior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 CoGTA and National Treasury ‘Minimum competency levels for municipal officials effective from October 
2015’ Media Statement 30 September 2015. 
94 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003: Exemption from Regulations 15 and 18 of 
Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels, 2007 (GN No. 91 GG 40593 of 03 February 2017) 
(hereafter MFMA Second Exemption Notice). 
95 Regulation 18(1) Competency Regulations. 
96 Regulation 13 Competency Regulations. 
97 Regulation 18(2) Competency Regulations. 
98 See also section 83 MFMA. 
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managers at the end of the period of grace; and many more. In what follows, I will address only 
a few of these complex interpretative issues. 
 
3.6.1 Who is affected? 
The Competency Regulations apply to financial officials as well as supply chain management 
officials at both senior and middle management levels. This is where the problem lies: who are 
financial officials? The term ‘financial official’ is defined to mean an official exercising 
financial management responsibilities, which includes the accounting officer, chief financial 
officer, senior manager and other financial officials.99 Accordingly, for an official to be 
regarded as a financial official, he or she must exercise financial management 
responsibilities.100 
However, given the breadth of the definition, these regulations appear to apply to all senior 
managers, including Human Resource managers, Specialised Technical Services managers, 
Corporate Services Managers or Water and Sanitation Services managers or their equivalents, 
even though their jobs at face value do not appear to have any financial management aspects. 
A closer look at their jobs, however, reveals that these do have a financial aspect in that the 
officials compile and oversee departmental budgets. But do they exercise financial 
management responsibilities? The authors has argued elsewhere that many of them do.101 For 
example, the Water and Sanitation Services manager of the City of Cape Town oversees the 
compilation and implementation of a massive capital budget (R1.5 billion as at 2016) and an 
even more impressive operating budget (R5.4 billion as at 2014).102 Implementing such a 
budget must surely constitute exercising financial management responsibilities, and this 
category of managers should therefore attract the attention of the Competency Regulations. As 
a result, all managers that report to the Municipal Manager are affected by the regulations by 
virtue of their exercising financial management responsibilities.103 
This conclusion is confirmed by the statement from the National Treasury released on 30 
September  2015  to  the  effect  that  there  are  ‘other  lower  level  officials  with    financial 
 
 
 
 
99 Regulation 1 Competency Regulations. 
100  Mathabathe v Emfuleni Local Municipality and Others (J 511/2013) [2013] ZALCJHB 45 at para. 15. 
101 Ntliziywana 2016: 51. 
102 City of Cape Town 2016/17 Annual Budget. See the Submission by the Social Justice Coalition on the 
Cape Town 2016/17 Draft Budget – 29 April 2016. 
103 Ntliziywana & De Visser 2014. 
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management responsibilities not immediately affected by these requirements such as your 
clerks and financial management interns, among others’.104 If clerks and interns exercise 
financial management responsibilities, senior managers who oversee large departmental 
budgets surely also do the same. 
 
3.6.2 Legal consequences of non-compliance 
The Competency Regulations make a distinction between three categories of financial and 
supply chain management officials to which this question applies, relative to their appointment 
date.105 The consequences of not meeting the minimum requirements are different for each 
category. 
 
3.6.2.1 Non-compliant appointments before 1 July 2007 
The first category relates to those officials who were appointed before the Competency 
Regulations came into effect, i.e. before 1 July 2007. In this regard, the Competency 
Regulations provide that their continued employment is not affected, as long as they comply 
with the competency requirements before the end of the grace period. As indicated earlier, this 
period was meant to end on 31 December 2012. However, the National Treasury extended this 
deadline thrice on 20 April 2012 for 30 June 2014,106  on 14 March 2014 for 30 September 
2015,107 and on 3 February 2017 for 31 August 2018.108 Accordingly, this category of officials 
is safe, as long as they comply with the competency requirements on or before 1 September 
2018. Given the length of this special dispensation, 10 years, one cannot conceive of a reason 
why this category of officials would be found non-compliant. 
 
3.6.2.2 Non-compliant appointment after 1 July 2007 
The second category of officials are those that were appointed after 1 July 2007 but before the 
end of the grace period. This category includes every senior manager appointed after 1 July 
2007 but before 31 August 2018. The majority of the current municipal officials fall in this 
category. In this regard, the Competency Regulations provide that a municipality may employ 
 
 
 
 
104 National Treasury Media Statement available at http://www.gov.za/speeches/minimum-competency-levels- 
municipal-officials-effective-october-2015-30-sep-2015-0000. 
105 Regulations 15, 16 and 18 Competency Regulations. 
106  MFMA Circular No. 60 of 2012. 
107  MFMA First Exemptions Notice 2014. 
108 MFMA Second Exemptions Notice 2017. 
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officials that do not meet the prescribed minimum competency levels, provided that their 
continued employment is made conditional on them attaining the required competency criteria 
before the end of the grace period.109 The attainment of minimum competency levels before the 
stipulated time-frame must be must be included as a performance target in the officials’ 
performance agreement.110 As such, they also benefit from the five-year period of grace which 
was later extended to a ten-year period. If such officials do not meet the minimum competency 
criteria before the end of the grace period, they would be in breach of the employment contract. 
However, the Competency Regulations are not clear on what exactly the legal consequences 
are. On a literal reading of regulation 18(1), which states that no municipality may ‘employ’ as 
opposed to ‘appoint’, one is led to conclude that all employment contracts of defaulting 
officials in the ‘employ’ of municipalities on 31 August 2018 are automatically invalidated 
retrospectively. No municipality may have in their employ a person as a financial or supply 
chain management official if that person does not meet the competency levels prescribed for 
the relevant position in terms of the Competency Regulations.111 
Even though enough time has been given for senior officials to comply, this literal 
interpretation would have the deleterious and absurd consequence of a massive exodus of 
senior managers, which could not have been the intentions of the lawmaker. Furthermore, it 
would effectively exclude anyone outside of local government from applying for senior 
management posts in a municipality if he or she does not already possess the minimum 
competencies as prescribed, thus dramatically decreasing the pool of available and skilled 
persons that are able to work in local government, including national or provincial officials or 
experts outside of local government. 
However, it is difficult to maintain that there are automatic legal consequences for the officials 
in question, as South Africa’s labour laws militate against such automatic encroachments on a 
person’s employment contract. So, what must a municipality do? Is it compelled to dismiss 
these officials, or perhaps demote them? As yet, the National Treasury has not told 
municipalities what to do. It simply said, in a joint media statement with CoGTA on 30 
September 2015, that the process that municipal councils as employers can follow to  enforce 
 
 
 
 
109 Regulation 18(2) Competency Regulations. 
110 Regulation 16 Competency Regulations. See also MFMA Second Exemption Notice 2017. 
111 Regulation 18(1) Competency Regulations. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
349 
Chapter Eight 
 
 
 
these requirements should be consistent with the Labour Relations Act, Systems Act as 
amended, and Performance Regulations as amended by the Appointment Regulations, the 
MFMA, the Competency Regulations and the MFMA Exemption Notice.112 The two 
departments also offered to support municipal councils to manage the enforcement of these 
requirements in line with the given legislative framework.113 
In effect, municipalities are left to their own devices in this maze of legal requirements. As 
such, we are likely to see varied and disparate outcomes from the application of the same legal 
principles, a situation that is not conducive to legal certainty or in harmony with the principle 
of legality and the rule of law.114 
 
3.6.2.3 Non-compliant appointments after 31 August 2018 
In the last category are those officials who are appointed after the end of the grace period, i.e. 
after August 2018. The legal consequences of a non-compliant appointment seem to be clear 
and straightforward in this regard. The Competency Regulations provide that, after the end of 
the grace period, no official who does not meet the requisite minimum competency levels may 
be employed (read to mean appointed).115 If there are appointments made contrary to this 
regulation, then such appointments would be unlawful and can be challenged in court. 
However, this category is not as obviously defined as one may think. There are in fact three 
different scenarios. First, it could relate to ‘new recruits’, i.e. individuals from outside local 
government who are appointed into a position that falls under the Competency Regulations. 
The legal position is clear in this regard. In terms of regulation 18(1) of the Competency 
Regulations no non-compliant appointment may be made. If it is made, it is clearly unlawful 
and can be challenged in court. 
Secondly, it could relate to an official who already works in local government but outside the 
reach of the Competency Regulations and who is subsequently promoted into a position where 
the regulations do apply. Regulation 18(1) seems to be applicable in this regard as well. 
Thirdly, it could relate to an official who works in local government and falls within the reach 
of the Competency Regulations but who assumes a new senior position in local government 
for which a different set of criteria apply. For example, an official in the middle  management 
 
 
 
112  National Treasury Media Statement 2015: 2. 
113  National Treasury Media Statement 2015: 2. 
114 Ntliziywana 2016: 43-7. 
115 Regulation 18(1) Competency Regulations. 
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level (who thus required a Diploma in Municipal Financial Management at NQF level 5) is 
promoted to senior manager and now requires a Certificate in Municipal Financial 
Management at NQF level 6. It is not immediately clear what the legal consequences are in this 
regard. 
These legal difficulties need to be clarified. Municipal councils should not be left to their own 
devices lest they be used as a political tool to exclude exactly the kind of competent officials 
who are meant to be appointed in the first place. The case of Msengana-Ndlela,116 discussed at 
length in Chapter Six and herein below, is instructive in this regard. 
 
3.6.2.4 What is the meaning of ‘competent in’? 
The term ‘competent in’ could easily be interpreted to mean that the relevant official must, 
either through previous experience or qualifications, be ‘competent in’ the unit standards 
prescribed for financial and supply chain management officials. This would mean therefore 
that they do not need to do the MFMP. If, on the other hand, a senior manager does not have 
the prior experience or qualifications to meet those competencies, then the unit standards are 
prescribed to ensure that such person can meet the desired competencies. This interpretation 
would ensure that even people from the private sector stand a chance of being employed in 
local government if they have done the MFMP or are deemed competent in the competency 
areas through previous experience and/or qualifications. 
However, the phrase ‘competent in’ should not be read in isolation. The Competency 
Regulations state, in the case of an accounting officer, for example, that 
[t]he accounting officer of a municipality ... must comply with the minimum 
competency levels required for higher education qualification, work-related 
experience, core managerial and occupational competencies and be competent 
in the unit standards prescribed for the financial and supply chain management 
competency areas as set out below.117 
The Competency Regulations then set out the higher education required (bachelor’s degree or 
a Certificate in Municipal Financial Management); work-related experience (five years at 
senior management level); core managerial and occupational competencies (as described in the 
Performance Regulations); and financial  and supply chain  management  competency    areas 
 
 
 
 
116 Msengana-Ndlela v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (3282/2013) [2015] ZAECPEHC 31. 
117 Emphases added. 
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(which are the required minimum competency levels in unit standards). What is clear is that 
these minimum competency requirements are not listed in an either-or fashion. All of them 
have to be complied with: one cannot pick and choose which of them to comply with. For 
example, if an official does not have the prior experience to meet these requirements, he or she 
cannot be saved by the MFMP. The unit standards, which result in a certificate in Municipal 
Financial Management, are not designed to ensure that such person can meet the desired 
competencies. They are an additional requirement on their own. 
Another difficulty with the Competency Regulations is that officials with PhDs, MBAs and, in 
the case of CFOs, those registered as Chartered Accountants, are still required to attend the 
MFMP depending on the assessment of their existing qualification and the competency gaps 
identified. That is why regulation 13 enjoins the municipal manager to assess the existing 
competencies of officials with the aim to identify competency gaps and address them through 
the MFMP. It is possible that through this assessment one’s MBA or PhD could be found to be 
encompassing all or most of the unit standards in much greater detail. It is also possible that 
through this process a CFO, who has all the necessary qualifications and may even be a 
chartered accountant with local government experience, might be found not to have 
competency gaps and thus be excused from undertaking the MFMP. 
What is clear, however, is that officials cannot, on the mere basis of their educational 
qualification and experience, expect to be exempted from complying with the further two 
requirements. In high-capacity municipalities, for example, regulation 5 states that a CFO must, 
first, either have an honours degree or be a chartered accountant. Secondly, he or she must have 
seven years’ related experience. Thirdly, he or she must possess core managerial and 
occupational competencies. Lastly, he or she must have the required minimum competency 
levels in unit standards. So, over and above qualifications (either honours or registration as 
chartered accountant) and experience, the CFO must also have the required minimum 
competency levels in unit standards. In the case of a CFO, a Certificate in Municipal Financial 
Management is not an alternative to qualifications but an addition to them. 
Another peculiar example is that of a CFO at a low-capacity municipality. Regulation 6 
provides that he or she must either have a bachelor’s degree in relevant fields or a Certificate 
in Municipal Financial Management; five years’ work-related experience; core managerial and 
occupational competencies; and the required minimum competency levels in unit standards, 
which translates to a Certificate in Municipal Financial Management. The absurdity of this 
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regulation is that the Certificate in Municipal Financial Management is both an alternative and 
an addition. This means that if an official does not have a bachelor’s degree, he or she can do 
the MFMP instead and get the Certificate in Municipal Financial Management. However, if an 
official does have a bachelor’s degree, he or she still needs to be assessed to ascertain how far 
that bachelor’s degree offsets competency areas. In essence, such officials would still need to 
undertake the MFMP and get the Certificate in Municipal Financial Management. 
This is why Dr Msengana-Ndlela was challenged for not having the skills, expertise, 
qualifications and competencies prescribed by law despite her having two bachelor’s degrees, 
a master’s degree and a PhD and having been a director-general of a national government 
department for seven years.118 The one qualification Msengana-Ndlela lacked was that she had 
not completed the Municipal Finance Management Programme required by the Competency 
Regulations.119 She was supposed to undergo an assessment to see if that would absolve her 
from doing the MFMP, given her qualifications, years of experience and proven capability. 
On this interpretation, the Competency Regulations appear to be counterproductive in that they 
are used to exclude precisely the kind of personnel required to achieve excellence. This is how 
a former director-general with a PhD and seven years’ experience in a national department that 
is responsible for all of local government could be deemed unsuitable. Local government really 
cannot afford to exclude high-calibre individuals such as Msengana-Ndlela from the pool of 
eligible candidates, because qualifications ultimately offer no guarantee of excellence – proven 
capability comes the closest.120 
If left unclarified, the Competency Regulations risk being (ab)used in an attempt to exclude 
exactly the kind of high-calibre individual required from the pool of eligible candidates in a 
manner that defeats the larger objective that the Competency Regulations sought to achieve – 
‘to professionalise the local government sector to make it a career choice for talented officials 
and to some extent mitigate some of the root causes of poor financial management and service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Ntliziywana P & De Visser J ‘The unexpected pitfalls of professionalising local government’ Politics Web 28 
June 2013 (hereafter Ntliziywana & De Visser 2013). 
119 Ntliziywana 2016: 45. 
120 Ntliziywana & De Visser 2013. 
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delivery’.121 This can only be done by recruiting qualified, experienced and competent 
personnel.122 
Lastly, the Competency Regulations are reliant on municipal processes – they do not have a 
mechanism for external enforcement. The MFMA simply states that a municipality must 
provide resources or opportunities for the training of said officials to meet the prescribed 
competency levels.123 It says of the national and provincial treasuries that they ‘may assist 
municipalities in the training of said officials’.124 Regulation 13 in turn enjoins the municipal 
manager to monitor and take steps to ensure compliance with the prescribed competency levels 
within the time-frame.125 Regulation 17 simply repeats the provisions of section 83(2) of the 
MFMA. Regulation 18 merely states that ‘no municipality may … employ a person … if that 
person does not meet the competency levels’,126 without indicating in clear terms how to 
enforce this provision and what the actual consequences are in the event of a breach. It means 
that the Competency Regulations do not have teeth when it comes to enforcement. This gap, 
that of an insufficient enforcement mechanism, was filled by the amendments to the Systems 
Act, to which I now turn. 
 
3.7 Systems Amendment Act 
Important amendments to the Systems Act were effected in 2011. These amendments make 
further provision for the appointment of municipal managers and managers directly 
accountable to municipal managers. They also provide for procedures and competency criteria 
for such appointments, and for the consequences of appointments made otherwise than in 
accordance with such procedures and criteria. In terms of the Amendment Act, to be appointed 
as a municipal manager or a section 56 manager a person must have specific qualifications and 
experience, which are set out in a separate set of regulations issued pursuant to this provision.127 
Appointments made in contravention of such minimum competences and the recruitment 
process are invalid.128 
 
 
 
 
121 CoGTA and National Treasury Media Statement 30 September 2015. 
122 Ntliziywana 2016: 45. 
123 Section 83(2) MFMA. 
124 Section 83(3) MFMA. 
125 Regulation 13 Competency Regulations. 
126 Regulation 18 Competency Regulations. 
127 Section 54A(2) read with section 56(1)(b) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
128 Section 54A(3) read with section 56(2) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
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The Amendment Act further provides for an external enforcement mechanism in the 
implementation of these requirements. Accordingly, municipalities must report to the MEC for 
Local Government on each senior management appointment made, and the MEC must in turn 
pass the report on to the Minister.129 If a person is appointed in contravention of the 
requirements contained in the regulations,130 the MEC must enforce compliance by the 
municipalities with such requirements by taking appropriate steps that include applying to court 
for a declaratory order on the validity of the appointment or taking any other legal action against 
the municipality.131 If the MEC fails to enforce compliance with the competence framework, 
the minister responsible for local government may have to step in.132 It should be noted that no 
such external enforcement exists under the Performance Regulations, MFMA and Competency 
Regulations. 
In the event that no suitable candidate can be found through the normal recruitment process, 
something which is already happening in a number of smaller and rural-based municipalities,133 
the municipality may ask the MEC for local government to second a qualified official.134 If the 
MEC is unable to second anyone, the municipality may ask the minister responsible for local 
government to do so.135 
The Amendment Act also deals with ethical issues and thus gives effect to the values and 
principles of high standards of professional ethics in municipal administration. It provides that 
a staff member dismissed for misconduct cannot be re‐ employed elsewhere for a certain period of time.136  In essence, the Act sets a moratorium on the re‐  employment of such   staff 
by other municipalities or other spheres. The Act provides that the duration of the moratorium 
must still be prescribed through regulations. However, when a staff member is dismissed for 
financial misconduct, the Act itself sets the duration of the moratorium at 10 years.137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 Section 56(4A) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
130 See next section. 
131 Section 54A(8) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
132 Section 54A(9) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
133 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Public Service Commission & MECs of local government on status of 
municipalities’ 4 September 2012. 
134 Section 54A(6)(a) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
135 Section 54A(6)(b) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
136 Section 57A(1) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
137 Section 57A(3) Systems Amendment Act 2011. 
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As noted in the forgoing discussion, the Amendment Act provides for the Minister to enact 
regulations that are going to spell out qualifications and experience required for appointment 
into senior management positions as well as the moratorium for specific categories of dismissed 
senior managers. The ensuing discussion looks specifically at those regulations. 
 
3.8 Appointment Regulations 
The regulations envisaged by the Amendment Act setting out the minimum competence 
requirements and recruitment processes were promulgated in 2014 as Regulations on 
Appointment and Condition of Employment of Senior Managers.138 The main objectives of 
these regulations are ‘to create a career local public administration governed by the values and 
principles of public administration as enshrined in Chapter 10 of the Constitution characterised 
by a high standard of professionalism’.139 The Appointment Regulations also outline the 
government’s resolve to professionalise local public administration.140 
The Appointment Regulations reiterate the provisions of the Amendment Act relating to the 
invalidity of an appointment made otherwise than in terms of the prescribed requirements and 
rely on the provisions for external enforcement contained therein. They state that no person 
may be appointed as a senior manager unless such a person possesses the relevant 
competencies, qualifications, experience and knowledge set out in Annexures A and B.141 
Annexure B provides content to the competency framework relating to qualifications and 
experience, while Annexure A outlines the core managerial and occupational competencies. 
Accordingly, senior managers must have a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (mostly social 
sciences, public administration or law), five years’ relevant experience, advanced knowledge 
and the competencies set out in Annexure A of the Appointment Regulations.142 The 
Appointment Regulations further provide that an applicant for a senior manager post must 
disclose his or her academic qualifications, proven experience and competencies. 143 
The Performance Regulations do not contain similar provisions prohibiting appointments made 
otherwise than in terms of the competency framework contained therein. They simply state that 
 
 
 
 
138 Appointment Regulations. 
139  CoGTA Circular No. 2 of 2014: 3. 
140  CoGTA Circular No. 2 of 2014: 3. 
141 Regulations 8 and 9 Appointment Regulations. 
142 Annexure B Appointment Regulations. 
143 Regulation 11 Appointment Regulations. 
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the competency framework constitutes an inherent requirement of the job144 and employment 
of senior managers must be subject to ‘the submission of original certificates or certified copies 
thereof of the employee's academic and professional qualifications and proof of previous 
employment prior to the signing of the employment contract’.145 They further exempt those 
employees who do not meet the prescribed competencies when the regulations take effect146 
and enjoin municipalities to assess them in order to identify capacity gaps for the purposes of 
development.147 
Furthermore, they do not provide for an enforcement mechanism in the event of failure to 
comply with the competency framework contained therein. Even though the Competency 
Regulations in turn prohibit the employment of persons who do not meet the competency 
framework contained therein,148 they nevertheless do not provide for an enforcement 
mechanism. As seen in section 3.4.2 above, there is no clarity and certainty on the actual legal 
position in the event of a failure to meet the competency framework contained in the 
regulations. As such, the Appointment Regulations, read with the Systems Amendment Act, 
are remedying this defect in the two earlier regulations. 
The Appointment Regulations further repeal and replace a number of regulations in the 
Performance Regulations, especially those relating to making qualifications, experience and 
core competencies an inherent requirement of the job.149 This essentially means that the 
competency framework contained in the Performance Regulations has now been replaced by 
the one contained in the Appointment Regulations. As such, reliance can no longer be placed 
on the Performance Regulations in assessing whether an official meets the qualifications and 
experiential requirements. This is now extensively regulated by the Appointment Regulations 
and is subject to external enforcement, leaving the Performance Regulation to deal with 
performance management issues only. 
The difference between the competency framework contained in the Performance Regulation 
and  that  contained  in  the  Appointment  Regulations  is  that  the  former,  in  addition     to 
 
 
 
 
 
144 Regulation 38 Performance Regulations. 
145 Regulation 4(4)(b) Performance Regulations. 
146 Regulation 39(4)(b) Performance Regulations. 
147 Regulation 39(4)(a) Performance Regulations. 
148 Regulation 38 Competency Regulations. 
149 Regulation 46 Appointment Regulations. 
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qualifications and experience, requires core managerial and occupational competencies,150 
while the latter requires instead leading competencies, core competencies and the eight Batho 
Pele principles.151 There is an overlap between the old core managerial and occupational 
competencies, on the one hand, and the new leading competencies and core competencies, on 
the other. The only additions are the levels of achieving the leading and core competencies152 
and the Batho Pele principles. The qualification and experience requirements are still the same, 
namely a recognised bachelor’s degree in public administration or relevant field and a 
minimum of five years’ experience at senior management level. As such, the Appointment 
Regulations were merely tightening professionalism in this score. The Batho Pele principles 
now have to be taken account of when appointing a senior manager. 
In relation to the Competency Regulations, the competency framework contained in the 
Appointment Regulations, while tightening ethics and professionalism, seems to be lowering 
the bar somewhat. First, the Appointment Regulations treat all municipalities in the same 
manner. They do not make the differentiation that the Competency Regulations do in relation 
to a municipality’s budget size. As a result, all senior managers, regardless of whether they are 
appointed in high-capacity municipalities or not, need to have a bachelor’s degree in the 
relevant field, five years’ experience at senior management level, and critical leading 
competencies and core competencies. In addition, the eight Batho Pele principles must be taken 
into account. Given that these two sets of regulation exist side by side, municipalities could 
easily choose the less stringent Appointment Regulations when appointing senior managers, 
other than the CFOs,153 in high-capacity municipalities, thereby rendering the Competency 
Regulations redundant. This is not conducive to legal certainty. 
The second instance where the Appointment Regulations are lowering the bar is in relation to 
the certificate of competence. While it is a compulsory requirement under the Competency 
Regulations for a senior manager to have a certificate in municipal financial management, as 
discussed in section 3.4.2.4 above, the Appointment Regulations in turn say that a certificate 
of competence in a particular field is not a requirement but an added advantage.154    Similarly, 
 
 
 
 
 
150 Regulation 26 Performance Regulations. 
151 Annexure A Appointment Regulations. 
152 Moving from basic, competent and advanced to superior. 
153 Annexure B of the Appointment Regulations states that the competency framework for CFOs is as prescribed 
under the Competency Regulations. 
154 Annexure B Appointment Regulations. 
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municipalities could easily choose the less stringent of the two regulations and render the 
Competency Regulations redundant. 
The Appointment Regulations further respond to the issue raised in the Amendment Act of 
prescribing a moratorium on the reappointment of senior managers dismissed for misconduct. 
In this regard, Schedule 2 to the Appointment Regulations contains 11 categories of misconduct 
and the time period that must expire before a person is re-employed in a municipality. When it 
comes to financial misconduct, the moratorium is 10 years.155 For all other categories of 
misconduct, the moratorium is five years. For the breach of the Code of Conduct, the 
moratorium is two years.156  None of the earlier Regulations addressed this issue of ethics. 
 
3.9 Testing the mettle of the Appointment Regulations 
Courts have had an opportunity to test the effectiveness of the provisions of the Systems Act 
relating to the competency criteria for the appointment of senior managers and the regulations 
issued in furtherance of the objectives of the System Act. 
It should be noted that the provision of the Systems Act and the regulations issued pursuant 
thereto are not an end in themselves. They were enacted to fulfil a particular function, namely 
to promote the constitutional values and principles of professionalism and, as such, to make 
local government administration a professional, efficient, responsive, impartial, accountable, 
and transparent administration.157 The South African Municipality Workers Union v Merafong 
City Local Municipality158 case is an instance of the application of the competency criteria 
which goes beyond merely looking at the prescribed competency criteria to what this 
competency criteria is meant to achieve. The lesson drawn from this instance is that the conduct 
of senior managers must align with the ethos of the professionalisation initiatives, which is 
possibly why the Batho Pele principles are included as a key factor to consider. That is what 
the Labour Court was called upon to look at in SAMWU v Merafong. 
This case involved the appointment of a certain Mr Mabaso as a municipal manager of the 
Merafong City Local Municipality in 2012. The facts of the case indicate that Mr Mabaso   is 
 
 
 
 
155 Schedule 2 Appointment Regulations. 
156 Schedule 2 Appointment Regulations. 
157 Section 195(1) Constitution. 
158 South African Municipality Workers Union and Another v Merafong City Local Municipality and Others [2013] 
ZALCJHB 64 (SAMWU V Merafong case) 
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eminently qualified and experienced for the purposes of the Systems Act.159 Before the 
appointment in question, he had served as the municipal manager of a district municipality 
(Sisonke District Municipality) for more than 10 years, thus satisfying the experiential 
requirement. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Public Administration.160 As it is, this meets the 
prescribed requirements. However, Mr Mabaso also hold an Honours degree in Public 
Administration.161 If one were to look only at the prescribed competency criteria of the 
Appointment Regulations, this would be the end of it. 
The challenge before the Labour Court was that Mr Mabaso was not a suitable person to be 
appointed a municipal manager, regard being had to the provisions of section 54A(2) of the 
Systems Act.162 As mentioned above, this section requires a person applying for the position of 
municipal manager to at least have the skills, expertise, competencies and the prescribed 
qualifications. Relying on the report of the Auditor-General of the 2009/10 and 2010/11 
financial years in respect of the management and financial affairs of Sisonke District 
Municipality, it was contended that Mr Mabaso lacked the requirements demanded in the 
section, in view of his having been the municipal manager for the relevant period covered by 
the report.163 
In the report, the Auditor-General expressed strong opinions regarding, first, the municipality’s 
liquidity ratio and financial stability, which threatened the viability and very existence of the 
municipality. Secondly, the municipality had incurred irregular expenditure to the tune of 
R351.9 million as a result of contracts awarded in contravention of procurement laws164 and of 
Mr Mabaso’s failure to prevent irregular expenditure. Thirdly, Mr Mabaso failed to meet the 
requirements of the MFMA before committing the municipality to long-term debt. Finally, Mr 
Mabaso and the municipal council did not exercise adequate oversight over compliance with 
relevant laws and regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 These facts appear in an appeal launched by the Merafong City Local Municipality to the Labour Appeal Court 
in which the Appeal Court reversed the decision of the court below on a technical ground that the Minister was 
not given an opportunity to remedy the defect. The appeal case is reported as Merafong City Local Municipality 
v South African Municipality Workers Union (‘SAMWU’) and Another (2016) 37 (ILJ) 1857 (LAC) (Merafong vs 
SAMWU). 
160 Merafong v SAMWU paras. 3 and 4. 
161 Merafong v SAMWU para. 4. 
162 SAMWU v Merafong paras. 5-9. 
163 SAMWU v Merafong para. 18. 
164 In particular the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations. 
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It was further argued that as an accounting officer Mr Mabaso had failed to implement controls 
to ensure that documents and records are filed properly and easily retrievable and available for 
audit purposes. The report noted that some of these problems were identified in the previous 
audit cycle and were brought to the attention of the municipality. The contention was that Mr 
Mabaso clearly failed to address those concerns and that, in appointing him without considering 
his past performance, the Merafong Municipal Council acted irrationally and its decision is 
liable to be set aside. 
The Labour Court held that section 54A(2), read with section 55(2), section 54A(4)(b) of the 
Systems Act, and section 195 of the Constitution, makes it clear that for appointment as 
municipal manager, the appointee must possess adequate knowledge and ability to perform the 
statutory duties of municipal manager. It held that the only inference to be drawn from the 
Auditor-General’s reports for 2010 and 2011 was that Mr Mabaso was not ‘suitable’ to be 
appointed as municipal manager.165 The Court held that section 54A(3) of the Systems Act 
plainly rendered void the appointment of an unsuitable person to that position and that Mr 
Mabaso was shown not suitable for the position. The Court further held that the municipality’s 
process in making the appointment was defective, because in essence it omitted canvassing the 
said Auditor-General’s reports with Mr Mabaso.166 The Court further held that the municipality 
did not act rationally in making the appointment, because it disregarded ‘material, reliable and 
available information’ which was relevant to the suitability of Mr Mabaso, and that his 
appointment in those circumstances was unreasonable and irrational.167 
This case brings to the fore the additional criterion brought about by the Systems Amendment 
Act and the Appointment Regulation issued pursuant thereto. This criterion is suitability. Over 
and above the competency criteria for appointment, senior managers must also be suitable, 
having regard to their past experience. This criterion puts to a halt the phenomenon of senior 
managers mishandling municipal finances and/or being involved in corrupt practices and still 
relying on that experience for promotion or appointment elsewhere. The Amendment Act and 
the Appointment Regulations, through the introduction of the Batho Pele principles, are 
introducing the culture of consequences which has been absent for some time now. Previous 
experience is not taken for its own sake, but is now used to test a candidate’s suitability. 
 
 
 
 
165 SAMWU v Merafong paras. 19 and 22. 
166 SAMWU v Merafong para. 27. 
167 SAMWU v Merafong para. 27. 
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4 Implications for managerialism 
The resurgence of some elements of the Weberian form of bureaucracy naturally would have 
implications for the NPM tenet of managerialism. The autonomy enjoyed by managers must 
be accompanied by proven skills, expertise, qualifications, experience and competencies. This 
has consequences for the open skills recruitment practice. However, as has been noted, the 
Weberian elements exist side by side with the NPM elements. A limited form of lateral 
appointment still obtains. Municipalities do not appoint the best and the brightest fresh from 
college, who then grow within the systems to become senior managers. Senior managers from 
the private sector or elsewhere are appointed, provided they meet the Weberian competency 
criteria now in existence, albeit contradictory. The definition of ‘senior management level’ in 
the Paulse case, which includes the level at which a person who occupies a position in a 
management level outside the local government sphere but which is substantially similar to 
senior management level inside the local government sphere, leaves the room open for 
appointment outside local government. 
Even though sideway appointments are still permissible, the focus has now shifted from outputs 
to inputs. As indicated in section 3.4.4 above, new entrants from outside local government will 
have to prove their inputs before appointment. Despite proven capabilities elsewhere, a failure 
to prove, or comply with, entry requirements holds sever repercussions, as demonstrated by the 
tale of Dr Msengana-Ndlela. This blanket exclusion deprives local government of the kinds of 
managers required to turn the tide of dysfunction. As was seen in Merafong v SAMWU, entry 
requirements do not offer any guarantee of excellence, whereas proven capability does. In casu, 
a municipal manager with all the necessary qualifications was held to be unable to perform the 
statutory duties of a municipal manager for failing to exercise adequate oversight over 
compliance with relevant laws and regulations. This failure resulted in large sums of irregular, 
wasteful and unauthorised expenditure. The court had to reverse his new appointment. 
Furthermore, the abrupt resurgence of the Weberian model collided head-on with the existing 
practice of open skills recruitment. The Paulse case, in which politicians sought to influence 
the outcomes of an appointment process by withholding the outcomes of the competency 
assessment from full council, provides evidence of the old practice vis-à-vis the new. This led 
the council to appoint the second-best candidate, which was lawful in terms of the old practice 
but unlawful in terms of the new, resulting in its being reversed in court. Even after the  court 
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action, there was a relentless outside political influence forcing the council to appeal the court 
decision. 
Moreover, the professionalisation drive is not compatible with short-term contracts. The 
Competency Regulations which gave senior officials a special dispensation of 10 years for 
them to acquire certain skills, expertise, qualifications and competencies might be frustrated 
by the short-term contracts. Even though officials had to train for all those years, there is no 
guarantee that they will be retained at local government. It would be wasteful to train them 
only to lose them to other spheres due to the job insecurity that comes with short-term contracts. 
The other dilemma presented by the Weberian notion of qualifications as an entry requirement 
is the complexity of the laws that decree those requirements. Their complexity would have 
severe repercussions for managerialism as they confuse even judges. The case of Mahura v 
Greater Taung Local Municipality, where a judge misdirected himself in several material 
respects is a case in point. If these laws confuse even judges, what would the situation be with 
senior managers, let alone politicians? It is submitted that these laws are a convenient 
instrument in the hands of politicians to enable them to interfere in the day-to-day running of 
a municipality and to exclude unwanted officials. Many instances, such as the Allan Paulse 
case, the Msengana-Ndlela debacle and the Merafong case, have illustrated the dangers of 
leaving important decisions regarding senior appointments to politicians. This has implications 
for managerialism. 
 
5 Informal initiatives towards professionalisation 
The professionalisation initiative of the national government was supported by the 
‘professionals in the system’ who were seeking to establish a gatekeeping mechanism through 
professional associations. These associations were hoping eventually to obtain statutory 
recognition as they had under apartheid.168 The repeal of the statutes that gave these 
professional association statutory recognition during apartheid left a vacuum in the regulation 
of the municipal finance and town clerk169 profession. Nothing was put in place to enforce the 
registration, skills development and professional status of candidates before they could be 
appointed into senior municipal positions. Instead, generic qualifications had no focus on local 
government and the enforcement of professional ethics, and as such were not appropriate  for 
 
 
 
168 See Chapter Three, section 4.3. 
169 Now called municipal manager. 
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the local government sector. Municipal finance officers, in effect, no longer fell under the 
auspices of a professional body that had the power and competency to regulate their respective 
professions and competency. 
The system of local government faced serious problems of incapacity, incompetence, fraud, 
corruption and the general dysfunction detailed in the preceding chapter. This was due to the 
exclusion of South Africa’s black majority from the training and professional development of 
municipal managers and finance officials in the past and the halting of such training and 
professional development in the current dispensation. The new demands of local government 
to rectify the after-effects of apartheid required more skills and expertise, which were not 
there.170 On the other hand, the MFMA, which repealed and replaced the Municipal 
Accountants Act, insists on the appointment of suitably qualified persons.171 
It is submitted that, contrary to the popular narrative, the problems of skills deficit at local 
government are not due to affirmative action and cadre deployment policies. They are a result 
of the exclusion of generations of black people, first, from the body politic and, secondly, from 
membership of and training by these professional institutes. Affirmative action and cadre 
deployment policies would mean nothing if there were proper governance structures in black 
areas and a large enough pool of trained and competent black candidates from which to choose. 
These policies are necessary to reverse the exclusion of the majority of black managers, and 
professional association must ‘come to the party’ to train as many of those already in the system 
as possible, in line with the competency frameworks currently in operation. 
However, given that most of this training was previously done on the job after suitable 
appointment172 in the same way as envisaged by the laws and regulations ushering in the 
resurgence of the Weberian model, the likes of Msengana-Ndlela would still be kept out. The 
Competency Regulations, for example, only give a period of grace to those senior managers 
currently in the system and within the reach of the competency framework contained therein. 
What about those who are in the system but not within the reach of the Competency 
Regulations, or those who are not already in the system? To cater for the Msengana-Ndlelas of 
 
 
 
 
170  Buthelezi & Dollery 2004. 
171 Section 83 MFMA. 
172 Even though membership of the professional bodies was voluntary before 1988, one had to be employed at a 
municipality to be a member. In 1988, membership of these professional bodies ceased to be voluntary. All town 
clerks and municipal accountants or treasurers had to be members; they could not perform the functions of town 
clerks or treasurers functions without being members. 
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the world, it is important to retain some of the NPM’s privileging of experience over formal 
qualifications. Moreover, people die or move on to other careers. Reliance cannot be placed on 
the officials currently in the employ of municipalities for the entire local government sector. 
There must be a second layer pool of managers which is being trained, in line with the current 
framework, to take over from the current pool. Professional associations would come in handy 
in this regard by using the already existing competency framework to train another layer of 
municipal officials. 
The Institute of Municipal Finance Officers, discussed immediately below, already caters for 
the second, even the third, layer pool of municipal employees. It has three categories of 
members that are not directly employed by municipalities. First, there is a Junior Member of 
IMFO (JIMFO) who is required to have completed Grade 12 (NQF level 4) and is doing in- 
service training anywhere in the public service.173 Secondly, there is a General Member, 
meaning ‘[a]ny person … who is involved in finance matters but do[es] not have a finance 
related qualification’.174 The following are included in this category: municipal managers, 
officials in a related institution involved in financial or audit matters, and officials in the private 
sector involved in municipal finance or municipal auditing.175 The third category relates to 
persons who are full-time students in a finance- or auditing-related qualification at a tertiary 
institution and who are not working in a Local Authority.176 This opens room for training of 
persons not yet in the system. 
The next sections examine the role of these associations. 
 
5.1 Institute of Municipal Finance Officers 
As a result of the vacuum created by the repeal of the Profession of Town Clerks Act and the 
Municipal Accountants Act, a number of institutes emerged to fill it. In the case of municipal 
finance officials,177 the Institute of Municipal Finance Officers (the IMFO), a transformed 
version of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, took charge and maintained 
 
 
 
173 IMFO        Membership        Booklet        available        at       http://cdn.entelectonline.co.za/wm-566841- 
cmsimages/MEMBERSHIPBOOKLETprofile.pdf (accessed 1 July 2017) (hereafter IMFO Membership 
Booklet). 
174 IMFO Membership Booklet. 
175 IMFO Membership Booklet. 
176 IMFO Membership Booklet. 
177 The IMFO represents finance, audit, risk management, performance management and related professionals in 
the public sector. 
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self-regulation. However, given that there is no hard rule requiring registration with the institute 
before appointment to municipal jobs, some finance officials are not members of the IMFO.178 
The only relevance of the IMFO is as an advisory body.179 For example, it has been playing a 
critical role in rendering expert advice on financial matters to key local government 
stakeholders such as CoGTA, SALGA, LGSETA and the National Treasury.180 The IMFO also 
provides input on legislation and financial regulations, and participates in and contributes to 
standard-setting by the Accounting Standards Board.181 
With the promulgation of the Competency Regulations, the IMFO has slowly regained its lost 
status. It has now aligned its membership requirements with the competency criteria prescribed 
in terms of the Competency Regulation and has been playing a critical role in helping finance 
officials meet the deadline.182 It is now once again at the forefront of promoting the professional 
status of municipal finance officials, and this is a sure way of promoting the institute and 
attracting new members. There have even been reported instances of the IMFO paying the 
tuition fees of finance officials for the MFMP in order to meet the prescribed criteria.183 The 
IMFO is registered with SAQA in accordance with the provisions of the National 
Qualifications Framework Act of 2008.184 
The IMFO, working with the National Treasury and LGSETA, also assists in the assessment 
of competencies by providing its qualified assessors, and it is thus in a perfect position to 
identify capacity gaps.185 This gives the IMFO a central role to play not only in training and 
skills development but in developing an ethical code of conduct with which members must 
comply. The IMFO has also been proactive in the management and monitoring of the progress 
of each CFO and each finance officer’s development programme.186 
The remaining task for the IMFO is to lobby for the introduction of legislation that will change 
its status to a statutory body to promote professional development of municipal employees and 
 
 
 
 
178 LGSETA Turnaround and Repositioning Plan (2014) 10. 
179 School of Government, UWC Draft Concept Paper towards the Development of a National Professionalisation 
Framework for Local Government (2012) 26 (hereafter Draft Concept Paper). 
180  Draft Concept Paper 2012: 26. 
181 IMFO Annual Report 2016: 53. 
182  De Lange 2009: 7. 
183  Mathabathe v Emfuleni Local Municipality and Others (J 511/2013) [2013] ZALCJHB 45 at para. 5. 
184  Draft Concept Paper 2012: 27. 
185  De Lange 2009: 8. 
186 IMFO Annual Report 2016: 38. 
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enforce the code of conduct.187 It is submitted that the alarming levels of dysfunctionality, lack 
of consequences for irregular and wasteful use of municipal resources, fraud and corruption 
would be the thing of the past were the IMFO to be given statutory recognition in a way similar 
to how the Municipal Accountants Act gave IMTA statutory public recognition in 1988.188 
As things stand, the IMFO cannot be effective in enforcing its codes of professional ethics 
because not every financial officer is a member of it. Only a statute, such as the Municipal 
Accountants Act, would buttress IMFO’s mission to promote the values and principles of 
professionalism contained in section 195 of the Constitution. The standards have been set 
already through the Competency Regulations, Systems Act and Appointment Regulations. The 
legislation simply needs to mandate IMFO to enforce these standards and ring-fence the 
functions relating to financial officials so that only those who are members of it and subject to 
its rules can perform them. This is a preferable to policing the competency framework 
contained in the regulations, because professional associations, unlike the provinces which are 
empowered to enforce compliance therewith, are not subject to political influence. 
It is further submitted that this would improve ethics in many municipalities. As things stand, 
section 57A of the Systems Act, which prescribes a moratorium on the reemployment of 
municipal officials dismissed for misconduct, waits for municipal processes, namely a 
disciplinary process and a dismissal, to take place. What if no dismissal ever takes place? A 
publicly recognised IMFO, on the other hand, would act on mere allegation with prima facie 
proof, investigate them and enforce its codes because its reputation depends on it. 
 
5.2 Institute of Local Government Management of South Africa 
This Institute has similarly metamorphosed a number of times in an attempt to shed its racist 
past. As opposed to the erstwhile Institute of Town Clerks, which represented only town clerks, 
the Institute represents all senior managers.189 After the repeal of the Profession of Town Clerks 
Act in 1995, there was a lull for two years. The ILGM was eventually established in 1997 to 
be the premier professional body for local government managers.190 Similarly, the ILMG 
initially determined its own standards for the professional development and capacitation of its 
 
 
 
 
187  De Lange 2010: 25. See also IMFO Annual Report 2016: 4. 
188  Act 117 of 1998. 
189  Draft Concept Paper 2012: 27. 
190  Draft Concept Paper 2012: 27. 
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members. It also provides a professional development, information-sharing and networking 
opportunities for its members, and has a code of ethics to which members must comply. 
However, as can be expected, not all managers are members of the ILGM, and as such its code 
of ethics cannot be effective across the board.191 
The ILGM has been a vocal proponent of the professionalisation of local government 
management, arguing that membership of the ILGM should be made mandatory for all 
managers in local government so that its code of ethics would be applicable to all.192 A small 
victory, but certainly one that goes a long way, was achieved when SAQA recognised the 
ILGM as a professional body for the purposes of the National Qualifications Framework Act 
67 of 2008 late in 2013.193 In addition, SAQA approved a new professional designation for 
those municipal managers who comply with the competency requirements in terms of the 
Systems Act and the Appointment Regulations, namely ‘Accredited Municipal Manager’, 
abbreviated as AMM. 194 
The qualification relates directly to competencies outlined in the new competency profiles for 
municipal managers, established by the national Department of Cooperative Governance, in 
terms of the amended Systems Act. As such, while the IMFO has aligned it entry requirements 
and professional development to the Competency Regulations, the ILGM has aligned its 
requirements to the Systems Act and the Appointment Regulations. 
It has even established a Regulatory and Professionalisation Committee which has made 
concrete proposals on the legislation to drive the professionalisation process.195 Draft 
legislation, submitted to CoGTA for consideration, envisages the establishment of a South 
African Professional Local Government Management Council (SAPLGMC) which would have 
broad statutory powers in determining education and qualification standards for the profession 
of local government manager. This body would also act as an education and training quality 
assurer under the SAQA Act for all local government management qualifications; in certifying 
membership of the profession; in the accreditation of education and training providers; and in 
the regulation of the professional behaviour of local government managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
191 LGSETA Turnaround and Repositioning Plan (2014) 38. 
192 ILGM website available at http://www.ilgm.co.za/Professionalisation.aspx. 
193 Draft Concept Paper 2012: 27. 
194 ILGM website available at http://www.ilgm.co.za/Professionalisation.aspx. 
195  Draft Concept Paper 2012: 27. 
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Similarly, this institute plays a central role in professionalisation initiatives, and the last step to 
cementing its position would be a statute that recognises it as such. This would go a long way 
in turning the tide in the largely dysfunctional sphere of government and thereby promoting 
the values and principles contained in section 195 of the Constitution. 
To counter the gatekeeping nature of these association, which has the potential to exclude the 
likes of Msengana-Ndlela, they must be allowed to recruit members who are not in the employ 
of municipalities and train them as a pool of employees to replace the current officials. 
Furthermore, limited sideways entry into local government in line with the NPM must be 
allowed. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This chapter brings to light a shift in thinking from wholehearted commitment to the NPM 
paradigm, which promised to infuse efficiency and effectiveness in the public service and rid 
it of incompetence. Persistent dysfunctionality among municipalities and municipal entities has 
forced a rethink of the government’s theoretical position. 
After an initial embrace of NPM, which produced mainly perverse results (and not effective 
service delivery), the pendulum has recently swung back to a Weberian approach. National 
government is swiftly reintroducing qualifications-based meritocracy in the local public 
administration. New entrants into the employ of local government need to go through a 
prescribed course of training and special examination. However, the resurrection of the 
Weberian model does not seek to supplant the NPM model – it is reintroduced side by side the 
NPM model. For example, lateral entry from the private sector and other spheres into local 
public administration are still allowed. The focus, however, has now shifted from outputs or 
outcomes to inputs. New entrants have to prove qualifications and competencies (inputs) 
upfront, they cannot be appointed on condition that they will produce results (outputs) in some 
future date. This means the focus is no longer on what they can deliver, relative to what they 
have done elsewhere, but what qualification, skills and expertise they bring to the organisation. 
Proven capabilities elsewhere, short of compliance with entry requirements, do not cut it. This 
was aptly demonstrated in the case of Dr Msengana-Ndlela. 
Even though the return of the Weberian model, which reinforces professionalism, is to be 
lauded, overemphasising entry requirements at the expense of proven ability does not guarantee 
excellence of service delivery. This much was made clear in Merafong v SAMWU where a 
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municipal manager with all the necessary qualifications was held to be unable to perform the 
statutory duties of a municipal manager for failing to exercise adequate oversight over 
compliance with relevant laws and regulations. This failure resulted in large sums of irregular, 
wasteful and unauthorised expenditure. 
Furthermore, as the discussion has shown, the return to the Weberian form of bureaucracy has 
had some negative impact on the NPM tenet of managerialism. Over and above contractualism 
and the performance management system that serve as counterweights to managerial 
autonomy, that autonomy must now also be accompanied by proven skills, expertise, 
qualifications, experience and competencies. This provides an opportunity for undue political 
meddling in the appointment of senior managers and ultimately in their operations. Instances 
of such meddling were highlighted in this chapter. The Paulse case, in which politicians sought 
to influence the outcomes of an appointment process by withholding the outcomes of the 
competency assessment from full council leading the council to appoint the second-best 
candidate, is a case in point. Furthermore, even though this council decision was reversed in 
court, there was a relentless outside political influence forcing the council to appeal the court 
decision. 
Even though the MEC has an oversight responsibility over appointments, if councillors can 
successfully withhold information from council it would equally be easy to do this to the MEC. 
The cases above illustrate the dangers of leaving the appointment of senior officials to 
politicians. This has repercussions for the notion of letting managers manage free from 
interference. 
Moreover, the professionalisation drive is not compatible with short-term contracts. The 
Competency Regulations, which gave senior officials a special dispensation of 10 years in 
which to acquire certain skills, expertise, qualifications and competencies, might be frustrated 
by short-term contracts. Even though officials had to train for all those years, the short-term 
contract systems do not offer any security regarding future employment prospects. There is no 
guarantee that they will be retained at local government. It would be wasteful to train them 
only to lose them to other spheres or to the private sector because of the uncertainties and job 
insecurity that come with short-term contracts. 
The other dilemma presented by the Weberian element of qualifications as an entry requirement 
is the complexity of the laws that decree those requirements. Their complexity also holds severe 
repercussions for managerialism as they confuse even judges. The case of Mahura v  Greater 
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Taung Local Municipality, discussed earlier, underlines this complexity. In this case the 
complexities of these laws confused the judge, leading him to apply the law incorrectly and 
arrived at a mistaken conclusion. If these laws confuse even legal specialists such as judges, 
how could we expect non-specialist administrator, let alone politicians, to understand them? 
This has the potential to create inconsistent application of the laws throughout the country. 
It is proposed that the best solution for these and the many other problems besetting local 
government is for the national government to return to the statutory-association model of 
professionalisation which mandates existing professional associations to enforce the existing 
standards. The standards have been set already in the Competency Regulations, Systems 
Amendment Act and Appointment Regulations, as discussed above. IMFO and the ILGM have 
also aligned their own requirements with those standards. Furthermore, these institutes have 
both been accredited by SAQA as professional associations. What remains is for them to be 
given the sanction, through statute, to regulate their respective sectors and for their functions 
be ring-fenced. 
The advantages of recognising these institutes through legislation are many and varied and are 
the only available solution to making local government a career of choice and thus turning the 
tide in local government. First, ring-fencing the functions of senior managers, on the one hand, 
and finance officials, on the other, would ensure that all these officials belong to professional 
institutes and are thus bound by codes of ethics. Currently, the reach of IMFO and ILGM’s 
codes of conduct is limited as not all senior managers belong to these institutes. The only way 
to force them to belong to the institutes is to ring-fence functions and criminalise exercise of 
those function otherwise than by members of the institutes. Accordingly, these institutes would 
not only focus on capacity-building and professional development but also enforce ethics, 
thereby addressing corruption, laziness, mismanagement. 
It may be argued in this regard that the Systems Amendment Act already deals with such issues 
through the moratorium it sets, among others. However, in order for the MEC to enforce the 
moratorium, he or she must first wait for municipal disciplinary processes to unfold and for 
someone to be found guilty and dismissed. There must be a dismissal for misconduct before 
the moratorium on reappointment kicks in. What if the majority of cases do not reach that 
stage? The professional institutes, on the other hand, will act on mere allegations – with prima 
facie proof of misconduct – because their credibility and reputation depends on it. For example, 
instance, where the Auditor-General expresses an opinion on the finances of a    municipality, 
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the relevant body would have to act to rectify the problems so that the Auditor-General’s 
findings do not go unaddressed, as is currently the case. 
Secondly, it would make local government a career of choice in that not everyone would be 
allowed to exercise the functions of senior managers, as was the case after the enactment of the 
Profession of Town Clerks and the Municipal Accountants Acts of 1988. These Acts restricted 
the performance of certain functions to members only, making it difficult for non-members to 
perform such functions. In fact, it was a criminal offence to do so. As such, the institutes would 
take care of training of their members in the laws currently in existence and develop members 
to be able to perform their functions. These institutes would also play a role in managing the 
performance of managers through their own rules and thus help municipalities in the processes. 
This process would deter senior officials from hopping to other spheres or to the private sector. 
Long-term service would come with its perks. It would also halt the phenomenon of introducing 
officials from the top, without experience or knowledge of local government. However, limited 
lateral entries should be permitted so as to include those managers not currently in the employ 
of local government but who are highly skilled and experienced. 
These institutes would also train enough managers so that there is an available pool of 
competent managers to choose from whenever a vacancy appears. This would halt the 
phenomenon of secondment of personnel from other spheres who otherwise do not have the 
right skills for the sector. Furthermore, this would help in the even distribution of skills 
throughout the country. Skills distribution would not depend on economic context. If there is a 
vacancy and there is a manager available and ready for appointment, then an institute would 
make a recommendation. Vacant funded posts would be a thing of the past. 
Most importantly, the institutes would arrest the problem of leaving each municipality to its 
own devices in interpreting laws. Now that the institutes have aligned the existing laws with 
their requirements, this would foster a common understanding of the laws. It would be easier 
for the institutes to engage National Treasury or CoGTA on what it sought to achieve on behalf 
of its members than for individual municipalities to send such requests to the National Treasury 
or solicits varied and contradictory legal opinions. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Conclusion 
1 Outline of the main argument 
At the beginning of this study it was asserted that local government under apartheid failed to 
deliver services to the people of South Africa. Instead, it caused structural disparities, service 
backlogs, and gross inequalities within and among the South African population based on race. 
This was partly attributable to the pathologies of the Weberian model of service delivery, which 
obtained, partially, at the time until it was fully implemented in 1988. With the end of apartheid, 
and the need for rapid service delivery to rectify the damage done by apartheid, the usefulness 
of the Weberian model was in doubt. Its efficiency was regarded by the new government of 
dubious value in addressing the challenges it faced. The new government instead brought in a 
new model of service delivery, the NPM, as a policy and law in both national, provincial and 
local levels of government. The main problem, however, was that poor service delivery 
persisted despite the introduction of the NPM. This forced a rethink by the new government, 
which led to a resurgence of the Weberian model. 
The main purpose of this study, therefore, was to examine the failures and limits of legislating 
the NPM in South Africa. The study sought to investigate whether the introduction of NPM 
principles in local government legal framework had the desired effect of transforming service 
delivery for the better. It also sought to investigate why, in recent times, there has been a 
resurgence of the Weberian model. The study posed five substantive questions to guide this 
investigation: One, why did the national government adopt the NPM policy at national and 
local levels? Two, how were NPM principles expressed in the government’s policy and 
legislative framework (both national and local)? Three, did the manner in which NPM 
principles were expressed in the legal framework facilitate or thwart the implementation of the 
NPM? Four, where the legal framework facilitated implementation of NPM principles, did this 
have the desired results of improving service delivery? Five, given the resurgence of the 
Weberian model of delivery, is any role left for the NPM in the legal framework? The findings 
of this study are outlined below. 
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2 The rise and fall of Weberianism 
The apartheid white local government, which operated a brutal system of racial segregation 
and domination, was partially modelled along Weberian lines.1 It was characterised by a 
‘bureaucratic, law-driven, hierarchical, multi-layered, departmentally fragmented, inward- 
oriented, racial oligarchy’.2 The Weberian model became more pronounced and was fully 
embraced towards the end of the apartheid era as a result of the enactment of the Professions 
of Town Clerks Act3 and the Municipal Accountants Act.4 The real reason for the full adoption 
of the Weberian bureaucracy was to close the loophole that allowed many town clerks and 
town treasurers to circumvent the enforced route to be a town clerk or treasurer through 
professional associations. The changes brought about in 1988 were occasioned by the fact that 
the writing was on the wall for apartheid and as such the apartheid government was fearful that 
the system, if not tightened up, would allow in new unqualified black entrants, Africans in 
particular. So, these laws were an attempt to keep unqualified blacks out of the system. To get 
in, they had to meet new strict requirements that were not applied to white personnel before 
1988, namely qualification, prior experience and memberships of a professional association. 
The rationale for the fall of the Weberian model, with the end of apartheid, and the adoption of 
the NPM model of delivery by the post-apartheid government can, therefore, be located within 
the context of the damage caused by apartheid and the need for rapid delivery of services to 
rectify those ravages. The Weberian model that obtained during the apartheid era would not 
provide rapid service delivery because it was racist and static. It was racist in the sense that it 
ensured ‘the development of separate local authorities for separated racial groups, under the 
leading theme of ‘own management for own areas’,5 which was meant to limit the extent to 
which affluent white local authorities would bear the financial burden of servicing 
disadvantaged African areas.6 This produced ‘a clever scheme of naked exploitation on the 
basis of race’,7 as the well-resourced and viable commercial centres, with their strong revenue 
 
 
 
1 Chipkin I ‘Transcending bureaucracy: State transformation in the age of the manager’ (2011) 77 Tranformation 
41 (hereafter Chipkin 2011). 
2 Fitzgerald P ‘Towards a developmental public administration paradigm’ in Fitzgerald P, McLennan A & 
Munslow B (eds) Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa (1995) 512 (hereafter Fitzgerald 1995). 
3  Act 75 of 1988. 
4  Act 21 of 1988. 
5 De Visser J ‘Developmental local government in South Africa: Institutional fault lines’ (2009) 2 Commonwealth 
Journal of Local Governance 8 (hereafter De Visser 2009). 
6 The White Paper on Local Government (9 March 1998). 
7  De Visser 2009: 8. 
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base, were reserved as white areas.8 These areas were protected from the influx of Africans by 
a number of statutes which formalised geographical and racial segregation, thus securing viable 
rates bases for white people. The reality of the apartheid past was one of a ‘balkanised’, 
fragmented public administration which was divided racially and ethnically.9 The result was a 
plethora of parallel bureaucracies responsible to multiple political authorities.10 
Furthermore, the local government system was exploitative in the sense that it reserved the 
outlying and poor peri-urban areas (townships) without any meaningful formal economies for 
African people.11 These townships did not have an economic tax base as apartheid regulations 
barred retail and industrial developments in African areas, forcing African communities and 
retailers to spend most of their money in white areas.12 Moreover, expenditure on black South 
Africans was a fraction of what it was on whites.13 This rendered the local government 
institutions therein, which were designed to reinforce the policies of segregation and economic 
exclusion, stillborn.14 None of these institutions had resources to make any meaningful impact 
on the quality of life of their constituencies.15 Given the strict hierarchy in the Weberian model 
of delivery, the administration was forced to follow blindly the political dictates of the day and 
implement these racist and exploitative policies. 
The Weberian model was static in the sense that it was slow to act and bureaucratic, resulting 
in inefficiencies.16 Officials were fixated on procedural correctness and compliance with rules. 
They lacked discretion and autonomy to act independently, and waited for superior orders 
before they could act on anything. This resulted in reels of time-consuming and despair- 
creating red tape and paperwork,17 making the administration too dilatory for instant decision- 
making and communication. Furthermore, the administration was not only large but lax. 
The other reasons for the adoption of the NPM by the post-apartheid government were, first, 
that the post-apartheid government was inundated by an international reform wave towards the 
NPM. In this regard, the NPM was promoted as the model that would bring efficiency in   the 
 
 
 
8  De Visser 2009: 8. 
9 Fraser-Moleketi G Public Service Reform in South Africa: An Overview of Selected Case studies from 1994- 
2004 (Master's thesis, University of Pretoria, 2006) 20 (hereafter Fraser-Moleketi 2006). 
10  Chipkin 2011: 1. 
11  De Visser 2009: 8. 
12  White Paper 1998: 23 para. A.1. 
13 Chipkin 2011:1. 
14 Picard LA & Mogale T The Limits of Democratic Governance in South Africa (2015) 129. 
15  White Paper 1998: 23 para. A.1. 
16  Hughes 1994: 56. 
17  Bergmann 1991: 16. 
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delivery of the much-needed services. This period also coincided with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the growing dominance of the neo-liberal project. Secondly, the NPM was 
introduced in response to imperatives to transform the public administration. Among these 
imperatives was the need to deracialise the public service, something which the Weberian 
model stood to obstruct. Thirdly, the post-apartheid government was influenced by the 
international financial institutions that dictate the rules of the global economic game, and the 
leading sectors of capital, towards adopting the NPM model. 
 
3 The emergence and expression of NPM principles 
The second question asked how NPM principles were expressed in local government policy 
and legal framework. To answer this question, I needed to look at the national level where the 
policies and legislation were set. The study demonstrated, in Chapter Four, that the national 
aspirational policy documents, namely the Reconstruction and Development Programme,18 the 
White Paper on Transformation of Public Service and Administration,19 section 195 of the 
Constitution,20 the White Paper on Human Resource Management and Administration,21 White 
Paper on a New Employment Policy for the Public Service,22 and the Presidential Review 
Commission23 laid the foundation for the expression of NPM principles. In this regard, these 
principles were expressed through managerialism, which includes professionalising decision- 
making power,24 performance management25 and the contract appointment system;26 public- 
private partnerships,27  and corporatisation.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 African National Congress Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994). 
19 The White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (GN 1227 GG 16838 of 24 November 1995). 
20 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
21  The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service (GG 18594 of 31 December 1997). 
22 The White Paper on a New Employment Policy for the Public Service: Managing People in a Transformed 
Public Service 9 September 1997. 
23 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Transformation and Reform of the Public Service (Proclamation R10 in 
GG 17020 of 8 March 1996). 
24  White Paper 1995: 33 para. 8.2 and 37 para. 9; Presidential Review Commission 1998: 175 para. 7.2.3.6, read 
with 63 para. 2.6.4. 
25 White Paper 1995: 22 para. 6.1.3; section 195 Constitution; White Paper on a New Employment Policy: 27 
para. 5.9. 
26  White Paper 1995: 189 para. 8.2. 
27 Presidential Review Commission: 166 para. 7.2.1. 
28 African National Congress Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) 128. 
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Chapter Five in turn demonstrated the manner in which the legislative framework29 governing 
public service gave expression to the NPM principles of decentralising decision-making 
power,30 performance management,31 contract employment,32 public-private partnerships, and 
corporatisation at national level.33 
Following the national example, the legislative framework for local government gave effect to 
the NPM principles of managerialism, public-private partnerships and corporatisation. As seen 
immediately above, managerialism encompasses the principles of transferring decision-making 
power to managers (letting managers manage) and the attendant principles that are meant to 
circumscribe managerial power and freedom, namely performance management and contract- 
based appointment. 
In regard to letting managers manage, the law confers wide discretion and autonomy on 
managers with regard to organisational and staff issues such as the appointment, promotion, 
dismissal and transfer of members of staff, performance management, and the obligations, 
rights and privileges of managers. In this regard, the White Paper on Local Government 
elevates the role of the manager in the bureaucracy by delegating34 operational management 
responsibilities to managers.35 Furthermore, sections 55 and 66 of the Systems Act contain a 
full spectrum of powers and functions relating to organisational and staff issues which can only 
be exercised by the municipal manager within the policy framework provided by the council. 
The municipal manager also plays a role in the appointment of section 56 managers by council. 
These appointments can only be done after consultation with the municipal manager.36 
Moreover, the laws regulating the structures, systems and finances of local government have 
widened the discretion of senior managers in the functioning of a municipality. In this regard, 
the Structures Act states that the municipal manager is the head of the municipal administration 
and is also the accounting officer for the municipality.37  The Systems Act, which repealed 
 
 
 
29 Public Service Act 103 of 1994, Public Service Regulations, 2001 (GN R1 of 5 January 2001), and Public 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. 
30 Section 9 Public Service Act Public Service Regulations, 2001 (GN R.1 of 5 January 2001). 
31 Sections 3(5), 3B and 7(3)(b) Public Service Act. See also Chapter 4 of the Public Service Regulations. 
32 Section 12(1) Public Service Act. 
33 Section 3 Public Service Act read with sections 38(1)(m) and 54(2) of the PFMA. 
34 ‘Delegating’ is used loosely in this context. It does not carry its usual meaning of temporarily transferring 
powers and revoking them at an appropriate time. Here responsibilities are permanently transferred to managers. 
35  White Paper 1998: 162 para. 2.2.1. 
36 Section 56(1) Systems Act. 
37 Section 82 Structures Act. 
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section 82 of the Structures Act, and the MFMA, contain similar provisions with regard to the 
widened role of the municipal manager.38 In this regards, the municipal manager is the head of 
the municipal administration,39 the champion of the IDP and performance management,40 the 
service delivery agent,41 the interface between council and administration,42 the accounting 
officer43 as well as the custodian of all records and documents of the municipality.44 Over and 
above these powers and functions, the municipal manager generally performs the functions and 
exercises the powers that are delegated to him by the municipal council, in which case the 
discretion of the municipal manager is limited in the sense that the council can decide at any 
time to revoke those delegated powers.45 
This is the fulcrum of the managerial responsibility and discretion conferred upon municipal 
managers. The municipal manager has become hands-on in the management of municipal 
affairs. For example, as the interface between council and the administration, the municipal 
manager manages communication between administration and the municipality’s political 
structures and office-bearers. In the role as the champion of the IDP and performance 
management, the municipal manager is responsible for the implementation of the 
municipality’s IDP and ensuring that the administration operates in accordance with the 
municipality’s performance management system. In the role as the service delivery agent, the 
municipal manager is responsible for the management of the provision of services to local 
communities in a sustainable and equitable manner. Lastly, the municipal manager has the duty 
to implement legislation. 
In all these responsibilities, the municipal manager works hand in glove with heads of 
departments who are intimately attuned with the workings of the departments. Municipal 
councils and councillors are barred from interfering in municipal administration and in the 
exercise of these powers and thereby compromising the discretionary power and autonomy 
conferred on managers.46 
 
 
 
 
38 Section 55 Systems Act. 
39 Section 55(1)(a) Systems Act. 
40 Section 55(1)(c) Systems Act. 
41 Section 55(1)(d) Systems Act. 
42 Section 55(1)(j) Systems Act. 
43 Section 55(2) Systems Act read with section 60 MFMA. 
44  Section 117 Systems Act read with section 63 MFMA. 
45 Section 55(1)(m) Systems Act. 
46 Item 11 Code of Conduct for Councillors read with section 117 MFMA. 
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Municipal councils, on the other hand, are given the performance management system and 
contract-based appointment system as tools to keep managerial autonomy in check.47 Section 
57(1)(a) and (b) of the Systems Act states that the appointment of senior managers can only be 
done in terms of a written employment contract with the municipality and subject to a separate 
performance agreement. Section 57(6)(b) further states that the employment contract of a 
municipal manager must include a provision for the cancellation of the contract in the case of 
non-compliance with the employment contract or the performance agreement. Section 57 read 
with regulation 4(4)(a) of Performance Regulations therefore imposes an obligation on 
municipal councils to conclude employment contracts and performance agreements with senior 
managers upon appointment and, in the case of performance agreements, annually thereafter, 
and conduct quarterly reviews of senior managers’ performance each year. If municipal 
councils are not happy with the performance of managers, they could either terminate the 
contract of employment on grounds of poor performance or not renew it at the expiration of its 
term.48 Renewal or otherwise of the employment contract depends on the prior satisfactory 
attainment of identified performance objectives and targets.49 
Section 54A(4) of the Systems Act further provides for an open skills recruitment system, 
which entails the external advertisement of all posts to allow senior officials in the former 
administrations to compete for such posts with applicants drawn from outside local 
government. This principle seeks to open up recruitment to the broader sections of the 
population in line with the constitutional objectives of objectivity, fairness, redress and broad 
representation enunciated in section 195 of the Constitution. Furthermore, in the period 
between 1998 and 2006, the Systems and Structures Acts did not prescribe any form of 
qualification and experience, simply stating in each case that a person appointed as a municipal 
manager or a manager directly accountable to the municipal manager must have skills and 
expertise to perform the duties associated with the post in question, without specifying what 
those skills should be.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Section 57 Systems Act. 
48 Section 57(6)(b) Systems Act read with regulation 32(3) Performance Regulations and regulation 16 of 
Disciplinary Regulations. 
49 Tshongweni v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (2012) 33 ILJ 2847 (LAC) at para. 33. 
50 Sections 82(2) Structures Act and 56(2) Systems Act. 
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In essence, qualifications and seniority were not the only consideration taken account of in 
appointment and promotion decisions, as is the case in the closed employment system. Reliance 
on internal promotion would frustrate the constitutional objectives of objectivity, fairness, 
redress and broad representation.51 These principles require that posts must be advertised 
nationally to reach and attract a larger pool of applicants and ensure open competition, 
especially from persons historically disadvantaged, to ensure, ultimately, a public 
administration that is broadly representative of the South African people. The selection criteria 
are based on competencies, as indicated by track record in performance, rather than undue over- 
emphasis of academic qualifications. The aim is to make local government jobs more 
accessible to all sections of society, achieve employment equity, and provide equal 
opportunities for advancement for people at all levels within local government. 
Local government policies and legislation further provide municipalities with options to 
externalise service delivery through public-private partnerships and corporatisation.52 The 
Green Paper on Local Government outlines the full spectrum of service delivery options to 
choose from to mobilise additional capacity and resources for effective service delivery. These 
include public-private partnerships and corporatisation.53 The White Paper on Local 
Government states: 
Municipalities have a range of delivery options to enhance service provision. 
They need to strategically assess and plan the most appropriate forms of 
service delivery for their areas. Their administrations need to be geared to 
implement the chosen delivery options in the most effective manner and so 
ensure maximum benefit to their communities.54 
The Systems Act, in chapter 8, outlines the various options available to municipalities as well 
as the criteria to be used when deciding on service delivery mechanisms. Section 76 of the 
Systems Act contains a complete list of service delivery mechanisms, categorised as either 
internal or external mechanisms.55 Section 78 of the Systems Act sets out the criteria and 
procedure that would help municipalities in deciding which would be the most viable option to 
provide the service. This section guides municipalities in choosing between 
 
 
 
 
 
51 Section 195(1)(i) Constitution. 
52 Sections 76 and 78 Systems Act read with section 120 MFMA. 
53  Green Paper 1997: 42 para. 2.3. 
54  White Paper 1998: 159 para. 2.2. 
55 Section 76(a) and (b) Systems Act. 
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delivering the service themselves or appointing an external service provider to do so in terms 
of a service delivery agreement. 
Another piece of legislation having a bearing on alternative service delivery mechanisms at 
local level is the MFMA. It concerns the financial management of municipalities and municipal 
entities, has provisions relating to public-private partnerships, and deals with feasibility, 
procurement, contracting, security and debt.56 For example, section 120 specifically requires a 
feasibility assessment to be carried out before a public-private partnership is concluded.57 
Both these options seek to introduce business practices or private sector management 
techniques into local government in order to achieve greater efficiency, cost-savings or service- 
quality improvements. The benefits of the public-private partnership option is the mobilising 
of resources (alternative funding) and scarce skills from the private sector and transferring of 
substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection with the performance of the 
municipal function to the private sector. The benefits of corporatisation are the business 
practices or private sector management techniques in the delivery of services and the arm’s- 
length distance or autonomy enjoyed by municipal entities, which ensures more freedom and 
flexibility from the municipal bureaucracy, with its associated red tape and deficiencies. In 
principle, the answer to the above question sounds as though the NPM was given full 
expression, but when looking deeper at the manner in which it was expressed, a different 
picture emerges. 
 
4 The manner in which NPM principles were expressed 
With regard to the question whether the manner in which these NPM principles were expressed 
in law facilitated or impeded the implementation of the NPM, it is revealed, in Chapters Six 
and Seven, that there is a mixed bag of outcomes. In some instances, the law is clearly showing 
hesitancy to give full effect to the NPM, while in others it gives full expression in a manner 
that facilitates implementation. Some NPM principles were expressed in a manner that 
thwarted or impeded the full implementation of the NPM. 
When it comes to managerialism, four legislative issues impede the proper implementation of 
the NPM. The first is that section 56(1)(a) of the Systems Act provides that it is the council 
 
 
 
56 Section 120 MFMA. 
57 Section 120(4) MFMA. 
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itself that appoints second-level managers (below the municipal manager) and that distorts the 
lines of accountability.58 This contradicts the provisions of the Systems Act that the municipal 
manager, as a head of the administration and the accounting officer, is charged with the 
formation and development of an administration that is economical, effective, efficient and 
accountable.59 Furthermore, the municipal manager alone is accountable for the proper 
functioning of municipal administration, including the maintenance of discipline.60 This raises 
the question as to how municipal managers are expected to manage the administration and 
maintain discipline if they cannot appoint their own team of executives. 
This constrains the discretion given to municipal managers to form and develop an economic, 
effective, efficient and accountable administration which they must manage within the law.61 
It also constrains the discretion given to section 56 managers, as heads of their own 
departments, in that their appointment by politicians decreases their independence. They are at 
the beck and call of politicians to do their bidding. The National Development Plan agrees that 
the appointment of senior managers by the council rather than the municipal manager often 
complicates or distorts the lines of accountability between senior managers and the municipal 
manager.62 The National Development Plan also proposes that a municipal manager must be 
given authority over appointments of managers reporting to him or her because, as things stand, 
he or she ends up being answerable for issues he or she has limited or no control over, in a way 
that undermines his or her authority.63 Furthermore, even though the Code of Conduct for 
Councillors contains a provision that prohibits councillors from interfering in the 
administration,64 prohibiting councillors from interfering in the administration, while allowing 
them to appoint the very same administration, is self-defeating. There is a possibility that the 
mere fact of appointment makes the administration beholden to the councillors who appointed 
them. 
When it comes to the maintenance of discipline of staff by the municipal manager,65 some 
managers could use the fact of their appointment to challenge the authority of the municipal 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Section 56(1)(a) Systems Act. 
59 Section 55(1)(a) Systems Act. 
60 Section 55(1)(g) Systems Act. 
61 Section 55(1)(a) Systems Act. 
62  National Development Plan 2012: 415. 
63  National Development Plan 2012: 414. 
64 Item 11 Schedule 1 Systems Act. 
65 Section 55(1)(g) Systems Act. 
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manager. This would undermine the authority of the municipal manager and render municipal 
administration ungovernable. Ultimately, it is the municipal manager, and no one else, who 
accounts for his or her administration. Furthermore, since the employment contracts of senior 
managers are concluded with the council but their performance agreements with the municipal 
manager, the municipal manager is in a difficult position as far as enforcing the performance 
management system and disciplining his or her staff is concerned, which has the potential to 
render the authority of the municipal manager nugatory. 
It is an inconsistent application of the NPM principle of managerialism, therefore, for the 
lawmakers to prohibit interference in procurement decisions but not in appointment decisions. 
This means, in essence, that while municipal managers are empowered with full discretion in 
supply chain management, specifically procurement decisions, by the exclusion of political 
involvement,66 that same discretion is curtailed in human resource management, especially the 
appointment of senior managers. There are contextual similarities between supply chain 
management and human resource management, and they both have a propensity to attract 
political interference. In the same way as in procurement decisions, the role of the council and 
councillors should be limited to the formulation and adoption of the recruitment policy, and 
not on implementation of the policy.67 It is inconsistent of the lawmakers to empower managers 
only in supply chain management issues but not in human resource management issues, as both 
sets of issues are integral to the principle of letting managers manage: they relate to the core 
functions of the municipal manager as the head of the municipal administration and an 
accounting officer. Councillors should not be involved in the appointment of section 56 
managers, which is the implementation of the recruitment policy.68 
The second is that there is a panoply of laws and regulations, emanating from national 
government and prescribing certain actions and outcomes.69 This leaves little scope for 
discretion by managers and, in effect, curtails their powers and chokes their innovativeness. 
Instead of expending time and energy devising innovative ways of delivering services to the 
communities, managers are stuck in ticking boxes and meeting the prescriptive demands of the 
many laws governing the sector. A comparison of the national and provincial levels reveals 
 
 
 
 
66 Section 117 MFMA. 
67 Ntliziywana 2012: 57. 
68 Ntliziywana 2012: 57. 
69 Performance Regulations of 2006, Competency Regulations of 2007, Systems Amendment Act of 2011, 
Appointment Regulations of 2014, and Public Administration Management Act of 2014. 
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that the public service in these two spheres does not suffer from the same problem of 
overregulation, indicating that there is a level of mistrust towards local government. The 
overregulation at local level impedes the exercise of the wide discretion conferred on senior 
management as they find themselves operating in an environment that is encumbered by 
regulations and red tape. Autonomy and managerial discretion presuppose that other spheres 
are not issuing showers orders as to what actions should be taken and what kinds of outcomes 
should follow from these actions. This state of affairs has the potential to erode managerial 
autonomy and relegate senior managers to being the implementing agent of other spheres. 
The third is that there are conflicting laws from CoGTA and the National Treasury, and most 
recently DPSA, which are confusing managers and as thus are undermining their discretion. 
The rivalry between these departments vying for regulatory control of local government is 
having a negative impact on managers in that it is confusing them in relation to which 
regulations to apply to which factual situation. Managers are caught in between the three 
ministries, a situation that is not conducive for the proper exercise of their autonomy. 
The fourth is the varying contractual regimes for senior managers. Not all senior managers are 
strictly on short-term contract. When it comes to the municipal manager, section 57(6) 
prescribes fixed-term employment of five years.70 If the contract is concluded during the term 
of a council, it may not exceed one year after the election of the next council.71 In the case of 
section 56 managers, the Act leaves the employment terms to the parties to decide, but leaves 
room open for council to elect to also apply section 57(6) to a section 56 manager, in which 
case this fact must be recorded in the employment contract itself. 72 
The whole idea behind the introduction of the fixed-term contract system was to improve 
accountability and induce a focus on outputs.73 The employment contracts are used to induce 
performance in that they would only ‘be renewable based on an assessment of performance 
against specified targets’.74 The application of different employment regimes to senior 
managers, therefore, means that the regime that improves accountability and induces  
 
 
 
 
70  Uthukela District Municipality vs Khoza and Others (D 735/2013) [2015] ZALCD 19 (Uthukela case) at para. 
48. See also section 57(6) read with the repealed section 57(7) of the Systems Act. Given that this discussion is 
for the period 2000-2006, the repealed section 57(7), which sought to extend the application of fixed-term 
contracts to section 56 managers, is still applicable 
71 Section 57(5)(a) Systems Act. 
72  Uthukela case at para. 48. 
73  White Paper 1998: 160 para. 2.2.1. 
74  White Paper 1998: 160 para. 2.2.1. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
384 
Chapter Nine 
 
 
 
 
performance is only applicable to the municipal managers and not to heads of departments. It 
is left to the discretion of the council, when it comes to second level managers, whether to 
extend the regime or not. In the exercise of their discretion, municipal councils might, and 
indeed have, exclude(d) a significant section of section 56 managers. 
With regard to public-private partnerships, it is argued that the procedures for externalising 
services are convoluted, complex and costly and, as such, very few municipalities are using 
public-private partnerships as options for externalising service delivery. First, the section 78 
procedure is impossible to implement. It entails four stages, all of which require an elaborate 
assessment or feasibility study. Section 120 of the MFMA and the PPP Regulations complicate 
the procedure for externalising services by imposing additional layers of compliance. 
As a result of this complexity, only 21 out of 257 municipalities countrywide have attempted 
externalising services using public-private partnerships.75 None of these public-private 
partnerships have reached the implementation stage, even though majority of them were 
initiated in 2011. In essence, none of the registered public-private partnerships with regard to 
providing core services are functional. It is argued that the complex nature of the legislative 
framework giving expression to the NPM principle of public-private partnership requires 
additional capacities within municipalities and that this poses a challenge for a number of 
municipalities. The PPP Unit has not been active in providing the technical assistance required 
at different stages of externalising the service through public-private partnerships. 
A comparative analysis of the procedure for externalising a service through public-private 
partnerships at national and provincial levels reveals that the procedure therein is much simpler. 
At national level, the first two reviews, namely initial internal review and external mechanism 
review, are bypassed. The national process begins with the inception phase in terms of which 
the procuring institution registers the project with the PPP Unit.76 This is followed by a 
feasibility study on the most appropriate mechanism for procuring the project.77 If the 
feasibility study shows that the PPP is the viable option, the National Treasury gives it its stamp 
of approval and the procuring institution invites the market to submit bids for the provisions of 
 
 
 
 
 
75 National Treasury PPP Unit Public Private Partnership available at http://www.ppp.gov.za/Lists/PPP 
percent20Project percent20List percent20Master/Municipal.aspx (accessed 15 March 2017). 
76  Regulation 16.3 Treasury Regulation 16 (GG 23463 of 25 May 2002). 
77 Regulation 16.4 Treasury Regulation 16. 
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service. Once a suitable bidder has been chosen, the project is implemented.78 Unlike the 
section 78 procedure and the further procedure added by the MFMA and its Regulations, the 
procedure in terms of Regulation 16 is not complex. As a result, as at 2015 there were 24 active 
PPP and 50 more in the pipeline for only 35 national departments,79 compared with only 27 
PPP for the entire local government sector, consisting of 257 municipalities. 
This raises the question of why the government is using different standards for national 
government and local government. The phenomenon can be explained by the general mistrust 
displayed by the national government in the ability of local government to act responsibly. 
Such mistrust also explains the flurry of laws, discussed above, overregulating local 
government. 
When it comes to corporatisation, it is argued that even though corporatisation ensures an 
arm’s-length distance between the entity and municipal administration, a corporatised entity is 
still subject to the same laws and procedures as an ordinary service department. The tight 
financial regime the MFMA imposes on municipalities is also applicable to municipal 
entities.80 The human resource management regime, namely appointment procedures, 
performance management system and conditions of service applicable to municipalities, is also 
applicable to municipal entities.81 Tight regulatory control of entities runs counter to the 
rationale for creating a stand-alone entity away from the parent municipality so as to cushion 
it from the strictures of regulation and red tape. As a result, corporatisation is no different than 
ordinary municipal administration, and as such there is no incentive to corporatise services. It 
is simply an additional expense to the local fiscus. 
As a result, only 39 municipalities82 out of 257 are utilising municipal entities for the delivery 
of a service(s). The rest of the 223 municipalities have been discouraged by the strict regulatory 
regime introduced in 2003. Since then there are only 62 municipal entities countrywide, as 
opposed to the 91 that existed before the introduction of the strict regime in 2003. The majority 
of these were created before 2003. Of the 34 municipalities, only the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality has corporatised most of its major or core functions, with 12 entities 
as at 2017. This is an example of the NPM taking over, signifying that the City of Johannesburg 
 
 
 
78 Regulation 16.6 Treasury Regulation 16. 
79 Word Bank Establishing Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons Learned from the Global South (2015) 4. 
80 Sections 84-104 MFMA. 
81 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
82 This number decreased to 34 after the 2016 local government elections. 
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has fully embraced corporatisation. However, because of lack of coordination and wastage, the 
City of Johannesburg is re-incorporating all its entities into mainstream municipal 
administration. 
Furthermore, because of the tight regulatory regime for entities, the trend is to use municipal 
entities to plug capacity gaps in the municipality. This means that where a municipality has the 
necessary capacity and expertise to provide basic services, there is no incentive to opt for 
corporatisation.83 However, where a particular area falls outside the traditional activities of the 
municipality, and as such there is no established capacity and expertise in that area, then 
corporatisation is seen as a viable option. 
A few examples of this trend are in the large metros of EThekwini and Cape Town. First, they 
both opted for municipal entities as a vehicle to run convention centres in Durban and Cape 
Town, which are not core municipal services. Secondly, the EThekwini metro established a 
municipal entity called Durban Marine Theme Park with the aim to stimulate economic growth. 
Because running a theme park is not core municipal business, a municipal entity was created 
for this purpose. Thirdly, the City of Cape Town established a company to operate its rapid bus 
transport (BRT) system. Given that the provision of public transport was a new venture for the 
City, the operation of the BRT was entrusted to a municipal entity in the form of a private 
company. All this indicates that the original intent of this NPM tenet of separating service 
delivery units from the municipality to offer them greater autonomy and flexibility and to 
introduce business practices to achieve greater efficiency did not prove feasible in most cases. 
It proved usable where much specialised services were required, and not the-run-of-the-mill 
municipal services as the City of Johannesburg has tried. 
There are other instances where the legal framework gives full expression to NPM principles 
in a manner that facilitates their implementation. These instances relate to the open skills 
recruitment system, the fixed-term contract for municipal managers and performance 
management. With regard to open skill set, between 1998 and 2006 the law required the person 
to be appointed as a municipal manager or a manager directly accountable to the municipal 
manager to have skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with the post in question, 
without specifying what those skills should be.84 Furthermore, the law states that the post must 
 
 
 
83 Steytler, Ntliziywana & De Visser 2010: 30. 
84 Section 82 Structures Act. 
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be advertised nationally to attract the larger pool of potential candidates.85 This means opening 
up recruitment to the broader sections of the population. It is argued that this is in line with the 
constitutional objectives of objectivity, fairness, redress and broad representation. In essence, 
qualifications and seniority are not the only consideration taken account of in appointment and 
promotion decisions, as is the case in the closed employment system. All the persons who 
qualify for the appointment, transfer or promotion shall be considered and the evaluation of 
persons shall be based on training, skills, competence, knowledge and the need to redress the 
imbalances of the past. 
The second instance where the legislative framework facilitated the implementation of NPM 
principles was with regard to fixed-term contracts for municipal managers. The Systems Act, 
in line with the NPM principle of fixed-term contracts, prescribes the appointment of municipal 
managers to a fixed-term of five years.86 The Systems Act further states that if the contract is 
concluded during the term of a council, it may not exceed one year after the election of the next 
council.87 This makes the five-year term of a municipal manager coincide more or less with the 
five-year term of council. 
The third instance where the legislative framework facilitated the implementation of NPM 
principles was in relation to the performance management system. The Systems Act and the 
MFMA gave full effect to the NPM tenet of performance management system in a manner that 
facilitates implementation. First, the Systems Act deals with the manner in which 
municipalities should deal with performance management. It provides for the establishment 
and development of a performance management system for each and every municipality in the 
country in the manner that is commensurate with its resources; and for the manner in which it 
should be monitored and reviewed by the municipality.88 The performance management 
systems must set key performance indicators and targets and provide for the monitoring, review 
and reporting on municipal performance based on indicators linked to the IDP.89 The Act 
requires all municipalities to ‘promote a culture of performance management among its 
political structures, political office bearers and councillors and its administration’.90 
 
 
 
 
85 Sections 54A(4) and 56(3) Systems Act. 
86 Section 57(6) read with the repealed section 57(7) Systems Act. 
87 Section 57(5)(a) Systems Act. 
88 Sections 38, 39 and 40 Systems Act. 
89 Sections 41 Systems Act. 
90 Sections 38(b) Systems Act. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
388 
Chapter Nine 
 
 
 
The Act further states that a performance agreement must be concluded within 60 days of 
appointment and annually thereafter, within one month after the beginning of a financial year 
of the municipality.91 Failure to conclude the performance agreement within the specified 
periods result in the lapsing of the appointment. In the case of the municipal manager, the 
performance agreement must be entered into with the municipality as represented by the mayor 
or executive mayor, as the case may be.92 When it comes to a manager directly accountable to 
the municipal manager, the performance agreement must be entered into with the municipal 
manager.93 
The MFMA in turn enjoins the mayor to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the performance 
agreements of municipal managers and section 56 managers are concluded and comply with 
the provisions of the Systems Act.94 The MFMA also requires the mayor to ensure that the 
performance agreements of said officials comply with the MFMA to promote sound financial 
management and are linked to the measurable performance objectives approved with the 
budget and to the service delivery and budget implementation plan.95 
The Performance Regulations in turn subject the employment of a municipal manager and those 
managers reporting directly to him or her to the signing of a separate performance agreement,96 
with the aim of measuring and evaluating their performance.97 In terms of the regulations, the 
employer is enjoined to create an enabling environment that facilitates effective performance 
by its senior managers.98 This includes an obligation to maintain a workable relationship with 
the managers, consulting them whenever the exercise of powers or decisions to be taken will 
have an effect on the performance of their function.99 When it comes to performance 
monitoring and evaluation, these regulations employ a carrot-and-stick approach to ensuring 
satisfactory performance. In the case of outstanding performance, the officials concerned are 
rewarded with a performance bonus for a job well done.100  In the case of unacceptable 
 
 
 
 
 
91 Section 57(2)(i) and (ii) Systems Act. 
92 Section 57(2)(b) Systems Act. 
93 Section 57(2)(c) Systems Act. 
94 Section 53(1)(c)(iii)(cc) MFMA. 
95 Section 53(1)(c)(iii)(aa) and (bb) MFMA. 
96 Regulation 4 Performance Regulations. 
97 Regulation 27 Performance Regulations. 
98 Regulation 30(1) Performance Regulations. 
99 Regulation 31(1)(c) Performance Regulations. 
100 Regulation 32(2) Performance Regulations. 
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performance, systemic remedial, developmental support or corrective steps are provided to 
assist such employees to improve their performance before the problem worsens.101 
The picture that emerges of the way in which NPM principles were expressed in the legislative 
framework for local government is one of poor implementation and mistrust of local 
government institutions by national government, which translates into hesitancy to give full 
effect to the NPM. Unfortunately, the NPM is not the winner in both instances. Where the 
national government clearly has no choice but to implement national policy imperatives or 
priorities, it gives full expression to the NPM at local government. The open skills recruitment 
system, for example, fitted in with the government’s transformation imperatives of 
deracialising the public administration. That is why it is given full expression even at local 
level. The same can be said for the fixed-term contract for municipal managers, which ensured 
that the incoming government cleans out the old administrators and puts in people favourably 
disposed to its policies and vision. Performance management came in handy to keep the old 
administrators still in the system in check. 
However, it would seem that there was no clear alignment between certain NPM principles and 
legitimate government priorities. First, regarding the appointment of second-level managers, 
the national government decided to throw caution to the wind and reserved that role for council 
in case there were still old administrators in the system. If a municipal manager happened to 
belong to the old regime, it was going to be difficult to entrust him or her with the important 
task of deracialisation. That was best left to incoming politicians. 
Secondly, the panoply of laws thrown at local level prescribing certain actions and outcomes – 
which, by the way, is not the case at national level – clearly shows that national government 
does not quite trust local government to act responsibly. Thus, it prescribed what actions to 
take and the outcomes of those actions. 
Thirdly, the rivalry between three national departments vying for regulatory control of local 
government also indicates that the mistrust of local government is a dominant narrative at 
national level. The only problem is that each of these departments sees itself playing a role in 
regulating local government and prescribing actions and outcomes. The mistrust of local 
government also plays itself out in the different standards prescribed for PPPs at national and 
 
 
 
 
 
101 Regulation 32(3)(a) Performance Regulations. 
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local level. At national level, the procedure is simpler and quicker, whereas at local level it is 
complex, convoluted and costly. 
The varying contractual regimes for senior managers and the fact that corporatised entities are 
still subject to the laws and procedures that an ordinary service department is subjected to could 
be explained as a design flaw in the system. Overall, the balance tilted against the NPM. The 
national government showed hesitancy in giving full expression to the NPM at local level. 
 
5 Factors in the legal framework that facilitated the NPM 
implementation 
In instances where NPM principles were expressed in law in a manner that facilitated their 
implementation, the desired results were often not achieved: the implementation of the NPM 
has routinely had adverse effects. First, the open skills recruitment system led to patronage 
appointments or the appointment of unsuitable persons. Although the open skills recruitment 
systems requires at most that a person appointed as a manager must have skills and expertise 
to perform the duties associated with the post in question, it did not specify what those skills 
should be.102 It placed the emphasis on performance rather than qualifications, and this opened 
the floodgates for appointments that flout the rules and procedures.103 The open skills 
recruitment systems has been used as a licence to appoint unsuitable and unqualified persons.104 
Some of these appointments are justified on the basis of affirmative action and cadre 
deployment policies, while others are purely for patronage reasons. The open skills recruitment 
system was too open to stop any of it. This NPM principle therefore allowed neo- 
patrimonialism to flourish. This is attributable to a design flaw, which is indicative of the 
unsuitability of this NPM principle in the South African context. 
Secondly, fixed-term contracts for municipal managers and those section 56 managers also on 
fixed-term contracts led to political manipulation and the revolving-door phenomenon. Given 
that the fixed-term employment contracts of senior managers coincide more or less with the 
term of a council, this NPM principles enables the incoming government to clean out the 
existing administration. Furthermore, short-term contracts are being used as a stick to punish 
those senior managers who do not toe a particular political line, and more importantly  follow 
 
 
 
 
102 Sections 82(2) Structures Act and 56(2) Systems Act. 
103 Ntliziywana 2012: 50. See also the State of Local Government Report 2009: 31. 
104  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 31. 
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certain financial directives. Once their contracts expire, these do not get renewed even if the 
officials performed well in terms of the performance agreement. In essence, the five-year 
contract for municipal managers and those section 56 managers also on fixed-term contracts 
has been a source of anxiety and instability in municipal administration. 
The high turnover of municipal managers, as is the case with HoDs at national level, has a 
multiplier effect on the turnover of the senior management because invariably new municipal 
managers come with new strategies, bring new organisational structures and focus substantive 
attention on building their own teams. 105 Every time there is a change at the top, some form of 
reconfiguration takes place when a new manager arrives with his or her own priorities, 
approach or strategic perspective.106 Sometimes they fail to leverage on the gains made by the 
previous municipal manager and are unable to account for work or progress that took place 
during the previous period. These changes can be disruptive and impact on stability and the 
delivery of services as it takes about six months to a year for the new municipal manager to 
settle in. 
In addition, it takes time to build relationships of trust and mutual respect in institutions, and 
once relationships are created, there is a likelihood that energies, commitments and loyalties 
will be channelled towards common strategic objectives. Senior management has to adapt to 
the new style and vision of the new municipal manager, resulting in the first six months to a 
year of appointment being unproductive. Continuous changes in leadership over short periods 
affects the pace of the implementation of the strategic plan.107 This is another indication of 
unsuitability of the NPM principle (fixed-term employment system) in South Africa, adding 
weight to the critique that that the NPM is not suitable in developing countries. 
Thirdly, the performance management system is poorly implemented because it relies on the 
capacity of the mayor which is not always there. As a result, many municipalities do not 
conclude performance agreements with their municipal managers and managers directly 
accountable to municipal managers at all, or they do not do so within stipulated time-frames.108 
There are frequent cases of performance management systems not established or complied 
 
 
 
 
 
105 Public Service Commission 2008e: 13. 
106  Nzimande 2012: 14. 
107  Smit 2015: 47. 
108  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
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with, and many municipal managers with non-signed performance contracts.109 This is not an 
isolated case of two or three municipalities not having signed a performance agreement with 
their municipal managers - the number is quite alarming. In this regard, the number was 76 in 
2008, 54 in 2009, 36 in 2011, and 41 in 2012.110 
All of this indicates that the culture of performance management is not yet entrenched in South 
African local government, either due to incapacity or lack of political will. To add insult to 
injury, acting managers, of which there are many, do not have to sign performance agreements 
because, by law, they can only act for three months, renewable for a further three months.111 
This is creating a culture of impunity in that senior managers cannot be held accountable for 
non-performance if there is no agreement in place that outlines key priorities for 
implementation during the financial year. 
Furthermore, the failure by municipal managers to sign performance agreements is 
compromising the entire value chain of the performance management system as organisational 
performance has to be cascaded from the accounting officer to the entire staff to ensure linkages 
between overall organisational performance and individual performance.112 How, then, can 
municipal managers enter into performance agreements with section 56 managers if they have 
not concluded theirs with the municipality as duly represented by the mayor or the executive 
mayor? They cannot effectively enter into performance agreements with subordinates when 
their performance agreements have not been concluded. That would mean otherwise that there 
is no link between individual performance objectives and targets and the overall organisational 
objectives and targets. As such, a failure to sign a performance agreement by a municipal 
manager holds severe repercussions for the entire performance management system in a given 
municipality. Once again, this is a pointer that adds weight to the critique regarding the 
suitability of the NPM in developing countries on the basis of lack state capacity which is a 
precondition for the successful implementation of the NPM.113 
Lastly, corporatisation in the City of Johannesburg has not worked. The City is the only 
municipality that has gone all-out in embracing corporatisation in relation to most of its core 
municipal  services.  The  City has  opted  for  corporatisation  as  a  mechanism  for effective 
 
 
 
109  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
110  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
111 Section 56(1)(c) Systems Act. 
112  Public Service Commission 2012b: 22. 
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delivery of its major services. It is not just the only municipality but also the only metro to 
corporatise most of its core municipal services. However, corporatisation has not led to 
efficiency in the delivery of services to local residents. In the words of Herman Mashaba, the 
Executive Mayor of the City of Johannesburg, ‘The entities have struggled with achieving 
service delivery levels which have been satisfactory for our residents.’114 
This was occasioned, first, by the difficulties in getting suitable boards of directors for all 12 
municipal entities therein. Secondly, there were difficulties in getting 12 good managers; not 
all 12 managers recruited on each occasion are likely to be good. Thirdly, there were difficulties 
in getting cooperation between all 12 entities. It is well-nigh impossible to get all entities to 
work in harmony when they are operating at arm’s-length, removed from the municipal 
manager who should be able to coordinate. Lastly, for entities to work, there should be 
duplication of personnel. In this regard, there should be skilled personnel in the municipality 
in order to be able to monitor the entities’ performance. If there are no such skilled personnel, 
there can be no proper controls over entities. This assessment is in line with the findings of 
levels of productivity of municipal companies in Portugal. The research published in 2011 
found that these companies had low levels of productivity compared to levels achieved by the 
in-house former municipal service.115 
In the case of the City of Johannesburg, such lack of coordination and low levels of productivity 
have led to the mooted reversal of the policy to use corporatisation as an external service 
delivery mechanism. In this regard, the City of Johannesburg is in the process of reintegrating 
all its municipal entities into the City’s administration. However, it is not certain when this 
move will be implemented, as the City recently announced the appointment of the board 
chairpersons and various board members of municipal entities to ‘achieve the service delivery 
demanded by our residents’.116 It remains to be seen whether this new leadership is meant to 
lead the reincorporation of all municipal entities in the City of Johannesburg into the metro’s 
administration. This suggests that corporatisation in South Africa is not working, and this leads 
to questions of suitability of the NPM in developing countries. All the questions of suitability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 Statement by Cllr Herman Mashaba, Executive Mayor, City of Johannesburg, on the occasion of the City’s 
2015/16 Annual General Meeting (AGM) for Municipal Entities held on 17 March 2017 (Mashaba 2017). 
115 Da Cruz NF & Marques RC ‘Viability of municipal companies in the provision of urban infrastructure services’ 
(2011) 37(1) Local Government Studies 108. 
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raised in this section will be considered when addressing the next question relating to the 
resurgence of Weberian bureaucracy. 
 
6 Resurgence of the Weberian model 
As a result of the failures of the NPM model of delivery, there has been a resurgence of the 
Weberian model of governance. While not completely abandoning the NPM paradigm, the 
government has been swiftly moving towards the Weberian model of service delivery by 
reintroducing qualifications-linked meritocracy alongside the NPM’s performance-linked 
meritocracy in local public administration. Some of the changes also reinforce the NPM, not 
only the Weberian model. This resurgence is spearheaded by three national departments, then 
DPLG (now CoGTA), the National Treasury and Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA), that seem to be vying for regulatory control over local government. 
First, the DPLG kicked off this resurgence in 2006 by introducing qualifications and experience 
requirements for the appointment of local government managers through Performance 
Regulations.117 This is clearly a Weberian element. These regulations, in addition to the 
performance management system, which is an NPM element, contained enforceable 
qualification criteria. The National Treasury followed in 2007 by passing the purely Weberian 
Competency Regulations118 containing a comprehensive competency framework which 
consists of minimum qualifications, work-related experience, core managerial competencies 
and core occupational competencies for managers. As a result, a prescribed course of training 
and a prescribed special examination are once again prerequisites for employment in local 
government. 
In 2011 CoGTA amended provisions of the Systems Act dealing with recruitment of managers 
to provide for new procedures and competency criteria for appointment, and for the 
consequences of non-compliant appointments. CoGTA further issued Appointment 
Regulations119 which gives further effect to the competency framework contained in the 
amended  Systems  Act.  DPSA  entered  the  fray  by  enacting  the  Public     Administration 
 
 
 
117 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly 
accountable to Municipal Managers (GN R805 GG 29089 of 1 August 2006). 
118 Local Government: Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels (GN R493 GG 29967 of 15 June 
2007). 
119  Local Government: Regulations on Appointment and Condition of Employment of Senior Managers (GN  21 
GG 37245 of 17 January 2014). 
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Management Act,120 which also regulates employment in the public administration, including 
local government. This Act also authorises the Minister of Public Service and Administration 
to prescribe compulsory educational requirements for employment in the public 
administration.121 
These multiple regulations are causing confusion as their sheer volume and complexity is 
making it difficult for municipalities to decide which regulations to apply and to decipher their 
meaning. The overzealousness of national government is proving to be counterproductive. 
Secondly, the Systems Amendment Act further refined and reinforced the Weberian principle 
of work-related experience by requiring an additional element of ‘suitability’.122 This element 
also reinforces the NPM as it also looks at track record, and not only at qualifications. In this 
regard, an applicant’s previous experience must be an experience that stands him or her in good 
stead. This is meant to weed the system of the incompetent people that came in through an 
open skills basis. The Merafong123 judgment is instructive in this regard, where the Labour 
Court found the municipal manager unsuitable, despite the fact that he met the qualification 
requirements, because of the strong opinions expressed by the Auditor-General against him in 
relation to his previous position.124 Consequently, the bar has now been raised as both the 
Weberian and the NPM elements form part of appointment requirements. 
Thirdly, section 56A of the Systems Amendment Act provides for the separation of politics 
from the administration, another principle that reinforces the resurgence of Weberian model as 
well as the NPM tenet of letting managers manage. As noted in Chapter Two, the Weberian 
model wanted a clear separation between politics and administration. The role of politicians 
was to set policy and that of administrators was implement that policy to the point of self- 
denial.125 
Lastly, the resurrection of the Weberian bureaucracy was expressed through the resurgence of 
the idea of professional institutes which could train and discipline members. This is purely a 
Weberian tenet. 
 
 
 
 
120  Act 11 of 2014. 
121 Section 13 Public Administration Management Act. 
122 Section 54A(2) Systems Act. 
123 Merafong City Local Municipality v South African Municipality Workers Union and Another [2016] ZALAC 
12 (Merafong v SAMWU). 
124  SAMWU v Merafong paras 19 and 22. 
125 Sager & Rosser 2009: 1139. 
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Even though lateral entries from the private sector and other spheres into local public 
administration are not completely abandoned, the focus has shifted from outputs or outcomes 
back to inputs. As explained in chapter eight under section 3.4.4, this shift in focus has changed 
the position dramatically. A person appointed from outside local government will have to show 
that he or she meets the entry requirements relating to skills, expertise, qualifications, 
experience and competencies before appointment. The previous position where they could 
simply be appointed on condition that they will produce results later, has changed. Managers 
now have to prove their performance capability beyond trust that they can perform later, but 
through hard facts.126 Trust is good, but facts and figures are much better. This means that the 
focus is no longer at what they can later deliver but what they bring to the organisation. So, 
despite proven capabilities elsewhere, if a person does not comply with entry requirements, 
then he or she is excluded. The Msengana-Ndlela debacle discussed in chapter eight aptly 
illustrates this point.127 
The resurgence of the Weberian model is occasioned by the failure of the NPM to deliver on 
its promises. That failure of the NPM to deliver services confirms the critique of its suitability 
in developing countries. The critique holds true in the case of South Africa, where the NPM 
failed to deliver due to a lack of skills, weaknesses in the rule of law, the nature of political 
culture, design flaws in the legislative framework, and intrinsic shortcomings in certain NPM 
principles themselves. 
First, the critique asserts that because the NPM relies on the existence of skills, expertise and 
capacity for the successful implementation of its sophisticated reforms, it could hardly succeed 
in developing countries because generally they are lacking in that front.128 These are the 
preconditions for the successful implementation of the NPM reforms. It has been shown in 
South Africa that the mayors, upon whose capacity the performance management system relies, 
often lack the necessary skills, expertise and capacity resulting in poor implementation of the 
performance management system. Similarly, corporatisation in the City of Johannesburg has 
been shown to have failed due to lack of skilled boards of directors, managers, and municipal 
staff  to  settle  and  monitor  service  level  agreements.  The  lack  of  such  skills  has  made 
 
 
 
 
126 Torsteinsen H ‘Why does post-bureaucracy lead to more formalism?’ (2012) 38(3) Local Government Studies 
341. 
127 See also Msengana-Ndlela v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (3282/2013) [2015] ZAECPEHC 
31. 
128  Polidano 1999; Caiden & Sundaram 2004. 
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corporatisation unsuitable in South Africa. The same problem of skills shortage also holds true 
for public-private partnerships as well. Public-private partnerships are unsuitable in South 
Africa because there is a lack of skills base and as a result they do not perform the redistributive 
function they were meant to perform. 
In the case of short-term contracts, the critique asserts that given the general skills shortage in 
developing countries, it is burdensome to have a contract system that leads to the 
haemorrhaging of scarce skills and the existing institutional memory.129 The argument is that 
the short-term nature of these contracts translates into a rapid turnover of managers and the 
concomitant failures of accountability. In South Africa, this NPM principle has been shown to 
be eroding the existing skills in local government. Managers often move on or are forced out 
at the end of the contract and fail to account for problems they might have caused. Furthermore, 
as has been seen with the revolving-door phenomenon in South Africa, the short-term contracts 
lead to greater political control over senior managers.130 This also manifests in the use of short 
term contracts as a stick to punish those senior managers who do not toe a particular political 
line, and follow certain financial directives. As such, these principles, because they rely on 
capacity, proved unsuitable for South Africa. The conception of short-term contracts was 
simply bad for application in developing countries, confirming the critique regarding the 
suitability of the NPM in developing countries. 
However, in the case of the performance management system, enough capacity is being 
developed and the tide is slowly turning. For example, 76 municipalities out of 278 in 2008 did 
not have performance agreements in place for their municipal managers.131 That figure has 
gone down significantly in subsequent years, signifying that South Africa is not doing so badly 
in the area of mayoral capacity development. In 2014, the figure had gone down to 26 municipal 
managers.132 As such, there is ample room for improvement. South Africa is slowly gaining 
the necessary capacity in this front, which is a precondition for the successful implementation 
of the NPM reforms. On the managerial front, however, this progress is blemished by the short- 
term employment system and the political culture attendant to it. Local government is bleeding 
capable managers as a result of short-term contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
129  Cameron 2009: 928. 
130  Cameron 2009: 925. 
131  The State of Local Government Report 2009: 30. 
132  AGSA 2015: 81. 
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Secondly, the open skills system has proven to be unsuitable in the South African context 
because of a flaw in its design. It was so wide open that there was no way it could monitor who 
comes into the system, and it has also fallen foul to a political culture of abuse of processes. 
One of the preconditions for the success of the NPM is a set of pre-existing rules to enforce 
it.133 Given the relaxation of the rules and, as such, the absence of the rule of law in this area, 
this principle is susceptible to abuse for narrow political interests or patronage, and has the 
potential to plunge the public administration into chaos. 
Thirdly, the appointment of second-level managers by councils rather than municipal managers 
and the varying contractual regimes for senior managers are also design flaws in the legislative 
framework giving effect to the NPM. However, while the first flaw undermines managerial 
autonomy, the second one, where senior managers are appointed on a permanent contract, has 
ensured stability in senior management. Even though it is a design flaw, it turns out to be a 
good mistake because short-term contracts are a bad idea in countries with shortage of skilled 
personnel. 
Fourthly, NPM principles of managerial autonomy and public-private partnerships similarly 
proved unsuitable in South Africa because of the paradox of recentralisation. The critics of the 
NPM movement charge that empowering managers to manage programmes and budgets 
detracts from the accountability of elected politicians and distorts the lines of accountability. 
In this regard, it is argued that political executives have lost their control over the 
implementation of their policies following managerial reforms put in place under the banner of 
managerial autonomy.134 It is argued that this has resulted in the hunger of these political 
executives for more control over public managers, leading to frequent interference in 
managerial decision-making. While decentralising certain powers and functions, governments 
in developing countries rightfully retain centralised decision-making.135 This is important 
because most developing countries have adopted the notion of a developmental state, that is, a 
strong, interventionist activist state.136 In order to supervise developmental programmes and to 
ensure that they are in a position to guide their weak and impoverished economies out of the 
woods, developmental states need to retain centralised decision-making power. 
 
 
 
 
 
133  Sarker 2006. 
134 Atreya & Armstrong 2002: 10. 
135  World Bank 1997, Polidano & Hulme 2001. 
136  Levin 2004: 13. 
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In the first place, this has manifested itself in South Africa in the panoply of laws thrown at 
local level prescribing certain actions and outcomes. While delegating certain powers and 
functions to manager, national government has issued a number of prescriptive demands to 
ensure that local government acts responsibly. True to this paradox, this clearly shows that the 
national government did not quite trust local government managers to pursue its developmental 
programme and to act responsibly, thus it has centralised decision-making in the form of central 
laws that prescribed what actions to take and the outcomes of those actions. No similar 
prescription of detail of how managers should conduct themselves is found at national and 
provincial levels. 
In the second place, the need for the national government to play a supervisory role over local 
government, which is seen as recentralisation, has played itself out in the rivalry between three 
national departments vying for regulatory control of local government. This also indicates that 
the mistrust of local government is a dominant narrative at national level. The problem is that 
each of these departments sees itself playing a role in regulating local government and 
prescribing actions and outcomes, thus the rivalry and lack of coordination. The same rivalry 
is not found in relations to the provinces, because they belong to the public service and as such 
operate within the national norms and standards under the direct supervision of national 
government. 
Thirdly, the mistrust of local government apparent in the moves to centralise decision-making 
also plays itself out in the different standards prescribed for PPPs at national and local level. 
At national level, the procedure is simpler and quicker while at local level it is overly onerous 
and costly. All these initiatives aimed at retaining centralised decision-making power and 
regaining control of local government have delivered local government into the bureaucratic 
clutches of national government. 
South Africa is not alone in this paradox, however. Even developed countries are affected by 
increased bureaucratisation following transfer of powers to line managers and agencification. 
In this regard, a study of regulation inside the UK government 10 years after it reorganised 
most of its civil service into agencies revealed that regulation of government in many domains 
have increased in formality, complexity, intensity and specialisation.137  McSweeny refers   to 
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numerous other studies showing a trend of increasing bureaucratisation, one evident in 
increased powers of inspection and in the reassertion of hierarchy over every area of public 
management in the UK, including local government.138 
Another developed nation, Norway, seems to be in the same boat. A study of 12 Norwegian 
municipalities that were corporatised compared to the Norwegian municipalities that were not, 
found that, in the same way as municipal entities in South Africa are treated like service 
departments, ‘these municipalities did not differ from Norwegian municipalities generally’.139 
The division of administration into four departments, each headed by a department manager, 
did not differ. The corporatised entities mirrored the service departmental structure, with a 
system of political boards elected by the municipal council. The price for increased freedom 
for operational managers, in Norway as in the UK and South Africa, has been an increase in 
efforts for more coordination and control from the strategic level. 
By contrast, corporatised entities in Singapore are not suffering from the red-taped associated 
with service departments. They are sufficiently autonomous and wield substantial discretion in 
going about their business. As noted in chapter seven, Singapore, which is classified as a 
developing country like South Africa,140 is leading the way and is proving to be a success story 
among developing countries.141 
In sum, even though the argument why the NPM is not good for governance holds true for 
South Africa, given that there is no recorded success story of the NPM since its inception, this 
argument also applies to other countries, not just in developing countries. It has been shown in 
the foregoing that there are the NPM success stories as well as failures both in the developing 
and the developed world, even though South Africa per se has not recorded a success story in 
17 years. However, the failures of South Africa are not representative of the failures of 
developing countries; Singapore and Ghana are prime examples of success stories in varying 
degrees. Furthermore, even in South Africa some elements work better than others. As 
Polidano puts it, ‘the outcome of individual NPM initiatives depends on localised contingency 
 
 
 
138 McSweeney B ‘Are we living in a post-bureaucratic epoch?’ (2006) 19(1) Journal of Organisational Change 
Management 28. 
139 Torsteinsen 2012: 327. 
140 United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2017: Country Classification available at 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/2017wesp_full_en.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
141 Sarker AE ‘New Public Management in developing countries: An analysis of success and failure with particular 
reference to Singapore and Bangladesh’ 19(2) International Journal of Public Sector Management (2006) 195. 
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factors rather than any general national characteristics.’142 For example, Ghana showed relative 
failure in its management reform in the health and state enterprise sectors, while its 
achievements in revenue authorities are spectacular.143 Moreover, there is a diversity of motives 
behind the adoption of the NPM reforms. 
The NPM, therefore, could only be said to be inappropriate in developing countries if it is taken 
as a package, as opposed to a number of separate techniques, because a number of elements 
work while others do not, depending on the motives behind the NPM reforms and what 
Polidano refers to as ‘localised contingency factors’. This is the case in all countries which 
have adopted the NPM reforms, including the UK where these reforms emanated, not only in 
developing countries. It is for this reason that all countries adopting the NPM reforms, both 
developed and developing, need to keep an open mind as to what may work and what may not, 
and to be guided by the needs of the situation. 
 
7 Recommendations: The future role of NPM 
The question that remains unanswered is whether there is anything left for the NPM despite 
its failures and the dominant resurgence of the Weberian model. It is argued that there is still a 
further role left for the NPM, albeit very limited, namely to soften the hard edges of the 
Weberian model, to mobilise resources from the private sector in order to help rectify the 
ravages of apartheid, to insulate professional decision-making by managers from political 
meddling and to hold managers personally responsible for their actions. There are four NPM 
elements that can achieve this: letting managers manage, limited sideways entry, performance 
management systems, and public-private partnerships. Below are the recommendations on how 
the NPM can still play a role alongside the Weberian model.  
First, with regard to letting managers manage, this is an element that is also recognised by the 
Weberian model, namely separation of politics from administration. This element is aimed at 
ensuring stability in municipal administration and to minimise political interference. It is 
recommended that political involvement needs to be completely outlawed in the 
implementation of policies. That is the domain of the administration. As is the case in supply 
chain management practices, councillors should be barred from appointing senior managers 
and, as such, playing any role in the implementation of human resource management policies. 
 
 
 
142 Polidano C ‘Public management reform in developing countries: issues and outcomes’ (1999) 1(1) Public 
Management 121 (hereafter Polidano 1999). 
143  Polidano 1999: 130. 
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It is therefore recommended that municipal managers should have the powers to appoint, 
discipline and dismiss their staff as part of their role as heads of municipal administrations 
and as accounting officers. 
Secondly, the NPM can still play a role to soften the harsh elements of the Weberian model 
through sideways entries. There are many instances where a strict focus on qualifications has 
overlooked highly competent officials either from the private sector or from elsewhere in the 
state machinery who happened not to have the requisite qualification for local government but 
to have proven themselves in practice. Qualifications alone do not offer any guarantee that 
performance will be up to standard. Given the ravages of apartheid that are still stark, it would 
be counterproductive, therefore, to exclude competent officials with proven track record either 
within local government or elsewhere. It is recommended that limited sideway entries into local 
government, in line with the open skills recruitment system, is one NPM principle that should 
be used in the current juncture. Section 54A(4)(b) of the Systems Act recognises the need for 
sideway entries by requiring the appointment of a suitable person. As explained in the 
Merafong judgment, the requirement of suitability encompasses skills, expertise, competence 
and the prescribed qualifications144 and, as such, the NPM requirement of track record as well 
as the Weberian requirement of qualification. In essence, the new recruits entering from the 
sides would have to pass the Weberian requirement of qualifications as well as show their 
suitability in terms of track record. They would have to show facts and figures about their 
suitability before joining the organisation. 
Thirdly, the NPM can still play the role of mobilising resources and scarce skills from the 
private sector and transferring financial risks to the private sector. In this regard, it is 
recommended that public-private partnerships should be used. The infrastructure and service 
backlogs are still too large to be left to the public sector alone. However, the regulatory 
framework for PPPs should be relaxed so that it is not as stringent and costly. The PPPs 
regime applicable at local government should be aligned with that applicable at national and 
provincial levels. The latter is less cumbersome and relatively easy to implement compared to 
the currently regime applicable at local level. If trust is the problem, then differentiation should 
be allowed and large metros should be enabled to do so easily. 
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Fourthly, given our chequered history of officials committing untold atrocities and not taking 
personal responsibility for them but instead hiding behind procedural correctness or the fact 
that they were following orders, there is still a need for a system that would hold managers 
personally responsible for their own actions. It is recommended that the performance 
management system should be applied in this regard. However, the mayors would have to be 
capacitated to be able to implement and enforce the performance management system. 
Furthermore, the provincial government would have to play its oversight role more 
assertively. The current failures to establish a performance management system, to enter 
into performance agreements, and to enforce the system arise from a lack of capacity and 
political will to enforce the performance management system. 
That notwithstanding, not all NPM principles that were incorporated into the legal framework 
are useful, as many have produced mainly negative outcomes. Short-term contracts, for 
example, are not useful in the current juncture. Even though short-term contracts are an 
important ballast to the phenomenon of time-servers, they have had detrimental effects on 
stable administration, skills retention and institutional memory. They lead to a rapid 
haemorrhaging of competent personnel, resulting in instability and loss of institutional 
memory, and South Africa is not at a stage where it has a large pool of competent officials 
lying in wait. Short-term contracts also provide a fertile ground for corruption as managers tend 
to engage in corrupt activities in preparation for life out of office. It is therefore recommended that 
managers must be employed on a permanent basis and only removed after disciplinary 
proceedings. This can be reinforced by further professionalisation through institutes, which 
would enforce the ethics and discipline of their members. Professional associations would help 
to monitor performance, enforce ethics and train and develop managers professionally. That 
would ensure stability, skills retention and a corruption-free environment. 
In sum, Weberian model of delivery was partly abandoned because of it failures to provide 
services to our people, among other things, during the apartheid era. The model of service 
delivery that came in its place, the NPM, is also not delivering on its promise of infusing 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services. Now we are seeing the resurgence of 
the Weberian model alongside the NPM model which is still in operation. As a result, there is 
an untidy and clumsy use of models of service delivery that contradict each other. For example, 
while the Weberian model insists on qualifications, the short-term contracts flush qualified 
personnel out of the system. It is recommended that short-term contracts should be done away 
with and that there must be a strict separation between politics and administration to exclude 
council in the appointment of senior managers. That would ensure stability. Furthermore, the 
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hard edges of the Weberian model need to be softened by the use of some the NPM elements 
that do not contradict the Weberian model, such as limited open skills recruitment systems. 
The limited use of open skills set is recommended to ensure sideways entry of those competent 
managers lost from the system because of short-term contracts and others with track record of 
performance from other sectors and/or spheres. Furthermore, the performance management 
system is recommended to carry on ensuring that managers are held accountable for their 
actions. Public-private partnerships are, in turn, recommended to mobilise much-needed 
resources from the private sector to rectify the ravages of apartheid. 
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